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Abstract 
 
This study analyses the attitude of the legislator in the United Arab Emirates towards 
capital punishment and its usage. The study examines whether the legislator is moving 
towards abolishing this harsh punishment or is insisting in using it, and in either case asks 
why. This study also examines the reasons for the legislator attitude and whether it has 
been affected by the global trend and the global movement towards abolishing this 
penalty for all crimes, even for those committed in wartime. Further, the study asks 
whether the legislator in the United Arab Emirates follows the Western way of thinking 
in dealing with this punishment or whether it is still connected with its Islamic roots in 
using this punishment. 
An overview of the crimes punished by death in the Islamic Sharia provisions is provided 
in the first three chapters. Chapter 4 provides the background of the formation of the 
UAE and the development of its legal system, clarifying how the system could avoid the 
execution of an innocent person. Chapter 5 deals in depth, and critically, with the details 
of crimes punishable by death according to the punitive laws of the United Arab Emirates 
to examine how far the legislator was justified in deciding such penalty for such crimes. 
Chapter 6 of this study deals with the rights of the defendant facing the death penalty and 
the evidential guarantees provided by the legislator during the interrogation and trial, and 
whether such guarantees would save the life of an innocent person. Then Chapter 7 along 
with chapter 8 examine the differences between Islamic and Western laws in the ways 
they deal with the death penalty and serious crimes. Chapter 9 examines the impact on 
the UAE legislator, at the level of the constitution and punitive laws, of the global trend 
with respect to the death penalty, whether the UAE legislator has been affected and 
influenced by this trend, and the extent of any influence. This study concludes with 
Chapter 10, which discusses recommendations concerning this harsh punishment.      
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Introductory Chapter 
 
Crime is choice, bad choice, in the balance of goodness and evil: the betrayal in 
Paradise, the slaying of Abel by his brother Cain. It increases as we increase now seven 
billion souls on the face of the planet. To survive even our own natures, crime must be 
punished, the harshest crimes by the harshest penalties, that much is evident. But what 
should be the harshest of all penalties, imprisonment until death or death itself? On that 
the world is divided.  
 
This thesis is presented at a university and in a country shaped in a certain way over the 
question of the death penalty. Now approaching fifty years since the last person was 
hanged on British soil, there will be few lawyers, and fewer academics, whose practice 
began before abolition. But the thinking behind this work springs from fourteen hundred 
years of tradition, and not a tradition of superficial customs merely but of religious 
belief, and not a religious belief like so many others, open to every generational wind, 
but one whose integrity may not be dishonored. Islam is our surrender to the Almighty, 
the Qu’ran our recitation. The reader is politely asked to bear this in mind.  
 
Yet if this study was simply a recital it would scarcely be worth writing, much less 
reading. A considerable part of what must be recounted here is an examination of the 
death penalty in sharia (Islamic law) and its practice in Islamic countries. What should 
be apparent is that this is a live issue for Muslims, one requiring us to exercise our 
intellectual resources. It is understandable, perhaps, for non-believers to imagine that all 
things are settled and unchangeable in law that is given to us. But this is over-simple. 
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Religious teaching poses many difficulties that Allah expects us to overcome by finding 
the best solution. Neither mercy nor punishment can be set a side. Benefit is a key 
concept here: how best do we deter the most serious crimes that threaten the security of 
the individual and society as a whole? 
 
Since the writer is from the United Arab Emirates, a state subject to many cultural 
influences from outside the Arab world, we will examine its particular case in relation 
to the death penalty. Does it deal with capital punishment according to the provisions of 
the sharia or is it moving in line with Western thinking? Research on this topic is scarce 
and rather difficult to achieve in the UAE. Academics tend to avoid it as a topic difficult 
for the authorities to discuss. The writer has obtained new information which will be 
presented for the first time in the academic record, especially information related to the 
actual number of executions carried out in the UAE.  
 
Many articles and reports, coming from organisations like Amnesty International, 
simply state that the UAE retains the death penalty. There is a complete absence of 
discussion as to its reasoning or to the current thinking within society. Yet it is essential 
to know how and to what extent capital punishment is implemented by the courts. We 
must also confront the question of error: what ought to be the attitude of the legislature 
to the possibility of executing an innocent person. Can the state itself be culpable and, if 
so, what should be the consequences?  
 
These considerations form the primary task and give the writer reason to believe he can 
make a useful contribution to the field within his own country. Yet they would be 
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inadequate as a thesis without relationship and justification to the largely secular, 
Western world. Here is a quite different context for discussion of the death penalty, one 
that plunges the writer into entirely new questions as to its social meaning and disputed 
value. Why regulations vary so greatly across the world and why there is a powerful 
movement to force uniformity on abolition are issues that involve a great deal of 
research both contemporary and historical. Diverse sources have been used. 
 
The thesis is divided into nine substantive chapters, six domestic and particular to 
Islamic law and the situation within the UAE, three that look outward and consider the 
nature of objections to the death penalty and their impact on Islamic society. The first 
chapters deal with the attitude of sharia to capital punishment. This begins with the 
implementation of the death penalty in relation to divine ordinance crimes. We examine 
the concept of retaliation and the penalties prescribed under Islamic law, and, in the 
following chapter, the discretionary penalties which are the prerogative of the ruler and 
whose exercise is governed by questions of security and the peace of mind of society. 
From this point, we move to consider the penalty as an aspect of punitive legislation 
within the UAE. The origins and evolution of the country’s legal system are examined. 
In the fifth chapter, crimes punishable by death in the UAE are looked at in turn, 
including the narcotics code and the anti-terrorism code issued in 2005. Finally, in this 
section, the legal safeguards for offenders liable to the death penalty in the UAE are 
scrutinised and comparisons made with the disposition of other, similar legislatures. An 
estimate will be given as to the conduct and effectiveness of UAE policy on the death 
penalty. 
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The seventh chapter begins with a discussion of the origins of the abolitionist movement 
in the West. It questions the provenance and durability of this thinking and, in 
particular, the capacity of Human Rights activism in the United Nations and elsewhere 
to understand the rooted objections that stand against it. This is followed by a more 
general enquiry into the meaning of capital punishment and the nature of justice in 
secular society. It finds an extraordinary lack of historical realism and of clarity in 
Western thinking.  
 
The thesis defends the right to uphold the death penalty not on grounds of cultural 
difference merely but as a coherent response to the existential problem of justice. 
Chapter nine deals with the extent of Western influence on UAE legislators. This 
question and others concerning different cultural responses to the death penalty are 
brought together in the conclusion. Here the writer’s opinions and recommendations are 
given in a way that may be of benefit to others. May Allah grant that this work is of 
some value to our legal resources. 
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Methodology 
 
In this thesis, the researcher has used a combination of methodological approaches in 
order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the actual and real use of the death penalty 
in the United Arab Emirates, since the researcher comes from there. 
 
In order to carry out an effective, useful and critical study of the actual situation and the 
reasons for the use of the death penalty in the UAE, and whether this is common, the 
researcher decided to base his primary on an exploration of the penal code (and other 
punitive codes) to discover the extent of the use of the death penalty, as well as to 
analyse statistics gained from the Criminal Investigation Departments and the 
Correctional Institutions. 
 
The position of the researcher as a police officer in the Correctional Institutions in 
Dubai allowed him to gather all the information related to this matter. He has made 
every effort to gather similar information from the other Emirates, but their cooperation 
was generally not forthcoming since in each case this kind of information is rarely 
discussed in public because of the reluctance of government authorities to do so. They 
do not want to attract unpleasant media attention but prefer to deal with this matter in 
their own calm way.      
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A field study was carried out in Dubai, it being a pioneer Emirate with a Western way 
of thinking, more so than the other Emirates in the Union1, which were nevertheless also 
considered in this study. 
 
The researcher interviewed officials connected with the issue. These were judges, public 
prosecutors, lawyers and police officers. The researcher also attempted to carry out a 
survey by questionnaire. However, since only a few people responded initially, it was 
decided that this method was not viable. 
 
The legislation of the UAE has been extensively examined here, specifically the Federal 
Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Anti-narcotic Code, the Anti-terrorism 
Code and the judgments of the Federal Supreme Court. 
 
Library resources were also used widely in this research, especially in relation to the 
Holy Quran and the narratives of the Prophet. Furthermore, mainly Arabic references 
were used when dealing with the punishment in the Islamic sharia and when explaining 
the legal structure of the UAE. English resources were used to clarify the situation in the 
West and wherever they have served the study. There was frequent recourse to Internet 
material, newspaper articles, journal and reports from special listed organizations. A 
broad approach was taken to material in the international debate on capital punishment. 
                                                 
1 In 1963, the forward-thinking Sheikh Rashid Bin Saeed Al-maktoum of Dubai, ruler from 1958 to 1990, 
went to the USA to see how his vision of a Dubai of future might be implemented. He envisaged that 
Dubai could become the main trading centre for the region, and many of the present infra-structure 
projects such the international airport derive from him. To encourage outside investment, and important 
aspect of his policy was to harmonize Islamic and Western legal practices (see Hamza, K,. Sheikh Rashid, 
Close Perspective, UAE Press, 2007, p. 145 & passim).     
 7
Reference is made to the cultural and historical background as well as to current 
publication in Europe and the USA. 
 
Why was this subject chosen? 
In general, the UAE is facing a lack of research concerning penal law in general and the 
death penalty in particular since most of the existing research has been undertaken in the 
West, not in the UAE. It was therefore decided to take the initiative and start this 
research to shed light on the situation in the UAE and to explore the way to enable 
future researchers to continue what it started here. To the writer’s knowledge, the death 
penalty has not been previously researched in the UAE since this subject creates 
embarrassment in some quarters, as it mentioned above, and is generally avoided, 
especially by officials. 
 
Why were the Islamic sharia and Western laws chosen for comparison with the 
UAE? 
As a modern country, the United Arab Emirates from the time of its independence has 
attempted to adopt both the Islamic and Western forms of legislation. As an Islamic 
Arab country it could not adopt entirely Western legislation and as a modern country it 
did not want to adopt fully Islamic sharia. The United Arab Emirates thus provides a 
good example of an attempt to harmonize contrasting laws. The researcher has tried to 
provide a detailed account as an opportunity for others to compare the Islamic Sharia, 
the Western way of thinking regarding the death penalty, and the approach of the 
legislator in the United Arab Emirates. On the other hand, the researcher wished to 
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clarify to what extent the legislator in the UAE has been influenced and affected by the 
Western way of the thinking. 
 
Since the researcher is a full-time police officer, he was unable to expand the research to 
other neighbouring countries. However, some indication of their approach to this issue 
has been provided in the research. Moreover, the researcher attempted to gain more 
statistical data; however, he faced a lack of cooperation in this endeavour. Thus, in this 
research, only realistic statistics were provided and only answers given by people who 
were interviewed and agreed to their names being mentioned are included; answers 
from others who preferred their names not to be mentioned are not included to preserve 
the honesty of this research.     
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Chapter One 
The Death Penalty and Divine Ordinance Crimes 
 
Introduction: 
All divine doctrines, without exception, and the Islamic Sharia in particular, emphasise 
the necessity of the promotion of virtue and security among communities of mankind, 
stressing that such values can never be realized unless the five human necessities, 
namely the safeguarding of the person, his religion, lineage, intellect, and property. 
 
However, maintaining these five essential values cannot be achieved without imposing 
punishments that give individuals the feeling that their lives, property and dignity are 
protected; that attention is given by the legislator to them; and that everybody becomes 
aware that infringement of these necessities is forbidden and constitutes a great danger. 
This is reflected in the punishment stated by Allah, and by the ruler who is responsible 
for the safety and security of society. Although the punishment or threat of punishment 
will not prevent crime, it is supposed that will keep it within acceptable limits which do 
not threaten safety and security, since individuals have the right to live peacefully. 
Perhaps the most severe punishment that may be inflicted upon a person is capital 
punishment, which is the subject matter of this research.  
 
In this thesis, light will be shed on this punishment, which is in accordance with the 
Islamic Sharia as being a divinely ordained punishment, i.e. imposed by Almighty Allah 
on specific categories of crimes. Hence, in the Sharia, this punishment is a divine right 
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that may not be remitted or replaced with another judgement. In light of this, we will 
focus in this chapter on the doctrinal rules of capital punishment. 
 
Before entering into the details of the research, it is important to stress that there are 
many juristic differences that will arise in the course of the discussion. However, the 
opinions mentioned in this regard will be examined according to the four schools of 
faith (religious schools of thought) stressing the Imam Malik2 school of faith. This is the 
official religious faith adopted in the United Arab Emirates. We will consider the other 
three schools of faith, namely those of Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal3, Imam Al-Shaf’ee4 
and Imam Abu Hanifa5. Although there are schools of faith besides these, my discussion 
will essentially focus only on these four as being the best known and most widely 
adopted in Islamic countries. However, other schools of faith may be mentioned as 
opportunity permits.  
 
To make it clear to the reader, it is worthy saying that any Muslim person should follow 
one of the Imams. For example, the majority of the inhabitants of the Arabian 
Peninsula, Sudan and North Africa are followers of the Imam Malik school of faith, 
whereas the majority of the inhabitants of Egypt and Iraq are followers of the Imam 
Abu Hanifa school of faith. Following a specific school of faith is important in order to 
understand the judgment taken in solving a specific disagreement. Yet differences 
between the schools of faith are relatively insignificant in relation to the essence of the 
sharia. The following example may make this clearer; the crime of adultery is 
                                                 
2 Imam Malik Ibn Anas (93- 179 A.H). 
3 Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (164-241 A.H). 
4 Imam mohammad Ibn Edrees Al-Shaf’ee (150-204 A.H). 
5 Imam Al-Noman Ibn Thabit Ibn Al-Noman (80-150 A.H). 
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condemned by all schools of faith but a dispute was raised in respect of whether to 
consider sodomy with a woman as adultery. It is a condition for the crime of adultery 
that the woman is penetrated through the vulva only but not through the buttocks6. What 
is the judgment of the latter act? Thus, examples of such disputes will be given in this 
research as they arise. We will also discuss, with details, any disputed topic related to 
the subject of this research. As for the secondary topics, they will be mentioned briefly 
so that the discussion will focus only on the core and direct subject matter of the 
research.  
 
According to the issues mentioned above, we will clarify here the crimes punished by 
death as mentioned in the Holy Qur’an and for which no pardon can be given except 
under specific conditions, which will be discussed. These crimes are: adultery, armed 
highway robbery, rebellion and apostasy. It must be understood that Islamic sharia is 
different from Western law in one significant way: judgments under Islamic Sharia have 
two main sources, the Holy Qur’an and the Prophetic Sunna – any utterance or deed of 
the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, or His approval of any utterance or deed 
made by others (affirmation). Thus, if Islamic jurists are faced with an issue or Sharia 
judgment, they will examine these two sources. However, if an unambiguous decision is 
not found, the role is given to the third source of Sharia judgments, which is the 
agreement of jurists at a specific time on a specific issue provided that such judgment 
can be derived from either of the two main sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna. Thus, 
unanimity is required to infer a sub-judgment from a major judgment. On the other 
                                                 
6 The three Imans (Malik, Al-shafee and Ibn Hanbal) agreed that the punishment of sodomy with a 
woman is the same punishment of adultery, however, Iman Abu Hanifa said that sodomy deserve the 
same punishment but as a discretionary punishment not a divine ordinance one. (Obada, H., Divine 
ordinance crimes and its rules (Arabic), Jaraem Alhudud wa ahkameha Ahshareia, Dar Alfikr Aljamee, 
2010, pp. 48-49).   
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hand, Western law is man-made and consequently changeable according to time and 
place, which makes punishments under Western law fit society’s requirements. By 
contrast punishments according to Islamic Sharia, such as those prescribed by divine 
ordinance, have been established since they were revealed in the Holy Qur’an and the 
Prophet's Sunna more than 1400 years ago. The nature of the punishments under Islamic 
Sharia will be elaborated later in this thesis. In discussing some issues Qur’anic verses 
and authentic Prophetic sayings (Hadeeth) have been used, as mentioned by famous 
Hadeeth reciters who included in their books only authentic Hadeeth, such as Imam 
Muslim7 , Imam Al-Bukhari8, Al-Tirmithi9 and Abu-Dawood10. 
 
Islam does not ignore the establishment of an integrated punitive system that assures a 
reduction in the phenomenon of crime and its restriction within society. Moreover, the 
goal of this system is not only to punish, it is also to rehabilitate criminals whenever 
possible and prevent others from committing the same crime. Therefore, it protects the 
interests of society, encourages the attainment of a virtuous character and discourages 
antisocial behaviour that can spoil the lives of others. 
 
For this reason, Allah gave the divine ordinance punishments (Al-Hudud) and 
mentioned them in the Holy Qur’an, which was sent to his messenger Mohammad, 
peace be upon him. Islam sees the death penalty as a right of Allah, as in the case of Al-
Hudud, which was stated in the Holy Qur’an and in the Sunna of the Prophet. This is at 
                                                 
7 Abu Al hussain Muslim Ibn Alhajaj Al qushairy Al naisaburi (206-261 A.H) 
8 Mohammed Ibn Ismael Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Al mughaira Al bukhari (194-256 A.H). 
9 Abu-Essa Mohammad Ibn Essa Ibn Sawra Ibn Moosa Al-tirmithi (209-279 A.H) 
10 Abu-Dawood Sulaiman Ibn Al-Asha'ath Ibn Is-haq Al-sejestani (220-285 A.H) 
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variance with the point of view of Western countries which view the penalty merely in 
terms of its utility in crime prevention which is a narrower perspective. The death 
penalty in the Islamic sharia is not only used for this reason: it is here a right of God11. 
The discussion will now consider crimes that fall under Al-Hudud crimes in the Islamic 
Sharia, and the discussion will concentrate on crimes that imply execution, but other 
crimes will be discussed in the context of the research. 
Islamic criminal provisions recognise seven major offences, for each of which a penalty 
has been prescribed in the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammad, peace 
be upon him; these punishments are called Al-Hudud or the fixed punishments12. 
The seven offences are adultery, slander, drinking of alcohol, theft, armed highway 
robbery, rebellion and apostasy. Based on their severity, Allah decided the death penalty 
was appropriate for four crimes due to their cruelty and bad effects, whether on the 
criminal, the wronged person or the society, as will be explained in this research. 
The Al-Hudud punishments in Islamic law were prescribed by Allah in the Holy Qur’an, 
with the exception of one offence, adultery (committed by a married person), for which 
the punishment is prescribed in the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon 
him. 
The reason Islamic law prescribed a punishment for each of these offences needs to be 
explained, as does the reason Islam mentions only these offences to be subject to the 
death penalty. All Muslims know that the main role of Islam is to protect lives, religion, 
                                                 
11 Ibn Aby Baker, Shams Aldeen Aby Abdullah Mohammad Ibn Aby Baker., The saying of Jurists taken 
from the intent of God (Arabic), E’alam Almowaqe’ean An rab Alalmeen (invistegated by Taha 
Abdulraouf Saad), part 1, Maktabat Alkeleyat Alazharia (Cairo), p.114. 
12 Jafar, Ali Mohammed., Punishment philosophy in Islamic sharia (Arabic), Falsafat Al oqoba fi 
Alsharia Alislamea, first edition, 1997, p.47 
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parentage, intellect and property. Hence, Allah and his Prophet Mohammad, peace be 
upon him, specified these offences and left other offences to the authorities to decide the 
punishments suitable for them13. 
 
In respect of this research, there are four offences that come under the Al-Hudud 
category which are subject to the death penalty, and we need to focus on them and to 
clarify whether, according to Islamic law, it is necessary to execute anyone who 
commits one of them and whether there are strict conditions to be fulfilled first before 
the implementation of the penalty. 
 
1.1 Adultery or Fornication 
Divine doctrine states that the wisdom of the Almighty decreed that both man and 
woman should have distinct natures to attract one another and make each have a strong 
desire to bring each into contact with the other, a contact that leads to the fruit of 
reproduction to perpetuate mankind. However, Allah did not leave this issue without 
discipline but ordained marriage and gave the conditions and rules for it. Those who do 
not comply with the rules of Allah and do not take into consideration the rules of 
marriage, follow their desire and fall into Zina (adultery or fornication). The sharia is 
very severe towards those who do not comply and who follow their desire to commit 
Zina. The punishment prescribed by Allah, as He said in Surat (Al-Noor), is that the 
adulterer and adulteress, guilty of adultery or fornication, should be flogged with a 
hundred lashes. This punishment applies to the female and male fornicators who are 
                                                 
13 These are called discretionary punishments, will be examined in Chapter 3.  
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unmarried, but for those who are married the punishment is more severe, as stated in a 
Hadeeth (narrative) of the Messenger of Allah, Mohammad, which is stoning to death14. 
The Islamic sharia is severe towards adulterers and adulteresses who are married to 
restrain their desires and divert their thinking from committing illicit sexual intercourse. 
Hence if, after marriage, they still contemplate this major sin, it proves that the desire is 
for a prohibited enjoyment. The severity of the sharia is to restrain the person and 
prevent the crime. The punishment for adultery is deterrent in its nature: either flogging 
or stoning to death15. 
 
Islam forbids adultery in order to protect lineages from confusion. If adultery is not 
forbidden, then lineages would intermix16 and consequently individuals would not know 
their own lineage leaving such children lost, neglected, and corrupted from the very 
beginning of their lives17. Furthermore, forbidding adultery protects individuals from 
fatal venereal diseases18. In this regard, a Professor of Preventive Medicine in California 
University, Dr. John Piston, said "The evidence gathered from many studies proves that 
venereal diseases mostly stem from sexual intercourse practised outside of marriage 
                                                 
14 Alghamdi, Mohammad., The death penalty (Arabic), Oqobat Aledam, Maktabat Dar Alsalam (KSA), 
1992, p.502 
15 Mansoor, Aly Aly., Hudud Crimes, in ‘The Islamic Criminal Justice system’, M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Editor, Ocean Publications, 1982, p.196 
16 Some people might argue that scientific development and the DNA test could eliminate the confusion 
of lineage intermix. However, it is impossible to take all parents along with their children to the 
laboratory to establish parentage. DNA testing where there is suspicion that a particular child is 
legitimate. Who can prove that every child is the legitimate offspring of his father?.    
17 Abu-zahra, Mohammed. The crime and punishment in Islamic provisions (Arabic), Al-jareema wa Al-
oqoba fr Alsharia Alislamia (Cairo) p.65 
18 Some people might argue that medical advances can cure all diseases. But can we then, for example, 
justify the spread of the HIV virus? Can we be sure that using contraceptives will offer a full protection 
against disease? There are many diseases which lead to permanent sterility (see Faraj, H., Consequences 
of illegal sexual relationship (Arabic), Tawabea alelaqat aljensia alghair shareia, Alwalaa Press, Cairo, 
2006, p. 195)     
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relationships".19 Adultery is also a main reason for youth declining to get married with 
consequent reduction of the birth rate.20 
 
Islam also grants a man the right to marry up to four women at the same time provided 
that he is equitable to them all, and this also serves to restrain his desire. It also gave the 
woman the right to ask for divorce, if she realizes that her husband is not capable of 
satisfying her desire, in order to enable her to marry another man21. However, as the 
sharia is severe in its punishment of adultery, it is also strict in its rules of evidence to 
prove the crime as well, as will be discussed later when dealing with the conditions for 
the punishment to be carried out. 
 
Discussion arises over whether it is better for Muslims who have committed Zina to 
avoid Allah's anger on Judgment Day by confessing the Zina, or to remain silent. There 
was a disagreement amongst Muslim scholars on this issue. Ibn Hazm22 held that it is 
better for the individuals to confess, citing the incident of Ma’iz Ibn Malik Al-Aslami 
and his confession of committing Zina, and also the incident of a woman who confessed 
to the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, whom he ordered to be stoned to death23. 
The other school of thought believes that the guilty party should not reveal himself if 
Allah has covered up his sin. In this context, the same incident of Ma’iz being stoned is 
used to support this opinion because the Messenger of Allah turned his face away from 
                                                 
19 Al-taweel, Nabil Subhi., The Sexual diseases (Arabic), Al-amrad Al-jensia, Mo’asasat Al-risala, p.9 
20 Al-Ghamdi, Mohammad., op.cit.,  p.507 
21 Elahi, Fadhl., Preventing adultery in Islam (Arabic), Altadabeer Alwaqia men Alzina fi Alfiqh Alislami, 
Edarat Turjoman Alislam (Pakistan), First Edition, 1983,p. 213 
22 Imam Aby Mohammad Ali Ibn Saeed Ibn Hazm (384-456 A.H)  
23 cf. The authentic narratives of Al-Bukhari (Arabic), Sahih Al-Bukhari, investigated by Ahmed Zahwa 
and Ahmed Enaya, Dar Alketab Alarabi, Beirut (Lebanon), 2006, p. 440  
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Ma’iz many times when Ma’iz came to him to confess. At the execution, Ma’iz tried to 
run away but people followed him and carried on stoning until he died. Some references 
say that the prophet said “would that you had left him alive, he would have repented and 
God would have been merciful to him”24. This indicates that the Messenger of Allah 
wanted Ma’iz to hide his crime, but when he found him to be insistent in his confession, 
it was not possible to withhold the punishment of being stoning.25 
 
There is no doubt that the second opinion is the more correct one because Allah forgives 
all sins and if the worshipper repents sincerely and returns to his Lord, and promises 
Him that he will not return to his sins. The proof text here is the Hadeeth of the Prophet, 
peace be upon him, stating "any one of you who has committed a forbidden act without 
disclosing the same, his act will remain unrevealed. But if such wrongdoer reveals his 
wrong action, then he will be subject to the ordained punishment.”26 Thus, we find that 
the Islamic sharia is strict concerning proof of Zina and that, because of the severity of 
the punishment for it (death), it safeguards the innocent from being wrongly punished, 
as will be clarified later. 
 
Furthermore, the Islamic sharia permits the adulterer to revoke his or her confession of 
adultery until the date of the execution of the ordained punishment. Such adulterer may 
revoke his or her confession of adultery at any time before the ordained punishment is 
carried out provided that adultery is not proved in a way other than by his or her 
confession such as the testimony of four witnesses to the adultery. This confirms the 
                                                 
24 Doi, Abdur Rahman I., Women in shari’ah (Islamic Law), Ta-Ha Publishers, London, 1989, p.123 
25 Auda, Abdul-Qader., The Islamic criminal legislation, (Arabic) Al-Tashree Aljenaee Al-Islami, part 2, 
Dar Al-ketab Alarabi, p.378 
26 Abu-zahra, Mohammad., op.cit., p.150  
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interpretation that there is a preference for the adulterer not to reveal his adultery.27 
Later we will examine the safeguards in place to avoid imposing capital punishment 
against the adulterer to show the tolerance of the Islamic religion. These prove that 
religion does not impose severe punishments on people without sound justification or 
without examining the actuality of wrongdoings or crimes, and that the most severe 
penalties are only applied when there is no other choice.      
 
1.2 The crime of Al Harabah (armed highway robbery) 
The second crime of Al-Hudud punishable by death is Al Harabah, armed highway 
robbery. This crime has three definitions according to Islamic doctrine: enmity to the 
public, the great burglary, and highway robbery28. 
 
Scholars use all the above terms to express the same meaning, mostly without 
differentiation. The nearest meaning to Al Harabah is armed highway robbery, as it is 
originally extracted from the Arabic word Harb, which means war and this conforms 
clearly to the verses of the Holy Qur’an29. This term covers all types of harm to the 
public other than those included in the other two definitions, because if it is called the 
great burglary it directly gives the impression of taking money from others under threat 
of force of arms, not only on the highway or in open spaces but anywhere. If it is called 
armed highway robbery it also gives the implication of trespassing and preventing the 
                                                 
27 Al-nabrawy, Mohammad Sami., Divine ordinance crime (Arabic), Ahkam Tashrea'at Al-hudud, 
Matba’at gareem (Cairo), p.84 
28 Najeeb, Mostafa Ahmed., in ‘Security and law Gazette’ (Arabic), Mejalat Alamn Wa Alqanon, Dubai 
police college publication, July 2005, p.180 
29 Surat Al-Maeda, verse 33 
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public from making their way in safety, and that it is accompanied by physical or 
financial assault30. 
 
Consequently, the most accurate definition of Al Harabah is ‘A group or an individual 
who waylays on the highway, aiming to prevent members or the public from making 
their way, to steal from and attack or kill them’31. To elaborate further, Al Harabah 
occurs when a group of people, who have strength and force, terrify Muslims by 
attacking their persons or property in the desert, village or town.  
 
The crime may include either of the following cases: to take another’s money by force, 
or to attack the public and prevent them from going on their way freely. These both 
have the condition of the use of weapons or any other instrument capable of causing 
physical injury, or otherwise being threatened, and if they occur in an urban situation 
they have the condition of a lack of help. Furthermore, to be culpable, the offender must 
be above 18 years of age. 
 
As determined by the Islamic sharia, the objective is to safeguard people's blood, 
wealth and honour and to facilitate ways and means for their living, transport and travel. 
The highway robber, disregards these natural rights and prevents people from travelling 
freely by plundering their most precious assets: safety, self-worth, property and honour. 
Thus, highway robbers are fighters against Allah Almighty and His Prophet, and 
                                                 
30 Najeeb, Mostafa Ahmed., op.cit., p.183 
31 Ahmed, Hilali Abdellah., The Islamic criminal legislation (Arabic), Osool Altashree Aljenaee Alislami, 
Dar Alnahda Alarabia (Cairo), 1999,p.188 
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offenders against all Muslims. The Lawgiver has aggregated their punishment, making 
it one of the rights of Allah where no forgiveness is accepted until deterrence and 
inhibition takes place32. 
 
The crime of Al Harabah is proved by evidence and confession in the same way as the 
crime of burglary. Imam Malik stated that the testimony of the robbed against the 
robbers is a proof, and it is also proved by hearing independent testimony33. Imam Al 
Shaf’ee said that the testimony of companions may be considered when they are not 
claiming money related to their escort being robbed34. In cases where the limit for 
accepting the testimony is incomplete, such as where there are not two male witnesses 
or where the robber has declared his guilt but then later renounced his declaration, he 
shall be punished by a discretionary punishment. This is because the relevance of the 
testimony is related to judges’ satisfaction with the evidence on which he must 
adjudicate35. If the judge is not satisfied, the main punishment (Had) is given up and 
discretionary punishment only can be determined. As a supplement to this, if the robber 
declares then withdraws his confession, the Had punishment (death) is given up he is 
only be liable for the rights or property of the robbed36. 
 
A question may arise concerning when the punishment for the crime of Al Harabah can 
be dropped. According to the Islamic sharia provisions, the punishment for Al Harabah 
                                                 
32 Al-jendi, Hosni., The objectives of punishment in Islam (Arabic), Al-maqasid Al-shareia Leloqobat fi 
Al-Islam, First Edition, 2005, Dar Alnahda Alarabia (Cairo), p.230 
33 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., part 2, p.574 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, pp.574-575 
36 Ibid, p.575 
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is dropped following the culprit repentance if he stopped in the act of committing the 
crime of Al Harabah before being discovered, and handed himself over to the police or 
public prosecutors before the authorities were able to arrest him. However, any 
reduction of the punishment because of his repentance shall not prejudice the rights of 
the victims and the state in respect of penalties and legal blood money (diya)37. 
 
The punishment for Al Harabah crimes, as it is stated in the Holy Qur’an: “The 
recompense of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and do mischief 
in the land is only that they shall be killed or crucified or their hands and their feet be 
cut off from opposite sides, or be exiled from the land. That is their disgrace in this 
world, and a great torment is theirs in the Hereafter”38. According to this verse of the 
Qur’an, we need to distinguish between four types of case and specify their 
punishment. The first is when the culprit intimidates people without killing or 
stealing, concerning which Imam Malik said that the ruler or the judge has the right to 
choose either execution or banishment according to the public interest39. The second 
case is when the culprit steals property only. Here, Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Al 
Shaf’ee said that his left hand and his right foot have to be cut off, or the other way 
round, his right hand with his left foot. However, Imam Malik gives the ruler or the 
judge the right to choose a suitable alternative as a discretionary punishment40. In the 
third case, which is when the culprit kills without stealing, Imam Abu Hanifa and 
Imam Al Shaf’ee said that he must be executed by any means. Moreover, Imam Malik 
                                                 
37 Peters, R., Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (Theory and practise from the sixteenth to the twenty-
first century), Cambridge Uni. Press, 2005, p.59 
38 Surat Al-Ma’eda verse 33, 34 
39 Abu-zahra, Mohammad., op.cit., p.116 
40 Abdul-mohsin, Mostafa Mohammad., Islamic criminal legislation (Arabic), Al-Nizam Aljenaee Alislami 
(Al-Oqoba), part 1, Dar Alnahdha Alarabia, 2007, p.901 
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gives the judge the right to crucify the culprit41. In the fourth case, when the culprit 
kills and steals property, Imam Al Shaf’ee and Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal say that he 
must be executed and crucified, whereas Imam Abu Hanifa says that the ruler or the 
judge has the right to choose between executing him by first cutting off his hand and 
foot and then crucifying him, or executing him without crucifixion. Imam Malik said 
that the ruler has the right to choose between executing or executing and crucifying.42. 
 
  1.3 Rebellion (Al Baghi) 
Rebellion is defined by scholars as when a Muslim group, having a leader, forces people 
to stand against the legitimate ruler with the purpose of dismissing him based on a 
certain interpretation of the Islamic rules, and with a clear intention43. In other words, 
rebellion is when a group of Muslims stand against the ruler trying to dismiss in order to 
appoint another. Such people are considered oppressive. Whatever the understanding 
they might have relied upon in their rebellion beyond the explicit meaning of the texts 
which they so as violated, they have no justification. 
 
  When such rebellion occurs, the Muslim ruler and nation must resist such rebellion 
until the rebels change. The purpose of a war against them is to prevent not to kill, and 
that is why an injured person is not be killed, and anyone running away is not be 
pursued. They are not be held liable for any money they might have taken or people 
                                                 
41 Abu-zahra, Mohammad., op.cit., p.117 
42 Al-Ghamdi, Mohammad., op.cit., p. 293 
43 Mansoor, Aly Aly., op.cit., p.197 
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they have killed while they are away under the law of Al hudud. However, any person 
killed among the rebels is considered as having been punished according to the Had44. 
 
The grounds for fighting rebels comes from a verse of the Holy Qur’an: “And if two 
parties or groups among the believers fall to fighting, then make peace between them 
both. But if one of them outrages against the other, then fight you (all) against the one 
which outrages till it conforms to the will of Allah. If it conforms, then make 
reconciliation between them justly, and be fair. Verily, Allah loves those who are 
equitable”45. 
It is clear that the object of fighting is for conciliation between the Muslim parties in 
dispute, and Allah has named them brothers and ordered a reconciliation between them, 
and a lasting justice which is pleasing to Allah and His Prophet, according to the Holy 
Qur’an46. 
During the fighting of the rebels (Al Khawaneh), Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib explained the 
approach of the followers (Al Sahaba) of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him), 
saying “We have three commitments towards you, we shall not forbid you to enter the 
mosques of Allah, and we shall not forbid you from the waters and shadows, and as 
long as your hands are in ours, we shall not start fighting you unless you do so”47. It is 
clear that Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib considers them Muslims. However, if they are out to 
                                                 
44 Ibid, p. 197 
45 Surat Al-Hujurat, verse 9 
46 Amer, Abdul-Aziz. The Discretionary punishment in Islamic sharia (Arabic), Al-Tazir fe Al-Sharia Al-
Islamia, Dar Alfeker AlArabi, p.31 and thereafter. 
47 Al-maqdesi, Ibn Qudama., The sufficient (Arabic), Al-Mughni, investigated by Raed Sabri Ibn Aby 
Alfa, part2, Bait AlAfkar Aldawliya, 2004, p.2163 
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fight against the ruler, then fighting them is only to prevent rather than to punish or kill 
them. 
 
Therefore, scholars have agreed that when the Imam or the ruler is able to stop the 
rebels without fighting, he must do so, but if he cannot then he shall have the right to 
fight them. This is also why the scholars agree that there is no liability for what is 
destroyed by the rebels while they are acting against the ruler, unless they destroy the 
wealth of someone or kill or injure persons not related to the fighting, in which case 
they should be liable for all of that48. 
 
Following the acts of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib concerning betrayals (Al Khawaneh), 
scholars also have no dispute concerning the ruler’s right to call the rebels to return to 
the Muslim group, and obey their Imam. Such judgment is not referred to under crimes 
punishable by had. Judgment on those against whom the crime is proven are liable to 
punishment under the criminal code unless there are mitigating circumstances. This 
would apply to an act of death caused through negligence, for example. 
 
Some scholars are satisfied by these rules which relate to the rebels and state that the 
rebels are not deviants or disbelievers because they dispute according to an 
interpretation they believe to be right, but is in fact wrong. The names of rebels are not 
to be announced publicly or insulted, and if speeches are made insulting them, the 
                                                 
48 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., part 2, p.619 
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judiciary considered this to be based upon an entirely wrong scholarly interpretation49. 
In some schools of faith, if the rebels stand against the Imam due to an injustice, they 
are not considered rebels. It is the duty of the Imam to end such injustice, and the people 
may not support the Imam because that would be considered support for injustice. 
However, people shall not support the rebels either, because that would be supporting 
them to stand against the Imam. Following this opinion, Imam Malik, may Allah bless 
him, said “If the rulers are like Omar Ibn Abdul Aziz, people shall have to support them 
and fight with them, but with regard to others, you leave them to face Allah’s 
revenge”50. Ibn Taimia51 says that under any circumstances Muslims should obey their 
ruler and if they believe that he acts against the Islamic Provisions then it is their duty to 
advise him accordingly52. 
 
The question of rebellion is now a very a challengeable one for all Muslims. In the 
course of this research, the citizens of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and now Syria 
have revolted against their governments, and we have witnessed the toppling of the 
Presidents of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. The critical question here is whether 
such coups constitute the crime of Rebellion proscribed by the Islamic sharia as 
previously defined, or whether these acts could be seen as resisting a state of fear, 
disorder and instability within these societies? In brief, and in light of these 
developments, it is worth giving Dr. Yousif Al karadawi’s53 opinion54. He has pointed 
                                                 
49 Ibid, p.599 
50 Ibid, p.602 
51 Ahmad Ibn Taimia and called The Sheikh of Islam, a famous jurist among late Muslim jurists, died in 
728 A.H.  
52 Ibn Taimia, Ahmad., Fighting the rebels in Islam states (Arabic), Alesyan Almusalah Aw Qital Ahl 
Albaghi fe Dawlat Alislam wa Mawqef Alhakim menho, investigated by Abdul-rahman Omaira, Dar 
Aljeel (Beirut, Lebanon), p.14 and thereafter. 
53 Dr. Yousif Alkaradawi is one of the very well known scholars among Muslims in the modern era. 
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out that it is impermissible to revolt against a fair ruler, whose leadership is found to be 
accepted by the people, and is satisfied with believing in God, the Prophet Mohammed 
and rules according to the Law of God. Thus, a revolt of the people against such a ruler 
requires fighting off and deterring such transgressors until they regain their senses. 
However, he also says that a ruler against whom a forceful revolt is for the benefit of 
public interest, can be permitted, if the ruler is one who is disliked by the majority of 
people for imposing his will, who continues to rule until death, and bequeaths his power 
to his son or another of his choice. This is one who does not rule by the Law of God, 
and under whom people must live in a state of despotism, inequality of opportunities 
and social position. In these circumstances, a necessary revolution cannot be regarded as 
a Rebellion. 
 
Dr. Alkaradawi also adds that in response to those fearing sedition and other problems, 
like widespread instability and the harmful appearance of organized gangs, that such a 
rebellion would not persist for long, since gangs represent only a small fraction of the 
population and cannot intimidate everyone. Inevitably, law and order will prevail and all 
security matters will be soon be addressed properly. People then will live with a better 
ruler who will not repeat the damaging mistakes of his predecessor55. 
 
I believe that the statement made by Dr. Alkaradawi is quite reasonable when it comes 
to considering the kinds of injustice that Arab citizens are subjected to under such 
                                                                                                                                               
54 Dr. Yousif Alkaradawi expressed his opinion in; Alsharia wa Alhayat program, AlJAZEERA 
Television, 11-9-2011  
55 Dr. Yousif Alkaradawi’s opinion was confirmed and agreed totally with by Dr. Mohammed Ali 
Alsabouni, head of Syrian Scholars Association, during; Alsharia wa Alhayat program, ALJAZEERA 
Television, 2-10-2011.  
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oppressive regimes. Leaders of the type referred to apparently believe that hoarding 
almost all the wealth of the nation is their sole right, and this creates a despotic and 
coercive atmosphere in which the vast majority of the people cannot express their 
opinions. Furthermore, they are deprived of basic human rights with improper access to 
health, education, residence and a respectable life, without being able to elect their own 
representatives in a parliamentary system. 
 
1.4. The crime of Apostasy (Al Reda) 
An apostate in the Islamic sharia is one who turns away from Islam, whether he 
embraces another religion or says that he disbelieves in Islam after having once been a 
believer. It is not considered to be apostasy unless committed by someone of a mature 
and sound capacity, who intentionally and wilfully decides to leave Islam.  
 
In capacity, whether by insanity or some other cause, is treated in the following ways. 
The apostasy of the insane or mad person is not considered valid under the crime of 
Alreda because acts of madness are specifically referred to in a speech by Prophet 
Mohammad, peace be upon him: “These are excused, the boy until he becomes of age 
and mature, the person asleep until he awakens, and the insane person until he is 
cured”56. In the case of a drunken man who reneges when he is drunk, it is said that his 
apostasy is only to be considered when he become sober again. If his response is still 
that he insists in disbelieving in Islam he shall be sentenced to death under the law of 
                                                 
56 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., p. 632 
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apostasy57. Moreover, It is also said that his apostasy is not to be considered because he 
is not in a normal state of mind, like that of a person who is asleep58. It is believed that 
the latter is the correct opinion by the majority of jurists, despite there being differences 
among scholars concerning this issue. Where there is doubt, the judicial instinct of a 
Muslim court is always to prefer a merciful interpretation. In the case of a person who is 
compelled to become an atheist, it shall not be considered an apostasy so long as his 
heart is full of belief. This is provided for in the Holy Qur’an: “Whoever disbelieved in 
Allah after his belief, except him who is forced thereto and whose heart is at rest with 
faith; but such as open their chests to disbelief, on them is wrath from Allah, and theirs 
will be a great torment”59. This is also the position taken by the Hadeeth which says that 
“Muslims are forgiven for mistakes, forgetfulness and duress”60. 
 
As regards the will or intention in saying or performing an act of apostasy, scholars state 
that such an act must be intentional. In other words, such a person must know that he is 
committing an act of apostasy but goes ahead and does it anyway61. Thus, apostasy is a 
wilful action. A person who commits any act of apostasy, but who is not aware of it, is 
not liable to the death penalty unless he insists on the apostasy when he is sober and of 
sound mind. 
 
                                                 
57 Ibid, p.633 
58 Ibid. 
59 Surat Al-Nahil, verse 106 
60 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., p.633 
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 29
The Holy Qur’an provides that “Whoever of you turns back from his religion and dies 
as a disbeliever, then his deeds will be lost in this life and in the Hereafter and they will 
be the dwellers of the fire. They will abide therein forever”62. Moreover, the Sunna has 
provided for this, and scholars are unanimous on this question. Imam Al-Bukhari 
reported in his book that Ekrema said:  
“Imam Ali caught all the people who left Islam and ordered them to be burnt, 
and when Imam Ibn Abbass came to know, he said, “if it was me, I would not 
burn them because I heard the prophet say; do no torture people in the way god 
shall, I would kill them in other methods according to the Hadeeth; ‘He who 
changes his religion shall be killed’”63. 
In the above Hadeeth, religion means Islam because if a Jew or Christian embraces 
Islam, he shall not be killed. As for change from one religion to another (other than 
Islam) this is not referred to in this Hadeeth. 
 
The death sentence is a general punishment for men and women, but some scholars 
dispute the killing of women, though all are agreed on the killing of men. Other scholars 
say that there is no difference between men and women in sentencing, due to the 
generality of the Hadeeth: “He who changes his religion is to be killed”, and again in 
the Hadeeth: “No Muslim shall be killed except for three reasons; the married adulterer, 
the murderer and the apostate who turns away from his religion and group”64. 
 
                                                 
62 Surat Al-Baqara, verse 217 
63 Sabeq, Sayed., The Sunna principles (Arabic), Fikeh Al sunna, New Edition, 1998, p.305 
64 Iman Muslim, The authentic narratives of Iman Muslim (Arabic), Sahih Muslim, investigated by 
Mohammad Ahmed Al-Hilali, Maktabat Al-thaqafa Al-deenya, Narrative No.1676, p.435 
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Regarding the condemnation of an apostate, scholars say that he is not to be killed 
unless he is first asked to repent. The meaning here is that a person must be given time 
to repent and to be persuaded of his wrong if he is in any doubt. Scholars rely on the 
Hadeeth in which it is reported by Al-Darqatni that a lady named Umm Marwan 
reneged from Islam, but when the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) came to 
know this, he ordered her repentance and said otherwise she must be killed65. Umm 
Marwan after reflection decided to repent. However, some scholars prefer to rely on the 
saying of the Hadeeth: “He who changes his religion is to be killed”. 
  
Scholars dispute the period required for an acceptable repentance. Imam Malik says that 
it must be at least three days and nights from the date of turning away from Islam, 
because this is the time generally for an excuse to be made. Thereafter, a person should 
be asked to repent promptly or be killed66. It has also been said that there is no precise 
period, because there is always the possibility of repentance, and that Islam is merciful. 
This is the view of the school of faith belonging to the fourth Calif, Imam Ali.67 
 
Since repentance is the desired result to relief the mistaken person of his apostasy, it is 
important to understand how this can be properly achieved. Repentance there is 
according to the level of disbelief. In the case where the apostate disbelieves any of the 
obligatory rules of Islam, he shall repent by saying the Shahadah. But if he disbelieves 
in one of the prophets or does not deny a specific prohibited act, then he must declare 
his repentance at that time by saying the Shahadah: “There is no God but Allah, and 
                                                 
65 Abu-zahra, Mohammad., op.cit., p.130 
66 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., part 2, p.640 
67 Ibid, p.641 
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Mohammad is his Prophet”. Here we need to clarify that apostasy is not only turning 
away from Islam but also occurs when a Muslim denies one of the holy books, one of 
the prophets or rejects one of the methods of Islamic worship. These may be prayer, 
paying the Zakat, or fasting for the month of Ramadan, since in all these cases this is 
considered apostasy without mitigating circumstances68.  
 
Furthermore, he who is not aware of anything prohibited for any reason, such as having 
newly embraced Islam or living in a country other than a Muslim country or in the 
desert, shall not be considered an apostate but shall be taught and preached to. But if 
they continue disbelieving they shall be punished as an apostate. Those who permit a 
prohibited act but believe that it is not prohibited are not be considered apostates but 
transgressors. Consequently, Islamic sharia does not force people to embrace the 
religion but if they do, then they must not for any reasons renege and leave Islam69. 
 
As we have said, Islam does not compel people to belong to its religious community. 
This is provided for in the Holy Qur’an: “There is no compulsion in religion”70. This 
does not involve a contradiction in the attitude towards an apostate, since his 
punishment is for deliberately turning from the religion into which he has been accepted 
and the community of which he is a part. It was reported that one of the Ansar Muslims 
had two sons who were Christians before the mission of the Prophet Mohammad, peace 
be upon him, told them: “I will not leave you until you embrace Islam”. So they went to 
the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, and the father said “Then shall part of me 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Abu-zahra, Mohammad., op.cit., p.71 
70 Surat Al-Baqara, verse 256. 
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go to hell, while I stand watching”71. Then Allah gave them the verse concerning 
compulsion in religion. Islam does not accept that religion is in the hands of people to 
be played with, that is to say to be embraced one day and to be turned away from the 
next. Thus, the lawgiver is wise to permit the repentance of the apostate and to give him 
time to repent. If the apostate has any doubts he should be preached to and convinced. 
But if he does not repent, he shall be considered an apostate who intends rebellion, and 
may intend to create doubts among the poor and illiterate who may think that he has 
good reason to disbelieve. Therefore, it is important to understand that the apostate is a 
danger to the community of Islam, and that his actions must be checked. 
 
At the beginning, people of other religions resorted to conspiracy in the face of the new 
religion of Islam. They ordered their followers to believe in the Prophet, peace be upon 
him, in the morning and to apostatise in the evening. They did this so that they could 
influence simple people in a negative way about Islam72.  
 
Every country has at some time treated separatists, or objectors to the social and 
political order, as outlaws and subject to severe punishments such as deportation, 
imprisonment or an even harsher penalty. They have been considered traitors to their 
country. The apostate, for no acceptable reason, is a separatist from the Islamic group. 
Moreover, he is a dangerous oppressor who will try to hinder the belief of others. He 
disrupts the unity of Muslims by creating doubt in their religion, which is their system 
                                                 
71 Sunan Abu-Dawood, op.cit., p.234 
72 It is stated in the Holy Qur’an: ‘And a party of the people of the scripture said; believe in the morning 
in that which is revealed to the believers, and reject it at the end of the day, so that you may turn back’. 
(Surat Al-Imran, verse 72) 
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of belief, their behaviour, and their social, moral and political order. This is provided for 
in the Hadeeth which states that an apostate is “One who abandons his religion and 
separates from the group”73. 
 
Every act of apostasy may merit the sentence of death in order to rescue people from 
this evil. Other societies are not different. For example, if a person in a communist 
country of the past had objected to communism and called for people to fight against it, 
what would have been the result? It is very likely he would have been killed whether by 
sentence of a court or extra-judicially. Or if a person has objected to a monarch or royal 
rule, calling for change, would he not have suffered imprisonment torture and perhaps 
death? And if now a person in a capitalist country calls for the introduction of 
communism, what is likely to be the reaction? In a country like USA, even if he is not 
punished in some way, he may be thought insane74. Should we therefore be surprised 
that the community of Islam react strongly against the apostate? 
 
The judgment of a sentence of death for the apostate is a matter of divine law. The 
belief and logic of this is stated by Allah in the Holy Qur’an: “The word of Allah 
completed in truth and justice. No one can change these words. And he is the auditor 
and omniscient.” However, there are also interesting opinions rejecting the 
implementation of the death penalty for apostates, since it is said the duty of the Prophet 
                                                 
73 Imam Abu Dawood, The authentic narratives of Imam Abu Dawood (Arabic), Sunan Abi-Dawood, 
investigated by Sedqi Mohammad Jameel, part4, Dar Al-fikr, 2003, Narrative No.4352, p.113 
74 Those writers, actors and film-makers, brought by Senator Joseph McCarthy before the House 
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and the other messengers was only to convey the message, not to compel anyone to 
accept it75. Another opinion says that changing religion is not a crime in itself if it is not 
accompanied by a declaration of war against Islam and Muslims76. In spite of these 
opinions, most jurists and thinkers, even modern ones, based on many authentic 
Hadeeth agree that the apostate deserves the death penalty77.    
 
1.5 Death Sentence Safeguards in Islamic sharia 
The sharia is the first point of reference in the criminal law and it includes the 
safeguards against the imposition of the death penalty just as can be found in 
contemporary, Western criminal law practice. Approximately fourteen centuries ago, it 
laid down general principles with regard to punishment in general and the death 
sentence in particular. These principles represent safeguards for individuals who come 
before the ruler78. The principle of crime and appropriate punishment is one of these 
safeguards which are expressed in contemporary law in the saying “no punishment 
except by the provision of law”. 
It is stated in the Holy Qur’an that Allah Almighty said: “And we never punish until we 
have sent a messenger”79. It is just the same with the penal judicature, as the legal 
authority was established at the very outset of Islam. The Prophet, peace be upon him,  
                                                 
75 Two writers who take this view, see Saeed, Abdulla. & Saeed, Hassan., Freedom of Religion, Apostasy 
and Islam, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, page 69 and passim..  
76 Shama, Mohammed., in ‘Alkhaleej Newspaper’, issue no. 10337, supplement 2, p.1, Aldeen Lelhayat 
supplement, 7-9-2007  
77 The new Egyptian president Mohammad Mursi was asked such a question by a journalist, during his 
presidency campaign. Because he has an Islamic background and fear of Islamic sharia to be 
implemented was a vital thought of people. He said that ‘human beings is free in adopting his belief 
without affecting others beliefs, however, the announcement of apostasy in front of people would not be 
permitted since that will affect their beliefs’.  
78 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., part2, p.629 
79 Surat Al-Israa, verse 15 
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was himself who took up this authority. He also gave the authority to others. For 
example, He sent Muath Ibn Jabal as a Justice into Yemen, as it is know from the 
famous narration of this event. There he was asked to judge between the people, 
according to the provisions of Islam, in fairness and justice80. 
 
After the Prophet’s era, the judiciary became an authority through the appointment of 
specialist judges. The Islamic sharia takes into account the equality principle in 
punishment as penalties are laid down for both the ordinance and the retaliation crimes. 
It is applied to all people without distinction. With regard to the precise nature of the 
penalty, however, this is left to the discretion of the ruler according to circumstances. 
This is not a violation of the principle of the equality before the law, as its very nature 
and purpose is to confront the crimes of the perpetrator when certain crimes, other than 
ordinance and retaliation crimes, are committed. Similarly, Islamic law also takes into 
account the principle of personal responsibility. Its criminal provisions have held 
precedence in laying down the principles for almost fourteen centuries. That is when the 
Almighty said in the Holy Qur’an “No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of 
another”81. 
 
The Islamic sharia lays down special safeguards with regard to the death sentence 
during the trial stage concerning the laws of evidence. These are examined in this 
section to clarify how and why Islamic sharia imposes the death penalty. Very few 
                                                 
80 Abdul-mohsin, Mostafa Mohammad., op.cit., p.935 
81 Surat Al-Ina’am, verse 164 
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people are sent to death according to the crime of divine ordinance since there are 
critical conditions to be met before such a sentence can be implemented. 
 
The Islamic sharia, while requiring the death penalty for a number of crimes pertaining 
to the basic elements of society which could wreck its very structure, has laid down 
important safeguards. These answer the criticism directed towards this penalty by 
contemporary philosophers and jurists who are against this harshest of punishment. In 
particular, there basic thinking rest on the impossibility of reversing an execution. 
Judicial oversight or mistakes can not be rectified over a death sentence that has already 
been carried out. Therefore, there must be safeguards in the rules of evidence and 
procedure which try to prevent oversight and mistakes from occurring. 
 
Rules of evidence have been carefully devised. They vary according to the nature and 
type of each crime, as each crime requires particular forms of evidence which may 
differ from that of another. Punishable crimes in this context specified by the Islamic 
sharia cover: adultery, armed highway robbery, rebellion and apostasy. Among these 
crimes there are some which impose their nature and which call for just one type of 
evidence, and others which require several, as stated in the Islamic sharia provisions. 
We shall refer to each as a separate topic. There is a special rule of evidence laid down 
with regard to retaliation that will discuss later. However, with regard to capital 
punishment, the death penalty is not imposed except for crimes of the very same nature 
as those for which the death sentence is stipulated by the Islamic sharia. The same 
standard of evidence is required for all these divine ordinance crimes. 
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The Islamic sharia has laid down the particular rules in the crime of adultery. These 
concern the admission of the perpetrator, the testimony of witnesses, and inference that 
can be made by the court. A confession by the perpetrator of having committed 
adultery, and admitting his guilt, provides that such an admission is clear and detailed 
and given by a responsible, sane and mature person who is physically able to copulate82. 
However, scholars disagree somewhat over the conditions to be met in the confession. 
For instance, Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal maintain that the 
confession should be made four times83 and that the perpetrator should give testimony 
as a witness in accordance with the Hadeeth of Ma’iz.  
 
The narration of this was made by a Muslim from Buraidah: “Ma’iz came to the 
Prophet, Peace be upon him, and confessed to have committed adultery but he was sent 
back. He came again the next day and again was turned away, and a messenger was sent 
by the Prophet to his people asking if they knew of any problem with his sanity. They 
denied knowing anything about his intellect except that he is one among them. He came 
for a third time and a messenger was sent once again asking about his sanity. He was 
told there was no problem with him or with his intellect. When he came to the Prophet, 
Peace be upon him, for a fourth time he ordered him to be stoned”84. Abu Hurairah 
relates this account in the following way: “A man from Al Aslamin, Ma’iz, came to the 
Prophet, Peace be upon him, when he was in the mosque and said ‘O messenger of 
Allah, I committed adultery’. The Prophet, Peace be upon him, turned his face away 
                                                 
82 Mansoor, Abdul-Malik., Adultery crime (Arabic), Jaremat Al-zina, Dar Alnoor wa Alamal (Cairo), 
1985, p.88 
83 Al-bashar, Abdullah Abu-saif., Proving adultery (Arabic), Torok Thobot Al-zina, undated, p.13 
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from him but he again faced him and said, ‘O Messenger of Allah, I have committed 
adultery’. The Prophet, Peace be upon him, turned his face away from him. But he 
repeated it a total of four times and when he testified for the fourth time the Prophet, 
Peace be upon him, called him and asked: ‘Are you insane?’ He said: ‘No’. Then the 
Prophet, Peace be upon him, said: ‘Are you married?’ He replied ‘Yes’. Then the 
Prophet ordered him to be stoned85. 
 
Although Imam Malik and Imam Al Shaf’ee considered a confession sufficient even if 
it were made only once86, Imam Abu Hanifa and his companions deemed that the 
confession had to be made before a court or before the ruler. However, the majority of 
scholars do not agree with either of these interpretations. If the confessor makes his 
confession in front of four witnesses, he satisfies the rules of evidence for testimony and 
adultery is proved against him. He is therefore liable to punishment unless he changes 
his confession and denies the charge of adultery87. Imam Abu Hanifa has insisted that 
only the perpetrator’s confession in front of the judge is to be accepted, and that a 
confession in front of someone else is to be rejected88. Here we can see why the Imam 
Abu Hanifa was strict in demanding prove of adultery before a court since this involves 
the harshest of punishment, i.e. death. 
 
Islamic sharia provisions pay special attention to the testimony of witnesses in relation 
to their number, and the authority of the judge in accepting the sincerity of their 
                                                 
85 Ibid, p.141 
86 Jabr, Dandal., Adultery (Arabic), Al-zina, maktabat Almanar (Amman, Jordan), First Edition, 1985, 
p.34 
87 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., p.432. 
88 Mansoor, Abdul-malik., op.cit., p. 94  
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testimony, as well as the uniformity of all who have given evidence. It lays down the 
general conditions of testimony to be fulfilled by the witness. He must be sane, an adult 
with good memory and vision, honest and a Muslim. As with evidence related to 
adultery, the number of the prosecution witnesses must not be less than four. This is in 
keeping with the saying of Allah in the Holy Qur’an “And those of your women who 
commit illegal sexual intercourse, take the evidence of four (reliable) witnesses from 
amongst you against them”89. He said also “And those who accuse chaste women, and 
produce not four witnesses (to support their allegations), flog them with eighty 
lashes”90.  
 
The testimony of women is not accepted in adultery according to the majority of jurists 
such as the four Imams previously quoted91. However, it is narrated by Ataa and 
Hammad, the companions of Imam Abu Hanifa, that in a particular case they accepted 
the testimony of three men and two women to prove adultery92. Ibn Hazm deems that it 
is absolutely permissible to accept the testimony of women provided that the testimony 
of one man is acknowledged as being equal to the testimony of two women. Thus, it is 
permissible to accept the testimony of eight women without having one man amongst 
them93. It is also a condition that evidence is based on eye witness and not on the 
citation of another witness. 
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91 Mansoor, Abdul-Malik., op.cit., p.100 
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The holding of a testimony council is also a condition and should the testimony council 
lapse due to delay in testifying, then the testimony of the delaying person shall not be 
accepted and those who gave their testimony are deemed as slanderers if their number is 
less than four. This means that the four witnesses should give their testimony at the 
same time and place. 
 
Furthermore, it is a condition that a long time must not elapse between the occurrence of 
the crime and the testimony of the witnesses. This condition was maintained by Imam 
Abu Hanifa,94 although a different line was taken by Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal. Other 
Imams, such as Al Shafei, Malik and their companions also have their own 
interpretations. However, the opinion of Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal is generally accepted, 
which is that delay in giving the testimony is accepted95. From what has been said 
above, it can clearly be seen that Islamic sharia is strict regarding the crime of adultery, 
even though it does not accept three witnesses to prove this crime, which indicates that 
Islamic sharia is merciful and does not want to condemn people to death without 
accurate evidence that may be almost impossible to obtain. Moreover, upon the 
fulfilment of all of the above terms in the testimony – general or special, even though 
some of them are subject to disagreement – it does not require this punishment. The 
matter is decided in the end by the deliberation of the judge. Witnesses might disagree 
with each other about the precise details of what took place as, for example, in whether 
the male organ was inside the vagina or not. Since punishment depends on the exact 
circumstances of the act, if the witnesses are mistaken or give false evidence they may 
themselves be liable for the harsh punishment of eighty lashes. Their can also, of 
                                                 
94 Mansoor, Abdul-Malik., op.cit., p.101 
95 Al-maqdesi, Ibn Qodama., op.cit., part X, p.187 
 41
course, be variation in testimony with regards to the place and time of the act. This 
might lead to putting doubt into the mind of the judge, and prevent him from imposing 
the most sever punishment96. 
 
We must also consider what inferences are permitted in cases of adultery. What are 
taken to be reliable signs in proving adultery, are, for example, the pregnancy of an 
unmarried woman. A charge of adultery may also be levelled against a woman who 
marries an adolescent before he reaches puberty. In UAE, the age of consent is 
generally to be taken fourteen. If a woman contracts a relationship which renders her 
marriage null and void, or marries an adult and gives birth to a full-grown baby within a 
period of less than six months, an inference of adultery can be made. Pregnancy in it 
self is not a clear indication of adultery; in the contrary, it may be evidence proving the 
opposite. Pregnancy without fornication, which can be the result of either a forcible rape 
or a misunderstanding on the part of the woman, is not considered adultery. These 
positions are maintained by the Imams, such as Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Al Shaf’ee 
and Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal. Thus, in the situation where adultery is not proven 
without pregnancy or where a woman claims that copulation was forced on her, or that 
she did not understand what was happening, then she is not to be punished97. Moreover, 
Imam Malik deems that a woman is liable for punishment if pregnancy occurs, unless 
she can prove that she copulated through misunderstanding or under duress. If she so 
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claims and was known for her chastity before the accusation, then no punishment shall 
fall upon her98. 
Turning to safeguards to other divine ordinance crimes, the nature of the crime of armed 
highway robbery (Al Harabah) calls for the provision of evidence by two methods, 
namely confession and external proof. The confession of a perpetrator or perpetrators to 
having committed the crime of Al Harabah and their insistence on their confession 
before the Council of Judges shall be taken to be strong evidence in proving the 
presence of the elements of Al Harabah. The confession is not permissible unless it is 
explicit, detailed and made by a mature and sane person. The judge is responsible for 
checking the validity of the confession and that it is made by a person not suffering from 
mental illness99. The sharia provisions have laid down these conditions with regard to 
the death sentence for crime of Al Harabah in the manner stated above. It has also 
recognises the validity of recantation by the confessor. 
 
Evidence by means of the testimony of at least two witnesses is sufficient to prove the 
crime against the perpetrator. A quorum cannot be constituted other than by two male, 
reliable witnesses, or by one male and two females. The testimony must be by those 
who have seen, and not merely heard of, the crime and the judge must be convinced and 
satisfied with the testimony. The competence of the judge to asses the evidence may be 
considered as a substantial guarantee for the accused. In cases where there is a 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 
99 Salama, Ma'amom Mohammad. The criminal judge limitation (Arabic), Hedod Saltat Al-qadi Al-
jenaee, Dar Ghareeb Lelteba'aa, p.87 
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contradiction in the testimony of witnesses, the judge can set aside such evidence and 
rule according to his personal understanding and conviction100. 
 
In respect of safeguards for the crime of apostasy, which is to turn away from Islam and 
to forsake it as a religion, or to fail to confirm it either by words or deed, a substantial 
proof is required. Evidence of this crime must be shown by a clear and loud expression 
of turning away from Islam, or by ceasing to confirm it and resolving to remain of that 
mind. These elements, i.e. loud utterance and resolution, represent the material aspects 
of apostasy, yet the person who turns away from Islam should be given a period for 
repentance to think clearly about his crime. He is then asked again and advised of his 
position before the hearing. Elements protecting the accused in the crime of apostasy, 
i.e. loud utterance and resolution after a period set aside for repentance, must be 
satisfied before a sentence of death can be passed. Once again we observe that if the 
apostate person sees he is facing the death penalty, it is likely that he will revert and 
deny his apostasy. This attests the justice and mercy of sharia. 
 
Finally, as we have see the crime of rebellion is established if the elements agreed upon 
by the majority of the jurists are present, which are rebelling against the ruler and the 
intentional use of force against him. The rebels may not be fought against unless they 
are actively fighting against the ruler. The Imam or the leader must not venture to fight 
against them unless he has already warned them in written form and attempted to 
prevent them from continuing with their rebellion. He must also try to find out the 
reason for their unlawful behaviour. This was seen in the case of Imam Ali Ibn Abi 
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Talib with the Khawarij (apostates) at the battle of Al Jamal. In accordance with the 
saying of the Almighty, in the Holy Qur’an, that if two parties among the believers fall 
into a fight, make peace between them, but if one transgresses beyond bounds against 
the other, then you must fight against the one that transgresses until he complies with 
the command of Allah. It is to be noted here that fighting the rebels is not considered a 
punishment but rather a preventative measure to avoid a probable danger to society that 
might lead to disorder and anarchy. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that divine ordinance punishments are predetermined by Allah, 
and as observed, the death penalty is prescribed for four crimes: the adultery of a 
married man or woman, armed highway robbery, rebellion, and apostasy. Allah has 
prohibited adultery to protect lineage and to prevent extra-marital relations, and to 
prevent a person’s honour from being subject to ridicule101. In addition, extra-marital 
relations comprise one of the main reasons for the transmission of highly dangerous 
diseases, such as HIV/AIDS. Allah forbids the crime of highway robbery in order to 
spread peace and safety in society and to permit people to move and travel freely. Allah 
also forbids the crime of rebellion in order to stabilize keep stability in the form of 
legitimate government, and to avoid the appearance of a governor whose actions may be 
                                                 
101 Dr. Abdulbasit Mohammad, a medical analyst at the National Research Centre in Cairo, announced 
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worse than the previous one. To avoid the Islamic religion form being subject to 
ridicule, Allah has shown us the crime of apostasy. A person cannot belong to Islam one 
day and leave the next, if he adheres to Islam it must be from his will and conviction in 
a condition that does not change. It is stated in the verse of the Holy Qur’an: “there is no 
constraint in religion”. But this verse should not be interpreted as meaning an individual 
is free to convert to Islam and then leave it since, as we explained, this must be 
considered as negatively affecting other believers, as will as public morality. The 
apostate is not at liberty to spread chaos through out society.  
 
In this chapter, the conditions have been specified which constitute the manifestation of 
these crimes, and how the criminal may be identified. It has also been shown that it is 
not easy to prove and confirm such crimes, since there are many safeguards in place. 
The Islamic sharia guarantees that the crime of adultery cannot be proved unless the 
perpetrator confesses that he has committed the act and insists on his confession, or that 
there are four witnesses to the crime, which is in practice, extremely difficult to achieve. 
The sharia surrounds the perpetrator of the crime of armed highway robbery with 
safeguards to avoid the implementation of the death penalty against him. 
 
It is essential to understand that the mind of the offender directly affects the attitude of 
the court to his offence in Islamic society. Thus, it is always the case that the law looks 
for the repentance of the wrongdoer before punishment. In this aspect, there is a clear 
deference between a secular society that looks mainly to the facts and consequences of a 
crime, and a God-believing society, that is concerned as much with the spiritual 
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condition of the criminal as with his actions. He is always granted the opportunity to 
repent. Furthermore, the Islamic sharia surrounds the perpetrator of the crime of 
rebellion with safeguards by giving him the opportunity to escape the punishment 
prescribed by the sharia, since the purpose of the law is not to kill but to prevent his 
aggression. In the crime of apostasy, the sharia asserts the importance of giving advise 
and guidance to one who hesitate so that he may be given a period of time to reflect and 
repent and, if at all possible, to come back to Islam. 
 
We may conclude, therefore, that although the Islamic sharia insists upon the death 
penalty, implementation of the divine ordinance punishment is extremely rare102.  This 
refutes those critics who claim that the death penalty is widely used in the Islamic 
countries, for, as we have seen, the standard of proof is very high. Besides, the sharia 
affords protection to the perpetrator with extensive safeguards in order to avoid 
implementation of the death penalty, and the perpetrator is always given the opportunity 
to repent and recant. Islamic sharia encourages the perpetrator to listen to counsel, and 
even to hide his sin, as in cases of adultery. When people came to confess their crimes 
before the Prophet, peace be upon him, he turned his face away. Many times he gave the 
confessor a sign that he should not confess since God would hide his sin. Thus, the 
Prophet, peace be upon him, asked his companions not to carry out the divine ordinance 
punishment where any doubt persisted. This evidence shows that the Islamic sharia is 
forgiving and merciful. In the next chapter, we will discuss the category of punishment 
where the death penalty is prescribed by Allah for the benefit of individuals. This is so 
                                                 
102 It is worth repeating at this point that no death sentence relating to divine ordinance crimes has been 
carried out in the UAE since the formation of the state. 
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they may understand that they have a choice, whether to commit a crime, or to live 
peaceably for the benefit of all society.                     
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Chapter Two 
Retaliation 
Introduction: 
In the introduction to this research, it was pointed out that there are three kinds of 
punishment according to the Islamic sharia: the first is the divine ordinance 
punishment, which is predetermined by the Almighty and no one can prevent the 
implementation of this punishment if the crime is proved against the perpetrator. This 
kind of punishment was discussed in the first chapter. 
 
In relation to the question of death penalty, we will discuss the second type of 
punishment, which is predetermined by God but for the benefit of the individual. This 
kind of punishment is called retaliation. The death penalty as a retaliation is prescribed 
for homicide. In this chapter we will look at the reality of retaliation according to the 
Holy Qur’an and the narratives from the Prophet Mohammad. In addition we will 
review the conditions of its implementation and the conditions that should be met both 
by the murderer and the murdered person, for the death penalty to be implemented as a 
retaliation. 
 
Throughout the discussion we must constantly address the vital question of how it is 
possible to avoid the use of the death penalty, and what substitute punishment can be 
used. We begin with the meaning of retaliation, or Al-Qisas, as it is known in the 
Islamic sharia, and the wisdom behind its concept. 
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2.1 The Meaning of retaliation (Al-Qisas) 
The meaning of Al-Qisas is "fairness". This fits its legal meaning since linguistically it 
gives the sense of equality in general. In the sharia there is an equality or 
proportionality between the crime and the penalty. Also deriving from the linguistic 
meanings of Al-Qisas is the sense of to "trace", as in the idea of tracing or following in 
someone’s tracks103. It also has also the connotation of the "Qisas of the forefathers" 
meaning the stories of our ancestors. There is a relationship between these senses and 
legal definition because, through Al-Qisas, the perpetrator is hunted down. He does not 
escape without a penalty, just as the victim of the crime is not left unable to vent his 
anger. Therefore, Al-Qisas involves the combined concept of the perpetrator receiving 
punishment and the victim of the crime venting his anger104. 
 
Retaliation is a limited penalty with its origin being established in the Holy Book of 
Allah and its further specifications in the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammad. This 
stated many times, as for example when Allah said: "O you who believe! Retaliation is 
prescribed for you in the case of murder, the free for the free, the slave for the slave 
and the female for the female, but whoever is pardoned by his brother (i.e. the 
deceased's guardian) in recognition of something (blood money) then it should be 
adhered to properly and the payment should be given to him with good conduct. This 
is alleviation and a mercy from your Lord. So whoever commits aggression against the 
killer after taking the blood money shall have a painful torment. And in legal 
retaliation (Al-Qisas) there is saving of life for you, O you people of understanding, 
                                                 
103 Cf. Zaho, Ahmad Al-najdi., Homicide in Islamic (Arabic), Alqatl Alamd fe Alfiqh Alislami, Dar 
Alnahdha Alarabia (Cairo), 1991, p.17  
104 Cf. Abdulateef, Mohammad Saeed., Retaliation in Islamic provisions (Arabic), Alqisas Fi Al-sharia 
Alislamia, Maktabat Dar Al-Turath, 1989, p.73 
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that you may become pious"105. 
 
Thus, Al-Qisas is entirely consistent with the punishment of the divine ordinance crime 
(Al-Hudud), since it is also a specified penalty. However, it also differs from Al-Hudud 
since it gives a negotiable right to the individual. What is meant by "a specific penalty" 
is that it is limited in its range, without their being a lower or higher scale within which 
it can vary. What is meant by legal retaliation giving a negotiable right to the 
individual is that the victim of the crime or the victim's relative can grant pardon, if it is 
acceptable to them, and thus, through this pardon, the penalty may be lowered or 
dropped106. 
 
Allah the High made clear that legal retaliation is the law of all the prophets and that it 
is established in all of the divinely revealed laws, since He, the High, said, after relating 
the story of Cain killing his brother Abel through jealousy and envy, "Because of that 
We ordained for the Tribe of Israel that if anyone killed a person not in retaliation of 
murder, or to spread mischief in the land, it would be as if he killed all mankind. And if 
anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind. And indeed, there 
came to them our Messengers with clear proofs"107. 
 
It has been narrated that the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said "No 
Muslim's blood is allowed to be spilled except in one of three cases; the married 
fornicator, a life for a life (the murderer), and the one who commits apostasy from his 
                                                 
105 Surat Al-Baqara, verses 178, 179 
106 Amer, Abdul-Azeez., The discretionay ounishment in Islam (Arabic), Altazir Fi Alsharia Alislamia, 
Third Edition, 1957, p.38 
107 Surat Al-Maeda, verse 32 
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religion by splitting from the Muslims community”. Furthermore, the Prophet, peace 
and blessings be upon him, said "(Killing) with intention implies retaliation, and by 
mistake implies blood-money".108  
 
2.2 The justification of the laws of retaliation 
Retaliation is a penalty that serves to deter crime. Yet if the criminal intentionally 
commits a murder, then he is liable to be punished by a justice that is equivalent to the 
crime. For instance, it is not acceptable for a father to lose his son, and then see the 
murderer coming and going while he, the father, has been deprived of seeing his child. 
Similarly, it is not acceptable that a man who gouges out the eye of another man, can be 
observed the one-eyed victim walking amongst the people. Now, if it is thought that 
gouging out an eye is too severe a punishment, in the same way that it might be claimed 
that to end a life by a legal retaliation is too severe, must it not be said that the crime 
was equally severe, and that the hard hearted criminal should be punished with a penalty 
that is equal to his crime109. 
 
It is not logical that we consider mercy for the perpetrator and do not consider the pain 
of the victim or his relatives. Compassion must be for those who suffer and not just for 
those who cause suffering. How can one put it better than the Prophet, peace and 
blessings be upon him, when he said regarding this issue, "He who does not have 
mercy will not be treated with mercy"110.  
 
Furthermore, legal retaliation causes the perpetrator to realise that the penalty that 
                                                 
108 Saheeh Aljame'a, part 4, p. 62, see also; Ahmad Alnajdi Zaho., op.cit., p.22-23  
109 Ibn Aby Baker, Shams Aldeen Aby Abdullah Mohammd., op.cit., p.115 
110 Sahih Al-Bukhari, op.cit., Narrative No. 5997 
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awaits him is the same as the action which he intends to commit. This must have the 
effect of causing him to feel less certain of his action, since he knows that there will be 
no escape from the penalty, and that to flee will make him a constant fugitive always 
hunted by the police as well as by the family or the guardian of the victim. If this 
deterrence is strong enough it may prevent him from committing the crime, but if he 
does go on to commit it, and the penalty comes to him, then he must accept his 
punishment with a conviction in the fairness of the ruler’s justice. This is in 
consequence of his condition as a Muslim. He cannot justify rebellion against Allah’s 
law, since He is the most just of judges, and this is a penalty earned by his own hands. 
 
At the same time, retaliation vents the anger of the relatives of the victim of the crime. 
This is unlikely to be achieved simply through the imprisonment of the wrongdoer, 
however long his sentence might be. If the victims are denied a direct sense of 
relationship to the person who has committed an offence against them, they will rarely 
feel that he suffers a real penalty for his actions. Thus, the relatives of the deceased in a 
case of murder must gain direct authority over the murderer’s life, whether to grant a 
limited pardon or to pursue him through the retaliation of Al-Qisas111. 
 
In retaliation lies the life of society, which should be a fine respected and calm life, 
since it tears out evil by its roots. Because of this Allah, the Exalted and High, said 
“And in retaliation (Al-Qisas) there is saving of life for you”112. In the same way, He 
says that to spare a life through legal retaliation has life in it for the whole society. If 
there were no legal retaliation, blood would be spilled and the matter would be in the 
                                                 
111 Cf. Sanad, Najati., The Theory Of Crime and Criminal Responsibility in Islam: Shari’a, The 
University of Illinois at Chicago (International Criminal Justice Office), USA, p.62 
112 Surat Al-Baqara, verse 179 
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hands of the strong and powerful only. There would be no comfort for those who should 
have the right to choose the punishment of wrongdoers, and only the shrewd and corrupt 
would have the power to judge, bringing chaos to society. The life of the community is 
not to be found in the life of a scattered and disputatious people, in which have removed 
the rights of the weak, and where revenge alone takes the place of the law. Rather, the 
life of society is healthy and united only through mutual love and the exercise of mercy 
in justice. This is not possible without a retaliation which equates the penalty with the 
crime, so that the penalty is appropriate and proportionate to the crime even to the 
highest degree. 
 
2.3 Conditions for the implementation of the laws of retaliation (Al-Qisas) 
There are some conditions that relate to the crime, which may be murder, some that 
relate to the perpetrator, and others that relate to the victim. Before explaining the 
conditions of homicide, a definition must be given of the various categories of a murder. 
Murder is an action in which one person causes another life of a human being to cease, 
since if it ceases without such an action it is called death. Following this, we can say 
that there are three types of murder which depend on whether the action is intentional, 
half-intentional or a mistake. These are outlined as follows. 
 
Intentional murder is one of the crimes for which the Legislator (Allah) has required 
legal retaliation without controversy. Intentional murder is when a responsible person, 
being of a sound mind, pursues the killing of a human being, whose blood is inviolable, 
yet knowing that he is most likely to be killed for his action in retribution113. By this 
                                                 
113 Abdulatif, Mohammad Saeed., op.cit.,  p.24 
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definition it is understood that the crime of intentional murder cannot occur unless 
certain principles are fulfilled. 
 
The first of these is that the murderer is sane, mature, and willed the murder. As to 
sanity and maturity, it is found in the Hadeeth of Ali, may Allah honour his face, that 
the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said “the pen has been lifted from three 
types of people; the insane until he becomes sane, the sleeper until he wakes up, and the 
child until he becomes mature”114. As to the intention, it is said in the Hadeeth of Abu 
Hurairah, may Allah be pleased with him, “A man was murdered in the time of the 
Prophet, may Peace and Blessings be upon him, where the matter was brought to him 
and he referred it to the relative of the deceased. But the murderer said: “By Allah, I did 
not intend to kill him! So the Prophet, peace be upon him, said: ‘Verily if he is truthful 
and yet you kill him, you will enter the hellfire’. So the man was exempted”115. 
 
Also, Abu-Dawood relates how the Messenger of Allah, may Allah's peace and 
blessings be upon him, said "With intention (in killing) there is to be retaliation, except 
if the relative of the deceased grants pardon"116. Ibn Majah narrated that the Prophet, 
peace and blessings be upon him, said "Whoever kills intentionally then retaliation is to 
be made, and whoever prevents it then he has the curse of Allah, His angels, and all 
people upon him, Allah will not accept from him any barter or fairness”117. 
 
                                                 
114 Imam Abu-dawood, opp.cit., part4, Narrative No.4401, p.131. 
115 Narrated by Imam Abu-dawood and Imam Al-tirmithee 
116 Cf. Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., p.574 
117 Ibid. 
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The second principle is that the method used in an unlawful killing is a method that is 
liable to cause death, and there is no other condition than that it should normally cause 
death. This may be a specific method or a general one, since both eliminate life. 
Examples of methods that may be used are killing by fire, drowning in water, throwing 
from a high place, crushing by pushing down a wall, by strangling, by starving through 
prevention of food and water, or exposing to a predatory animal. These are methods 
likely to cause death. In addition, a killing may be made by the poisoning of food given 
to someone who does not suspect that it has been poisoned. If this person dies, then the 
poisoner is subject to retaliation under the condition of intentional murder. 
 
The third principle is that the deceased must be a human being whose blood is held to 
be legally inviolable, i.e. his blood cannot lawfully be spilled. 
 
Unless all this three conditions are met, a killing is not considered intentional. It may 
be, however, considered semi or half-intentional. This when a responsible person kills 
a human being, whose blood is inviolable, in a way that would not normally cause 
death. An example might be beating a person lightly or with a small stick, or hitting 
someone with a small stone, in such a way that did in fact cause his death. This is 
legally defined as a semi-intentional murder, regardless of whether the blow was to a 
vital part of the body, or whether the victim was small or sick and likely to die from 
such a blow, or was strong and yet the aggressor continued with the blows until he 
died. It is called semi-intentional because the murder falls between an intention and a 
mistake, since the blow was intentional but the death was unintended118. It is therefore 
                                                 
118 Al-maqdesi, Ibn Qodama., op.cit., part 2, p.2024 
 56
neither completely intentional nor completely a mistake. If the crime is not fully 
intentional, retaliation does not apply because at the foundation of the law is the 
principle of avoiding bloodshed, and this cannot be permitted without a clear evidence 
of intention. On the other hand, since it is also not completely a mistake, due to the 
blow being intentional, a mandatory and severe amount of blood money must be paid 
to the family of the victim. Al-Daraqutnee relates the authority of Ibn 'Abbas, may 
Allah be pleased with them both, that the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be 
upon him, said: "retaliation is obligatory only in the case of intention and in the case of 
a mistake there is blood-money and no retaliation, but whoever kills unknowingly with 
a stone or a stick then severe blood-money should be paid"119.  
  
It has been reported by Ahmed and Abu Dawod on the authority of 'Amr Ibn Shu'aib 
from his father, and from his grandfather, that the Prophet, may peace be upon him, 
said: "The blood-money of semi-intentional killing is a severe one, like that of intention. 
But the one who commits it is not killed”. Ahmed, Abu-Dawood and Al-Nasa'ee 
reported that the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, spoke on the 
day of the conquest of Mecca, saying “Verily he who is murdered by mistake was still 
intended by the whip, the stick and the stone”120. 
 
Sometimes a human being pursues an action that is allowable in itself but which fails to 
take the care and precaution that is legally required. He sets caution aside and happens 
to kill someone without wanting to do so. This is called "murder by mistake". 
 
                                                 
119 Al-maqdesi, Ibn Qodama., op.cit., part2, p. 2076, Ibn Qodama said that the prophet made a severe 
legal blood money for this case and equal it with the intentional murder which is one Hundred camels. 
120 Sabiq, Sayed., op.cit., p.345 
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Murder by mistake is divided into three types. The first relates to a mistaken action. An 
example might be when a person aiming his rifle at a bird misses the target and hits 
someone standing near the bird. The Pellets that have struck this person were fired by 
the person responsible for the death, and it cannot be disputed that he has carried out 
this action. However, the death caused was not intended by him, and is thus classified as 
a mistaken action.  
 
The second type is of a mistaken intent. Examples might be when a weapon is fired at a 
person on the assumption that he is a legitimate target as in an act of war, or at a Muslim 
assumed to belong to an enemy force, and such a person is killed. Here, the mistake is 
not in the action of the perpetrator, since he aimed at a target which he intended to hit, 
and did actually hit it; rather, it is a mistake that lies in the assumption or belief of the 
perpetrator. This, therefore, is described as mistaken intent. 
 
Additionally, there is a third case, springing from the two previous ones, which is a 
mistake in both the action and the intention. An example might be where the 
perpetrator fires in the direction of another person, believing him to be a legitimate 
target, but instead hits a third party. In this case, the mistake is indeed in the action, 
since the shot missed the original target intended by the offender, but also in the 
intention since the perpetrator aimed his weapon at a human being that he thought was 
a legitimate target. This kind of murder is not liable to retaliation because there was 
not intent, but blood money and expiation121 are obligatory. Furthermore, the 
perpetrator is forbidden to inherit from the victim, had he been entitled to such an 
                                                 
121 Fasting for 60 days continuously or freeing a slave. 
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inheritance or mention in his will122. This category of murder is based on Allah the 
High’s statement: "And never is it for a believer to kill a believer except by mistake, 
and whoever kills a believer by mistake then freeing of a believing slave and a blood-
money should be presented to his family unless they give up their right as charity. But 
if the deceased is from a people at war with you and he is from a people with whom 
you have a treaty then blood-money should be presented to his family and the freeing 
of a believing slave is obligatory. And whoever does not find one or can not afford to 
buy one, then instead a fast for two months consecutively, seeking acceptance of 
repentance from Allah. And Allah is ever knowing and Wise."123 
 
It is clear from this discussion that retaliation is under the law of AlQisas is only due in 
cases of intentional murder. In the case of semi-intentional murder or murder by 
mistake, blood money, and the freeing of a slave or fasting for sixty days, are 
obligatory. It should be stated that slavery no longer exists in Muslim state like the 
United Arab Emirates. Therefore, Muslims follow the specification of the sharia which 
is to give another option, a fasting for sixty days.  
 
With regard to the murderer, the sharia requires that we also speak of the conditions 
affecting him and, in order to clarify these conditions, we must attend to the Muslim 
scholars of Fiqh. They agree that the following conditions must be fulfilled with respect 
to allowable retaliation against the murderer. 
 
                                                 
122 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., p.588 
123 Surat Alnisa’a, verse 92, See also Abu-yahia, Mohammed Hassan., Retaliation in souls in Islam 
(Arabic), Alqisas Fi Alnofos Fi Al-sharia Alislamia, First Edition, Almaktab Alislami- Dar Ammar, 1989, 
p.31  
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The adult male is measured by his sexual maturity, and the adult female by her 
menstruation, which for most individuals is around fifteen years of age. Thus, if the 
perpetrator is too young or not of a sound mind, there can be no retaliation against him 
or her. The same restriction applies to cases of sudden or temporary insanity, as well as 
to individuals were a sleep or unconscious. 
 
The justification for this is given in what Aisha, may Allah be pleased with her, narrated 
from the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him: "The pen is lifted from 
the sleeper until he wakes up, from the one afflicted with madness until he becomes 
cured, and from the child until he becomes mature”.124 Thus, the Hadeeth indicates that 
the lifting of the pen means the lifting of responsibility, and the lifting of responsibility 
prevents punishment and reprimand; as such, retaliation is not obligatory125. 
 
Turning now to the perpetrator who is deemed to have free choice, a murderer is 
someone who intends to commit homicide. Thus, if a person of power forces someone 
to commit a murder, and this turning results in the killing of a human being, the 
instigator must be punished a capital offence, and not the person who has been forced. 
The direct perpetrator of the crime is this case is punished with a discretionary sentence. 
This was the opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa, and is one of the two opinions of Imam Al-
Shaf’ee. The Hanafee or the followers of Imam Abu Hanifa say that if someone is 
forced to destroy a Muslim's property by having been given an order, which mean that 
he fears for his life, then it is allowed for him to commit that act126. However, some 
                                                 
124 Narrated by Imam Abu-dawood. 
125 Shoman, Abbas., Person and property protection in Islam (Arabic), Esmat Al-dam Wa Al-mal fi Al-fiqh 
Al-islam, Dar Al-bayan (Cairo), 1996, p.342 
126 Ibid, p.352 
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scholars believe that only the one who has been compelled should be killed and not the 
one who forced him. This is the other opinion of Al-Shaf’ee127. Again, others, among 
them Imam Malik and Imam Ibn Hanbal, say that they should both be killed unless the 
victim’s relatives grant a pardon. According to this view, if pardon is granted then blood 
money is obligatory, since the murderer has intended to save himself by killing someone 
else, and the same logic applies to the one who forced him128. If a responsible person 
commands a non-responsible person, such as a child or an insane person, to kill 
someone else then retaliation falls on the person giving the command, since the one who 
performed the murder is only like a tool in his hand. Therefore, Al-Qisas is not imposed 
on him; rather, it falls on the one who caused it129. Furthermore, if a ruler commands the 
death of someone in rebellion then either the commanded man knows that it was 
rebellion, or he does not know. If he knows that it was, yet carries out the command, 
then Qisas must fall on him. The victim's relative may grant pardon, but blood money is 
obligatory since the man pursued the killing in the knowledge that it was rebellion. He 
cannot be excused on the grounds that he acted against the legitimate ruler. This is in 
accordance with the Islamic principle which says that there is no obedience to the 
creation that is in disobedience to the Creator, as stated by the Messenger of Allah, may 
Allah's peace and blessings be upon him130. However, if the offender is unaware that the 
victim did not deserve to be killed, there is still to be retaliation unless the relative 
grants pardon or blood money. This is exacted from the one who commanded the killing 
and not his agent. The agent acting for the ruler out of obligation to obey his lord, would 
otherwise constitute a disobedience to Allah. If someone gives a murder weapon to 
                                                 
127 Ibid, p.353 
128 Ibid, p.354 
129 Cf. Al-maqdesi, Ibn Qudama., op.cit., part 2, p.2037 
130 Ibid, p.2075 
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another person yet does not order him to kill, this does not imply any fault on the part of 
giver131. 
   
There is a further condition attaching to the murderer who is subject to retaliation but 
made inviolable through belief, custody or indemnity. What is meant here is specific 
protection different to the protection of the deceased which decrees that his blood 
cannot be spilt without just cause. Through this, the Muslim, the non-Muslim in 
custody, and the non-Muslim in indemnity, are all subject to Qisas if they kill someone 
of the same or a higher status, since they are all inviolable through Islam or a covenant 
of protection or safety. This applies to the Muslim who commits a violation that causes 
his blood to be shed in vain, either through apostasy, extra-marital fornication or by 
taking a life without justification. This is in accordance with the Hadeeth: "No Muslim 
person's blood is permitted (to be spilled) except in one of three cases; the married 
fornicator, and a life for a life, and he who apostates from his religion through leaving 
the community of the Muslim nation”132. All of the above-mentioned people are subject 
to retaliation if they kill someone of an equal or higher status, unless the relatives of the 
victim grant pardon from retribution. If pardon is granted, then legal retaliation shall be 
waived and blood money from the accused is obligatory. On the other hand, in the case 
of the killer being among forces of the enemy, then he is not killed under laws of 
retaliation. Rather, he is killed because he is spilling blood in vain. What is meant by his 
execution not being a legal retaliation is that if he is to kill while fighting and yet cannot 
be caught until he becomes a Muslim, then his blood is inviolable, because Islam 
                                                 
131 Sabiq, Sayed., op.cit., p.378 
132 Imam Al-Bukhari, Sahih Al-Bukhari, Narrative No.6878, p.1389 
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expiates him from whatever he has done before133. 
There is no legal retaliation for a father who kills his son or his grandson. Al Tirmithi, 
writing on the authority of Ibn Omar, may Allah be pleased with him, that the 
Prophet, may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, said “A father is never killed 
for (killing) his son"134. This is distinct from when a son kills one of his parents, since 
in that case he is subject to capital punishment without controversy. The explanation 
for this is that parents are the cause of their son's existence, and therefore the son must 
not be the cause of his parent’s death. If he does kill one of his parents, the son is 
subject to legal retaliation135.  
 
Whoever is in ignorance of the prohibition of murder, such as someone who is new to 
Islam, or in ignorance of the protection of the victim as, for example, a person who 
shoots a Muslim in a non-Muslim area of war assuming that he is of the enemy forces, 
then he is not subject to retaliation. This is because retaliation should avoid situations of 
doubt, and the murderer’s ignorance of the prohibition of murder, or his ignorance of 
the protection of the victim, constitutes a situation of doubt. However, if he shoots 
someone whom he believes to be of the enemy forces in an Islamic country and thereby 
kills a Muslim, then he is subject to legal retaliation, for whoever is present in an 
Islamic land has his blood protected, as opposed to the person who is in a non-Islamic 
land where such killing is allowed136. Thus, a claim of ignorance, as described here, is 
not accepted from someone who grew up amongst Muslims even if he swore to that 
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ignorance. The apparent situation denies the possibility of his ignorance since the 
prohibition of murder is universally known. If the person said that he knew that his 
action was prohibited but did not know that it entailed retaliation, then he is still to be 
killed, since if he was aware of its prohibition, he is obliged to abstain from it137.  
 
Regarding the condition that must fulfilled in respect of the victim, the protection, or Al-
'Ismah, comprises prevention and preservation. The protection of the victim is that he is 
protected from murder and deserving that his blood should not be spilt. This protection 
involves one of three things, as follows. Islamic protection is established in both the 
Holy Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammad. There is consensus that a 
Muslim is protected as long as he does not commit a crime that causes his blood to be 
spilt, i.e., apostasy, fornication after marriage, or taking a life without a life having been 
taken. The evidence for this is in the Holy Qur’an: "and whosoever kills a believer 
intentionally, his recompense is Hell to abide therein..."138 and in the Sunna: “I have 
been commanded to fight against the people until they believe that there is none worthy 
of worship except Allah, so if they say it then their blood and wealth has been protected 
against me”139 and “No Muslim's blood is permitted (to be spilled) except in one of 
three cases: The extra-marital fornicator, and a life for a life, and he who apostates from 
his religion through leaving the community of the Muslim nation”. These statements 
demonstrate that a part from those exclusions mentioned, everybody has a fundamental 
protection through Islam140. 
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The people of the ancient Holy Books have a covenant of protection, and a treaty with 
any leader of a Muslim state, who reside in the land of Islam and enjoy its nationality 
and its security. Accordingly, what is for them is for us, and what is against them is 
against us, regarding rights and obligations. Thus, their wealth and their blood become 
inviolable in regard to whoever acts in a hostile way towards them. They are protected 
through the Jizyah, or tribute, that they pay, and by abiding lawfully according to the 
tenets of the Islamic sharia. They are also protected by defending the sanctity of the 
Muslims, and his wealth and blood, and by not committing any crimes which might 
invalidate this covenant of protection. This ruling is based on His, the High's, statement: 
"Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the day after and who do not consider 
unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the 
religion of truth [i.e., Islam] from those who were given the Scripture (Jews and 
Christians), until they pay the Jizyah with willing submission, and feel themselves 
subdued”141. This protection occurs even to the extent that, if they give the Jizyah142 and 
make a pact with the leader to do that, then their blood and wealth are protected. 
 
There is an additional covenant of safety for an individual of the enemy force who 
enters the land of Islam under the protection of the ruler and the Muslim people. 
However, it extends only to their period of visiting the land of Islam, whether to visit 
family, or to undertake some business. At the end of this time, they return to the status 
of being part of an enemy force. This protection is taken from His, the Most High's, 
statement: "And if anyone of the Polytheists seeks your protection, then grant him 
                                                 
141 Surat Al-Tawba, verse 29 
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exist anymore. 
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protection so that he may hear the words of Allah [i.e., the Qur'an], and then escort him 
to where he can be secure, that is because they are a people who do not know."143 
 
For retaliation to be imposed on the perpetrator, a victim must be equal to the 
perpetrator in blood status. This difference between people depends on one of four 
criteria: the status of a person’s religion with respect to Islam; whether the person is a 
free man or a slave; whether the person is male or female; and whether it concerns one 
individual or a group of individuals. 
 
It is agreed that if the deceased is equal to the murderer in any of these four criteria, 
then legal retaliation is obligatory. But if they differ in one or more aspects, there is 
some dispute between the Scholars of Fiqh in regard to the treatment of the perpetrator. 
This requires some detail to clarify the issue for the reader. The first situation might be 
the killing by a free man of a slave. In this case, the Scholars Imam Malik, Al-Shaf’ee 
and Ibn Hanbal have said that the free man is not to suffer retaliation by being killed for 
a slave, irrespective of whether it is his own slave or someone else's144. However, Imam 
Abu Hanifa and his companions said that the free man’s life may be forfeit for a slave, 
unless it is his own145. The evidence of the first group (Malik, Al-Shaf’ee, Ibn Hanbal 
and those with them) is found in a statement by Him, The High: "Legal retaliation is 
prescribed for you in the case of murder - the free for the free, the slave for the 
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slave”146. The point of this verse is in its categorizations and classification, i.e. that 
retaliation is prescribed for the free when he kills the free, and for the slave when he 
kills the slave. Therefore, if a free man murders a slave he should not be killed for him. 
This opinion is supported by Ibn Shaybah, when he relates that the Prophet, may Allah's 
peace and blessings be upon him, said that a Muslim should not be killed for someone 
bound by treaty, nor a free man for a slave147. Moreover, Al-Daraqutnee has shown in 
the links between the teachings of Isma'el Ibn 'Ayash from Al-Awzaa'ee, from 'Amr Ibn 
Shu'aib from his father, on the authority of his grandfather, the case of a man who 
murdered his slave intentionally. So the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be 
upon him, lashed him and banished him for a year, and denied him his share from 
among the Muslims and did not retaliate on behalf of him (the slave) but ordered him to 
free a slave148. A further evidence is that Abu Baker and 'Omar, may Allah be pleased 
with them, did not kill the free man for a slave among the Companions, and they were 
not criticised though they were among those most God-fearing149. Furthermore, it is 
agreed by every commentator that there is no legal retaliation for physical injury or 
impairment whether to the free or the slave in the case of injury, and therefore that 
murder cases should follow the same pattern150. 
 
On the other hand and in response to this, it is said that such an agreement is nullified 
through what has been written by Ibn Abi Layla, according to whom there is no 
difference between the free and the slave with respect to a right to the sanctity of his life 
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and protection of his person. In addition, there is the evidence from the second party 
(Imam Abu Hanifa and his companions) which concerns the interpretation of what is 
meant when the High says "O you who believe! Legal retaliation is prescribed for you 
in the case of murder." The evidence which is inferred here is that the verse gives a 
general indication that whoever takes a life should be killed for it. Moreover, this 
opinion also relies on evidence from the Sunna when the Messenger of Allah, may 
Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, said “Muslims are equal in blood, and the 
lowest among them strives for their protection, and a Muslim is not killed for a 
disbeliever (Kafir)"151. The point of the evidence here is that there is no distinction 
between the free man and the slave. Thus, the Hadeeth indicates that retaliation is to be 
imposed both for the free man and the slaves when it pertains to the sanctity of life152. 
Furthermore, Hassan from Samurah related that the Prophet, may Allah's peace and 
blessings be upon him, said "He who murders his slave will be killed, and he who 
injures him will face amputation”.153  
 
In the case of the killing of a non-Muslim, a Thimmee, being a free person living under 
Muslim rule, who may be a Jew or a Christian, scholars have differed on the issue. This 
has resulted in three distinct opinions. One is that the Muslim is not to be killed for a 
Thimmee. Among these are Al-Shaf’ee, Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and a group of others154. 
Others say that he should indeed be killed, and among these are Abu Hanifa and his 
companions155. The third opinion is that of Imam Malik, who said that a Muslim is not 
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killed for a Thimmee except if he has assassinated him156. The first party, known as the 
"Greater Scholars", used the following statement from the Holy Qur’an as evidence to 
support their views: "the free for the free, the slave for the slave and the female for the 
female”157. In this opinion, comparing the free with the free, the slave with the slave, 
and the female with the female, prevents a free man from being killed for a slave, etc. 
Furthermore, He, the High, has stated "And never will Allah grant to the disbelievers a 
way to triumph over the believers”158. Hence, to refuse equality to the disbelievers 
necessitates the prohibition of their right also to legal retaliation. Thus, if it is argued 
that they will not have equality with them, this is answered in two ways. Firstly, it is to 
be understood generally since the wording is general. Second, we already know from 
other verses that non-believers do not have equality with believers, and this is according 
to clear evidence and proof, and therefore it is not valid to interpret this saying with 
meanings that are derived from other verses159. 
 
In contrast, the evidence cited by the second party, namely Abu Hanifa and his 
companions, is from the Holy Qur’an containing the following statements by the High: 
“O you who believe! Legal retaliation is prescribed for you in the case of murder”160, 
"And we ordained for them therein a life for a life"161. The point of the evidence in these 
verses is that they refer to both deceased. There is here no difference made between a 
free man and a slave, or between a Muslim and a Thimmee. This second party also cites 
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from the Sunna the following statement of Allah's Messenger, may Allah's peace and 
blessings be upon him: "[For killing] with intent there is retaliation, unless the relatives 
accept the blood-money"162. The general meaning in this Hadeeth refers to both of the 
deceased. There is again no difference between a free man and a slave, or between a 
Muslim and a Thimmee. Moreover, it was narrated on the authority of 'Abdul-Rahman 
al-Baylamani that the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, killed a 
Muslim for a non-Muslim who was protected by treaty, and then said: "I am the noblest 
of those who fulfil their protection"163. It is also narrated that Abu Musa al-Ash'ary 
wrote to Omar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, to ask him about a 
Muslim who murdered a Christian. He replied that he should retaliate on his behalf164. 
 
Consideration of the evidence of both parties, we might say that a difference of 
opinions shows the mercy of God, since the believer is thereby able to choose 
whichever interpretation he finds is appropriate to the situation. Islam calls upon us to 
find the way that is the least harmful or damaging to our life on this Earth. Due to the 
distinctions made by the two parties, that is to say the evidences and the opinions of 
both Imam Malik and Imam Abu Hanifa, and according to the fairness of Islam, it is 
surely logical that a Muslim might be killed for a Thimmee, since he is a follower of the 
prophets and he cannot be seen merely as a disbelievers. The Federal Supreme Court in 
the United Arab Emirates, in one of its judgments, took the opinion of Imam Abu 
Hanifa and issued a judgment saying that even atheist non-Muslims are equal in law 
with Muslims, and both of them are entitled to retaliation, extending even to the 
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payment of legal blood money165. 
 
The third case is to kill a group for just one victim, an issue on which the scholars have 
differed. The greater among the Companions and those who came after them, as well as 
the scholars of Fiqh, among them Malik, Abu Hanifa, Al-Shaf’ee, and Al-Thawry, and 
others, said that a group is indeed to be killed for one person, whether that group is large 
or small. This was stated by the second Calif, Omar, and is found in one of the 
narrations from Ahmed ibn Hanbal166. Some others, such as Ibn Al-zubair and Al-
zuhree, have said that a group could be killed for killing one person since it is fair to 
retaliate against the many for killing only one167. Malik and Al-Shaf’ee said that several 
hands can be cut off for just one hand. However, the followers of Imam Abu Hanifa’s 
school of faith differentiated between a life and limbs, saying that a life is to be taken 
for a life, but only one limb should be cut off168. 
 However, the first party, who are known as the Greater Scholars, have used the 
following evidence as a proof for their position: "And in Al-Qisas there is [saving of] 
life for you, O you people of understanding, that you may become pious"169. 
The point of this evidence is that legal retaliation is indeed ordained to prevent murder. 
If retaliation is not permitted following murder by a group of people, then it would lead 
to people killing in this fashion with impunity. The wisdom contained in the principles 
of discipline and prevention would be lost. The second argument is found in the 
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narration of the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, when he said: 
"And you, O people of the tribe of Khuzaa' ah, you have killed this man from the tribe 
of Huthail and I am his legal guardian. So whoever is killed from today on, then his 
family has two choices; either they kill or they take the blood money”170. This narration 
refers to the killing by a group of people of just one victim, since the term 'whoever' can 
refer either to an individual or a group. Thus, a group may be killed for just one 
person171, and if a ruling is made giving exemption in a specific case, such a ruling 
should not be allowed. The first part also used as evidence that which is narrated on the 
authority of  'Omar, may Allah be pleased with him, that he killed seven men for the 
sake of one man from San'aa, and the Calif said "If all the inhabitants of San'aa had 
participated in the killing I would have killed all of them for him”172. 
Moreover, Ali Ibn Abi Talib killed the Hururiyah173 for killing Abdullah Ibn Khabab. 
They brutally slaughtered Abdullah Ibn Khabab in the way one slaughters a sheep, and 
when Ali was informed of this he said "Allahu Akbar! Tell them to bring us those who 
killed 'Abdullah Ibn Khabab!" So they said three times "All of us killed him!" So 'Ali 
said to his companions "They are indeed beneath you!" Then it was not long before he 
and his companions had them all killed. And Al-Mugheerah ibn Shu'bah also killed 
seven for just one. And Ibn Aabbas said "If a group kills one person then they are all to 
be killed for him even if they are a hundred"174. 
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Finally, we can say that retaliation is constitutes a penalty which is requires a single 
punishment for a single crime. However, it is mandatory in dealing with a group as for a 
single individual. The same principle applies for example, to slander. There is legal 
punishment for a group that slanders someone, how much more, therefore, is a group 
which has committed a murder worthy to be punished? Furthermore, blood money is 
obligatory whether it involves just one killer or a group. 
 
At the same time, scholars offer further scriptural evidence as proof, as firstly in the 
High's statement “And we ordained for them therein a life for a life”175, and in His, the 
High's, statement "retaliation is prescribed for you in the case of murder - the free for 
the free, the slave for the slave and the female for the female”176. From this, it is said 
that not more than one free human being should be killed for one free victim, nor more 
than one slave for a slave, nor more than one female for a female. Thus, there should be 
no more than one life for a single life177. A further evidence is His, the High's, statement 
"whoever is wrongfully killed then we have made an Authority for his relative. So let 
him not exceed in killing, verily he is aided"178. Thus, Allah forbids excessiveness in 
killing, and it exceeds what is right to kill a whole group for just one victim. 
 
To discuss this evidence, others say that the Greater Scholars can find further proofs, as 
in the verse beginning, "Verily in His, the High's, statement: 'a life for a life...’. This 
verse does not contain evidence to support the view that only a single life should be 
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considered. And in His, the High's, statement: 'the free for the free…', there is also no 
proof that just one free person is referred to. The same interpretation is made of His, the 
High's, statement: 'the slave for the slave, and the female for the female…', since it does 
not constitute a proof that only one slave or female is being considered. Rather, these are 
all words that are used collectively. Because the word 'Nafs' (life) also refers to lives, and 
the free also refers to the plural, and the slave or female can also refer to many slaves or 
women. And what is meant is to be cautious not to implement Al-Qisas on a life that has 
not taken a life. So by this reasoning, the purpose of Al-Qisas in the two verses is to kill 
whoever has killed, no matter who it may be. It is to rebuke the Bedouin Arabs who 
intended to kill, in addition to the killer, hundreds or more of those who were innocent of 
any killing, only to brag and boast about their honour and strength179. So Allah 
commanded justice and fairness, which is to kill only those who have killed”180. 
Furthermore, it seems that, the case of the people who killed Abdullah Ibn Khabab – 
where Ali Ibn Abi Talib asked the killers to admit that they had all kill him, and when 
they refused, he was satisfied of their guilt, he ordered his companions to attack and kill 
them all. This is consistent with the conclusion that a group may be killed for the killing 
of a single person in such a case.   
 
What appears to be meant is not to kill any one except the killer himself. His, the 
High's, statement "So let him not exceed in killing...” what is meant is not to kill other 
than the killer, and His, the High's, statement "Then we have made an Authority for his 
relative...”, necessitates that his authority is over a group as well as over a single person. 
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Thus, the verse is does not actually seem to be a proof against this evidence. The 
interpretation of "Verily one does not equal a group" is invalid because a single life is as 
sacred as that of group. We have Allah's, the High's statement, "Because of that we 
prescribed for the Tribe of Israel that whomsoever kills a person without right, then it is 
as if he has killed all people"181. Therefore the retaliation must be the same with regard 
to both. This contrast with the view that the killing of a group is not required for the 
death of a single person, even if this has been claimed by Imam Abu Hanifa, because 
the objective of retaliation is to spare the spilling of blood. So a group should not be 
killed for the death of one in order for blood not to be spilt182. 
Yet it is also held that the utmost right that can be established through legal retaliation is 
a sanction upon a group which kills a single person, since murder is for the most part 
performed through conspiracy and interaction. If retaliation were not obligatory in the 
case of conspiracy then this would be taken as an incentive or pretext for the shedding 
the blood, since the perpetrators would be safe from retaliation. 
 
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the evidence of the opposition to the 
Greater Scholars is not convincing. The Scholars’ claim to a general guilt stands up, and 
their opinion is the most influential one, as we can see from current legal practice in 
Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates. Serious crimes other than murder, such as 
burglary, if committed by more than one individual, are punishable by sentences that 
apply equally to all members of a gang. A group is, in fact, liable to the death penalty if 
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all the accused have participated in the killing, even if they have acted separately183. 
 
In the case of the killing a male of a female, the scholars of Fiqh agree that a male may 
be punished by the death penalty for killing a female. This follows the opinion of Ibn 
Al-Munthir and others who found general agreement on this matter. However, 'Ali Ibn 
Abi Talib and his companions maintained that if a man is killed for a woman then her 
relatives should receive only half of the blood money, but if a woman's relatives choose 
to spare the offender they may do so, and receive from him the full blood money. If a 
woman kills a man, and the man's relatives wish for her death, they can kill her and take 
half of the blood money or take the full share and spare the female perpetrator's life184. 
 
The support for this is taken from the Holy Qur’an: "And we ordained for them therein 
a life for a life", and "O you who believe! Legal retaliation is prescribed for you in the 
case of murder". Moreover, Allah's Messenger, may Allah's peace and blessings be 
upon him, have stated "Muslims are equal in blood, and the lowest among them strives 
for their protection, and a Muslim is not killed for a non-Muslim (Kafir)".  
The preponderant opinion, due to strong and convincing evidence, is that a male is 
killed for a female, which has great general benefit, and Allah knows best185. 
The question has already arisen of whether a father can be killed for killing his own son, 
and it has been stated that a father should never be killed for the death of his son. This, 
at least, was the consensus of the Companions, taking into account the position and 
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noble status of the father. It is through the father that the son has life, therefore it is 
impossible that the demise of a father, through legal retaliation, can be justified by the 
death of a son186. It is worth noting here, however, that the Federal Supreme Court in 
the United Arab Emirates, in one of it is judgements, has said that the male and female 
are equal under the laws of retaliation and in the amount of legal blood money that is 
payable187.  
 
2.4 Establishing retaliation in Islamic sharia 
According to the Islamic sharia, retaliation is established through either of two 
methods, after the occurrence of a homicide crime, namely, by confession or witness. 
These methods are discussed as follows. 
 
The meaning of confession linguistically is to establish and to obligate. It is derived 
from the word “confess”, meaning to tell of a matter that relates to the actions or right of 
another person. The basis of confession is that someone acknowledges his own actions 
or obligations to others, as for example, when someone says ‘I confess that there is 
sufficient proof against me in this matter’, or, ‘I confess that I should have done such 
and such a thing, because of my obligations to someone’, or, ‘I confess that by my 
actions, the rights of someone have been denied’. These are admissions of responsibility 
or guilt. 
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The validity of a confession depends on the confessor alone. Thus, the confession of a 
person on behalf of another is not accepted, and rather it is called here a testimony not a 
confession. The precise value here is that the confessor, in giving up his legal rights to 
protection before a court, spares a process from disputes and arguments in front of the 
judge188. 
 
In the second method, that of the witness, great reliance is placed in the sharia because 
this is the means by which the truth is clarified and becomes apparent. Therefore, it was 
named “Bayinah”, a clear proof, and is something the judge must depend on to reach a 
ruling in a case of disputed evidence. As for the acceptance of witnesses in legal 
retaliation, it is a condition that they are male. Female witnesses are not accepted in 
matters of legal retaliation, whether acting together with men, or by herself, and this is 
the position of the majority of jurists. They follow the principle found in the narration of 
Imam Malik, who took it from Al-Zuhree that the Sunna made clear that a woman may 
not bear witness against a man in legal retaliation189. 
  
There is also a condition that not less than two witnesses must be heard in legal 
retaliation. Thus, legal retaliation cannot be established without two male witnesses 
fulfilling the general and specific conditions, which are: maturity, sanity, freedom, 
Islamic belief, good conduct, ability of speech, hearing, sight and moral reliability. In 
addition, they must not have been previously under suspicion themselves for any 
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testimony they have previously given190. These strict rules are imposed by the Islamic 
sharia since the punishment for false witness is severe, and may deprive a person of his 
life.  
 
2.5 imposing the Death Penalty as a Retaliation Punishment 
In order to fulfil the terms of legal retaliation, three conditions are required. Firstly, the 
offender must be sane and mature. Thus, if it is a child or an insane individual then no 
one can substitute for them in this regard, whether father, legal guardian or ruler. 
Rather, in this case the perpetrator is detained until he matures or becomes sane, as the 
case may be, at which point he becomes liable to the punishment. This happened in the 
case judged by Mu'awiyah Ibn Abi Sufian when an offender called Hadbah Ibn 
Khashram was, in a case of legal retaliation, detained until the son of the deceased 
became sufficiently mature to demand or waive his rights. This was in the time of the 
Companions and no one criticized the judge for it191. 
 
The second condition is that all the legal representatives agree to fulfil it, and it is not 
allowed for just a few of them to decide the matter on their own. Thus, if some of those 
represented are absent or under-age, then it is obligatory to wait for their return or until 
they become mature, because whoever has a say in the affair cannot be absent from the 
process, since the opinion of such persons would be heard or considered192. 
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Imam Abu Hanifa said "The elder must have their rights fulfilled in the retaliation and 
should not wait for the young to grow mature, thus if one of the legal guardians grants 
pardon then the legal retaliation is dropped because it cannot be divided into parts"193. 
According to the third condition, retaliation should not go beyond the culpability of the 
perpetrator and harm someone else. Hence, if retaliation relates to a pregnant woman 
then she is not to be killed until she has given birth and has breast-fed her child, since 
killing her would extend to killing the foetus. Likewise to kill her before she breast-
feeds is prejudicial for the child. If, however, another person can breast-feed the child, it 
should be given to that person, and the mother may be killed, since now someone else is 
responsible for the upbringing and feeding of that child. If no one is found to take care 
of the baby then the mother must look after it for a period of two-years. Ibn Maajah 
reported that Allah's Messenger, may His peace and blessings be upon him, said "If a 
woman murders intentionally, then she is not to be killed until she has given birth to her 
child if she is pregnant, and until her child then is catered for. And if she fornicates she 
should not be stoned until she has given birth to her child if she is pregnant and until her 
child then is catered for"194. 
 
2.6 Waiving the Retaliation 
Retaliation in homicide cases cannot be dropped or waived unless some conditions are 
satisfied. The first logical issue is when the accused dies prior to the execution. In this 
case, paying blood money from his wealth to the relatives of the victim is obligatory. 
This was held by both Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and Imam Al-Shaf’ee. However, both 
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Imam Malik and Imam Abu Hanifa said that no blood money is to be paid in such a case 
since their right is to take the life of the accused, and the accused has died in this 
instance. This is valid unless the parties have chosen to waive their rights of retaliation 
and have accepted the blood money, a decision which may be given up to the point that 
the offender is to suffer195. 
 
The second issue where retaliation may be waived is the granting of pardon. Scholars 
agree that it is permissible to grant pardon in legal retaliation and that this is the better 
choice. The basis for this is in the Qur’an and the Sunna: He, the High, says "Qisas is 
prescribed for you in the case of murder, but whoever is pardoned by his brother (i.e., 
the deceased's guardian) against something (blood money) then it should be adhered to 
properly and the payment should be given to him with good conduct"196. Further, He, 
the High, says "and we ordained for them herein a life for a life, and for wounds is legal 
retaliation. But whoever gives up his right as charity, it is expiation for him"197. On the 
other hand, Anas Ibn Malik said: "I never saw the Messenger of Allah, may His 
blessings and peace be upon him, having an issue of legal retaliation brought to him 
except that he would command to grant pardon in it"198.  
 
There is a consensus among scholars that whoever receives the right to claim legal 
retaliation may grant pardon. It is, however, a condition that those pardoning are 
responsible persons, by virtue of their maturity and sanity. Thus, pardon is not accepted 
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from a child or an insane person even though such a person does have a right 
established in law199. Moreover, it should be noted that from among the victim’s 
relatives, only males who can inherit from him according to the Islamic sharia are 
permitted to grant pardon. Furthermore, retaliation can be dropped if reconciliation is 
made between the perpetrator and the victim’s representatives. 
 
2.7 Legal Blood Money (diya) 
Discussing the precise amounts payable as blood money is not our major concern. 
However, since it has already been shown that if retaliation is waived then blood money 
is obligatory, it is worth examining this topic must be addressed. Even in imposing 
blood money, the sharia shows that the law is merciful, since it is offering a 
compensation to the relatives who have suffered and lost their loved one. It 
recompenses them after the death of a family member, and, by direct confiscation of his 
assets, shows the murderer the consequences of his own action. The blood money is a 
punishment, but it is a punishment which gives him a new life. Thus, the offender 
should thank the Lord for this mercy, and think deeply before committing another 
homicide in the future. 
 
Legal blood money is the amount that it becomes obligatory to pay because of a crime, 
and it is paid to the victim or his legal representative. It encompasses both the issue of 
legal retaliation as well as the issue in which there is no legal retaliation. Blood money 
(diya) is sometimes called 'Aql (a collective pledge of compensation) This is derived 
from a time when the perpetrator who killed a victim, and had to pay blood money, 
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would collect the blood money in the form of camels from his tribe. Then he would tie 
them up in the courtyard out side the house of the relatives of the deceased200. The old 
Arabs, in the pre-Islamic past, practised a system of blood money. The Holy Qur’an 
confirmed the principle on the basis of Allah's statement "And never it is for a believer 
to kill a believer except by mistake, and whoever kills a believer by mistake then freeing 
of a believing slave and blood money presented to his [the deceased's] family is 
required unless they give up their right as charity. But if the deceased is from a people at 
war with you and he is a believer then only the freeing of a believing slave; and if he is 
from a people with whom you have a treaty then blood money presented to his family 
and the freeing of the believing slave. And whoever does not find one or cannot afford it 
then instead a fast for two months consecutively, all that seeking the acceptance of 
repentance from Allah, and Allah is ever knowing and wise”201. 
 
English common Law also developed an elaborate system of fines in place of the killing 
of a murderer. In this payment to the victim’s family could be substituted, depending on 
an assessment of the value of the victim’s life202.  
 
Turning to what is payable, there are many accounts regarding the amount of the legal 
blood money. Imam Al-Shaf’ee said that it is to be one hundred camels, which , if not 
found, should be of the same value. Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal agreed with that opinion. 
Imam Malik, however, said that it could vary depending on the origin of the people. 
Consequently, the Bedouins should pay it in the form of camels, and the people of the 
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city must pay it in some form of money. Imam Abu-Hanifa said that it could be paid in 
either gold or silver203. Some other jurists have said that the legal blood money should 
be ten thousand dirhams. This is according to what has come down to us from Omar Ibn 
Al-khatab, the second Calif. However, others have specified payment in the form of 
camels only, but that the age of the camels may vary according to the nature of the 
crime. They have said the blood money for homicide necessitates payment of the finest 
camels, but manslaughter requires payment of camels which are older or less 
valuable204. This all goes back to the fact that the Prophet, may Allah's peace and 
blessings be upon him, never estimated the blood money in any commodity other than 
camels. Thus, what was told by Omar Ibn Al-khatab, when he specified legal blood 
money to be paid in other goods, might have been responding to an increase in price of 
camels, or even that camels could not be found at that time. The Federal Supreme Court 
of the UAE has issued several judgements regarding this matter, declaring that the 
amount of legal blood for homicide or manslaughter should be one hundred camels.205 
This has been estimated by 150,000 dirhams206 which later, due to the increasing price 
of camels, was changed to a value of two 200,000 dirhams207. 
 
The wisdom and objective behind the principle of legal blood money is discipline, 
prevention, and the protection of lives. Because of this the people, who are obliged to 
pay this, need to be dealt with harshly: they should find it uncomfortable, painful and 
difficult to acquire the means to pay this penalty. It is not felt as a punishment unless the 
                                                 
203 Zaidan, Abdul-kareem., op.cit., p.198 
204 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., part 1, p.58 and after, see also Abu-zahra, Mohammad., op.cit., p.423 
205 Appeal No.108 and 111 for the year 16, hearing dated on 17/12/1994 
206 This estimation came in by the federal law No.17/1991, issued by the president, and this amount 
equals 41 Thousand US$. 
207 This estimation came in by the federal law No.9/2003, issued by the president, and this amount equals 
55 Thousand US$.  
 84
amount to be taken from their wealth is large, and they should be under pressure or 
difficulty to pay blood money to the victim of the crime or his inheritors. It is, therefore, 
really a penalty that combines both punishment and compensation208. On the other hand, 
the accused should feel and consider how the Lord is merciful and has given him a new 
life, and that he should not commit other crimes in the future. 
 
Blood money is obligatory in cases of mistaken or semi-intentional killing, and even in 
the case of the intentional murder of someone who does not fulfil the conditions of 
being responsible, like the child and the insane. It is also obligatory in the case of 
intentional murder (homicide) if the victim’s family gives pardon or the retaliation is 
waived or dropped for some other reasons209. 
 
According to the Islamic sharia, blood money can be both severe and light. Light blood 
money is paid in the case of killing by mistake and severe blood money in the case of 
semi-intentional or intentional murder, if the victim’s family gives pardon and the 
retaliation is dropped210. As to blood money for intentional murder, when pardon is 
granted by the legal guardian, Al-Shaf’ee and the Hanaabilah hold that, in this case, 
severe blood money should be paid211. Abu Hanifa holds that there is no blood money 
for intentional murder, if retaliation is demanded. Rather, what is obligatory in such a 
case is that the two sides come to an agreement, and whatever they agree on is to be 
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carried out immediately and not postponed212. He goes on that, as for severe blood 
money, it should be one hundred camels, forty of which are pregnant. This is in 
accordance with what is reported by Ahmed, Abu Dawood, An-Nisaa'ee and Ibn Majah, 
from Uqbah ibn Aws, who interpreted the Hadeeth from one of the Companions, that 
the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, had said: 
"Verily he who is murdered by mistake was still intended by the whip, the stick and the 
stone. Therefore there is severe blood-money, which is one hundred camels, forty of 
them should be in between the age of six years and nine and each one of them should be 
pregnant”213. 
 
The severity of blood money is only in relation to the kind and age of camels and not 
the number of the camels, since this is what was established by Islamic law. This is 
limited to what was heard from the Prophet, may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon 
him, through revelation and there is no room for contrary opinion since it is a decreed 
matter. 
 
Al-Shaf’ee and others hold that the blood money should be severe when the crime of 
murder is committed in the sacred month, the sacred land, or is done to a blood relative, 
because the divine legislation has magnified the sanctities of these principles. Thus, the 
blood money is of greater importance whenever the crime is severe. It has been told by 
Omar and Al-Qassim Ibn Mohammed and Ibn Shihaab that the blood money is 
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increased by close to a third214, but Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik took the position 
that blood money is limited to the amount specified in sharia, and that to increase it 
would be a great mistake, going against the very basis of the law. 
 
Blood money that is obligatory upon the murderer is of two kinds. The first is with 
regard to his or her own wealth and applies in the case of intentional murder, once legal 
retaliation has been dropped. Ibn Abbas said that the criminal’s representatives should 
not be responsible to pay this on behalf of the offender when he committed his crime 
intentionally, or has confessed to it. This applies even after reconciliation, in the case of 
intentional murder, and no Companion is known to have opposed this view215. Imam 
Malik relates from Ibn Shihab that in the case of intentional murder where the relatives 
have granted pardon, the Sunna has established that blood money should only be paid 
from the murderer’s own resources. His representatives may wish to pay it out of 
kindness in lesser crime cases, but they cannot pay it when it involves a killing that was 
intentional, or confessed, or when reconciliation has already been made216. It is the 
wrongdoer’s mind and intention which are called for the penalty. The criminal does not 
deserve to be helped by his representatives bearing the cost of blood money, and they 
should not be allowed to pay it once he has confessed, since the blood money is 
obligatory upon him once the confession has been made. In addition, the confession is 
restricted to evidence that lies only in the hands of the confessor, and no representatives 
can make it for him. Furthermore, his representatives cannot pay for him in a case of 
reconciliation, because reconciliation is not compulsory due to the murder, rather it 
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becomes compulsory due to the agreement of the reconciliation, so the criminal has to 
bear the responsibility for his crime.  
 
The second kind of blood money that is compulsory upon the criminal, is one in which 
his representatives may pay to assist him, if he happens to have such representatives. 
This applies to both semi-intentional murder and murder by mistake. In these cases, the 
criminal is treated differently from any of his representatives. Al-Shaf’ee said: “it is not 
compulsory upon the killer to pay any of the blood-money since he is excused”217. 
 
We need to make clear that the murderer’s representatives are always taken to be the 
blood family of the perpetrator, that they are sane and mature male relatives on his 
father’s side, who are wealthy and decent, and not female, young, poor, insane or 
anyone who has a religion different to the criminal. These conditions apply because this 
is an issue of assistance in which only specified persons are permitted218. 
 
The foundation for the obligation of the representatives to pay the blood money is one 
of family cohesion. Traditionally, family were expected to take care of their own 
members, and if one went a stray his relatives were obliged to compensate for any 
wrong he had done. It has been authentically narrated, that once two women fought, and 
one of them threw a stone at the other killing the foetus in her womb. So the Messenger 
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of Allah, may Allah’s peace and blessings be upon him, judged that blood money 
should be paid by the perpetrating woman’s representatives219. 
 
The blood money that is obligated upon a perpetrator’s family can be postponed for a 
period up to three years, and this is agreed among most scholars. As for the blood 
money which is strictly to be paid by the criminal out of his own wealth, according to 
Imam Al-Shafiee, may Allah be pleased with him, this must be paid instantly, since 
delay would only make it easier for the criminal’s family representatives. Imam Abu-
Hanifa’s followers, however, hold that it can be postponed for up to three years, just as 
in the case of unintentional murder220. 
 
The obligation of blood money upon the criminal’s family representatives is an 
exception from the general principle in Islam that a human being is responsible for his 
own doings and judged according to his actions. As Allah, the High, says, "And a soul 
shall not bare the burden of another"221, and as the Noble Messenger has said, "A son is 
not to be held accountable for his father's nor his brother's crime"222. 
 
There is, however, a compensating principle in parallel to the notion that the criminal 
must always be made to suffer. Islam ordains the cooperation of the criminal's family in 
paying the blood money in order to comfort and assist the criminal with regard to the 
crime that he has committed. This confirms the old Arab system that requires 
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cooperation, mutual assistance and help between men, and there is clear wisdom behind 
this. Once the tribe knows that they will bear the responsibility of blood money, they 
will do whatever they can to prevent their members committing crimes, and they will 
encourage them to behave well so that they will not fall into such mistakes223. 
 
The greater scholars of Fiqh hold that a criminal's family representatives do not bear 
anything less than a third of the blood money for an unintentional murder, and less than 
a third when it comes to the wealth of the criminal. But Malik and Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, 
may Allah be pleased with them, hold that no specific amount of blood money is 
compulsory upon any of the family representatives, and the ruler should do his best to 
decide whatever amount is easy for each of the representatives, starting with which ever 
family representative is most closely related224. 
 
The blood money of the woman when she is killed unintentionally is half of that of a 
man. This is the position of the majority of scholars. Since it has been related on the 
authority of Omar, Ibn Mas'ood, Zaid ibn Thabit, and 'Ali, may Allah honour their faces 
and be pleased with them all, that regarding the blood money of a woman it should be 
half of that of a man. No-one has criticised their opinion, thus it is considered a 
consensus. This is because the value of a woman is held to be half that of a man in 
inheritance and witness225. 
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Just as the blood money for a life is half of that of a Muslim, the blood money for injury 
is also only one half. This position was taken by Imam Malik and 'Omar Ibn 'Abdul-
Azeez, Abu Hanifa and Al-Thawry, and it is also taken from ‘Othman and Ibn Mas’ood, 
may Allah be pleased with them, who took the position that their blood money is the 
same as that of the Muslims. This was based on Allah's statement "And if he was from a 
people with whom you have a treaty – then blood-money should be presented to his 
family and the freeing of a believing slave"226. 
 
The blood money of one of the people of the Book, whether Christian or Jew, if he is 
unintentionally killed, is half that of a Muslim. Thus, the blood money of one of their 
males is half of that of a Muslim male and the blood money of one of their females is 
half that of a Muslim female. This follow the teaching of Amr Ibn Shu'aib and from his 
father and grandfather, that the Prophet, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, 
decreed that the blood money of someone from the people of the Book is half of the 
blood money of a Muslim227. 
 
However, Al-Zuhree said "The blood-money of a Jew and a Christian and every 
protected person is the same as that of the Muslim. This is how it was in the time of the 
Messenger of Allah, May Allah's Peace and Blessings be upon him, and the four Califs; 
Abu Baker, Omar, Othman and Ali, may Allah be pleased with them228. Then came the 
time of Mu'awiyah, and he put half of it in the Treasure House of the Muslims and gave 
half to the deceased. After that Omar ibn Abdul-Azeez decreed that only half should be 
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paid, and cancelled the other half that Mu'awiyah had used to put in the Treasure House. 
But I was never able to remind Omar ibn Abdul-Azeez of this and tell him that the full 
blood-money used to be paid to those under covenant of protection."229 
 
Al-Shaf’ee, may Allah pleased with him, took the position that their blood money is to 
be one third of that of the Muslim, while the blood money of the polytheist and pagans, 
who are either under protection or treaty of security, should be two thirds of a tenth of 
the blood money paid to the Muslim. His support for this position is that this figure 
represents the minimum sum of what had been said regarding the issue230. 
 
Regarding the foetus, if a child is killed through a crime committed against its mother, 
either intentionally or unintentionally, and the mother does not die, then payment of a 
Ghurra (a male or female slave), becomes obligatory, whether the foetus porn dead or 
remains within the womb and dies231. If it is porn alive and dies later, then the full  
blood money is to be paid, namely one hundred camels for a male and fifty for a 
female232. The presence of life can be ascertained through sneezing, breathing, crying, 
screaming or moving. 
 
Al-Shaf’ee made it a condition, in the case where the foetus dies inside its mother’s 
womb, that it should be known whether the fetus developed to the extent that the soul 
has been inspired in it. He explained that this can be judged as having happened by 
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whatever physical indication proves that it has the shape of a human being, such as a 
hand or a finger. Imam Malik, however, did not adopt the criteria and said "Whatever 
comes out of the woman's womb, whether it is just a piece of meat or a blood clot or 
whatever can show that it was to be a child, then the blood money is a Ghurrah”. But 
the position of Al-Shaf’ee may be considered stronger because his argument is based on 
actual physical evidence”233. 
 
The value of a Ghurrah had to be assessed in monetary terms since the perpetrator 
might not have any slaves. The equivalent of the Ghurrah was taken to be five hundred 
dirhams, according to the followers of Imam Abu Hanifa, or to one hundred sheep, as it 
is found in the Hadeeth of Abu Buraidah234. It is also said that it may be five camels. On 
the authority of Abu Huraira, may Allah be pleased with him, the Messenger of Allah, 
may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, it is decreed that the Ghurrah of a foetus 
is either a male or female slave to be given to the deceased235. 
 
Imam Malik and his companions said that the Ghurra is compulsory upon the criminal 
and must be paid from his own money, and the followers of Imam Abu Haneefah and 
Imam Al-Shaf’ee and the people of Kofah236 took the position that it is only compulsory 
on the criminal's family representatives since it is an unintentional crime237. It has been 
said by Jabir, may Allah be pleased with him, that the Prophet, Allah's peace and 
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blessings be upon him, judged that the Ghurrah is to be paid by the attacker's family 
representatives in the case of a foetus238. 
 
Moreover, the followers of Imam Malik and Imam Al-Shaf’ee have taken the position 
that the blood money of a foetus is to be given to its inheritors, as their inheritance is 
laid down in the sharia, and its ruling is the same as that for normal blood money in the 
sense that it can be inherited. It is also said that the blood money should be given to the 
mother, since the foetus is legally as one of her body parts and that therefore the blood 
money is strictly for her239. 
 
Scholars are in agreement that if the foetus comes out of the womb and then dies, there 
should also be expiation in addition to the paying of blood money240. But is the 
expiation also obligatory in addition to the Ghurrah if the foetus comes out dead? Imam 
Al-Shafi'ee said it is obligatory because he considered the expiation necessary in both 
unintentional and intentional murders241. Imam Abu Hanifa said it is not obligatory 
because the same ruling as that for intentional murder applies, and that there is therefore 
no expiation to be made. Imam Malik said that it was to be recommended because this 
is an intermediate case between intentional and unintentional murder242. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been shown that retaliation against the murderer is predetermined 
by God as a consolation to the heirs and relatives of the murdered. These might be a 
father, a brother, a son or a spouse. Chaos and revenge must not prevail in society, and 
this would be the case if a murderer is not punished as he deserves. However, it has also 
been shown how Almighty God encourages the relatives of the murdered to waive their 
rights willingly, since this is of benefit to their life on this Earth and in the life hereafter. 
God also expects the judge and the ruler to mediate between the relatives of the 
murdered and the murderer. He encourages the former to give pardon and accept blood 
money, but without forcing them to do so. Thus, by restricting the death penalty for 
murder to cases of homicide, God intends to console the relatives of the murdered, and 
avoids the spreading of chaos and the emergence of the law of the jungle. This shows 
that the Islamic sharia is equitable, forbidding the killing of innocent people. It also 
forms the basis of a reply to all those who believe that Islam and its sharia promote the 
use of the death penalty without good reasons. Islamic law encourages the blood 
relatives to waive their rights of retaliation against a murderer, so it avoids harsh 
consequences and the lack of justice for innocent people who have done nothing wrong. 
Not many people would face the death penalty if the courts adhere strictly to the Islamic 
sharia, that is if they accept the principles of pardon and the waiving of the right to 
retaliation, principles which are supported and encouraged by the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunna of the Prophet. The Islamic sharia has legalised blood money to be paid to the 
victim’s family as compensation if they waive their right to retaliation. This 
compensation might be better, in many cases, than asking for retaliation. With this 
compensation, the relatives of the victim might be able to afford a better life, better 
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education for the victim’s children, and better living conditions. We may be confident 
that Islamic law has provided conditions to save lives, even the lives of murderers. 
Liability to the death penalty arises from transgressing divine ordinances, but it is more 
likely to be exacted for crimes of a discretionary punishment. This is the authority given 
by Islamic law to the rulers and governments in order to spread safety and security, 
provided always that they do not exceed the wisdom that lies behind it, a subject that 
will be discussed in the following chapter.         
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Chapter Three 
Discretionary Punishment 
 
Introduction 
After referring to two categories of crime and punishment according to the Islamic 
sharia, we must examine in this chapter a third type, which is discretionary punishment 
or Ta’azir. This kind of punishment is prescribed by the ruler to maintain safety and 
security in society. Its main distinction is that it is exercised at the discretion of the 
ruler, and its provisions are not fixed243. The authority for discretionary punishment is, 
however, given at the time of the Prophet. It is granted by God to the ruler in order to 
deal with all types of crime and of criminal, since it is generally believed that any act 
which upsets the order and harmony of society must penalised. This must be understood 
in the context of a religious community which sets a high value on the cohesion of its 
social and internal relations. 
 
When a judge finds a certain action to be a crime, he is required to impose a specific 
punishment, a written record of which must be set down. Such punishments would not 
be known valued or reliable unless they were written down and published. This is that 
the public should be made aware, of avoid committing the activity or actions 
proscribed244. In this context the most important thing is whether it is possible for the 
authority to use the death penalty as a discretionary punishment. If it is, then to which 
                                                 
243 Lippman, M. , McConville, S. & Yerushalmi, M., Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure, Praeger 
Publishers (NY), 1988, p.52 
244 Ibid., p.53 
 97
type of crime should it be applied, since this is the harshest of punishments, though 
justified by the Lord for certain crimes. The definition this kind of crime will be made 
clear, together with the legal grounds for it, and the wisdom behind its legality. The 
chapter will conclude with answers to the questions posed. 
 
3.1 Definition 
The word Ta'azir literally means chastisement in the widest possible sense245, and the 
meaning of it in Islamic legislation is to discipline someone for a sin for which there is 
no fixed punishment specified in the Holy Qur’an or the Sunna of the Prophet. This 
means that it is a discipline that the ruler introduces to prevent a crime or sin for which 
Islamic law has not specified a particular penalty. It may be that a punishment exists, 
but the conditions for imposing have not been satisfied. Example of such a cases are 
when an illegal sexual act did not arrive at the point where the private parts met, or a 
theft where the stolen object was not sufficiently valuable for a hand to be cut off. These 
might constitute crimes for which there is no legal retaliation. They might also describe 
a situation where retaliation has been waived, but the judge still considers that the 
perpetrator deserves a discretionary punishment. 
 
As mentioned earlier, sinful crimes may be divided into three categories: a sin for which 
there are divine ordinance punishments or fixed punishments (Al Hudud); a sin for 
which there is retaliation (Qisas); and a sin where there is no Had or Qisas, and for 
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which the ruler uses his authority to specify a punishment, which are called 
discretionary punishments (Ta’zir)246. 
 
3.2 The Legality of Discretionary Punishment 
The legality of the discretionary punishment is found in what has been reported by Al-
Bukhari and Muslim on the authority of Haani ibn Nayar who heard the Messenger of 
Allah, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, say "Do not lash with more than 
ten lashes, except in a punishment legislated by Allah, the High"247. 
 
Furthermore, it is established that Omar Ibn Al-Khatab, may Allah be pleased with him, 
used to punish and discipline by the shaving off of hair on the head, by expulsion, and 
by beating. Similarly, he would burn the wine shops in villages where alcohol was sold, 
and burned the castle of Sa'd ibn Abi Waqas in Kofah when he put himself so far above 
the people. He even carried a stick, with which he used to beat those who deserved to be 
beaten, and he had a house for detaining wrongdoers248. This is taken from the Sunna of 
the Prophet and what has been narrated from his Companions. Moreover, as discussed 
previously, not all crimes are prescribed in the Islamic sharia, and therefore rulers or 
leaders of Muslim communities must devise and impose punishments for what causes 
harm to people and society249. 
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3.3 The Wisdom behind the legality of discretionary punishments 
As we have seen, the chief objective of punishment of any kind in Islamic law is 
prevention, discipline and thereby the rectification of both the society and the 
individual250. What is intended here is the correction and discipline prevent the criminal 
from repeating his crime, or continuing with criminal activity, and to stop the criminal 
from committing any form of crime, since he knows the punishment that will be 
imposed. Moreover, he knows his punishment is not only for him but it also awaits 
everyone who commits the same crime. Hence, benefits are obtained from both the 
discipline and the disciplined, since the perpetrator is prevented from returning to the 
crime, others are prevented from committing it and it is removed from their 
environment. The Islamic sharia prohibits everything that does not maintain these 
objectives. Thus, it prohibits the punishing of a criminal and the wasting of his 
humanity, and has removed everything that might bring about his death without 
justification, since punishment of this kind is not fixed. This, of course, may apply to 
crime that are severe and for which the authority has specified particular punishments, 
such as for the crime of drugs smuggling251. 
 
3.4 Examples of discretionary punishment 
Discretionary reprimands through speech, such as by criticism, discipline, or 
admonition. They can also be exercised by actions, depending upon the situation, which 
might be by imprisonment, banishment, displacement, expulsion, and death252. 
                                                 
250 Amer, Abdul-Aziz., op.cit., 293 
251 Amer, Abdul-aziz., op.cit., p.243 
252 Benmelha, G., op.cit., p. 215 
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Abu Dawood reported that an effeminate man was brought before the Prophet, with 
painted hands and feet dyed with henna253, and He said: "What is the matter with this 
one?" They replied "He imitates women." So the Prophet, may Allah's peace and 
blessings be upon him, commanded that he should be expelled from among the people 
to live at Al-Baqee'254. So they said "O Messenger of Allah! shall we kill him?" He 
replied "I have been forbidden from killing those who perform their prayers"255. Thus, 
the Muslim is not allowed to reprimand someone by the cutting of his beard, or by 
destroying his house, his gardens, fields, fruit or trees, just as it is not allowed to cut off 
someone's nose, ears, lips or fingertips, since these punishments are not known to have 
been authorised by any of the Companions. 
 
The Hadeeth of Haani ibn Nayar has prohibited the giving of more than ten lashes as a 
discretionary punishment. This position was taken by Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and a 
group of Imam Al-Shaf’ee followers. They said that it is not allowed to give more than 
the ten lashes that have been authorised under Islamic law as a discretionary 
punishment256. However, Imam Malik and Imam Al-Shaf’ee and others, took the 
position that it is permissible to add to the ten lashes but without reaching the amount 
prescribed for divine ordinance punishments. One group said that the discretion for a sin 
should never reach the level of the Hudud punishment257. Another group said that the 
discretion for forbidden or illegal sexual encounters between a man and a woman, such 
as kissing or hugging, should not reach the punishment for fornication, neither should 
                                                 
253 A kind of tree leaf with which, after being dried and mixed with water, women colour their hands and 
feet.  
254 A place outside Almadeena (a suburb) 
255 Sedqi, Abdul-rahim., op.cit., p.263 
256 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., part1, p.597 and after. 
257 Ibid. 
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the theft of a worthless object result in the cutting off of the hand258. It is also said that 
the ruler should do his best to determine the penalty in relation to the benefit to society 
as will as the severity of the crime259. 
 
It is permissible to reprimand someone by expropriating an offender’s wealth. This is 
the position of Abu Yousuf260, and Imam Malik has also stated the same. Ibn Al-Qayim 
said "Verily the Prophet, may Allah's Peace and Blessings be upon him, reprimanded by 
preventing shares of the booty, and said that the reprimand for he who refuses to pay 
Zakat is to take half of his wealth. As He, may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him, 
said in the account given by Ahmed, Abu Dawood and An-Nasaa'ee: “Whoever gives it 
will have his reward, but whoever refuses then I will take it together with half of his 
wealth. This is a strict order from our Lord”261. 
 
3.5 The right of the ruler to devise discretionary punishment 
Discretion lies in the hands of the ruler because he has been given general authority 
over his community. No one but the ruler has the right of discretion with people in 
general over the punishment of crimes. Exemption is given to three types of people, 
which is to discipline rather than to punish but rather to discipline. This exemption is 
given to the father, since he has the right to reprimand his son in relation to his learning 
and his behaviour. It appears that the mother also has that right while raising her son 
during childhood. Also, a light beating is allowed if a son does not pray when he is 
                                                 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid, p.595 
260 Abu Yousuf (Yacoub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habeeb Al-Ansari) is one of Imam Abu-Haneifa’s students. 
261 Al-maqdesi, Ibn Qudama., op.cit., p.491 
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supposed to. However, it is not for the father to reprimand the son after maturity, even if 
he acts foolishly. The second exemption is given to the slave owner, who also has the 
right to discipline his slave with regard to himself, or to Allah, the most High, according 
to the most accepted opinion. The third exemption is given to the husband. He has the 
right to discipline his wife if she consistently disobeys him, as is made clear in the Holy 
Qur'an, but can he also beat her for not performing her ordained prayers? It appears that 
he can actually do that also if, disciplining her to change her behaviour, since it is a way 
to remove evil. Furthermore, the husband is responsible for removing evil with his 
hands or tongue or heart, but what is referred to here is only the first of these two262. It 
is also permissible for a teacher to discipline young children. However, the discipline is 
allowed under the condition that it does not exceed and go beyond that which brings 
about the objective. If the punisher does exceed this level, he is considered a 
transgressor and might be punished by the authority with a discretionary punishment263. 
 
3.6 Discretionary Punishment and the Death Penalty 
The question then arises of whether it is possible to issue a death sentence as a 
discretionary punishment. It is understood from the scholars that in certain cases it may 
be possible. Imam Al-Shaf’ee, Malik, Abu Hanifa and ibn Hanbal reasoned that there 
are criminals who will not stop committing crimes even if they are punished. Examples 
are those who practise homosexuality, professional and habitual thieves, and those who 
spy for the benefit of the enemy. The ruler may sentence such offenders to death 264. It is 
relevant here to report that, in some references, that the Prophet Mohammad, peace be 
                                                 
262 Rabah, Ghassan., op.cit., p.217 
263 Amer, Abdul-Aziz., op.cit., p.300 and thereafter. 
264 Hiba, Ahmed., Islamic provisions in punishment (Arabic), Mojaz Ahkam Alsharia Alislamia fi 
Altajreem wa Al eqab, Matba’at Alem Alkotob (Cairo), first edition, 1985, p 201 
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upon him, ordered death for drunkenness after a person was caught for the fourth 
time265. Thus, the death penalty is considered appropriate for incorrigible criminals, 
when the need is to protect society266. Therefore, it is possible to use the death penalty 
as a discretionary punishment for a definite category of crimes. These should be defined 
as dangerous crimes which, in their definition, may vary from one country to another 
and from one era to another. Moreover, it should be used for determined criminals who 
can not be dealt with effectively by any other form of punishment267. 
 
Thus, dangerous crimes determine a prerogative for the ruler, which has been granted to 
him by God, in order that the ruler may impose order and safety in society. Along with 
this goes the essential qualification that the ruler must not be excessive in the exercise 
of this power. The use of the death penalty for minor crimes, as Imam Malik school of 
faith jurists believe, is wrong because the punishment should fit the nature of the crime 
and the character of the offender268. This merits further discussion, but here I would like 
to mention that the first Chairman of the Court of Cassation in Dubai, Dr. Mustapha 
Keera269, supported the idea of abolishing the death penalty for all discretionary crimes. 
He believed that it should be imposed only for those divine ordinance crimes prescribed 
by sharia. He based this thinking on the disagreement between jurists over whether the 
death penalty is appropriate or not as a discretionary punishment. He thought that such 
                                                 
265 Ibid p 201, see also Imam AbuDawood, opp.cit., Narrative No.4482 and 4484,p.160-161 
266 Benmelha, G., op.cit., p.215 
267 Al-turki, Abdulrahman A., Capital Punishment for Drug Offences In Islam and its Application In the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; An evaluative study, unpublished Phd thesis, The University of London, 2000, 
p.167 
268 Lippman, M., op.cit., p.88 
269 Mustapha Keera is a well Known Egyptian jurist and he was the first Chairman for the Court of 
Cassation in Dubai since its foundation by the legislator in 1988. Dr. Keera died a few years ago.  
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disagreement was an expression of God’s mercy, so why should the state determine the 
hardest choice, which is the death penalty, and not prefer other punishments.  
 
Conclusion 
The focus in this chapter has been the death penalty as a discretionary punishment, and 
it has been asserted that God allows the ruler to specify a punishment for certain crimes 
which he thinks do harm to the people and cause disturbance and insecurity in society.  
 
Discretionary punishments are strongly needed since both individuals and society are 
confronted by more and more crimes that are not categorised as either ordinance or the 
retaliation crimes. If the crime in question is not classified, and for one reason or 
another a fixed punishment cannot not be applied, then the legislator has a choice 
whether to exercise his discretion with the accused or not. In practise, this responsibility 
is devolved upon the judge in court. Moreover, there are dangerous crimes and 
dangerous criminals. The Islamic sharia provisions, as well as the Imams of the schools 
of faith, give the ruler authority to implement the death penalty in order to circumvent 
or curtail situations that are dangerous to society. Some examples have been detailed in 
this regard. For instance, the prophet Mohammad ordered the execution of the alcohol 
drinker after being caught for the fourth time, which after that period demonstrated the 
danger of that person in society and the likelihood that he might corrupt others. Imam 
Malik confirmed that the interest of society and Muslims must come first. For this 
reason, he allows the execution of the spy. 
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In this chapter we have observed that the ruler’s authority in using this power should not 
be absolute. Therefore, he must not abuse or be excessive in the exercise of this right, 
since it is given him for a specific reason, which is the maintenance of safety and 
stability in society. He must not use harsh punishments for petty crimes. Crime and 
punishment should be equivalent to each other. If they are not, the ruler’s punishment 
will be open to criticism. 
 
In Chapter Five, we will look further at discretionary punishment in relation to the death 
penalty in the penal laws of the United Arab Emirates. However, it is first necessary to 
give the reader a clear idea of the formation of the United Arab Emirates, the roots of its 
legal system as well as its current development. 
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Chapter Four 
The formation of the United Arab Emirates and its legal system 
 
Introduction 
The most significant recent change in some Islamic countries is the partial movement 
towards adopting Western-oriented laws. This movement has faced mass resistance 
from supporters of the Islamic sharia who think that movement towards or adoption of 
Western laws is responsible for the increase in the number of crimes in society and that 
the only way to keep it safe and secure is to return to Islamic law, which was adopted in 
the seventh century in Arabia and has prevailed among all Muslims since that time.1  
Among the Islamic countries that have started the adoption of Western laws is the 
United Arab Emirates, which provides an extraordinary example of a country trying to 
adopt both legislations, the Islamic and the Western, without contradictions or clashes. 
 
Prior to the issuance of the Federal Penal Code for the year 1987, the United Arab 
Emirates apparently adhered more closely to the enforcement of Islamic sharia, with 
regard to divine ordinance crimes, retaliation (Al-Qisas) and legal blood money (Diya), 
and towards a greater severity in relation to crimes of discretion (Ta’zir) in order to 
fulfill the needs of the society. As with most countries in the Islamic world and their 
legislators, the United Arab Emirates adopted and enforced the death penalty for certain 
crimes. 
                                                            
1 Al-Shaali, Khalifa Rasid. Crime Control, Policing and Security in the United Arab Emirates, 
unpublished thesis, The University of Wales at Aberystwyth, 1999, p.162   
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Although this research has not found any recorded death sentences prior to the 
declaration of the Union, the federal legislator, showing his severity towards some 
crimes and to maintain safety and security in society, has adopted capital punishment in 
the Federal codes of Punishment. Moreover, the local legislators in both Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai adopted this harsh punishment in their penal codes issued in the year 19702. 
 
Here we will examine the extent to which the UAE legislator has implemented the 
provisions of Islamic sharia, and whether these provisions were written into law 
without the intention of extensive implementation but just to avoid the clashes that 
would arise if they were not on the statute book. 
 
In this chapter, and prior to going into details about the death penalty and its 
implementation, the reader must first gain insight into the background of the country, its 
formation and its jurisprudence. Since the United Arab Emirates has a complicated 
judicial system, we need to examine types of courts and their formation, all those 
responsible for the criminal law in general and the death penalty in particular, at both 
the federal and local level. This involves both the Emirate of Dubai and the Emirate of 
Ras-Alkhaimah, since both Emirates have their own local judicial systems. In the late 
2006, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi also decided to constitute its own judicial system, so 
that there are now three Emirates with their own independent judicial systems, while the 
other four Emirates still follow the federal judicial systems. 
                                                            
2 Both codes were abolished after the issuance of the federal Penal Code in 1987. 
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4.1 The formation of the United Arab Emirates in Outline 
The United Arab Emirates was established on the second of December 1971 as a result 
of the unification of seven Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Om Al 
Quwain, Al Fujairah and Ras Al Khaimah. His Highness the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh 
Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan3, was elected by the other six rulers to be the president 
since he was the architect of this union4. The UAE was accepted both as a member in 
the United Nations and of the Arab League, and it proceeded to form a structured 
political entity founded on an internationally recognized basis among other countries of 
the world. Prior to 1971, the Emirates were known by several names that had been 
given to by foreigners, such as the Sheikhdom of the Omani Coast, the Trucial States 
and the Trucial Emirates.5 
 
As is the case with the other Arabian Peninsula countries, the UAE population is 
derived from Arab origins, linked with the Arab nations through common ties such as 
the Islamic religion, language, history as well as other close cultural ties. It is dominated 
by tribal characteristics. Generations belong to Arab tribes with their renowned ancestry 
and are named after these tribes. In the past, the Arabian Gulf countries were not 
separated into distinct states as the present time. Taken together, the UAE and the 
Sultanate of Oman were known as Oman. The first Arabs to settle in this part of the 
                                                            
3 Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan died in 2003 and his son Sheikh Khalifa replaced him.   
4 According to the Constitution, the Federal Supreme Council should hold a meeting every five years to 
elect a new president. However, Sheikh Zayed was always re-elected as president of the federation 
without any dispute.  
5 Al-Sayegh, Fatma., The UAE from the tribe to the state (Arabic), min Alqabeela Ela Aldawla, Alain; 
UAE Dar Alketab Aljamey p.11 and thereafter 
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Arabian Peninsula were the Azide tribe, a subdivision of the Qahtani in Arab genealogy. 
These emigrated from Yemen in the second century A.D. The second main group was 
the Adnani tribe, who immigrated from the north of the Arabian Peninsula. Together, 
the Qahtani and Adnani tribes compose the Arab genealogy of the region6. Down the 
years, however, the UAE population has been subjected to considerable social inter-
mixture deriving from foreign immigration. These have mainly come from the Indian 
sub-continent, from India, Iran and Africa. Coastal towns were more exposed to 
immigration that the desert interior, affecting its economic, social and educational 
structure. The Bedouins, or nomads, however, remained outside this blending, and have 
accordingly preserved their original Arab Heritage with all its characteristics and 
privileges. Before the discovery of oil, the coastal population depended on the sea as the 
source for their living, and approximately 90% depended on diving for and trading 
pearls. 
 
Islam came to the Gulf region during the life of Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon 
him, and under the leadership of Amr Ibn Al As, who had liberated it from Persian 
occupation and included it within a large Islamic community. Since this time and up to 
the beginning of the sixteenth century A.D., the region was part of a greater Arab 
Islamic Nation. In the sixteenth century, however, Europeans began to appear in the 
region, seeking a foothold in its strategic places. The first conquerors were the 
Portuguese, who after two centuries had occupied the region despite the resistance of its 
people. Later the region was disputed between the Dutch, the French and the British. 
                                                            
6 Al-Muhairi, Butti., Conflict and Continuity: Islamization and Modernization within the UAE Penal 
Code, unpublished PhD thesis, The University of Kent at Canterbury 1994, p. 65 
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The British presence succeeded in eliminating these other European forces and was able 
to establish close ties with the region, that become known as the Trucial Coast. From 
the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, Britain formed agreements and peace 
treaties with most of the Sheikhs in the regions, under the pretext of fighting off pirates 
in its territorial waters. 
 
When the British Government removed its military presence from the area east of the 
Suez Canal by 1971 at the latest, the rulers of the area gathered and met to achieve their 
aim of creating a union. Hence the United Arab Emirates came into existence on the 2nd 
of December, 1971.7 The United Arab Emirates is now open to the modern world with 
its tolerance of other religions and the cultural freedom given to the Western workers in 
the country. This is in marked contrast to most of its neighbours in the Gulf, and it has 
exposed it to some criticism from them. 
 
4.2 Provisions of the UAE Constitution 
Among the most significant aspects of the Constitution is the statement in Article Six, 
providing that the UAE shall be part of the great Arab Nation, closely knit together by 
common ties of religion, language and history. The Constitution also provides in Article 
Seven that Islam is the official religion of the Union, and that the “Islamic sharia is a 
main source of its laws”. It was declares that the official language of the Union is 
                                                            
7 The United Arab Emirates (A Historic Geographic Study), Publication of Documentation and Research 
Centre, Abudhabi: UAE, 1972. p.24 
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Arabic8. With these two articles, the origin of the UAE is firmly established as an Arab 
Nation with its Islamic heritage and traditions. This indicates that the rulers of the UAE 
had advocated that the UAE be an Islamic state that derives its authority and laws, or 
some of them at least, from the principles of the Islamic sharia provisions9. 
 
Questions then arise over whether the phrase “Islamic sharia” is the primary source of 
its legislation, and how this phrase should be interpreted. Is the sharia deemed to be the 
sole source of all laws or it is implied by the phrasing of Article 7 that other sources are 
permitted? One opinion says that the legislator revealed his intent when he issued 
Article 75 of Federal Law No. 80 of 1973 regarding the Federal Supreme Court. This 
stipulates that the Federal Court must apply both the provisions of the Islamic sharia, 
the federal laws and other laws applicable in the member emirates of the federation, 
provided that such laws conform to the Islamic sharia. The article adds that the federal 
court applies the norms and tenets of natural law10. Accordingly, Article One of the 
federal criminal code of 1987, which has been in effect in all of the Emirates ever since, 
has conformed with the provisions of Article 7 of the constitution which states that 
“judgement pertinent to crimes involving divine ordinances, retaliation and legal blood 
money shall apply the provisions of the Islamic sharia. Other crimes and discretion 
shall be defined according to the provisions of this law and other punitive codes”.  
                                                            
8 The temporary constitution was issued on 2nd of Dec. 1971 and became provisional in 1996. At the same 
time was a shift from the temporary status of the capital at Abudhabi to being a permanent one.  
9 Al-Ghufli, Saeed M.A.O., A reconsideration of constitutional review in the United Arab Emirates; "A 
posteriori" or "A priori" review?, unpublished Phd thesis, The University of Wales at Aberystwyth, 2000, 
p.198. 
10 Al-Hamadi, Hassan Ahmad., Divine ordinance, retaliation and blood money (Arabic), Al-hudud wa Al-
qisas wa Al-deya, Second Edition, Sharekat Abu-Dhabi lelteba'aa, 1998, p.27  
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Thus, according to this article, crimes which do not pertain to divine ordinances, 
retaliation and Diya are subject to the provisions of the federal penal code. This does not 
contravene the Islamic sharia since, as we have seen, the ruler has the right to devise 
penalties and adopt his own estimate of suitable punishment for what are called crimes 
of discretionary punishment11. Therefore, the Federal Supreme Court has ruled that if a 
judge hears a crime which is not governed by divine ordinances, retaliation and legal 
blood money, he will rule according to the provisions of the Federal Penal Code or other 
applicable laws. 
 
However, it is necessary to take into account that most Arab countries have tended to 
assimilate aspects of Western legal codes, especially those of the French and the 
English, despite there being a very significant difference between their laws and those 
of Islamic legislation. This is especially true in the area of criminal law where the 
Islamic criminal legislation has two unique aspects that have no equivalent in Western 
legislation. These refer, of course, to the laws of divine ordinances crime and retaliation, 
which are therefore quite strange to a Western way of thinking. As for the criminal law 
of the Emirates, although it confirms the enforcement of the rules of Islamic sharia with 
respect to the crimes related to Al-Hudud, retaliation and legal blood money, it does not 
define those crimes within bounds, and has left that hard task for the judges to 
accomplish. Such crimes and the laws of evidence relating to them require broad 
jurisprudential interpretative endeavors. It was wise for the UAE legislator clearly to 
                                                            
11 Federal Supreme Court, Appeal No.137, hearing dated on 6.1.1996 
  113
define those crimes and whether he really wanted the enforcement of the Islamic sharia 
for the crime of Al-Hudud and retaliation12. 
 
Another opinion states that during its preparation, the Federal Penal Code was not 
framed to contain the provisions of Islamic sharia and that the supreme Legislation 
Committee, formed by the Cabinet in 1978, objected to its omission. This committee 
added the Islamic sharia provisions thereto in respect of divine ordinance, retaliation 
and legal blood money (Diya) crimes and the law was changed from a purely secular 
law to a law with an Islamic colour. However, for unknown reasons, articles on divine 
ordinance, retaliation and legal blood money were mysteriously deleted and abbreviated 
into a single paragraph in Article One of the Penal Code. This was an indication that the 
Emirates, or at least the most powerful ones, were not willing to confine themselves to 
strict application of Islamic sharia. The reduced reference in this Article to the Islamic 
sharia provisions gives them flexibility in the implementation of sharia provisions. 
Thus, the legislator specifies discretionary punishments, to which all articles of the law 
refer with the exception of the first paragraph of Article One. This gives the only 
citation of Islamic sharia provisions, yet some of the discretionary punishments 
specified by the legislator contradict the Islamic sharia13.  
 
It seems that, the UAE legislator laid down this Article reluctantly as he wanted neither 
to abolish the Islamic sharia rules, since the country is an Arab Islamic country, nor to 
                                                            
12 Awadh, Mohammad Awadh., in ‘Security and law Gazette’ (Arabic), Mejalat Al-amn wa al-qanon, 
issue No.2, July 1994, Dubai Police Academy Publication, p.170 
13 Al-Mansoori, Ahmad Khalfan., in ‘Security and law Gazette’ (Arabic), Mejalat Al-amn wa al-qanon, 
issue No.1, Jan 2005, Dubai police Academy Publication, p. 15 
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determine them so as to impose a binding commitment upon him and not to have 
discretion in implementing them. It is manifestly clear that the UAE legislator was 
affected by a Western way of thinking, which considers Al-Hudud and retaliation rules 
as violations of human rights, as for example, in the punishment for drinking alcohol by 
flogging14. In addition, the legislator in the UAE wanted to create its own unique 
judicial system, that is to say a mixture of Islamic provisions and modern ones to satisfy 
both those conscious of their Islamic roots and those with a revised outlook who 
proclaim that the UAE is a modern country and needs to follow the Western world. The 
British, when they established courts in the Gulf in the middle of the last century, held 
joint courts, i.e. courts which implemented sharia provisions for disputes between the 
citizens, especially those concerning marriage, divorce and other family issues, and 
courts which implemented secular provisions for the foreigners.15 The UAE legislator is 
continuing to some extent a role started by the British. 
 
4.3 Profile of the Judiciary in the United Arab Emirates 
The first recorded local penal codes were passed in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai in 1970. This raises a question may be raised about the situation before the 
promulgation of these laws. 
In 1820, a peace treaty was signed between the British Government and the Arab tribes 
on the Trucial coast. From this time, the practice of English common law slowly began 
                                                            
14 The consumption of alcohol prohibited under the laws of divine ordinance crime. This has not 
previously been discussed, since, as sated at the beginning of this thesis, only crimes for which the death 
penalty is imposed concern us here. 
15 Brown, N.J., The Rule of Law in the Arab World, Courts in Egypt and the Gulf, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997, p.133 and after. 
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to leak into the region. From 1912, Sheikh Saeed Ib Maktoum was the ruler of Dubai. 
His policy was that it would be better for offenders who were British, or came from 
some other Western country, to be tried in front of their own judges. The British, 
therefore, gradually began to establish their own courts for cases involving non-
Muslims. Yet problems sometimes arose between the British and the local citizens. The 
courts found a compromise to resolve this difficulty by providing for the presence of 
two kinds of judge, a British and a local judge. The British used the legal system in 
operation in British India during 19th century16. 
 
The problem of understanding with the period prior to 1970, in respect of the judiciary 
and its judgments, is that verdicts involving the death penalty were not chronicled. Not 
many spoke of this period prior to the formation of the Union except in some short 
articles published in newspapers. Such an article was written by Ibrahim Bumelha, the 
ex-Public Attorney General of the Emirate of Dubai, in which he wrote that the first 
judge in the Emirate of Dubai was called Khamees in the regime of Sheikh Maktoum 
Ibn Hasher Ibn Maktoum, who held the power from 1884 until 1906. At that time, the 
judge used his own knowledge to give his judgment according to sharia provisions, 
which he had studied in Saudi Arabia. From his knowledge of custom, he sent 
judgments to the ruler for endorsement or to determine what he deemed fit17. Death 
Penalty judgments during the period could not be traced as most of the disputes, 
according to this newspaper article, were commercial or concerned minor criminal 
                                                            
16 This is a summary of the account given by Wilson, G., Scales of Justice; half a century of Dubai 
Courts, Media Prima: Dubai- London, p57 & Passim 
17 Bumelha, Ibrahim., The history of Dubai courts (Arabic), Tareekh Alqada’a fe dubai, retrieved 
23.4.2003, from www.dc.gov.ae 
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cases. That no death sentences were recorded does not mean, however, that none was 
carried out. After the era of Maktoum Ibn Hasher, and in the 1940’s and 1950’s, the 
justice system relied on a local judge called Mohammad Ibn Ahmed Al Shingeeti, who 
based his judgments both on the provisions of sharia and an understanding of the 
Ruler’s attitude18. Capital punishment was rare, although no definite number of 
executions is known19.   
 
Before discussing the profile of the courts responsible for giving sentences of capital 
punishment in accordance with the Criminal Procedures Law for the United Arab 
Emirates, it is important to consider how they are constituted. What follows therefore, 
must fall into two parts: in the first, the types of court used; and in the second, the 
establishment of the criminal courts. 
 
The UAE, since the declaration of independence in 1971, was in no hurry to unify the 
judiciary for all seven Emirates, or to make local courts subject to the new federal 
courts. Rather, the federal legislator gave the right to each Emirate either to change its 
courts into Federal Courts, or to keep their local courts. In accordance with this 
freedom, and as stipulated in Federal Law No. 6, five Emirates elected in 1987 to shift 
to the Federal judicial system. The Emirates of Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah, however, 
decided to keep their own courts, so neither Emirate is today bound within the federal 
                                                            
18 cf. Wilson, G., Scales of Justice; half a century of Dubai courts, Media Prima: London, Dubai, 2009, 
pp. 62-63  
19 Ibid 
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judicial system. Though the formation of federal courts did not result in a big change in 
terms of content, a significant difference lies in litigation method and the degree of 
litigation permitted. The Court of Cassation for the local judiciary in the Emirates which 
have reserved their right to their own supreme court, and maintained their own judicial 
system, do not follow the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court. Furthermore, legal 
principles set by the Federal Supreme Court are only binding upon the Emirates which 
follow the Federal judiciary. For the purpose of this study, the discussion will focus on 
how a death penalty judgment may be challenged, whether imposed by a federal or  
local Court. The formation of the Federal Courts will be examined next and the 
formation of the Local Courts will be also discussed, particularly those, of the Emirate 
of Dubai. These are not different in character from the local courts of Ras Al Khaimah, 
which also retains their own local judicial system. 
 
In respect of the formation of federal courts, they are constituted at three levels as 
follows. 
1. Court of First Instance 
The Federal Courts of First Instance were established in the year 1978 when the 
Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman and Fujairah requested their judicial system to 
shift from the local to the federal system. Federal Law No. 6/1978 was issued to 
approve this change. In the year 1991, the Emirate of Umm Al Quwain also requested 
such a change of a federal judicial system. Approval was given through Federal Law 
No. 18/1991. However, the Emirates of Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah have kept their 
local judicial system up to the present time. 
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The question here concerns how many judges the Court of First Instance actually has. 
Law No. 6/1978 stated that the Court of First Instance should have one judge only. Due 
to the seriousness of the matter in practice, this was amended by Law No. 5/1986, 
stipulating that the Court should comprise three judges when it hears cases involving 
murder, rape and theft. In a somewhat strange arrangement, appeals concerning the 
judgments of Courts of First Instance were to be made to the Federal Supreme Court 
directly but not the Court of Appeal, pursuant to Article 1 of Federal Law No. 5/1986. 
However, such ambiguity and confusion has been removed through issuance of the 
Federal Criminal Procedures Law in the year 1992, which distinguished two types of 
Court of First Instance. The first is the Criminal Court, comprising three judges, and the 
Court of Minor offences, which comprises one judge. The question arises as to how a 
case may be classified as a major crime or a minor offence. This will be examined later 
when the punishments pursuant to the Federal Penal Law 1987 are discussed. It is of 
great significant since the type of punishment is the criterion by which to decide which 
court hears a particular case. 
 
2. Court of Appeal 
The Constitution was not clear in respect of the Court of Appeal, as Article 103 of the 
Constitution stated that appeal of the judgments of the Court of First Instance should be 
before the Federal Supreme Court without the Court of Appeal being mentioned. 
Moreover, Article 95 of the Constitution divided the Courts into two types, the Court of 
First Instance and Federal Supreme Court, without mentioning the Court of Appeal. In 
order to remove this ambiguity, the Minister of Justice requested the Federal Supreme 
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Court to pass its decision, noting that the two Articles 95 and 103 authorized formation 
of Courts of Appeal to hear appeals against judgments of the Courts of First Instance20. 
Practically, there are two Courts of Appeal in existence. The first is in Abu Dhabi, 
which hears appeals against judgments issued by the Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance. 
The other is at Sharjah, which hears appeals against judgments issued by the Court of 
First Instance in the other Emirates, with the exception of Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah21. 
The court comprises three judges. 
 
3. Federal Supreme Court 
The Federal Supreme Court was established in year 1973 by virtue of Law No. 10/1973 
and is the highest authority at the federal judicial level. This court comprises a chairman 
and four judges. When first established, it heard disputes between the Emirates and 
provided explanations for any ambiguities in the articles of the Constitution. Later, a 
new activity was added when it came to operate as a Court of Cassation hearing appeals 
against judgments of the two Courts of Appeal according to Law No. 17/1978. The 
judicial judgments issued by the Federal Supreme Court, although they finalize the 
heard case, are considered guide references to all five Emirates in any future cases and 
disputes of a similar nature. 
     
The formation of the courts in the Emirate of Dubai provides an important example of 
the local judiciary system. As we have seen, according to the permission granted by the 
                                                            
20 Federal Supreme Court Decision No.1, the fourth judiciary year, dated 14 March 1976  
21 Al-Muhairy, Butti., op.cit., p.128 
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Constitution, both the Emirate of Dubai and the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah have their 
own local judiciary system. The court of Dubai will be taken here as representative of 
the local judiciary system since there are no significant differences between the 
practices of the two emirates. The first official law to establish the courts in the Emirate 
of Dubai was issued in 1970. The courts were of two types: Sharia Courts, against 
whose judgments no appeal could be made22. These were formed of one judge 
competent to hear all cases, especially in cases governed by the provisions of Islamic 
shaira, such as marriage and divorce disputes. They did not include cases under the 
provisions of civil statutes. Secondly, there were the civil courts comprising two 
entities, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal. In 1988, Law No. 1 was 
passed authorizing a Court of Cassation to be formed as the third tier of the civil Courts. 
Subsequently, the Law of Court Formation, 1970, was abolished and replaced by the 
new Law of 1992, whereby the courts were organized into three types corresponding to 
the federal judiciary. Thus, litigation was divided into three stages starting form the 
Court of First Instance, through the Court of Appeal and finally to the Court of 
Cassation, which is equivalent to the Federal Supreme Court at the federal level. Thus, 
the term or title “Sharia Court”, as in the law of 1970, disappeared for reasons that were 
not explained by the authorities. It might have resulted from wanting to unify the court 
system and to make it analogous to the federal judicial system. Alternatively, it may be 
that Western influences had started to affect even the titles of the courts. The Courts of 
First Instance became the First Instance Division of Summary Justice and the Full 
Bench First Instance Division. The First Instance Division of summary justice 
comprises one judge to hear civil and commercial cases concerning amounts not 
                                                            
22 In 1988 a law was issued in Dubai, authorizing appeals against the Sharia Court in all cases except 
matters concerning family. 
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exceeding one hundred thousand of the local currency (dirham), for offences and 
breaches less than felonies. At the same time, the Full Bench First Instance Division 
comprises three judges to hear civil and commercial cases concerning amounts over one 
hundred thousand dirhams, and with respect to offences referred by the Public 
Prosecutor. 
 
4.4 Types of crime specified in the legislation of the United Arab Emirates 
The Federal Penal Code or the criminal law, issued in 1987, made a classification of 
crimes, dividing them into three categories23, namely divine ordinance crimes 
(Alhudud), retaliation or blood money crimes (Diya), and discretionary crimes (Taz’ir). 
The crimes themselves were divided into three kinds according to the punishment 
prescribed in the Penal Code: Felony, misdemeanour, and violation. Moreover, the code 
defined the punishment for each of these three kinds. 
 
1. Felony 
The legislator defined a felony as any crime punishable by one of the divine ordinance 
or retaliation punishments, excluding from this the punishment for drinking alcohol and 
slander24. Here the legislator gave no clear indication about capital punishment being 
imposed against a person who committed a felony crime. The legislator continues in the 
second paragraph of the same Article that felony is to be punished by capital 
punishment, life imprisonment or temporary imprisonment. It would have been logical 
                                                            
23 Article No. 26 of the Federal Penal Code. 
24 See Article 28 of the Federal Penal Code. 
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for the legislator to have clarified, in the first paragraph, that capital punishment could 
be one of the punishments applied to a felony if that felony constituted one of the divine 
ordinance or retaliation crimes. Also, in the second paragraph, it should have been made 
clear that the death penalty referred to here is as a discretionary punishment, since there 
is no purpose in mentioning capital punishment twice without stipulating the types of 
crime to which it applies in each case. Again, the legislator acted in a similar way when 
he neglected to mention crimes of divine ordinance, in particular failing to show his 
willingness to implement the Islamic sharia provisions. Furthermore, in stipulating the 
period of life imprisonment he indicated clearly that life imprisonment means that the 
offender shall spend his whole life in prison25. This is not, however, the case with actual 
terms of life imprisonment, since the offender may be released after 20 years if he or 
she displays good conduct, or 25 years if he or she does not. 
 
2. Misdemeanour 
Misdemeanour is the second category of crime classified by the legislator. It is defined 
as a crime punished by imprisonment for less than three years, or a fine of over one 
thousand dirhams. The significant factor in this article26, defining misdemeanour 
crimes, is that in the final paragraph the legislator has stipulated the punishment of 
flogging for drinking alcohol and slander, yet in the amendment27 of the article, this 
paragraph was deleted. The reason for the deletion is not clear. However, this is a 
further indication of the direction in which the UAE legislator is going. Global pressure 
                                                            
25 See Article 68 of the Federal Penal Code. 
26 See Article 29, federal Penal Code. 
27 This amendment was made twice: the first took place in December 2005, when the flogging 
punishment was included but the crimes of drinking alcohol and slander were deleted; the second 
amendment took place in December 2006, when the flogging punishment was deleted. 
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regarding sentencing has gained ground with the legislator and a significant step is that 
flogging has been deleted from the Penal Code. 
 
3. Violation 
Violations refer specifically here to petty crimes. They may be any kind of action 
punishable either by custody for a period of not less than 24 hours and not more than ten 
days, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dirhams28.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have found that there are three29 supreme or cassation courts in the 
United Arab Emirates, the first being the Federal Supreme Court in connection with the 
federal judiciary, the second being the Court of Cassation in the Emirate of Dubai, and 
the third being the Court of Cassation in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. Since 2007, 
and despite being the seat of the supreme federal court, the Emirate of Abudhabi has 
added a fourth court of cassation, that is to say its own supreme court. Each provides its 
own potentially contradictory legal verdicts. This stands in marked contrast to countries 
around the world where there is only one Supreme Court issuing rulings that may 
constitute future legal principles. 
Given the multiplicity of communities, nationalities and ethnicities that characterizes 
the UAE, Article 7 of the constitution, is unclear and open to different interpretations, in 
declaring that the Islamic sharia is one but not the sole source of law. It shows the 
                                                            
28 See Article 30, federal Penal Code. 
29 They became four after the decision of Abu Dhabi to have its own local judicial system in late 2006 
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uncertainty created by the confluence of Arab and Westernized legislation. A further 
complication springs from the fact that the Constitution was composed by an Egyptian 
lawyer called Waheed Ra’aft, who himself came from a country influenced by a 
Western way of thinking. Clearly he derived the wording of Article 7 from Article 2 of 
the Egyptian Constitution. As a result, Article 7 allows many interpretations, from 
which some have concluded that the Islamic sharia is only one of several sources of 
legislation30. An instance of how this finds practical expression is that the legislator 
believed that he could abolish the punishment of flogging for the crime of drinking 
alcohol, even though it is stipulated as a divine ordinance punishment. This shows 
clearly that the legislator was influenced by Western laws. In the following chapter, we 
will examine the extent to which the legislator has been further influenced by a Western 
way of thinking in relation to the death penalty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 Butti Sultan Ali Al-Mehairy, The Position of Sharia within UAE constitution and the federal supreme 
court application of the constitutional clause concerning Sharia, 11:3 Arab Law Quarterly, 219, 1996, p. 
226 and after. 
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Chapter Five 
The Death Penalty in the Legislation of the United Arab Emirates 
  
Introduction  
As an Arab Islamic country, of which the official religion is Islam, the United Arab 
Emirates could not disregard the significance of the death penalty. It is, as we have seen, 
one of the divine ordinance and retaliation punishments and, according to the legislator 
of the UAE, has a deterrent effect which creates a protection and secures the stability 
and security of the society. This is consistent with the feeling of the overwhelming 
majority of those with Arab and Muslim roots. The great question here is how far the 
United Arab Emirates has taken capital punishment into account in its penal legislation, 
and what types of offence entail the death penalty. Is the use of the death penalty 
necessary for certain specific crimes, or is it possible to address these successfully by 
other kinds of punishment, and if so, what should these alternatives be?  
 
 
To answer these questions, we need first to indicate the types of crime for which the 
United Arab Emirates has designated the penalty of death. We must estimate whether 
certain crimes jeopardize internal security. Additionally, it is important to determine 
how far the legislator is influenced by sources other than Islamic sharia, and how 
correct he is in the assumption that the most severe crimes can be addressed by other 
penalties.  
  
5.1 The Death Penalty and the Federal penal code  
The Penal Code is precise in mentioning capital punishment only as a discretionary 
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punishment, and not as a divine ordinance or even as a retaliation punishment. The 
legislator, in the Federal Penal Code, dedicated eight chapters, from Article No. 1 to 
Article No. 434, to allocating punishments for discretionary crimes, since the legislator 
abbreviated the punishment for divine ordinance and retaliation crimes in the first 
paragraph of the first Article of this code. The first of these eight chapters deals with 
crimes against state security, whether internal or external, and the representatives of the 
regime. The second deals with crimes related to public positions, while the third deals 
with crimes against justice. The fourth deals with crimes of general danger and the fifth 
with crimes against religious beliefs and rites. The sixth chapter deals with crimes 
against family and the seventh deals with crimes against individuals. Finally, the eighth 
chapter deals with financial crimes. We will concentrate on crimes punished by capital 
punishment as a discretionary punishment, which are divided into three categories: 
crimes against state security, whether internal or external, crimes against the 
representatives of the regime; crimes against individuals which, in this research, is given 
priority. These crimes will be studied in detail to ascertain whether the federal legislator 
was right to impose such harsh a punishment, or whether such strictness was 
unnecessary as there were viable alternatives which could have been used. 
 
5.1.1 Crimes against the state and its figureheads 
Since its independence in 1971, the United Arab Emirates has established diplomatic 
and economic relations with all world countries on the basis of international law and 
peaceful coexistence with all countries. However, due to the instability which the 
world undergoes sometimes, and the possibility that disagreements or war could break 
out at any time, most if not all countries take procedures to strengthen their security 
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and encourage their citizens not to involve themselves with hostile powers that may 
harm or endanger the national interest whether before or during the outbreak of war31. 
Hence, the federal legislator established, through the Penal Law of 1987, the strictness 
of the punishment for crimes which may jeopardize the security and stability of the 
state, and he legalized capital punishment for such crimes. 
 
Article No. 149 of the Federal Penal Code states that "Any citizen who joins the armed 
forces of any country in a state of war with the country or the armed forces of any 
group opponent to the country shall be punished by the death penalty". After careful 
examination of this provision, it can be seen that the legislator has placed three 
conditions to be satisfied before capital punishment can be implemented:  
 
1. Citizenship 
The legislator stipulates that someone who commits the crime of joining the enemy 
army or opponent forces must be a citizen of the country, a matter that is easily proved. 
Hence, if someone who is not a citizen joins the enemy forces, he is not subject to the 
provisions of this article as the legislator is strict here due to the nature of treason 
inherent in this crime. If it is a citizen who joins with hostile power, he is considered a 
traitor in addition to being an aggressor against the country32.  
2. Joining the enemy forces or an armed opponent group 
 
The legislator has stipulated that the citizen should actually join the enemy forces. By 
joining is meant actually entering the service of the enemy forces, but it does not 
                                                            
31 The relevance of those remarks can be seen in the events of recent years in the Arab world. Although 
the UAE has remained quiet and stable, many of our neighbours have been effected by the upheavals of 
2011.   
32 Alwakad, Amr., Penal law (Arabic), Alkism Alkhas fi Qanoon Aloqobat, 1995, p 7 
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necessarily imply joining the regular military service in a conventional sense. It is 
sufficient that he participates in any military or technical act as, for example, working 
on a runway to assist warplanes to take off and land, or rendering medical or logistical 
services33. 
3. State of War 
The legislator has added to the above qualifications conditions the condition of a state of 
war existent between the UAE and another country or armed group. War is an armed 
conflict or struggle, whether between one country and another or between one country 
and an armed group aiming at usurping power34. Consequently, it is not sufficient to a 
state of war that the country has taken internal measures: the state of war must be 
officially declared35. 
 
Thus, joining with an enemy is a crime which might critically affect the country. The 
legislator was right surely to apply the death penalty and be strict in the punishment of 
this crime, as joining forces with an enemy is considered an outrageous crime against 
any resident of the country, and the more severe if it is committed by a citizen who has 
a duty to protect and defend his homeland and the unity of its lands. Many legislatures 
in the world36 punish their citizens with the death penalty for crimes of betrayal, during 
a state of war. On the other hand, since this kind of situation is very rare, so imposing 
the death penalty essentially means no more than that the state needs to insure that its 
citizens are loyal to their country and that such crime is abhorred. On the other hand, 
                                                            
33 Bakr, Abdulmohaimen., Penal law (Arabic), Alkism Alkhas fi Qanoon Aloqobat, Dar Alnahdha 
Alarabia, 1968, p 70. 
34 Suroor, Ahmed Fathi., Crimes against public interest (Arabic), Aljaraem Almodhera Belmaslaha 
Alama, Dar Alnahdha Alaraia, 1963, p 32. 
35 Alwakad, Amr., op.cit., p 10. 
36 This covered under the Egyptian Penal Code, Article 77 and in the penal codes of other Arab states, but 
it can even be found in the statutes of post 1945, European states, such as Netherlands, as referenced later 
in this thesis. 
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since this crime is of the discretionary type, the legislator might have imposed two 
punishments for it, the first being the death penalty and the second, life imprisonment. 
He might even have considered temporary imprisonment, in order to retain a 
discretionary option, depending, of course, on the particular circumstances of the case 
and of the perpetrator. By decreeing a mandatory sentence, the judge does not give the 
judge the opportunity to exercise his own judgment in cases where, for example, all the 
elements of the crime may be present, but where he thinks that the perpetrator does not 
deserve the death penalty. 
 
Turning to a second crime punishable by death, which is giving assistance to the enemy, 
Article No. 150 of the Penal Law states that "The death penalty shall be the punishment 
of:  
“(A) anyone who interferes for the interest of the enemy in any arrangement to shake 
the loyalty of the armed forces, or diminish their morale and resistance; (B) anyone 
who instigates the soldiers in a time of war to join the service of a foreign country or 
facilitate the same; (C) anyone who intentionally interferes in any manner to gather 
soldiers or men or collect money, supplies, and logistics, or arrange any of these 
things, in favor of a country or any group that is in a state of war with the state".  
 
We should note that this article details other criminal forms of helping the enemy, such 
as shaking the loyalty of the armed forces, and spreading fear and despair in the souls 
members of the armed forces in order to diminish their resistance. Paragraph (a) of this 
article is open to the criticism that it does not specify the condition that the criminal act 
must be made during a time of war, in contrast to paragraph (b), which adds the 
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condition that instigation to join the service of any foreign country applies to the 
military but not to any other category. Thus, instigation to the civilians does not satisfy 
the definition of the crime. Furthermore, this paragraph does not specify or make clear 
the type of service meant, and it states instigation to join the service of a foreign 
country in time of war without requiring that country to be hostile or in conspiracy 
against the UAE. The legislator might have been clear in this regard and criminalized 
only an instigation to join the service of a hostile country in a state of war with the 
UAE, since joining the service of a foreign country not in a state of hostility ought not 
to be criminalized. Work for another country may have an honorable purpose, such as 
the aiding of refugees or providing other humanitarian assistance37. 
 
As for paragraph (c), it clearly criminalized persons who provide money, supplies or 
logistics to any country in a state of war with the UAE. It is apparent in this paragraph 
that the criminal intention must be clear, i.e., an intention to betray the homeland, and 
not merely to gain material benefits. However, we do not find any clarification of 
criminal intention as long as the country is in a state of war with another country, when 
just thinking of helping the enemy, even for material profit, is a serious matter and 
should not be contemplated by any loyal citizen. On the other hand, paragraph (c) 
might be criticized for not making clear whether it refers to things, supplies or logistics 
that are collected and actually sent to the enemy, or whether collection alone is 
sufficient. The legislator should have been clear and stated that supplies and logistics 
must be transferred to the enemy for the death penalty to be applicable. In view of the 
severity of the punishment, this crime should be identified clearly.  
 
                                                            
37 Bakr, Abdulmahaimen. op.cit., p. 183. 
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However, the most significant issue here is that of the following article38, Article 151, 
which sentences to death anyone who helps the enemy to enter the territory of the 
country or even handles or surrenders any part of the land, port, fort or plane or any 
means of transportation. This was amended for reasons not known to allow either the 
death penalty or life imprisonment. This change seems a strange step for the legislator 
to have taken since the crime is more onerous than the crime specified in Article 150. If 
we consider the logic here, it is Article 150 that should be amended, not Article 151. 
The reasons for reducing the punishment should be studied well and should apply to the 
less dangerous crime, not to the most dangerous. Moreover, the legislator has not 
defined the perpetrator here and whether he should be a member of the armed forces or 
just a civilian. The legislator should also vary the punishment according to the 
perpetrator’s status. Using the word “Anyone” means all people: the citizens, the armed 
forces members and even the temporary residents of the country. Thus, it is surely 
sensible to distinguish between all these people and to vary the punishment. 
 
Turning to the third crime punishable by death, which is the crime of espionage, Imam 
Malik, as noted in chapter three, prescribed the use of the death penalty as a 
discretionary punishment for the accused in the crime of spying and accordingly, the 
UAE legislator has done the same. The legislator was strict in the punishment for this 
crime and stated in Article 154 “the death penalty is the punishment for anyone who 
contacts any hostile foreign country or anyone promoting its interests or with any of 
them to assist it in its warlike operations or to jeopardize the country’s war like 
operations”. Therefore, from this article it can be understood that the crime of spying 
                                                            
38 See Article 151, federal Penal Code and its amendment made in December 2005 by law No. 34. 
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must be committed during a state of war between the UAE and another country or 
countries. However, the legislator did not make clear whether the crime of espionage 
must cause harm to the country and whether the crime must actually jeopardize its war 
operations. The two cases should not be treated equally and the same punishment given, 
since, if capital punishment is imposed for a crime which does not cause actual harm to 
the country, what punishment can be imposed for the crime that causes a real disaster? 
Again, the legislator should not determine a mandatory sentence for this crime and 
should have differentiated by allowing discretion between these cases. A principle of 
punishment under the criminal code of all countries is that an act is judged by its 
consequences not merely by its intent39. 
 
In this context, we will discuss two further crimes punishable by the death penalty 
pursuant to the Federal Penal Code. The first of these is the overthrowing or usurping 
the regime, and the second is assaulting the safety of the representatives or figureheads 
of the regime. 
  
The federal legislator was very strict in respect of this crime, provided for under Article 
(174), as he prescribed the death penalty for whoever initiates the overthrow or 
usurpation of the regime by force. Here, this crime is treated as equivalent to the crime 
of rebellion, which, as we have seen, comes under the category of crimes of divine 
ordinance and which, according to the Islamic sharia, is punishable by death. It is 
assumed here that the legislator did not intend to equate the two crimes since he did not 
give any conditions or rules to imply such punishment. The legislator is concerned here 
                                                            
39 Suroor, Ahmed Fathi., op.cit., p. 22 
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to insure the stability of the regime and consequently its figureheads. His motive is 
surely incontestable since stability and even justice itself must be felt and touched in 
every aspect of life. This requires strictness. 
Another step was taken by the legislator when he amended Article (174) and added to it 
that the death penalty not only applies to those embarking upon this crime but even to 
those who attempt by any means to take power in the regime by force. Again, the 
legislator showed great strictness towards this crime, and this step was surely taken to 
provide more stability for the regime. Citizens of the United Arab Emirates may be 
confident that all people wish to live in peace which can never be gained without the 
stability of the regime. The country is moving steadily towards providing a better life 
for all its inhabitants and it needs to assure people that they live in a moderate and 
stable regime. Since, however, the legislator has not given further definition to the 
words “commence” or “attempt” in the amendment of the article, and does not specify 
whether such a crime must cause death or casualties, it seems advisable that a clear 
differentiation should be made between the two punishments – capital punishment and 
life imprisonment – to give more flexibility and discretion to the judge40. Without 
further clarification of the amendment to Article (174), there may be a danger that 
thought is equated with action, which would be almost impossible to establish as fact in 
a court of law.   
 
Moreover, the legislator stressed the need for the imposition of the death penalty against 
anyone who imperils the safety or who threatens the freedom of the President or even 
puts his life at risk41. The same punishment is imposed if the crime is committed against 
                                                            
40 See Article No. 174, federal penal code (1987) and its amendment made in December 2005. 
41 See Article 175, federal Penal Code for the year 1987. 
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the Vice President or the rulers of the six other Emirates. The first of these is physical 
assault, next is assault on the freedom of the figureheads, and finally the putting of their 
lives in danger. The legislator has prescribed capital punishment for all these actions. 
The legislator wanted to insure that any kind of assault, whether physical or not, is 
punished by death. Again, this is a matter in which the stability of the regime is 
implicated, in this case at the highest level of society. 
 
Furthermore, the legislator amended Article (175)42 to increase its strictness by 
prescribing life imprisonment for anyone who ‘tries’43 to commit such an action and to 
the death penalty if the act itself is attempted or committed. However, in the 
amendment, the punishment is to be imposed if the crime is committed against the 
President only and not against anyone else. The legislator, it seems, intentionally 
reduced the level of punishment by not including the Vice President or the rulers of the 
Emirates. He wanted to signal to observers that the country does not want to impose 
capital punishment but, at the same time, send a clear message that the life and safety of 
the president is not negotiable. However, the question arises as to what the punishment 
would be if a crime or the assault were to be committed against the Vice President or 
the rulers of the Emirates. The legislator omits to specify these sanctions in the 
amendment to the article. Yet it is surely essential to ascribe a punishment which should 
vary depending on the result of the crime. Capital punishment is applicable at least as a 
divine ordinance punishment if the crime of rebbelion causes death, according to the 
                                                            
42 See amendment made to Article 175 of the federal penal code according to Law No. 34, December 
2005 
43 The legislator used the word ‘tries’ and not ‘attempts’; although it is not a legal term it might be used 
here to assure more protection to the president. My concern is that this word has different meanings and it 
might be used here to give the power to the police to arrest anyone whom they think might be preparing 
for such action without a physical attempt or the commencement of the crime. 
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Islamic sharia. Furthermore, this punishment is stipulated in the case of committing the 
crime against presidents of foreign countries44. 
 
5.1.2 Crimes by and against individuals 
After relating in some detail the punishment of crimes against the regime and its 
figureheads or representatives, we must examine other crimes punishable by the death 
penalty, such as crimes committed by one individual against another member of the 
public. The federal legislator has specified the death penalty for certain crimes against 
individuals but the question here is whether the UAE legislator is moving towards 
abolition of this punishment, or away from it. The focus should be on crimes expressly 
punishable by the death penalty rather than crimes in which the legislator has given the 
judge the power of discretion to choose between the death penalty, life imprisonment or 
temporary imprisonment. However, cases where the legislator may choose to commute 
the penalty will also be discussed. The subject has been divided into three sections. In 
the first, perjury and false notification of crimes are looked at, in the second, crimes 
involving public danger, in the third, crimes against individuals and homicide in 
particular. 
 
A further crime affecting both the individual and the state is Perjury and false testimony 
in evidence. These are deemed to be among offences45 for which the legislator has 
stipulated imprisonment. However, he can be more severe in punishment if this crime 
have lead to the execution of an innocent person, or to his imprisonment for life. The 
legislator has stressed that a witness who commits perjury or someone who falsely 
                                                            
44 See Article No. 179, which is identical to Article 175, even down to its amendment: the legislator used 
the same words and terms. 
45 See Articles 253 and 276 of the Federal Penal Code. 
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notifies a crime, thereby sending any innocent person to death or life imprisonment, 
should receive the same punishment. Logically, the legislator is surely correct in his 
strictness towards this crime as a deterrent to anyone thinking of causing harm to others. 
This kind of punishment complies with the Islamic sharia provisions as stated by the 
Lord in the Holy Quran: “punishment is of the same kind as the deed”46. Consequently, 
if an innocent person has been sent to death as a result of perjury, the false witness shall 
receive the same punishment as if he intended to send the innocent person to his or her 
death. 
 
The legislator devoted the fourth chapter of the Penal Code to crimes involving public 
danger. These are dealt with in twenty-four Articles. Such crimes include attacking a 
means of transport and setting fire intentionally. It is strange that despite the gravity of 
some of these crimes, the legislator did not stipulate the death penalty for them, but was 
satisfied with imprisonment and a fine. In road accidents, for example, culpability may 
be so high that he death penalty, for both punishment and deterrence, should be 
considered. 
 
It is stipulated under the penal code that life imprisonment applies to anyone who 
attacks an aeroplane or vessel in order to seize it, to harm the passengers or to change its 
route47. Despite the gravity of such crimes, in which the criminal may occasion injury to 
the passengers, the legislator was content to impose a penalty of life imprisonment. It 
may be said that the legislator restricted himself to the term “injury” and does not refer 
to “murder”, so the question of the death penalty does not arise. However, to attack a 
                                                            
46 Surat Almaeda, verse 45. 
47 Article 288 and 289 of the Penal Code 
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vessel or aeroplane carrying innocent passengers is a major crime in itself and can 
expose innocent passengers to injury or death. Thus, the legislator might have been 
stricter since this crime is similar in nature to armed highway robbery crime (Al 
Harabah). It would surely have been better to give a judge the option of two 
punishments, namely the death penalty and imprisonment, whether temporarily or for 
life, depending on the circumstances. Such leniency of the legislator here is difficult to 
justify, though it might be assumed that the legislator intended to indicate that this 
punishment was only for attacking the means of transport and not for causing the death 
of passengers. However, in that case, the legislator could have drawn a distinction 
between these two scenarios and clarified the punishment for each. 
 
In the intentional setting of fire, the legislator stipulated imprisonment for not less than 
seven years for anyone who sets light to a building, factory, workshop, warehouse or 
inhabited dwelling, and if the fire causes the death of one person or more, then the death 
penalty shall be imposed48. Arguably this penalty should have been stricter and it should 
not be necessary to wait for innocent people to die before raising the threshold of 
punishment to the death penalty. It is difficult to see why the legislator was not more 
severe with such crimes. Moreover, in crimes of attacking means of transport such as 
aeroplanes and vessels, he was satisfied with stipulating life imprisonment, without 
defining the meaning of “disaster” (Karetha, as recognized in Article 288-289), or 
specifying whether it involved the death of one person or more49. Again, the legislator 
might have been more precise by suggesting two alternative punishment, namely death 
or life imprisonment where death has been caused, or temporary imprisonment where 
                                                            
48 Articles 304 and 305 of the Penal Code 
49 Article 289 of the Penal Code. 
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the crime caused no actual harm to persons or property. 
 
We have found here that a number of comments might be made as to the limitations set 
by the legislator. Firstly, there appear to be instances where the legislator has not chosen 
to follow the precept laid down by the sharia, reasons for which have already been 
suggested and will continue to be discussed in this thesis. Secondly, there are types of 
crime for which, it might be argued, in a legal system that admits the death penalty, 
there should be capital punishment. Taking together, these suggest an attitude of 
growing leniency, and reluctance to apply the full severity of the law to crimes of an 
extreme kind.  
 
In Chapter One, it was shown that Islamic sharia prescribes retaliation in crimes against 
individuals as this is a pure right given by Allah to the persons assaulted and their blood 
relatives. In crimes of intentional murder, Allah ordains retaliation against the murderer 
as punishment for the crime he has committed. However, Allah urges blood relatives to 
give pardon to the murderer and to waive their claim to retaliation; since such a waiver 
is much better for their life in this world and the hereafter. The federal penal law, as 
well as other criminal legislation, incriminates the murder of innocents but not invoking 
the principles of Islamic sharia with respect to retaliation, it does not stipulate the death 
penalty for intentional murder unless that act is associated with aggravated 
circumstances. This is in contrast to Islamic sharia, which does not differentiate 
between intentional murder and intentional murder associated with aggravating 
circumstances, and speak only of cases where the intention of the criminal is clear or not 
clear. Putting an end to a human life with a killing tool, for example, necessitates 
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retaliation unless the blood relatives relieve the perpetrator. The offender is then liable 
to pay Diya in addition to any discretionary penalty decided by the ruler or judge. In this 
section, examples of intentional murder as stated by the federal legislator are discussed 
along with the punishment for murder not associated with aggravated circumstances. 
This will be followed by a consideration of the punishment for intentional murder 
associated with aggravating circumstances. 
 
1. Intentional murder not associated with aggravated circumstances 
The legislator in the UAE has followed other legislators, such as the Egyptian 
legislator50, in stipulating life or temporary imprisonment for intentional murder not 
associated with aggravating circumstances. It is noted that the UAE legislator has given 
an option to the judge in imposing the punishment to choose between the maximum 
limit of life imprisonment or the minimum limit of temporary imprisonment, which 
Article 68 specified should be for a period of not less than three years and not to exceed 
fifteen years. Here, the attitude of the UAE legislator gives a clear indication of being 
affected by Western legislation and particularly secular Arab legislation, including that 
of Egypt which has been greatly affected by Western legislation. 
 
What is new here is the amendment to Article 332 of the Federal Penal Law passed in 
December 2005. The legislator added a paragraph which states “punishment of 
imprisonment for not less than one year if the blood relative waived their right of 
retaliation in any stage of the case procedures or before execution”. This addition was 
made to cover an error in Article 332 under which blood relatives waive their right of 
                                                            
50 See Article 332 of the UAE Penal Code and Article 234 of the Egyptian Penal Code. 
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retaliation and fixed mandatory punishment to the extent that the judge had no 
discretion to determine the same. This addition, however, introduces a viable 
punishment for intentional murder of imprisonment for not less than one, and not more 
than three years, in cases where the blood relatives have waived their rights. On the 
other hand, if the blood relatives refuse to waive their right, it is not clear whether the 
punishment is imposed in function of retaliation or as a discretionary punishment. 
Hence, it seems that this article was not required at all, since punishment for intentional 
murder is the death penalty as retaliation, pursuant to the sharia provisions, and 
pursuant to the first Article of the Penal Code. However, if the punishment is intended 
to be discretionary, then there is no need to add a new discretionary punishment, such as 
imprisonment, since this is already the specified, discretionary punishment for this 
crime. 
 
2. Intentional murder associated with aggravated circumstances 
The legislator has followed most of the Western legislation methods which differentiate 
between intentional murder and intentional murder with or without aggravated 
circumstances. However, this distinction does not follow the provisions of the Islamic 
sharia, in which there is no such distinction. The aggravated circumstances, as 
stipulated by the UAE legislator, are51: 
1- Intentional murder associated with observation or premeditation. 
2- Association between intentional murder and another crime. 
3- Intentional murder if the victim is an antecedent of the murderer. 
4- Intentional murder if the victim is a public official or commissioned to render a 
                                                            
51 See Article 332 of the Federal Penal Code. 
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public service while on duty or service. 
5- Intentional murder by poison or explosive material. 
The aggravated circumstances indicated here will be examined in more detail to 
discover the reasoning behind the attitude of the legislator, whether in being strict in the 
imposition of the death penalty or in being more lenient, and how far these conditions 
have roots in the provisions of the Islamic sharia, and whether such conditions 
contradict the provisions of Islamic law. 
 
With respect to premeditation, the first paragraph of Article 333 of the Federal Penal 
Code defines it as “the insistent intention, prior to the committing of the crime, against 
any person, and the precise and accurate preparation of all necessary methods for the 
committing of the act”. It should be noted that the Federal legislator, in his definition of 
premeditation, did not add to the phrase “the insistent intention prior to the act”. This 
may leads us to assume that it is sufficient in fulfillment of this condition for there to 
have been a lapse of time between the intention of the perpetrator and the commission 
of the crime. Accordingly, the main aspect in premeditation has been omitted, which is 
the psychological aspect. For premeditation to have occurred, the perpetrator must have 
thought about his crime in a calm and assured manner, forming his intention before 
actual engagement in the performance of the crime52. Accordingly, premeditation may 
be defined as the calm meditation of a crime, and the offender’s determination to carry 
it out, prior to committing that crime. In other words, the perpetrator in this period of 
time forms his intention to commit the crime in a fully conscious manner and can be 
presumed, therefore, to have calculated the consequences of his action. 
                                                            
52 Khaleel, Adli., Homicide cases (Arabic), Jaraem Alqatl Alamd, Dar Alkotob Alqanonya, 2002, p 403 
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1. Time Aspect    
Article 333 stipulates “the insistent intention prior to the (act)…”, which requires a 
lapse of a period of time, either long or short, between the intention of the perpetrator to 
commit the crime and his engaging in carrying it out. In fact, the aspect of time is 
required, yet it is essential to give an opportunity for the perpetrator to think and 
meditate on his crime, whilst being in a calm and assured state of mind, and free from 
the effect of emotions and mental disturbances. The aspect of time is therefore required 
as a main condition to achieve the mental aspect53. 
 
2. The psychological aspect  
In the psychological or mental aspect, the perpetrator has thought about the crime, 
insisted upon it and engaged himself to committing it, while being in a calm state, free 
from all emotions and anger. This aspect is the most important characteristic of 
premeditation, and the reason for intensifying punishment of the crime. The perpetrator 
who engages in the committing of the crime after thinking and in an assured mental 
state expresses a dangerous mentality. He is more dangerous than the perpetrator 
engaging in a murder with no prior insistence, but who is under the influence of an 
emotional rage or mental disorder54. Accordingly, premeditation requires that the 
perpetrator has calmly reached his decision, thus allowing him to think further and draw 
up a plan to carry out his crime. 
 
A vital question arises in relation to both 1 and 2 in the above, concerning the time 
                                                            
53 Salama, Ahmed Kamil., Commentary on the penal law (Arabic), Sharh Qanoon Aloqobat, Maktabat 
Nahdat Alsharq, 1987, p 38 
54 Suroor, Tariq., The penal law (Arabic), Qanon Aloqobat, Dar Alnahda Alarabia, Second Edition, 2001, 
p 61 
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period between premeditation of the crime and its execution. The Egyptian Court of 
Cassation, in one of its judgments, ruled that this should be determined by the court and 
that the judge has the right to decide this issue from the circumstances of each case.55 If, 
given the existence of the mental and time aspects, the condition of premeditation is met 
and, as a consequence, the culpability for murder is intensified, then the penalty may be 
elevated to the death penalty. This provision cannot apply if the perpetrator has 
murdered another person by mistake. Yet premeditation does not necessitate that the 
intent to murder is defined, as premeditation exists if the intent to murder is undefined 
but intended for a specified or unspecified person who the perpetrator has encountered. 
This applies if the intent is to murder whoever is in the way, regardless of their identity, 
in order to create a scene and disturbance, or in order to create fear in some person or 
persons56. Article 333 of the Federal Penal Code elaborates this meaning further by 
stating “against any person”. 
 
3. Premeditation and criminal participation 
Where there is agreement between two participants in a crime, the provision of 
premeditation is stipulated for each of them separately. Hence, co-ordination in the 
agreement to murder is not a decisive issue in the legal definition of premeditation, as 
the participants may suddenly intend to murder the victim, and agree to performing the 
murder at once, in such a manner that premeditation is not provided, as the period of 
time taken to agree does not allow for premeditation or calm thinking. 
Accordingly, a reverse action may be achieved and premeditation may be provided for 
participants in a crime without there having been a previous agreement to commit the 
                                                            
55 Egyptian cassation court, appeal heard on 25th, Jan, 1931 
56 Meki, Mohammed Abdulhamid., Crimes against individuals (Arabic), Jaraem Al eateda Ala Alashkhas, 
Dar Alnahdha Alarabia, 2002, p 114. 
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murder, as the two persons may insist – each individually – on the murder, without 
agreement, and hence they both commit the crime at the same time, or in periods of time 
that are close together57. 
 
4. Proving Premeditation 
As mentioned above, premeditation is a mental state, existing in the soul of the 
perpetrator, which has no physical effect on the outside but is derived from external 
facts, circumstances and conditions. 
Premeditation is not recognizable through physical actions performed by the 
perpetrator, and therefore cannot be proven by the testimony of a witness, but generally 
inferred by similarities. From that point, the perpetrator prepares his means before he 
commits the crime, whether he purchases a weapon that he intends to use to murder the 
victim, or expresses his intention to perform the crime prior to committing it, or 
threatens to murder the victim, or prepares in advance the means to enable him to 
escape after committing the crime58. 
 
Although the Islamic sharia punishes by the death penalty the crime of murder in all its 
basic form, the Federal Penal Code in Article 332 only punishes murder with 
premeditation by capital punishment. Thus, as we have seen before, the federal penal 
code in not fully in accordance with Islamic law, and in this there is a further illustration 
of how the federal legislator has been influenced by Western legislators, and by other 
Arab states which apply Western laws. 
                                                            
57 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shouki., penal law (Arabic), Qanoon Aloqobat “Alqism Alkas”, University of 
Almansoora press, 1985, p 71. 
58 Alsagheer, Jameel Abudlbaqi., Crimes against individuals (Arabic), Qanoon Aloqobat “Jaraem 
Aldam”, Dar Alnahdha Alarabia, 1997, p 51. 
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5. Ambush   
The Federal Penal Code regards ambush as an aggravated condition in the crime of 
intentional murder (homicide). The second paragraph of Article 333 of the Federal 
Penal Code defines the circumstances as being “The ambush of a person by another in a 
location or in several locations for a period of time whether short or long, to reach the 
murder of a person or his attack by any means of violence”. Article 332 of the Federal 
Penal Code stipulates the punishment for the premeditated murder with ambush as being 
“All those who wilfully murder a soul are punishable by death if the murder was 
committed with ambush…”. According to this interpretation, ambush occurs when the 
perpetrator waits for the victim for a period of time, whether long or short, in a place in 
which he expects him to appear, where he may surprise and attack him, the victim being 
unaware of the matter, and being unprepared to defend himself. Therefore, the ambush 
is a sudden attack on the victim, after waiting for the victim in a certain place, whatever 
its nature may be. Therefore, the crime is the same whether the perpetrator hides while 
waiting for the victim until the surprise and sudden attack is achieved in its complete 
form or is unhidden, as he may be concealed behind a wall or tree or may wait in a place 
to which the victim is accustomed to go. It may also be possible for the perpetrator to 
wait for the victim in a public place, such as in a street or a hospital, or a private place 
such as a garden, or in a place owned by the perpetrator himself, such as in his vehicle 
or at his home59. 
 
The legislator found that ambush is a means of having the killer guarantee the 
performance of his crime in an instance where the victim is unable to defend himself. 
                                                            
59 Saleh, Hassanain Ibrahim., Crimes against individuals (Arabic), Jaraem Aleteda Ala Alashkhas, Dar 
Alnahda Alarabia, 1983, p 54 
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Thus this method in itself is considered to call for severity of punishment, as it proves 
the perpetrator’s villainy and his persistence in guaranteeing the success of his action in 
causing death and destruction from unseen places60. 
 
There is a general distinction to be drawn between the conditions of ambush and 
premeditation. Premeditation, as previously mentioned, is a personal condition related 
to criminal intent, and is not valid except with respect to the concerned person separate 
from any other participants in the crime. Ambush, on the other hand, is a physical 
condition, related to the material facts of the crime, and is not related to criminal intent. 
Accordingly, it is enforceable on all participants and partners in the crime, whether they 
had knowledge or were ignorant of the fact. 
 
Ambush, as mentioned in the example of premeditation, is a severe circumstance in all 
crimes of murder and wilful attack and, accordingly, in most cases, ambush is 
associated with premeditation. However, ambush can be achieved in the absence of 
premeditation, as ambush in itself does not presuppose premeditation. On the other 
hand, the general opinion in France is that ambush constitutes a type of premeditation 
associated with the intention to commit the crime with an external action, which is the 
ambush of the victim in a place, in surveillance of his presence, and the enactment of 
this intention61. If this opinion had prevailed, the federal legislator in the United Arab 
Emirates would not have needed to mention ambush, since specifying premeditation 
would have been sufficient. However, the uncertainty between the two conditions exists. 
It may be assumed that ambush is possible in the absence of premeditation, as is the 
                                                            
60 Meki, Mohammed Abdulhameed., op. cit., p123 
61 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shawqi., Crimes against individuals in the UAE penal law (Arabic), Aljaraem 
Alwaqea Ala Alashkas Fe Qanon Aloqobat Alitihadi, Albayan press, first edition, 1990, p 121. 
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case when a person awaits his adversary after a fight, and then kills him, before showing 
the anger behind his action. Such a murder would be described as ambush without 
premeditation. 
     
Nevertheless, Proving ambush is an objective matter, on which the Court of Cassation 
(Supreme Court) has no surveillance over the lower court, except in the soundness of its 
reasoning. Ambush is a physical incident which may be proven by different forms of 
evidence, including confession and the testimony of witnesses. The court has the final 
word concerning its existence or non-existence, based on what it deems permissible 
with regard to all aspects of proof62. 
 
6. Murder correlated with another crime 
The federal legislator has stipulated conditions concerning severity in the second 
paragraph of Article 332 of the Penal Code by stating “The death Penalty is presented if 
murder is committed…correlated with another crime”. The notion of severity in the 
penalty of intentional murder correlated with the another crime is that the perpetrator 
who commits two crimes, one of them being the  crime of willful murder, within a set 
period of time exposes the extent of the hidden criminal danger inside him63. 
 
It is noted that the application of the general rules in the variety of crimes and 
punishments stipulated in Article 88 of the Federal Penal Code necessitates that the 
punishment for a perpetrator who commits another crime aside from wilful murder 
                                                            
62 Khaleel, Adli., op. cit., p 541 
63 Abdulsatar, Fauzia., Commentary on penal law (Arabic), Sharh qanoon Aloqoobat, Dar Alnahdha 
Alarabia, second edition, 2000, p 406. 
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should be more severe if the committing of both crimes would achieve a single 
objective, and hence the crimes were integrally associated. The federal legislator also 
decided the necessity of the general rules and therefore did not settle on bestowing the 
most severe penalty but decided to assign one severe penalty, which is the death 
penalty, as the other crime loses its identity and independence, leading to the 
impossibility of a severe condition for the crime of the murder, hence the death penalty 
is applied. Some other legislators64 demand that the other crime should be a felony, 
which contradicts the UAE legislator who holds that this other crime can be of any kind. 
 
For the condition of association in murder, the following three conditions are required: 
the performance of a willful murder, the performance of another crime and the existence 
of a temporal association between the murder and the crime. These conditions will be 
discussed in some detail as follows. 
 
A. The performance of a homicide crime 
For the provision of this condition, the perpetrator is required to commit the murder 
willfully, whether in the capacity of a direct doer, or in the capacity of a partner in 
causation. If the murder was a crime in error, correlated with another crime, then the 
condition of severity is not provided. For example, this situation would apply if a person 
                                                            
64 Article 234 of Egyptian Penal Code. 
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runs into another person with his car and kills him and while a passer-by attempts to 
catch him to prevent him from escaping, another one sustains permanent disablement.65 
 
B. The committing of another crime 
For the provision of the condition of severity, the perpetrator is required to have 
committed another crime alongside the crime of willful murder, and it is not a condition 
for the other crime to be complete, as it may rest on the limit of intent, as the law does 
not punish the other crime in itself but for its being a condition of severity for the 
punishment of willful murder. 
It is also a condition that the crime was committed alongside the willful murder but is 
completely independent of that murder and distinguished from it, i.e. not associated 
with any of its elements. Accordingly, the condition of severity is not achieved if the 
perpetrator commits a crime out of which two crimes result, such as if a shot was fired 
and injured two people, since here we face moral or false diversity, and not actual 
diversity. Hence, the most severe punishment is applied in accordance with Article 87 
of the Federal Penal Code. 
It is also a condition that the other crime is independent from the act of murder, in that if 
there is only one act which could be described in law under two different descriptions, 
or if there are actions, or a number of actions which are not found in the law except as 
one crime, the provisions would not apply. Moreover, the other crime should be 
punishable. If it is not, and if the perpetrator provides a reason of divulgence or an 
impediment to responsibility or punishment, the punishment would not be severe. This 
                                                            
65 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shauki., op. cit., p 124. 
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condition is not directly expressed in the context of the provision in Article 332 of the 
Federal Penal Code, yet it is inferred from the prudence of severity. As the legislator did 
not decide upon the death penalty, except to replace the punishment for wilful murder 
and another crime correlated with it, it has no place except if anyone who commits an 
act of murder or another crime deserves a punishment for his action. 
 
C. The association of time between the two crimes 
The condition for the severity of the punishment of wilful murder provided for in the 
second paragraph of Article 332 of the Federal Penal Code stipulated the existence of an 
association of time between the crime of wilful murder and the other crime. By 
association of time, is meant that both crimes are committed in one period of time. 
Without this condition, the notion of severity is non-existent, and therein lies a problem 
concerning it. The perpetrator who commits two dangerous crimes in a short period of 
time. The federal legislator has not defined the time limit within which the murder and 
the other crime is required to have been committed. Therefore, the provision of an 
association becomes an objective issue, subject to the discretion of the judge on the 
subject, through which he deliberates the existence of association in each case 
separately, in light of the notion of the legislator to increase the punishment for murder 
if it is associated with another crime. This issue cannot be reviewed by the Court of 
Cassation. The association between the crimes requires an association of time. 
However, at what point is it safe to say that the crimes are correlated concerning the 
closeness of the times at which they were committed? 
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It is a condition for the provision of this aspect that there is causation between the 
willful murder and the crime associated with it, as the federal legislator does not apply a 
condition that the committing of one crime leads to the other; it is sufficient that it is 
committed with the murder. Both crimes may be independent with respect to causation 
in spite of sharing an element of time. It is not required that the crimes are both 
committed in one place, or that they have one victim or one objective, and accordingly 
it is sufficient that the other crime is committed prior to or after or in association with 
the murder66. 
 
7. Variation in felonies 
If a number of felons have contributed to the committing of a willful murder in 
association with another crime, this is a condition of severity for each one of them, 
whether he is a direct perpetrator of the crime or has participated by causation only, or 
has contributed to either crime in his capacity as a partner by causation. 
If either of the felons contributed to one of the crimes and not the other, the condition of 
association is not applicable to him unless the other crime (in which the perpetrator is 
not involved) is the probable consequence of the first67. 
 
 
 
                                                            
66 Ahmed, Hosam Aldeen Mohammed., Commentary on penal law (Arabic), Sharh Qanoon Aloqobat, 
part 2, Dar Alnahdha Alarabia, 2000, p 84. 
67 Alfiqi, Amr Issa., Homicide crimes (Arabic), Alwajeez fi jaraem Alqtl Alamdi, Alnisr Aldhahabi press, 
2000, p 84. 
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8. Premeditated murder of relatives (parricide) 
The federal legislator in the United Arab Emirates increased the severity of the 
punishment for wilful murder if committed against a close relation of the perpetrator. 
Hence, the second paragraph of article 332 of the Federal Penal Code stipulated that 
“The death penalty shall be applied if murder is committed….on either of the 
perpetrator’s first degree relations”68. 
 
The clause clarifies that the condition of severity assumes a direct relationship between 
the perpetrator and the victim, consisting of the father, the mother, the grandfather, or 
the grandmother, and no others. There are some other legislators who include the 
children or grandchildren69, but the UAE federal legislator limited the scope to these 
relations only. The question which may arise here is why the legislator considers 
harsher punishment for willful murder necessary if the murderer commits the crime 
against his first degree relations. The reasoning behind the increase in the severity of the 
punishment refers to the fact that it is a horrendous crime by all standards; it indicates 
the dangerous criminality of the perpetrator and reflects a dangerous mentality that 
knows no limits. Those who murder their father, mother, grandfather or grandmother 
commit a crime against nature, defying human nature. Accordingly, the perpetrators of 
this crime should be removed from society through imposition of the death penalty70. 
 
                                                            
68 In Islam the first degree relations are father, mother, grandfather and grandmother. 
69 See Article 549 of the Lebanese Penal Code and Article 327 of the Libyan Penal Code. 
70 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shawki., op. cit., p 138. 
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As mentioned in Article 332, the condition for conviction concerning the murder of a 
close relation is that the murder is committed willfully with all the aspects previously 
mentioned. The relationship between the victim and the perpetrator must be father, 
grandfather, mother, or grandmother. The federal personal affairs law defines the 
existence or otherwise of a relationship, yet there is nothing to prevent the criminal 
judge from deliberating concerning this relationship considering that it is only a 
condition of the severity of the punishment without being limited to a certain method of 
proof. 
 
An additional condition concerns the moral aspect or the intent of the perpetrator. This 
is that he must have knowledge of his relationship to the victim at the time of 
committing the act, and that the victim is one of his relations. If his is ignorant of this 
fact, then the condition of severity is not provided. 
 
Another question may arise here concerning why the legislation is limited to the above-
mentioned relations and to no other person, such as relations in the second degree. Islam 
calls in the Holy Qur’an for the respect due to parents, and not to refuse their orders or 
demands. From this the federal legislator has insisted that the parents must be cared for 
and obeyed according to the provisions of the Islamic sharia.  
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9. Homicide of a public employee 
The Federal Penal Code increases the punishment of premeditated murder if committed 
against a public employee, as stipulated in Article 332; “The death penalty is applied if 
murder is committed…on a public employee or those who are appointed to general duty 
during or because of their performing of their service”. It is made clear by this clause 
that the condition of severity is provided through the specific description of the victim, 
whether his being a public employee or appointed to public service, and that he is 
murdered during, or as a consequence of, or with regard to his performing or practicing 
the duties of his office. 
 
The prudence of increasing the severity of the punishment relates to the fact that the 
perpetrator has murdered a public employee performing his duty, in the name of or for 
the benefit of the state. This is someone considered a representative of the state through 
the job he is performing. The committing of a murder in this light does not entail the 
person of the employee, but in fact entails the job he is performing or the service he is 
granting. Therefore, the federal legislator intended to provide protection to public 
employees to perform their duties and service in peace while, at the same time, 
encouraging people to join the public service. 
 
The legislator requires two conditions to be fulfilled to impose the death penalty in this 
crime: firstly, the capacity of the victim, and the victim being a public employee or 
appointed to carry out a public service; the committing of murder during the 
performance of his job or as a result of it. 
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The first condition, relates to the committing of premeditated murder of a public 
employee or someone who is appointed to perform a public service. The victim in the 
crime of premeditated murder accompanied with aggravated circumstances must be a 
public employee or appointed to public service. The federal legislator in the United 
Arab Emirates has defined a public employee in Article 5 of Federal Penal Code as 
follows: “In the provision of this Law, the public employees are: 
1. Those bearing encumbrances of the public authority, and those working in the 
Ministries and Government authorities.  
2. Members of the Armed Forces.  
3. Heads of Legislative councils, Consultations, Municipalities and their members.  
4. All those appointed by one of the public authorities to perform a certain job, in 
limitations of the delegated job.  
5. Chairmen of Boards, their members, managers and the remaining employees in 
the authorities and public establishments.  
6. Chairmen of Boards, their members, managers and the remaining employees in 
the authorities and establishments with a public benefit".  
 
Furthermore, all those who are not categorized in this article and who are appointed 
with a public service under the provisions of this law, and those who perform jobs 
related to the public service based on an appointment issued to him from a public 
employee who has this power of appointing, as per the laws or applied systems 
concerning the appointed job, are considered included. Also applicable in the 
enforcement of the provisions of the previous article is that the duty or job or service is 
either permanent or temporary, with or without wages, and may be either voluntary or 
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compulsory.  
 
The second condition, relates to the committing of a premeditated murder of an 
employee during, or as a consequence of, or regarding, the performing of his duties. 
Not only should the victim be a public employee but the crime should be committed 
during, or as a consequence of this. As a result of this condition, if the crime is 
committed against a public employee for some other reasons or purpose not related to 
his duty or service, the severity of this crime shall not be increased. Moreover, to 
implement the increase in severity, the perpetrator should know that he is committing a 
crime against a public employee. A question may arise here: if a public employee 
performs his duty or service in violation of the job or its content and a crime is 
committed against him, shall this condition be imposed or not? Since the law has 
clarified the procedures to be followed by anyone receiving an act against the law or 
suffering from an action performed by a public employee, he should follow the 
procedure and submit an appeal and no excuse can be accepted from him concerning 
the murder of a public employee71.  
 
10. Murder by means of poisonous substance 
The Federal Penal Code increases the severity of the punishment for premeditated 
murder if poisonous substances or explosives are used. The crime of murder with 
poisonous substances is distinguished from other crimes of premeditated murder in that 
the method used to cause death is "poisonous substances". Otherwise it is subject to the 
elements of willful premeditated murders. The prudence of the increase in the severity 
                                                            
71 Ibid, p143. 
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of this crime is based on consideration of danger and treason and betrayal on the part of 
the perpetrator. This type of crime occurs most generally between people with whom 
the victim is comfortable and whom he trusts due to their relationship, such as his wife, 
children, friends, relations, and servants72. In addition, poison is, in its essence, easy to 
conceal in the victim's food and drink, and therefore its discovery or proof of its use is 
not easy. With this method, murder seems easy to commit and difficult to prove.  
 
The federal legislator, concerning using a poisonous substance, stipulated in the second 
paragraph of Article 332 of the Federal Penal Code that "The death penalty is applied if 
murder is committed .... And a poisonous substance is used". In the Federal Penal Code, 
using a poisonous substance is considered to be a condition of increasing the severity of 
the punishment for premeditated murder, where the punishment becomes the death 
penalty. This situation is different from that stipulated in the French Penal Code, where 
the utilization of poison is in itself considered to be a crime, punishable by the death 
penalty, which is applicable if the victim merely ingests in the poisonous substances, 
even if the desired result, which is the death of the victim, is not achieved73. 
 
For the existence of this circumstance, the method used by the perpetrator must be a 
poisonous substance, considering that it is an additive element. This differentiates 
murder with poison from other premeditated murders. Further, this substance when 
used is required to waste the spirit, as here related: 
 
Firstly, Poison refers to each substance chemically affecting the fibres of a human in a 
                                                            
72 Meki, Mohammed Abdulhameed., op. cit., p130. 
73 See Articles 301 and 302 of the French Penal Code. 
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way which would lead to his death, regardless of its shape. It may be in a solid or liquid 
form or gaseous, and regardless of its source, whether it is from an animal, such as the 
venom of a snake, or a plant, such as morphine and cocaine, or a metal, such as copper 
or arsenic74. 
 
In reality, the idea behind describing the substance as poisonous is not to draw attention 
to its nature but the effect occurring in the circumstances in which it is used. The 
substance may be non-poisonous by nature but become poisonous if mixed with another 
substance. The mixture in this case would be considered poisonous, or the opposite if a 
poisonous substance is mixed with another substance leading to the disappearance of its 
harmful effects. Some may hold that in this case there is no crime, considering that this 
mixing would cause the substance offered to be non-poisonous. Others may have the 
opinion that in this incident there is an intention to kill by use of poison, as the 
substance offered is in reality a poisonous substance and does not lose its poisonous 
attributes except for reasons beyond the control of the perpetrator.75 
 
It is a condition of the application of the second paragraph of Article 332 of the Federal 
Penal Code for the substance used by the murderer to be poisonous, but if it is harmful 
only and would not normally cause death, but the perpetrator gave it to the victim with 
the intention of murder and it did result in death, then the action is be considered as 
wilful premeditated murder without aggravated circumstances. Whether or not the 
substance used by the perpetrator is a poisonous substance is a technical matter, 
                                                            
74 Abdulsatar, Fawzia., op.cit., p401 
75 Ibid, p. 402. 
  159
regarding which the judge shall refer to experts.76  
 
Secondly, the use of a poisonous substance is defined as any action by the perpetrator 
enabling the poisonous substance directly to affect the functions of life in the victim’s 
body, leading to death. For example, the condition is fulfilled if the perpetrators puts the 
poison within the reach of the victim, such as mixing it with his food or drink, or if he 
gives it to him through an injection into the body, or through the nose by inhalation of a 
poisonous gas, or through the mouth by food or drink, or through an open wound.77 
 
If the perpetrator has used a poisonous substance and the victim dies, then he would be 
questioned concerning the murder about the use of poison. But if the criminal result, 
meaning the death of the victim, is not achieved for a reason within the control of the 
perpetrator, or if the relation of causation is non-existent between the action of the 
perpetrator and the death of the victim, then this is not considered proof of an intention 
to murder by use of poison and would not be eligible for the death penalty. For proof of 
the intention to murder by use of poison, the perpetrator must go beyond the 
preliminary stage of preparation and enter the implementation stage of the crime. The 
border between preparation and implementation is defined as putting the poisonous 
substance within the reach of the victim, making it probable that he will acquire or in 
some way ingest the substance78. Accordingly, the purchase of a poisonous substance is 
considered part of the preparation work and for this the perpetrator is not punished. 
                                                            
76 Alsagheer, Jameel Abdulbaqi., Crimes against individuals (Arabic), Qanon Aloqobat “Jaraem Aldam” 
Dar Alnahdha Alarabia, 1997, p 72. 
77 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shawki., Penal law (Arabic), Qanon Aloqobat “Alqism Alkhas” University of 
Almansoora, 1985, p  
78 Salama, Ahmed kamil., Commentary on the penal law (Arabic), Sharh Qanoon Aloqobat “Alqism 
Alkhas” Nahdhat Alsharq, 1987. p 47. 
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Putting the poisonous substance within the reach of the victim, such that his acquiring 
of the substance becomes likely, is considered to be an action punishable by law, after 
which if the results are not achieved for reasons beyond the control of the perpetrator, 
such as the victim abstaining from eating the food, the perpetrator is guilty of the intent 
to kill by means of poison. 
 
Thirdly, for the crime of murder by poison, the poisonous substance should be used 
with an intent to exhaust the soul, hence it is specified that the perpetrator should fully 
understand the end of his action, as to the nature of the substance used in the murder, 
and to its being poisonous. If he has no knowledge as to the nature of the poisonous 
substance, or an error has occurred regarding it, then the intent to kill is not considered 
legally satisfied. 
 
The use of a poisonous substance in murder in the Federal Penal Code is considered a 
material condition of severity related to the method of committing the crime, and 
accordingly, all participants in the crime are affected. Murder by use of poison is 
normally accompanied at the same time by premeditation, as the preparation of the 
poison entails time, in which the perpetrator is given an opportunity to think calmly and 
become comfortable with his crime. However, murder can be committed by using 
poison without being premeditated if the perpetrator suddenly becomes intent on 
murder and the poison is prepared, such as if he gives the poison to his friend after a 
quarrel has occurred between them79. 
 
                                                            
79 Abdulsatar, Fawzia., op.cit., p 404. 
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Based on this, the use of a poisonous substance is considered to be a severity condition 
in itself, and is sufficient to increase the punishment leading to the death penalty 
according to Article 332 of the Federal Penal Code. The court, when it charges the 
accused with poisoning is required to have evidence that the substance used is a 
poisonous substance, and it can refer to expert opinion to determine the type of 
substance used. If the lawyer of the accused applies for the opinion of experts the 
request should be approved. Otherwise, the judgment will be considered faulty, thus 
justifying an appeal80. 
 
11. Murder by use of explosives 
The crime of murder by the use of explosives is distinguished by the method used to 
effect death, that being an “explosive substance”. Other than in that, it is subject to the 
same elements as obtain for the crime of premeditated murder. 
 
The severity of punishment in the crime of murder is related to the use of explosive 
substances and to the dangerous consequences of the practice of this method in murder, 
either at the level of financial damage that may result from it, or at the level of moral 
and psychological damage incurred to the safety and stability of the society. Although 
the UAE Penal Code is similar to that in Egypt, this circumstance is not mentioned in 
the Egyptian Penal Code. However, this circumstance does occur in the Lebanese Penal 
Code81. This difference in the codes might be explained by the fact that the UAE Penal 
Code is newer than that of Egypt, and the UAE Penal Code was issued in 1987 when 
the use of explosives was becoming more familiar around the world. 
                                                            
80 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shawki., Crimes against individuals in UAE federal penal law (Arabic), Aljaraem 
Alwaqeaa Ala Alashkhas fi Qanoon Aloqobat Alittihadi, albayan press, 1990. p 153. 
81 See Article 549 of the Lebanese Penal Code. 
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The crime of murder by explosive substance requires the use of explosives and the 
intent to murder one or more persons, whether or not the perpetrator has selected the 
victims, since the use of explosives entails the possibility of mass and unforeseeable 
consequences. Thus, if the perpetrator intends to murder an appointed person with an 
explosive substance and it kills other persons, he will be charged with murder for 
having explosion to kill all of them. The use of an explosive substance is considered a 
severity condition on its own, and it is sufficient to increase the punishment of murder, 
leading to the death penalty, as stipulated in the second paragraph of Article 332 of the 
Federal Penal Code. 
 
As has been seen, the UAE legislator was influenced by the Egyptian legislator when it 
imposed the death penalty for murder accompanied with aggravated circumstances 
contradicting the Islamic sharia provisions. The writer interviewed82 Mansoor Al-
Awadhi, a judge of the Dubai Criminal Court, who gained his law degree in Egypt, and 
questioned on this issue. The judge said that the UAE legislator was, indeed, influenced 
by the Egyptian laws, which in turn had been influenced by French ones. Moreover, he 
said that the legislator in the UAE took this step to reduce the number of murderers who 
might face the death penalty for murder, since most murder crimes are not accompanied 
by aggravated circumstances. He added that if this were not the case the judges 
themselves would be in an embarrassing situation, since they would be under pressure 
to impose many sentences of death, a position they would not favour. Judge Al-Awadhi 
is himself opposed to use of the death penalty for murder not accompanied by 
aggravated circumstances.   
                                                            
82 The interview took place at Dubai Criminal Court. 20.8.2007 
  163
5.1.3 The crime of rape 
There is no doubt that protecting people from being insulted whether morally or 
physically is one of the priorities for modern legislations. The UAE legislator shows 
responsibility in this matter, in order to afford protection to people not being sexually 
attacked. The death penalty may be imposed as a discretionary punishment for crimes 
of rape. This crime, which may be committed against both genders, is defined by the 
force or moral compulsion. Thus, the crime of rape is different in kind to both the crime 
of adultery and the crime of sodomy, because of the element of force or moral 
compulsion. Whereas the presumption in a crime of adultery is that illegal sexual 
relations took place by mutual consent, the crime of rape expresses the will of one party 
only. Not only is force a condition of rape, the crime requires full sexual intercourse to 
have occurred. Without satisfying this condition, a death sentence cannot be imposed. 
 
As has been stated the farce implied here can be a moral or a physical one. Physical 
force might be proved by the forensic examination of a doctor and other possible 
consequences of the incident83. However, proving the presence of moral force is the 
task of the judge in his interpretation of the particular circumstances of the alleged 
crime. Since the age of sexual maturity is taken to be 14 in UAE legislation, consent is 
not an accepted plea by the offender if the victim is below this age. Thus, the legislator 
fully protects minors as well as those who have suffered forcible rape by allowing for 
the imposition of the death penalty in both cases84.             
                                                            
83 Pregnancy or the sudden appearance of venereal disease might be two such possible consequences    
84 This is a complex and difficult question for all judiciaries. Bu raising the threshold, for example, 16 
may give age protection for sex offender but not for the victim. On the other hand depending on her 
sexual maturity, a female may complain falsely of an act of intercourse in which she willingly 
participated.  
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5.2 The death penalty in the anti-narcotic code 
After the increase of the illegal trade and circulation of narcotic substances in the world 
in general and in the United Arab Emirates in particular, the federal legislator issued 
Law No. 6 for the year 1986, further amended by Law No. 14 for the year 1995. These 
laws have designated severe punishment for the illegal trade and circulation of 
dangerous narcotic substances, up to the imposition of the death penalty. 
 
What is significant in the context of this research is the clause on the death penalty for 
certain specific narcotic crimes, as stipulated in the aforementioned law, which will be 
studied in detail below. All punishments are discretionary since these crimes are not 
divine ordinance or retaliation crimes. 
 
5.2.1 The Crime of instigation and dealing in substances harmful to the person 
In order to protect both society and individual human beings, the UAE legislator used 
his authority, provided in the Islamic sharia, to impose severe discretionary 
punishments for those who initiate or instigate the dealing of substances harmful to the 
mind with the intent of causing injury or harm to society and the individual. He decided 
to impose the death penalty if this crime led to the death of one or more persons, 
without violating the rights of the deceased’s guardians to claim the legal blood 
money85. It is noteworthy here that the legislator did not distinguish between dealing in 
a particular quantity of drugs. This is a distinction that surely should have been made. 
For instance, it is easily argued that the death penalty for those who deal in large 
quantities of drugs might be essential, since the harmful consequences of large-scale 
                                                            
85 See Article 45 Of the Federal Law on Combating Narcotic Substances. 
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dealing are obvious. On the other hand, as a police officer, the writer can say he is 
reasonably confident that the majority of drug abusers, among young people in 
particular, trade in small quantities of drugs in often motivated by the need to earn 
money so that they can buy drugs for their own use. It does not seem equitable or 
proportionate to implement the death penalty in such cases. It might argued that young 
people in these circumstances should be treated as patients suffering an illness rather 
than as criminals. 
 
5.2.2 The crime of cultivation, manufacture, trade and possession of narcotics 
In view of the gravity of this crime, and considering that it is the main reason for the 
ingress of narcotics in the State, and the harm incurred by society, the legislator has 
strongly expressed his condemnation of such actions by increasing the severity to 
liability to the death penalty86. Here there is clearly a situation of an illegal trade, 
causing harm to people, that hides criminals who deserve severe punishment. Given the 
geographic situation of the United Arab Emirates, located close to countries like Iran, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, the legislator is required to be strict in fighting such 
crimes to protect both individuals and society. Manufacturing or growing drugs for the 
purpose of trade cannot be considered a crime of little importance should be fought with 
a practical and severe punishment, namely the death penalty. However, the legislator 
might have given full discretion to the court to decide the punishment according to its 
circumstances and the quantity of the narcotic grown or manufactured.   
 
The legislator differentiates between possession and the means of obtaining a narcotic 
                                                            
86 See Articles 6, 35, 36 and 48 of the Federal Law On Combating Narcotic Substances. 
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substance. As already stated, the legislator has increased the severity of the penalty for 
obtaining with an intent to trade, making it punishable by death. Possession is liable 
only to a penalty of life imprisonment, together with a minimum fine of fifty thousand 
dirhams. In the event of a second or subsequent offence, the legislator has decreed that 
this may be dealt with by imposing the death penalty.87 Here again we note the 
legislator’s intention to be more harsh towards repeat offenders, since their behaviour 
indicates that the original punishment was not a sufficient deterrent in their case. 
  
5.2.3 The crime of assaulting employees enforcing the laws on narcotics 
The legislator safeguards employees enforcing the provisions of this law and imposes 
severe punishment on those who assault or oppose employees enforcing the provisions 
of the law. In particular officers of justice, and officers of narcotics, are protected under 
this law, which entails progressive punishment, as in the following: 
A. For transgression or opposition without inflicting wounds or assault, the legislator 
provides an imprisonment for a period of not less than three years and not more than 
five, and a minimum fine of twenty thousand dirham minimum, not to exceed one 
hundred thousand dirhams. 
B. For transgression or opposition with infliction of injury or assault, the legislator has 
made the punishment more severe in view of the greater harm being incurred by the 
employee who has been injured or beaten. Punishment is raised to imprisonment for a 
minimum of five years, not to exceed ten, and a minimum fine of twenty thousand 
dirhams, not to exceed one hundred thousand dirhams. 
C. For transgression or opposition where the public officer suffers a permanent or 
                                                            
87 See Article 49 of the previous law. 
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incurable disability, and where the perpetrator at the time of the crime is carrying a 
weapon. For this he may be punished with life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a 
minimum period of ten years, and a minimum fine of twenty thousand dirhams, not to 
exceed one hundred thousand dirhams. 
D. If the injury or beating leads to the death of the public officer, the legislator raises 
the punishment to a mandatory death sentence.88 
 
As we can see, the legislator provides protection for the officers who work in fighting 
crimes involving narcotics, since these crimes are harmful not only to the individuals 
themselves but also to the whole of society. The legislator was surely correct in this 
instance in imposing the death penalty. The public officer needs to feel that the 
legislator has afforded him the maximum safety and security so that he can undertake 
his duties without fear. 
 
The question arises as to whether it is possible to lower the deterrent sentences for 
combating the use and traffic of narcotics. Despite the fact that the legislator has clearly 
stated in the anti-narcotic code that all punishments mentioned in the law may not be 
decreased, reductions have been made. The judges should adhere to the provisions of 
Article 65, which states “the court cannot decrease the punishment mentioned in this 
law”, but in practice they do not. Perhaps the legislator was acting excessively in not 
allowing reductions in severity, since this has prevented courts from using their 
discretion to take each case on its merits. Although, the legislator did well to impose the 
death penalty for the most serious narcotics crimes, he did not specify the quantity of 
                                                            
88 See Articles 52 and 53 of the previous law. 
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drugs with which a perpetrator must have dealt. It is surely not fair to equate large and 
small quantities of drugs. Experience as a police officer has taught the writer that many 
people buy drugs simply for their own use, or occasionally to supply small quantities to 
others. In an interview with Dr. Ali Hassan Galadari of the Dubai Criminal Court, this 
judge was asked about determinate and mandatory sentencing by the legislator, and 
whether judges should be allowed to exercise their discretion in varying punishment to 
pass sentences lesser than the death penalty. His reply was that although the punishment 
is determinate, and article 65 clear enough, the judges should adhere to the law of 
criminal procedure, which provides that the three judges constituting the court must 
agree on the death penalty. If one of the three judges is not persuaded of the necessity 
for the death penalty then that punishment is waived and life imprisonment is imposed 
instead. Dr. Galadari added that the judge has full authority to evaluate each case on its 
merits, and to issue a sentence that fits all the circumstances of the case. These may 
include the age of the accused, the quantity of narcotic substances, and other elements89. 
Dr. Galadari went on to say that the death penalty is not in practice a definite 
punishment in narcotics cases, since the evaluation of the circumstances of each case 
rests with the prerogative of the judge. 
 
5.3 The death penalty and the anti-terrorism code 
The United Arab Emirates legislator, after the occurrences in USA of September 11th, 
2001, and as in some other countries in the world, attempted to prevent acts of 
terrorism90. He passed a new code in 2004 for this purpose. What is of relevance to this 
                                                            
89 The interview with Dr. Galadari took place in his office at Dubai Courts on 18.8.2007   
90 USA, for example, produced Patriot Act, effective 1st Feb. 2002, to fight terrorism.  
  169
thesis is that the death penalty would be imposed only for action when death occurs. 
This conforms to the provisions for murder with aggravated circumstances. Moreover, 
all actions provided for in the new code could have been dealt with under the penal 
code, since all theses actions are contained within it. Examples are: attacking a means 
of public transport or diplomatic premises, or by using explosives. The most surprising 
aspect of this new code is that all the accused, charged under anti-terrorism legislation 
are committed for trial before the Federal Supreme Court. This applies without 
distinction to citizens or residents of the UAE, even in those emirates which operate 
their own supreme court. Yet, as we have seen, the Federal Supreme Court  is the 
highest authority in the land, and therefore the offender or the offender will not be 
granted the same legal possibilities as those tired before a lower court, since the 
judgments of the Federal Supreme  Court can not be appealed.       
 
Conclusion 
The United Arab Emirates has certainly aimed at maintaining the internal security of the 
state through its penal legislation. It has also aimed at maintaining the security of 
individuals by criminalizing offences such as drug dealing, which jeopardize human life 
and lead consequently to disruption both in the field of work and in other important 
functions of society. 
 
It is apparent that the legislator has applied strict penalties, culminating in the death 
penalty, and has sometimes gone further by issuing specific penalties for drug dealing 
offences, without giving the judge discretion to choose between a minimum and 
maximum limit. This issue is controversial, since the legislator might perhaps have 
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enabled the judge to exercise free discretion. Apparently, the judge who chooses a 
penalty lighter than that contained in the law is in breach. Yet in the evidence of Judge, 
Dr. Galadari, courts do exercise discrimination on the particular circumstance on 
narcotics cases. Here we can say there is a legal uncertainty between the penal code and 
the provisions of the laws of criminal procedure. 
 
It is also clear that the legislator has designated the death penalty for premeditated 
murder with aggravated conditions, and has not designated the same for premeditated 
murder not associated with aggravated conditions. This is in violation of the regulations 
of the Islamic sharia, which do not provide for such a distinction. Here we can say that 
the legislator has pursued a penal policy that is influenced by Western legislation, as 
will as specifically the Egyptian Penal Code which imposes the death penalty only for 
homicide associated with aggravated conditions. In this case, it might have been better 
for the legislator to have prescribed the death penalty as a retaliation punishment, after 
giving notice to the blood relatives that they could choose to waive their right to 
retaliation and accept compensation or not. In the first Article of the Federal Penal 
Code, the legislator has decreed that the shaia must be implemented in cases of crimes 
of divine ordinance, retaliation and blood money, yet there appear to be contradictions 
to this principle in the current legislation. 
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Chapter Six 
The rights of the defendant and the evidential guarantees (safeguards) 
prior to the implementation of capital punishment within the UAE 
legislation 
Introduction 
The legislator in the United Arab Emirates has acknowledged the death penalty for 
several crimes, whether they are crimes jeopardizing national security or individuals, as 
have most other Islamic countries. Simultaneously, he has surrounded the criminal 
convicted of a crime with safeguards that apply during the investigation and prior to the 
implementation of a punishment. The legislator has adopted strict measures in relation 
to of these safeguards. Politicians and rulers have also intervened in the affairs of the 
state to limit the use of the death penalty in discretionary crimes, in addition to using 
their authority to mediate in order to prevent the execution of the death penalty as a 
retaliation punishment, as will be seen in this chapter. 
 
Accordingly, these safeguards will be categorized and discussed in detail, along with 
the right of defendants to defend themselves and the right of the judge to elaborate his 
own doctrine and methods of evidence. Consideration is also given to the safeguards 
that the legislator has secured for the defendant after the issuance of the death sentence 
in terms of whether the sentence implemented. Moreover, we will examine the method 
of implementation of the death penalty and clarify the extent to which the legislator 
actually uses the death penalty in the United Arab Emirates. 
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6.1 Death sentence safeguards in the procedures of the criminal court 
The intention of these procedures is to avoid as far as possible the execution of an 
innocent person. The discussion includes safeguards during the final interrogation, 
carried out by the court. After the public prosecution has completed its investigation of 
the crime and decided it must be transferred to the court, there are specific procedures 
governed by rules which the court must consider, and which are related to the final 
interrogation before deliberation. The general rules of the final interrogation are 
illustrated here, followed by the rules that govern the criminal prosecution, and finally 
the evidence admissible for the criminal prosecution. 
 
6.1.1  The general rules of interrogation 
The source of criminal prosecution according to the Federal Criminal Procedure Law, is 
mainly based on the interrogation conducted by the court to determine whether the 
accused is guilty. This includes listening to the statements of fact presented by the 
public prosecution, as well as listening to the defence witnesses. As a general rule, the 
court session must be in public, in contrast to the initial interrogation. The public has 
the right to attend sessions, and this principle is inherent in all legislation91. Article 161 
of Law of Criminal Procedure confirms this principle by stating "The session must be 
public. However, the Court in compliance with the public order or maintaining may rule 
that the hearing of a case may be completely or in part a closed session or to prevent the 
attendance of certain categories of person". Accordingly, the federal legislator under 
certain conditions has qualified the principle of public session to be limited to a closed 
session or not to be attended by some people if the court recognizes a reason for this to 
                                                            
91 Jehad, Jouda Hussain., Commentary on criminal procedure law (Arabic), Alwajeez fi sharh Qanon 
Alejra’at Aljenaeya, part 2, first edition, 1994. p 34. 
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apply, but this is to be taken as an exception to the general rule92. For example, the UAE 
courts hear most cases of sexual offences in closed sessions to avoid any kind of 
embarrassment that might occur, in particular to female victims. 
 
The court carries out an interrogation of the incident in the session by questioning the 
accused on the charge and hears the witnesses and experts, all in accordance with the 
principle which stipulates that it is not permissible to base a judgment on any evidence 
which is not presented before the court in hearings93. Article 209 of the Federal 
Criminal Procedure Law of 1992 confirms this principle by stating "The judge passes 
the judgement according to the conviction formed within himself, and accordingly he 
may not build his judgement on any proof which is not presented against the accused 
before him in the hearing". Accordingly, the verbal defence is an essential guarantee of 
basic human rights since it is not viable to judge a person based solely on the testimony 
of the witnesses or documents without giving him the full opportunity to present his 
defence. In the Islamic sharia it is the plaintiff's right to make his case and claims, 
followed by the accused who has the right to defend himself by objecting to the 
evidence presented by the plaintiff. It was narrated by Ali Ibn Abi Taleb (may God be 
pleased with him) that the Prophet (PBUH) said "If two men came for judgment, do not 
judge the first one without hearing the second”94. 
 
The final interrogation conducted by the court must take place in the presence of all the 
opposing counsel, and accordingly the Federal Criminal Procedure Law requires the 
                                                            
92 Obaid, Raouf., Procedure law principles (Arabic), Mabade Alejra Aljenaeya, Dar Aljeel press, 16th 
edition, 1985, p 639. 
93 Ibid, p 651 
94 Alhafez Abi Abdulla Mohammed Ibn Yazeed Alqazwani, Dar Alfiker, part 3, p 744, see also; Sanad, 
Najati., op.cit., p.81 
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notification and serving of all legal adversaries with the scheduled date of hearing. 
Notice given in the case of fines would be one full day prior to the hearing, three days 
for misdemeanors, and ten days for capital offences95. Moreover, the final interrogation 
may not be conducted without the public prosecution’s representative being present, 
considering that it is a part of the court formation, just as the interrogation may not be 
conducted in the absence of the opponents, whether the session is closed or in public. 
 
The attendance of the accused is a condition for the validity of the judgement 
procedures, and accordingly any procedure may not be taken in his absence or without 
his knowledge, otherwise the judgement shall be void for failure to follow procedure. 
However, an exception to this rule necessitating the presence of the accused in the 
session is stated in Article 164 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which requires the 
exclusion of the accused if he starts to behave badly during the session, and the court in 
this case has to inform him about the procedures undertaken during his absence96. 
 
6.1.2 The right to an attorney  
The exclusion of the accused does not prevent the attendance of his representative since 
the ability of the accused to resort to an attorney to defend him is a principle confirmed 
in all documents and policies, and is stated in the International Civil and Political 
Human Rights Declaration, on which the General Assembly of the United Nations 
unanimously agreed on 16/12/1966. Furthermore, the accused must be provided with an 
attorney by the court if he does not have one, without burdening him with attorney fees 
                                                            
95 See Article 158 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law 
96 Suroor, Ahmed fathi., Commentary on criminal procedure law (Arabic), Alwaseet fe Sharh Qanoon 
Alejara’at Aljenaeya, part 2 Dar alnahda alarabia, 1980. p 346 
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in case he does not have the capability to pay for them97. 
 
In addition, the Islamic sharia confirmed the principle of the right to an attorney. The 
precedent for this is found in the book of Nassab Quraish by Al-Zobeiny, where it is 
stated that there was a dispute between Hassan Ibn Thabit and many people before 
Othman Ibn Affan, in which Othman issued a judgement against Hassan. Hassan 
complained to Abdullah Ibn Abbas, and Abdullah told him he was in the right. They 
went to Othman Ibn Affan with this, and Abdullah Ibn Abbas gave his opinion, and this 
right was made clear to Othman, and accordingly judgement was passed in favour of 
Hassan Ibn Thabit98. 
 
UAE legislation does not stray far from this point, as it accepts the presence of an 
attorney without the attendance of the accused, or the attendance of the accused without 
the attorney, in misdemeanors and violations unless the court requires the attendance of 
the accused, and this necessitates both the attendance of the accused and his attorney99. 
As it has been shown, the attendance of an attorney is essential in capital cases where 
the accused might face the death penalty, and even if the accused cannot afford one, the 
court must provide. There is, nevertheless a troubling scenario, related to in more detail 
                                                            
97 In an interview with Mohammad Abdul-Malik, a well known lawyer in Dubai, this writer put it to him 
that a poor offender who cannot afford a good lawyer is more likely to be sentenced to the death penalty. 
He disagreed strongly, saying that according to the judicial system, the court must appoint a lawyer for 
any defendant who cannot afford one. I replied that a lawyer might not be enthusiastic to take the man’s 
case since he might find himself not paid for his work. But Mr. Abdul-Mailk contended that in the 
majority of cases where a perpetrator might face the death penalty, the judge himself would appoint a 
lawyer who he believed would not spare any effort to defend his client, and that he had witnessed this 
several times. (The interview took place at Mr. Abdul-Malik’s office in Dubai, 17.12.2007). 
98 Al-Qasimi, Dhafer., Govering structure in Islamic sharia and Islamic history (Arabic), Nidham Al hokm 
fi Alsharia wa Altarikh Alislami, Dar Alnafaes, 1978, p 382 
99 See Articles 194 and 195 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law. 
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later, in which the accused may be unable to pay for a qualified lawyer and be poorly 
represented even on a capital charge. 
 
6.1.3 Record of the proceedings    
The proceedings of the interrogation must be recorded in a report to prove that the 
testimonies of the dispute are documented. This report should also include the session 
date, the names of the judges, public prosecutor, clerk, and opponent, the testimony of 
the witnesses, the testimony of the defence, and the claims presented by all parties, even 
those judged to be on side issues. The senior clerk of the court must sign each page of 
the report100. 
 
6.2 Admissible criminal evidence 
The legislator in the UAE has authorized the court to prove the innocence or the guilt of 
the defendant according to the evidence submitted to the court from all parties. 
Accordingly, the discussion here divides into two topics: the freedom of the judge to 
establish the conditions for a conviction; and the methodology of admissible criminal 
evidence. The purpose is to examine the extent to which the legislator’s attempt to 
surround the suspect with safeguards is effective. 
  
6.2.1 The Freedom of the judge to establish his Conviction 
The majority of modern legislative procedures adhere to the principle of the freedom of 
the conviction of the judge, that he may accept all evidence presented to him, and he has 
complete freedom to evaluate each piece of evidence and to accept and refuse evidence 
                                                            
100 Jehad, Jouda Hussain., op. cit., p52 
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at his discretion. The Federal Supreme Court in the United Arab Emirates has 
confirmed this principle101. 
 
Further, the Federal Criminal Procedure Law applied this principle when it decided in 
Article 209 “The judge in the case passes judgment according to the conviction formed, 
and accordingly may not build his judgement on any evidence which is not presented to 
the opponents before him in the hearing”. In accordance with this provision, the 
principle which grants the judge freedom of conviction through evidence or lack of in it 
is not definite, and this freedom is limited as follows. 
 
6.2.2 Establishing conviction according to the Evidence    
Among the main guarantees in criminal trials is the assumption of the innocence of the 
accused person until proven guilty102. The Islamic sharia confirms that it is sufficient 
for the judge to doubt the soundness of the charges presented against the accused in 
order to proclaim his innocence103. 
 
In addition, the evidence from which the judge derives his conviction must be sound 
and in compliance with the law. Accordingly, the judge may disallow evidence, such as 
that acquired from the testimony of a witness given under duress, or evidence acquired 
from a false arrest or search104. 
 
                                                            
101 Appeal No. 23, hearing on 6/11/1986, Appeal No. 54, hearing on 11/3/1985. 
102 Appeal No. 45, hearing on 18/1/1985 
103 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shawki., Commentary on Federal Criminal procedure law of the UAE (Arabic), 
Sharh Qanoon Alejara’at Aljazaeya le dawlat Alemarat, Albayan press, part 2. 1990. p 63. 
104 Abu-Amer, Mohammad Zaki. Crime proof in criminal issues (Arabic), AlIthbat Fe Almawad 
Aljenaeya, Alfaniya lelteba’a (Alex.Egypt), 1985, p.157 
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The judge should not establish his judgement on evidence which is not presented to the 
defence in the session, and he may not build his judgement according to personal 
information, unless this information is a scientifically established view105. Article 152 
of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law of 1992 stipulates that the court must refer to 
non-criminal issues in which it passes judgement in accordance with the related laws, 
and accordingly if a civil incident is brought before a criminal judge, and it is 
considered an element leading to the crime, then with regard to its proof, the court must 
refer to the methods of proof applied in civil law. 
 
6.3 Methods of Criminal Evidence    
Methods of evidence as stipulated by the Law of Criminal Procedural are: testimony, 
confession, expert opinion, documentation and presumption. The methods of evidence 
can be divided into two parts: direct and indirect methods. The direct method is that 
which directly applies to the incident requiring proof. These methods are confession, 
testimony, expert opinion and documentation. The indirect methods do not directly 
apply to the incident requiring proof, but apply to the other incident having a logical and 
fixed connection to them. They require the judge to reason and deliberate to extract 
from the incident to which the evidence applies implications for the other incident 
requiring proof, and these methods produce “presumptions”. Accordingly, these 
methods, which are testimony, confession, expert opinion, documentation and 
presumption, are presented to establish the extent to which the legislator is strict in is 
judgement, with particular consideration of the death penalty and the need to avoid 
mistakes in executing the penalty. 
                                                            
105 Obaid, Raouf., op, cit., p 694. 
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6.3.1 Testimony of witnesses 
The summoning of witnesses occurs in accordance with the Federal Criminal Procedure 
Law by instructing them to attend as per the request of one of the plaintiffs or a member 
of the public authority. This should be twenty four hours prior to the hearing session, 
not including the time required to travel to the court, except in cases where the criminal 
has been caught red-handed, in which event the parties may be instructed to attend at 
any time. These instructions can be given verbally through any member of the judicial 
or public authority, and the witness may appear without a summons upon request106. 
During deliberation of the case, the court may summon and hear the testimony of any 
person, even through the issuance of a court order if necessary, and it also has the right 
to instruct a person to appear at a further hearing107. 
 
For the testimony to be considered as admissible evidence, certain conditions must be 
met by the witness, the most important being: 
(1) The witness must be capable of exercising reasonable discretion and be able to 
distinguish actions and events. Accordingly, testimony is not accepted from a minor, 
from a lunatic or drunk, or from someone under undue duress, whether from a 
psychological or economic point of view108. 
(2) The witness should swear a legal oath before giving his testimony, to tell the truth, 
and nothing but the truth. 
                                                            
106 See Article 89 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law 
107 See Article 93 of the previous law. 
108 See Article 91 ot the Federal Criminal Procedure law, which allows the court to hear testimony of 
someone who is not at least 16 years of age without oath and just as a reference. 
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(3) The witness may not be both a witness and judge at the same time. Accordingly, it is 
not acceptable for the judge to be a witness in the case over which he is presiding. Also, 
it is not acceptable that the public prosecutor attends the case as a witness in it. Identical 
restrictions govern the session clerk and the translator. 
The federal legislator does not differentiate between the testimony of a man and a 
woman. He considers both their testimonies to be equally valid and reliable. This is in 
contravention of the Islamic sharia, which states that a man’s testimony is equal to the 
testimonies of two women. 
 
6.3.2 Obligations of the witness 
All those who have been summoned to testify before the case should attend on the date 
scheduled for the hearing. Hence, if someone fails to attend, the court may issue a 
warrant for the arrest of this person, and may obligate him to pay a fine. The court may 
also pardon him from paying the fine if he appears and presents a viable excuse for his 
absence. 
If a witness presents an acceptable excuse for his inability to appear, then the court may 
dispense with his presence and delegate any judge to hear his testimony, as expressly 
stipulated in Article 94 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law: "If the witness is sick, 
or prevented from attending, then his testimony would be heard in place of his 
presence". 
 
The court may issue such a delegation by dispatching to the judge to whom the 
delegation is issued any written questions presented by the public prosecution or 
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defence, or presented by the court itself, that are related with the subject matter. Hence, 
the judge is required to interrogate the witness with these questions and record the 
witness’s responses to them. 
 
6.3.3 The power of testimony as evidence 
The most important issue here is how the strength of the testimony is determined in 
deciding the guilt of the accused. The court has full discretion in evaluating the 
testimonies of the witnesses, as it may accept the testimony of a witness with whom it is 
comfortable, and reject that of a witness if it doubts its soundness. It may also accept the 
testimony of a witness related to the victim, hence it cannot be blamed if it accepts the 
testimony of a dying victim, as long as it is comfortable with the attendant 
circumstances. The stipulations of Article 88 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law are 
in accordance with this interpretation. The court has the right to divide the testimonies 
of witnesses to derive what it regards as suitable in the right of any accused person, 
rejecting what it sees as unsuitable. It also has the right to accept statements transferred 
by one witness from another, even if it is denied by the other, if it perceives that this 
statement is the truth and represents a legitimate defence in the case being deliberated 
upon109. 
There is no obstacle that would prevent the court from taking oral evidence, even if 
contradictions exist with the technical or written evidence, as long as these 
contradictions do not reach an extent that makes it impossible for them to be adjusted 
and concealed. Moreover, contradictions in the testimonies of witnesses with regard to 
                                                            
109 Federal Supreme Court, appeal No. 19, hearing on 25/6/1984. 
-see also Dubai Cassation Court, appeal No. 35, hearing on 17/7/1994 
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any incident will not prevent the court from taking into account these incidents once 
convinced of them. 
The court also has the right to decide the extent to which a witness is to be believed, and 
the value of his oral evidence, in light of the behaviour of the witness, the circumstances 
of the case, and facts which may be revealed during the prosecution. 
Evaluating the testimony presented by the witnesses before a court, as well as in the 
initial interrogations, is an objective issue subject to the supreme authority of the court. 
Regarding this, the Court of Cassation may not exercise control, as the court is not 
obliged to state the cause of its conviction concerning the testimony of a certain witness, 
or why it has accepted the testimony of one of the accusers and rejected the testimony of 
another. The cause is apparent in law, which is its ease with what it accepts, and its 
unease with what it rejects110. From this discussion, it can be seen that the court or the 
judge has full authority to accept or reject a testimony of any witness or to accept one 
part of it and reject another part. Accordingly, the testimony cannot condemn an 
innocent person to be sentences to death unless there is abundant supporting evidence 
against the accused. 
 
6.4 Confession 
Confession is admission by the accused that he has committed the crime, in whole or in 
part, in front of a judge at a court hearing111. Confession by this definition gives the 
court the right to judge the accused without hearing from witnesses unless it doubts the 
                                                            
110 Ramadan, Medhat., Commentary on the UAE criminal procedure law (Arabic), Alwajeez fi Sharh 
Qanoon Alejra’at Aljazaeya Alittihadi, The UAE University Press, p 262 
111 Abu-Amer, Mohammed Zaki., op. cit., p 946 
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confession112. Accordingly, Article 165 of the Federal Procedure Law stipulates "If the 
accused confesses to a charge, the court has the right to issue its judgment without 
hearing the witnesses unless the committed crime is punishable by the death penalty, in 
which case the court has to go ahead in its examination". Here the legislator gives a 
clear indication that he has provided safeguards for the accused who face the death 
penalty even after his confession, since the accused might give a false confession for 
some reason. Moreover, the legislator has provided further conditions that apply to the 
confession. 
 
6.4.1 Conditions for a sound confession 
For a confession to be admissible as prosecuting evidence, certain conditions should be 
met, among which are: 
1. The confession should be issued by the accused against himself, as a confession 
issued from one accused against another, even if in the same crime or case, is not 
considered or taken as a confession. This is regardless of whether another accused 
person has confessed to the charge or denied it since the testimony of one accused 
person against another is considered admissible evidence. 
2. The confession should be issued by a person who can distinguish between things and 
has free will. It is not considered to be a confession if given by a lunatic, even if he is 
sane when he committed the crime. It is also not considered a confession if given by a 
person under the influence of drugs or as a result of economic or psychological duress. 
By economic distress is meant that the accused in a condition of such distress that he 
                                                            
112 Ibid, p 946 
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will willingly accede to any suggestions put to him in order to ensure his own or his 
family’s survival. By psychological duress is meant a torture or attack, such as members 
of the authorities extracting a confession by telling the accused that another person has 
confessed and that he should therefore confess as well113. 
4. The confession must be definite, clear, and reliable at the time it is made; hence, it is 
not feasible to accept a confession concerning any incident made at the crime scene or 
shortly thereafter114. 
5. The confession must be given or repeated by the accused in front of the court. 
Statements by the accused in a report made during the investigation or the initial 
interrogation, or before an administrative authority or a witness, cannot be reliable. Yet 
the court may base its decision concerning the confession of the accused if it occurs in 
front of witnesses or was written by himself, and if the court feels confident concerning 
its soundness and consistency with the truth after prosecuting the case115. 
It is perhaps a criticism that the most important condition here might not be sufficiently 
robust is establishing that such a confession of guilt should be given by the defendant in 
a manner that is free and voluntary116. This condition confirms the provisions of Islamic 
sharia, which asks the accused to hide his sin and to repent in cases such as divine 
ordinance crimes. Experience as a police officer has shown the writer that some 
policemen put the defendant under pressure to confess to crimes that he or she might not 
have committed, based on extraneous or corrupted evidence. Consequently, the court 
                                                            
113 Suroor, Ahmed Fathi., op, cit., p 335 
114 Ibid, p 337 
115 Federal Supreme Court, appeal No. 45, hearing dated on 18/1/1985 
116 Shaw, W. Evidence in Criminal Cases, Butterworth & Co. (Publishers), London, 1932, p.30 
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and judge bear a heavy responsibility to ensure that confession is given freely and 
voluntarily. 
     
6.4.2 The value of the confession in proving the crime 
Upon the court having been assured as to the confession, satisfying provision of the 
condition for its soundness, it may refer to it as evidence in a case. The court also has 
full liberty to estimate the value of the confession as evidence. It may accept it as soon 
as it is assured of its soundness and conformity to the facts of the case, because a 
confession conflicting with these facts may not be accepted. It may be the intention of 
the accused in his confession to hide the true criminal, with whom the accused may 
have a family relationship or interest, or to avoid his prosecution for another, more 
dangerous crime. Accordingly, the judge is required to investigate the extent to which 
the confession complies with other evidence in the case. He may accept it if he feels 
confident with it or exclude it if there is any doubt as to its soundness, regardless of 
whether the confession was made before him during the initial interrogation or in the 
session, and regardless of whether the accused stands by it or renounces it117. 
Accordingly, it is permissible for the judge to divide the accuser's confession, accepting 
from it what he sees as right and omitting the rest as void. As an example, if the accused 
acknowledges having committed the crime of murder but not premeditated murder, the 
acknowledgement of murder may be taken by the judge. Subsequently, the more precise 
circumstances of the crime will be considered with regard to premeditation or ambush, 
                                                            
117 Ramadan, Medhat., op. cit., p. 265. 
  186
and the accused may be convicted based on the provision of evidence from an additional 
source. 
The principle of dividing the confession of the accused originates in the freedom of the 
judge to establish a conviction, and pertaining to this principle, the UAE Federal 
Supreme Court has stated "The judge may divide the confession, accepting what he 
concurs with and omitting what he doubts”118.  
 
In serious criminal cases in the United Arab Emirates, there is no pressure on confession 
resulting from the practice of plea bargaining before trial. Unlike the situation in the 
USA, where it has recently being reported that as many as 50 percent of cases are 
settled before a hearing119, the prosecutor and defence counsel do not make back room 
deals. Moreover, the accused is not offered an incentive to confession by the practice of 
variable sentencing in order to avoid a heavier punishment. 
 
6.5 Expert Opinion 
An expert is one who by reason of his experience or skills in a specific field is qualified 
to speak on points on which he is asked to come to a logical conclusion120. The UAE 
legislator authorizes the court, whether on its own or by the request of the opponents, to 
appoint one or more expert to give his technical opinion concerning an incident of 
                                                            
118 Federal Supreme Court, appeal No. 23, hearing on 23/4/1984 
119 Reported in Albayan newspaper,  issue no. 11733, 2.8.2012, p.10 
120 Shaw, W., op.cit., p.97  
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significance in the criminal (penal) case which it is considering121. In essence, the court 
is the highest expert in a criminal case, and accordingly, it may accept or reject the 
report of an expert. If it is not convinced by the report of the expert, it may appoint 
another expert, as this process falls under the limits of the assumed authority of the 
court. The court may also make use of the report of an expert who is summoned in the 
investigation, disregard the report of an appointed expert, or make use of part of the 
report and disregard the remaining part122. 
 
Pertaining to this principle, the Federal Supreme Court in the United Arab Emirates has 
stipulated that in penal matters, the court has full liberty to establish a conviction that it 
sees as soundly based on the evidence and elements of the case, and to derive from any 
evidence or association the proof needed for its judgment, even if it appears in the case 
in the form of compatibility. Accordingly, the court has complete freedom in evaluating 
the evidential power and authority of the expert opinion stated in the case, as long as it 
is comfortable with such evidence. It is not permissible to question this decision123. 
 
Upon accepting either all or part of the expert opinion, the court is required to omit what 
is mentioned regarding the discussions of opponents in accordance with the principle of 
oral testimony and confrontation. In the event that the court is convinced by the report 
of the expert and refers to it in the judgment, it is not be obliged to comply with a 
request of an opponent to appoint another expert, or to reassign the task to the same 
                                                            
121 See Article 180 of the Federal Procedure Law. 
122 Zaidan, Adnan., Criminal procedures in UAE (Arabic), Alejra’at Aljenaeya fi Dawlat Alemarat, 
ALshurroq press, part 2, p 202 
123 Federal Supreme Court, appeal no 18. hearing dated on 23/11/1982 
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expert. It would also not be obliged to justify this or respond to it in giving reasons for 
the judgment124. 
 
6.6 Documentation 
Documentation which is sound and may be used as evidence includes papers which 
contain a threat, slander, insult, abuse, false report or forgery, and may be proof of the 
occurrence of the crime, associating it with the accused. These may be papers that 
contain the confession of the accused or a written acknowledgment from a witness 
concerning a certain incident125. The rule is that the documentation, whether official or 
conventional, is not restricted to use of a specific argument in proving the crime. As 
with any other evidence, it depends on the discretion of the judge and, accordingly, the 
court is not restricted to that which is registered in the investigation or in the 
interrogation report, unless constrained otherwise by a provision in the law126. 
 
Hence, the report of the interrogation conducted by the police or public prosecution, and 
that which it comprises, including a confession by the accused, investigators samples, 
and the testimonies of witnesses, are elements of proof, subject to the evaluation of the 
judge. These have the capacity for argumentation or discussion, in the same manner and 
extent as other evidence. The opponents may refute it, and the court according to its 
discretion may make use of it or disregard it. 
                                                            
124 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shawki., op.cit., p80 
125 Abu-Amer, Mohammed Zaki., op. cit., p 982. 
126 Ibid, p. 982 
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Accordingly, the court may not base its conviction on a document that has not been 
examined by the defence or that they have not had the opportunity to view and to 
discuss its contents in the session, as this would be regarded as a violation of the rights 
of the defendant. It is worth mentioning here that the Egyptian procedure law allows 
most documentation as evidence, with due consideration given to the soundness of its 
contents. In the UAE, the permitted documentation comprises: 
1) Reports that are considered the most significant documentation in a criminal case. 
This is described as “documentation recorded by specialized employees, in accordance 
with the conditions taken in its stance”. These reports are drafted to contain the details 
of violations, considered evidence of the case127. They enable the judge to gather 
reliable information concerning facts associated with the accused or others, without the 
need to conduct a final investigation with regard to the facts. Thus the judge does not 
have to waste time proving insignificant facts. Furthermore, the drafting of these reports 
is done with the knowledge of public employees of material facts related to violations, 
provided they are trustworthy in what they record. 
2) Judgments and session reports. If it is mentioned in either the judgment or the 
session reports that a particular procedure should be applied during the deliberation of a 
case, and if, accordingly, it is not feasible to prove its non-association except by 
contesting it as being invented and untrue, or if this is not mentioned, then the 
concerned party may prove, using all possible means, that the correct procedure has 
been neglected and violated128. On the other hand, UAE legislation does not exclude 
                                                            
127 See Article 301 of Egyptian Procedure Law. 
128 See Article 420 of the Egyptian Procedure Law. 
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any documentation and accepts documentation, like any other method of proof, subject 
to the evaluation of the judge. 
 
6.7 Lawful presumptions 
Lawful presumptions are the extraction or derivation of the incident requiring proof 
from another proven incident. In other words, it is the derivation of an unknown 
incident from a known one129. It is an indirect method of evidence, as it does not refer 
directly to the incident requiring proof, but to another one, which requires the 
application of logic.130 
Lawful presumptions may be legal or judicial: legal presumptions are those mentioned 
in law for the sake of reference. If they do not accept opposed proof, presumptions are 
such as the acknowledgment of a law published in the official gazette, or the 
presumption for a lunatic or minor to lack the ability to distinguish things. The legal 
presumption may be simple if opposing evidence is accepted, such as the presumption 
of the committing of the crime of adultery from the presence of a person in a Muslim 
house in a place designated exclusively for women.131 
 
Judicial presumptions, are those to be found inside the court, where the judge derives 
from facts proven before him by means of deliberation, and they are among the matters 
delegated to the discretion of the judge. As long as his conclusion regarding them 
                                                            
129 Shaw, W., op.cit., p.176 
130 Ramadan, Medhat., op. cit., p270 
131 Abukhatwa, Ahmed Shawki., op. cit., p 83. 
  191
complies with logic, these presumptions are unlimited. Examples of these are: the 
presence of a spot of blood of the same type as the murder victim on the clothing of the 
accused; the presence of footprints at the scene of an accident identical to the footprints 
of the defendant; seeing the accused leaving a victim crying for help; the presence of 
traces of drugs on the clothing of the accused, proving his association with those drugs; 
witnessing a number of people walking with someone in possession of stolen items, or 
entering a house with him and hiding in that house, from which can be concluded their 
participation in the theft132. All these are presumptions from which the judge may 
conclude that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. 
 
Presumptions are subject to the conviction of the judge, as with other aspects of 
evidence, and the judge may accept or omit them as he sees fit. It has been shown that 
the judge or the court has full authority to evaluate the methods of evidence, accepting 
what complies with logic and the circumstances of each case and omitting what does 
not. Although the crime might be proved by one or more of these definite methods, the 
legislator gives full authority to the court to issue a sentence according to its own 
evaluation. Moreover, if there is liability to the death penalty, the legislator asks the 
court to proceed with investigating and hearing the case, even if several methods of 
proof exist in the case. Although, the accused might face one or many proofs against 
him, the legislator has insisted in surrounding him with safeguards and gives the judge 
the full authority to evaluate all methods of proof to avoid condemning an innocent 
person. The most important safeguards given by the legislator are given by the 
Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code in which authority is vested in the rulers 
                                                            
132 Ibid, p.83 
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of the Emirates to waive any punishment in general and the capital punishment in 
particular.  
 
6.8 Implementation of safeguards in sentences of capital punishment 
After the issuance of the death penalty by the Federal Supreme Court, the sentence 
should be approved through a specified procedure, in which the legislator provides the 
accused with further safeguards, as will be clarified here. 
Article 283 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law states that at the time the Federal 
Supreme Court passes a final judgement in favour of an execution, the judgement must 
be submitted to the President of the UAE for approval. This procedure gives a chance 
for the criminal to obtain a pardon from the President if the punishment is discretionary. 
It also provides him with a second chance, since the President can intercede with those 
who have the right of blood if the punishment is a retaliation punishment. This 
happened when the late President, His Highness Sheikh Zayed, interceded with those 
who had the right of a citizen's blood, requesting that cede retaliation against the woman 
who killed their father. The President is authorized by the Constitution and legislation to 
pardon any punishment or to commute it, as stated plainly in Articles 54 and 107 of the 
Constitution of the United Arab Emirates as well as in Article 145 of the Federal Penal 
Code. In another recent case, His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Ibn Zayed, the President of 
the UAE, requested the relatives of the victim of a premeditated murder to give pardon. 
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His Highness paid the legal blood money and the perpetrator was released after being in 
custody for many years waiting for the retaliation to be imposed133. 
 
If we seek the highest degree of justice then it would surely be advisable when the 
President, after being briefed on the verdict, commands a committee of lawyers 
specially constituted to study the verdict and express their opinion and then to submit it 
again to the President. After this he may confirm the judgment or uses his power of 
pardon, as appropriate. This would constitute an additional safeguard. 
 
Article 165 of the Federal Penal Code states that the investigation in the court session 
begins when opponents and witnesses are called and when the accused is examined 
about his crime. If he confesses, the court may sentence him without hearing the 
witnesses unless the crime is to be punished by execution. In such a case, the court may 
not rely on his confession alone: it has to complement the investigation. Due to the 
gravity of the punishment, this article provides additional protection of the accused in 
crimes punished by execution.  
 
Article 218 of the Federal Penal Code affirms the necessity of consensus in the opinions 
of the three judges (unanimous approval) concerning the passing of the sentence of 
execution. It affirms the necessity for the agreement of all the judges concerning the 
sentence, and if one of them objects, the punishment will be replaced by life 
                                                            
133 Alkhaleej Newspaper, issue No. 9859, 17/5/2006, p 11 
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imprisonment. Moreover, the judgment should indicate clearly that the three judges are 
agreed on the death penalty, and if this is not the case, the judgment should be 
considered void and appealed against134. 
 
In this situation, it surely be better if the court were made up of five judges in order to 
increase the guarantee. The probability of error with five persons is less than that for 
three persons. Article 230 of the Federal Penal Code affirms that a sentence of 
execution is automatically appealed by law without the attorney or the accused being 
required to appeal. This is another guarantee to the person sentenced to death. The 
sentence of execution passed by the Court of Appeal is appealed against by law under 
Article 253, whereas Article 262 affirms the demand to reconsider the final judgement 
on the basis of the emergence of new evidence, although this does not halt the 
implementation of the judgment, unless this judgment is for the death penalty. 
 
6.9 The implementation of the death penalty 
The legislator has organized the process of implementing execution in Articles 282 to 
287 of the Criminal Procedure Law. These articles refer to the following: 
After the Court of Cassation, at the local judiciary system, and the Federal Supreme 
Court at the federal judiciary, being the highest and the final court, passes the final 
judgment of execution, and after the President or the Governor confirms this verdict, the 
                                                            
134 Police Magazine (Arabic), Mejalat Alshorta (Abu-Dhabi), Issue No.436, April 2007, p.71  
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convict is placed in one of the punitive facilities in preparation for the execution to be 
carried out. 
 
The relatives of the condemn are allowed to visit and meet him on the day appointed for 
implementation of the sentence and he is also allowed to meet a minister of his religion 
if he asks for that. The punishment is carried out in the presence of one of the members 
of the public prosecution, a deputy of the Ministry of the Interior, a doctor and the 
convict's lawyer. Nobody else is allowed to attend. In other words, the implementation 
is undertaken in a semi-closed manner. There is some criticism raised here because if 
the intent of the execution punishment is for a general deterrence, then why is it 
implemented in secret? In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the execution is carried out in 
public. This may be for two reasons: firstly to deter others from committing such 
crimes, but also to show people how the Islamic sharia is merciful even up to the last 
minute of an offender’s life, when the blood relatives can waive their right of retaliation 
and set the murderer free.   
After implementation of the sentence, the convict's body is given to his family. If they 
do not come to take it, the administration of the punitive facilities will organize a burial. 
 
6.9.1 Postponement of the implementation of the death penalty  
Article 288 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Law, following Article 475 of Egyptian 
Procedural law, states that the execution must not be implemented on an official feast 
day or feast days related to the religion of the convict. Article 289 of the same law 
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requires the deferment of the execution of a pregnant woman until she delivers her baby 
and has suckled him for a full two-year period. This is in accordance with the Sunna of 
the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, when he ordered a woman who had 
confessed that her pregnancy was the result of an adultery should deliver her baby and 
suckle him for two years and only then that she should be executed by stoning. Thus, we 
can see the wisdom and justice of Islamic law, which refuses to punish anyone other 
than the criminal. The foetus has no guilt concerning the crime the mother committed. 
This is referred to nowadays as the personal principle of punishment.  
 
However, it might have been better, in cases to which discretionary punishment applies, 
for the UAE legislator to have taken the same steps as the Jordanian135 and the 
Kuwaiti136 legislators in this matter. They decided that if a woman sentenced to death 
gives birth to a living baby, the capital punishment is replaced by life imprisonment to 
enable the woman to bring up her child. Naturally, this will only apply to crimes of 
retaliation and those requiring discretionary punishment. If the capital punishment is for 
an AI Hudud crime, it is a duty to follow the principles of Islamic law, of which the 
most important is that an AI Hudud punishment is a matter concerning the right of God 
and that therefore pardon cannot be granted by any human agency. However, it is 
mentioned in Article 274 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the UAE that it is not 
permissible to implement hastily a judgment passed for divine ordinance and retaliation 
crimes. This is meant to give the relatives of the murdered person a chance to grant 
                                                            
135 See Article 17 of the Jordanian Procedure Law. 
136 See Article 59 of the Kuwaiti Procedure Law. 
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pardon, and to give the person found guilty the opportunity to deny his confession if 
there is no other evidence against him. 
It is worth mentioning that Article 262 plainly requires the deferment of the capital 
punishment if the convict submits a petition to rehear the case. It would perhaps have 
been better, however, if the UAE legislator had precluded the implementation of capital 
punishment for those exceeding the age of sixty or seventy since persons at this age are 
waiting for their natural death and such punishment would be of little value. The 
Sudanese criminal procedure law, for instance, forbids use of the death penalty to 
persons over the age of seventy. Age and gender restrictions apply only to discretionary 
crimes. Moreover, in the UAE, in accordance with the Juvenile Code, there is a 
minimum age restriction of 18 with respect to capital punishment in discretionary 
crimes.  
 
After the death sentence is pronounced, whether as a retaliation (Al-Qisas) or 
discretionary (Ta'zir) punishment and after the elapse of the period, and after all legally 
stipulated methods have been utilized, then sentence will be enforced by a state agency, 
being the police in most cases. This section will deal with the method of enforcing the 
death penalty as prescribed in the Islamic sharia, and as used by most Arab states, and 
as consequently is the situation in the United Arab Emirates. 
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6.9.2 The Method of enforcing the death penalty in accordance with the sharia 
Scholars have disagreed as to the method of enforcing this punishment. Imam Abu 
Hanifa stated that the authority should carry out execution by sword and Imam Ahmed 
agreed that the punishment should not be carried out except by the striking of the sword 
to the neck. Imam Malik and Imam Alshafee, however, provided that the perpetrator 
should be punished by the same means as he (the perpetrator) assaulted the victim137.  
The reason for choosing the sword as a tool for punishment is that death is swift and 
that this form of execution causes the least pain to the offender. However, were there to 
be another tool faster than the sword, and one which inflicts less pain, then there would 
be no legal objection to its use138. Hence, scholars have resorted to the words of Prophet 
Mohammad, peace be upon him: “God has ordered benevolence in everything, if you 
kill, kill with benevolence, if you slaughter, you have to sharpen the blade, to relieve the 
carcass”. 
In one of its judgments, the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE left the issue of defining 
the method of enforcement to the authority, either by means of sword or by the fastest 
possible method of execution139. Practically, the United Arab Emirates resorts to 
shooting (firing squad) as a method for enforcing the death penalty, whether as a 
retaliation punishment (Al-Qisas) or as a discretionary punishment (Ta’zir). This is also 
the case in a large number of Arab states as well as in many other countries. 
 
                                                            
137 Imam Malik Ibn Anas, The chair (Arabic), Al-Mowata, section 3, p.123  
138 Auda, Abdul-qader., op.cit., p.154 
139 Federal Supreme Court, appeal no.4, hearing dated on 18.9.1981  
  199
6.10 Critical Study of the Death Penalty in the punitive laws of the UAE         
It has been pointed out that the UAE legislator has approved the death penalty in the 
punitive laws of the UAE. This penalty is stipulated in the Federal Penal Law issued in 
1987, the Narcotics Law issued in 1995, and finally the Anti-Terrorism law issued in 
2004 in accordance with the international movement to fight crimes of terrorism, crimes 
not expected to decrease within the short term. 
 
With the Islamic Sharia being the main source of legislation, the UAE has adopted the 
death penalty as divine ordinance, retaliation and discretionary punishments. It is 
important to this research to discuss the death penalty as a discretionary penalty to show 
whether the legislator has extended the application of this penalty or the approval of it 
within reasonable limits. 
 
6.10.1 The death penalty as stipulated in the Federal Criminal Law 
It was stated at an early stage in this research that the provisions of the Islamic sharia 
were in force in the UAE until the arrival of Western colonialism when some of the 
Western rules were applied in each Emirate. Both the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the 
Emirate of Dubai issued their own criminal law in the year 1970, which remained in 
force until the Federal Criminal Law was finally passed and issued in the year 1987. In 
addition, it was indicated that the provisions of Islamic sharia were summarized in the 
first article of the Federal Criminal Law, which states that the provisions of the Islamic 
sharia shall apply without numeration or explanation with respect to the divine 
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ordinance, retaliation and blood money. Although these provisions are clear, the 
legislator should have clarified them to avoid contradiction later on when he came to 
refer to discretionary crimes, since some of them come under the provisions of the 
Islamic sharia. In the remaining 433 articles, the law mentioned and explained the 
discretionary punishments which have come under the authority of the legislator to 
maintain security and order in the society, including the death penalty for a number of 
crimes. Crimes subject to the death penalty according to the Federal Criminal Law will 
be highlighted, and consideration will be given to whether such punishment suits the 
crime or whether the legislator went too far with this punishment. 
 
6.10.2 Crimes affecting external security of the UAE 
As with legislation in all countries, whether Islamic or Western, UAE legislation aims 
to protect the state and the regime so that chaos does not overwhelm the country when a 
new ruler or governor takes office. Such legislation is required to spread the feeling 
among individuals that the state is willing to deter whoever may consider disturbing the 
order, affecting all citizens. Some Western legislation may be in agreement with Islamic 
sharia in approving the death penalty for treason, as prescribed in the Islamic sharia for 
the crime of rebellion, a crime similar to that of treason. This is to achieve the twin aims 
of order and deterrence. 
 
Priority is given here to discussion of the status in the UAE in order to show whether 
the death penalty as a discretionary punishment is appropriate for the crimes indicated 
by the Federal Criminal Law, or whether there is no comparison between the crime and 
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the punishment, such as a harsh punishment for petty crimes. As indicated previously, 
this would be rejected by the Islamic Sharia, which allows the legislator to use the death 
penalty as a discretionary punishment but without being arbitrary. 
 
In the context of crimes harmful to the external security of the country, the legislator has 
established the death penalty against any citizen who helps the enemy forces during a 
state of war140. The UAE legislator does not take a dissimilar attitude in this respect to 
that of much Western legislation which adopts this penalty in time of war. In Turkey141, 
for example, although it has abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, maintains 
this penalty for crimes committed in time of war. To demonstrate that the UAE 
legislator has not overstepped this principle, he emphasizes that where such a crime is 
committed in peacetime, the punishment shall be life or temporary imprisonment, 
depending on the danger inherent in the crime142.       
 
6.10.3 Crimes affecting the internal security of the UAE 
In respect to crimes affecting internal security, the legislator adopted the death penalty 
to protect the regime and its figureheads in order to protect the public interest. He 
established the death penalty against anyone attempting to overturn the regime by force. 
In this point, the legislator adheres to the Islamic sharia which allows the death penalty 
                                                            
140 See Article 149, 150 and 151 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
141 The reservation states that the death penalty is retained ‘in times of war, imminent threat of war and 
for terrorism’. (cf. Amnesty International, ‘death penalty news’, September 2001, A1 index: ACT 53/ 
oo4/2001, p.3). As is discussed extensively later in this thesis, however, what actually is committed in 
time of war, whether by countries that are de jure abolitionist, or abolitionist with reservation is highly 
debatable.  
142 See Article 174 and 175 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
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against anyone guilty of sedition and attempting to act against the leader. However, the 
UAE legislator did not state, as the Islamic sharia does, whether the criminal deserves 
pardon or reduction of this punishment if he or they declare, repent and regret. As 
already mentioned, the Islamic sharia always encourages criminals to repent and regret, 
so that the harshest punishment the criminal might face can be waived. This principle 
stands in contrast to the view of the federal legislator, who does not allow for criminals 
to repent. This may be an indication of the impact of Western legislation, which does 
not place the dame value on spiritual repentance as does the sharia. The expression of 
regret is not considered sufficient to justify waiving the punishment under in modern 
UAE legislation, although it may be a supporting factor in reducing it. 
 
6.10.4 Crimes of attacking means of transport and other public utilities 
As for assaulting means of transport, the legislator has modified his attitude cornering 
crimes harmful to external and internal security. He does not stipulate the death penalty 
for crimes such as attacking aeroplanes and ships, even though such actions may cause 
disasters, but is satisfied with life imprisonment. Although he has employed the term 
“disasters”, which bears extra meaning, he did not explain what he meant by “disasters” 
and left this ambiguous143. He may have realized this flaw and tried to correct it when 
he issued the Anti-Terrorism Law in the year 2004. Here he adopted the death penalty if 
the attack of a means of transportation via air, land or water leads to the death of any 
person144. 
 
                                                            
143 See Articles 288 and 289 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
144 See Article 15 of the Anti-Terrorism Law issued in 2004. 
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6.10.5 Crimes against individuals 
In Chapter Five, it was stated that the UAE legislator was affected by Western 
legislation to a great extent in cases with aggravated circumstances, and that this was at 
variance with the provisions of the sharia. The UAE legislator prescribed life or 
temporary imprisonment for homicide but admitted the death penalty if the murder was 
accompanied by the aggravated circumstances.145  
The most convincing and revealing evidence that the UAE legislator was affected by the 
Western legislation in cases of homicide is that despite there having been 77 separate 
convection for this crime committed in the Emirate of Dubai in the three-year period, 
2001-2003, some of which were with aggravated circumstances146, only one offender 
was executed. Most of the death sentences given were commuted to life or even to 
temporary imprisonment. Some of them may have received pardon from the blood 
relatives, according to the provisions of the sharia. 
Since the amendment made to the Federal Criminal Code in 2005, a pardon given in 
place of retaliation provides for a mandatory sentence of one year’s imprisonment as a 
discretionary punishment. It is clear that those criminals who have received a life 
sentence, and did not receive retaliation as provided for by the sharia, and who were not 
pardoned by the relatives of the victims have not been dealt with according to Islamic 
law. Here, we cannot deny the possibility of unwritten, higher instructions, favouring 
flexibility regarding the death penalty, and resulting from international pressure to 
abolish the death penalty.  
 
                                                            
145 See Article 332 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
146 Source; Criminal Investigation Department, Dubai Police Force, 
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More than 120 nationalities from all over the world live in the UAE, and the legislator 
may wish to reduce their exposure to the death penalty. However, as we have 
continually shown, as a Muslim country the UAE cannot abolish it. The legislator is 
surely mistaken when dealing with individuals committing the most serious crimes if he 
decides that he cannot impose the death penalty for those which cause the death of the 
victim. This denies the right of retaliation to the blood relatives who must be given the 
choice either to choose retaliation or to waive their right and accept the legal blood 
money147. The legislator is strict regarding the crime of rape, as he prescribes the death 
penalty against the perpetrator, and even deems the crime as having been committed by 
force when the age of the victim is less than 14 years148. Yet it can be certainly argued 
that the legislator should distinguish between cases in which the criminal kills the 
victim after the rape, and when the victim is left alive. If the only punishment for rape is 
death, then the criminal has an incentive to kill the victim so that no proof of his crime 
remains. Yet the legislator should surely deter the criminal from killing his victim after 
rape, by imposing a punishment less than the death penalty for rape without killing. 
There is one further issue to be raised here, which is whether the legislator should also 
distinguish between cases of which rape is committed against a virgin and rape of an 
individual who has known sex before, or is a prostitute. From a Muslim and Arabic 
social perspective, these cases surly differ, and thus should not be treated equally by the 
law. Although both constitute a gross violation of the person, the consequences for these 
several victims are not the same and it is the accepted principle of law in every country 
that a crime must be, at least in part, judged by its consequences. 
 
                                                            
147 See Article 344 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
148 See Article 354 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
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Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the cultural attitudes toward illicit sexual 
behaviour of any kind are quite different with respect to the Muslim and Western 
worlds. We have already seen that proof of adultery under the sharia may be simply the 
presence of a male person, not related to the individual with whom adultery is alleged, 
in an unauthorized section of the house, and that the consequences, namely the 
punishment applicable, is far more sever tan would be contemplated in a Western 
country. It is in this context, therefore, that the view taken of the consequences of the 
rape of a virgin or innocent child should be seen. 
 
6.10.6 The death penalty in the Anti-Narcotics Code of 1995 
The legislator prescribed the death penalty for many crimes under the Anti-Narcotics 
Code issued in the year 1995, and emphasized in this law that the punishments are 
fixed punishments and the judiciary has no discretion to vary sentences between the 
minimum and maximum punishments allowed in the Federal Criminal Code. This 
mandatory and determinate sentencing does not seem logical, since a fixed punishment 
does not give full authority to the judge to evaluate the evidence fully. If the judge were 
to pass a lower punishment than that specified in the law, then the verdict will be 
criticized and appealed. However, the important thing in this respect is surely that the 
legislator should have stipulated the death penalty against importer of narcotic plants or 
substances, whose purpose is promotion or trade, in relation to their quantity149. As we 
have said before, the quantity of the plants or the amount of drugs is essential here 
since the harm will vary according to quantity. 
                                                            
149 See Article 48 and 49 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
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The legislator has approved the death penalty for another category of crime, which is 
the murder of a public official responsible for the implementation of the law, during or 
due to the discharging of his duty. In this regard, the legislator was surely correct to be 
strict in the penalty for this crime since the official must be protected so he can execute 
his duty fairly150. However, in Article 54, the legislator indicated that this penalty is as 
for a discretionary and not a retaliation punishment. Yet the legislator should surely 
have considered that the murder of a public official does not merit a discretionary 
punishment but deserves to be treated with retaliation, since a discretionary punishment 
may be remitted or pardoned by the Governor without reference to the blood relatives 
of the murdered official. 
 
The majority of drug traders who deal in small amounts of drugs may be drug addicts, 
which means they are themselves ill and may be forced to commit this kind of crime 
through the pressure of their own personal needs. They may require money to afford 
either medical treatment and rehabilitation or the drugs to keep themselves alive. The 
legislator should therefore also distinguish between trafficking cases, and even prescribe 
treatment and rehabilitation for these people, which mean of course, that the death 
penalty would not be justified. 
 
6.10.7 The death penalty in the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2004 
The federal legislator established the death penalty for many crimes of terrorism, which 
are spreading around the world. However, due to the global movement for the abolition 
                                                            
150 See Article 53 of the Federal Criminal Code. 
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of capital punishment, the legislator has added conditions to the death penalty that the 
crime must cause the death of one or more persons, or that the criminal or criminals 
used explosive substances. In this, the legislator, affected by the Western world, has 
gone in the direction of lowering the number of crimes subject to the death penalty 
since, even if they do not cause death, the criminal might still have faced the death 
penalty if this law had been issued in the 1980s or even in the 1990s. Moreover, the 
Anti-Terrorism Law approved life or temporary imprisonment for the detention and 
captivity of a king or a president of another country, as long as the crime did not result 
in his death. This is a considerable concession, which indicates that the legislator is 
highly affected by the pressures placed by some countries and organizations to abolish 
the death penalty. 
 
6.10.8 Record of the use of the death penalty in the UAE 
The Emirate of Dubai has occasionally implemented the death penalty as have other 
emirates in the union. In spite of a large number of death sentences issued, those carried 
out have been very few. This may be due to the ruler not approving the sentence, or for 
reasons related to the waiving of the rights of blood relatives. The first death penalty to 
be carried out in Dubai was on 15/10/1996. It was imposed on a man who kidnapped a 
child, then raped and killed her. This incident aroused public fury and led to the demand 
for the enforcement of the death penalty151. In this case, it can be seen that the death 
penalty was enforced as a retaliation punishment, but it could also have been enforced 
                                                            
151 According to the correctional Institutions, only 7 people have ever been executed in the recorded 
history of Dubai. The last execution carried out was in 2011. In the other Emirates, 8 people have been 
executed In Abu-Dhabi (first execution in 1998) , 4 in Sharjah, and 5 in Ras-Alkhaima (since 1998). All 
the executions were carried out according to the provisions of retaliation. 
  208
as a discretionary punishment, since the rules on rape fall under discretionary laws 
whereas premeditated murder demands retaliation. In either case, the murderer might 
have been relieved by the exercise of the rights of the blood relatives. This particular 
case in Dubai, in 1996, illustrates the true significant of the rights of the blood relatives. 
The murdered child, whose father was no longer alive, was represented at the execution 
by her mother. The formality of a lawful execution is such that at the moment before the 
sentence is carried out, the blood relative is asked if he or she wants the execution to 
proceed. In this case, the mother chose to order the execution of her daughter’s 
murderer. 
 
The death penalty was subsequently enacted on six other convicted offenders in Dubai, 
after their first trial in the Court of First Instance, their second in the Court of Appeal, 
and review before the Court of Cassation. These crimes of homicide were associated 
with other crimes and with aggravated circumstances. With regard to crimes involving 
narcotics, despite the issuance of death sentences to twenty-seven people, and its 
confirmation after all stages of appeal, none has been executed. It is significant to note 
that twenty-seven people who were sentenced to death for drug trafficking received a 
pardon from the ruler of Dubai in the single year, 2007. All were foreigners and they 
were all deported to their home countries. 
From 1998152 until the present only eight people have been executed In Abu-Dhabi, four 
people in Sharjah and five in Ras-Alkhaima. In the three other emirates, subject to the 
                                                            
152 We could not find the statistics for the period prior to 1998, however, an official who preferred not to 
mention his name informed us that the death penalty was not implemented for 15 years and then 
implemented again in 1998 (excluding Dubai which implemented the first execution in 1996). 
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Federal Supreme Court, there have been no executions. All of the executions carried out 
were for crimes related to homicide and the execution implemented because the blood 
relatives did not waive their rights in retaliation. It can be seen that the Emirate of 
Dubai, in which all federal criminal laws are valid, upholds the death penalty. The scope 
of the application of this punishment remains narrow, and the circumstances in which it 
may be used are limited. It is worth mentioning here that no execution was carried out 
in Dubai153 before the issuance of the federal penal code in 1987, and that no execution 
was even documented prior to this date. 
 
Implementation of the death penalty has been confined in the narrowest terms to crimes 
requiring discretionary punishment, over which the leader or rulers have great authority. 
For crimes of retaliation, however, its implementation is delayed to give a chance to 
those who have the right to blood money. As for the enforcement of Al-Hudud, this 
differs from one emirate to another, and from one crime to another. It cannot be said 
that it is enforced to a great degree, for  which there could be no clearer evidence than 
the incidence of thousands of adultery crimes that go unpunished, whether by flogging 
or stoning to death, enacted against offenders for contravention of divine ordinance 
laws154. 
 
                                                            
153 Since Dubai was a British protectorate and Britain itself abolished the death penalty in the late 1960’s, 
this influenced Dubai. Thus, no execution was carried out till 1996, although the Local Penal Code of 
Dubai, issued 1970, imposed the death penalty for many crimes including homicide.  
154 Statistics form the Criminal Investigation Department in Dubai showed 122 adultery cases in Dubai 
during the year 2003; however, no one was executed. 
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Conclusion 
The discovery of oil in the United Arab Emirates was a turning point for all aspects of 
life. The society in the Emirates used to be simple and people made a living that was 
barely sufficient. Now, however, society has become open to the world and is affected 
by everything that is going on around the world. In particular, it is tending to imitate 
Western society in many matters, especially in legislation. 
Initially, before the emergence of the state, the judiciary system in the United Arab 
Emirates used to pass their judgments and sentences in clear conformity with the 
Islamic sharia, because the society was Muslim, the UAE is geographically close to the 
land of Mohammad's message, and the religion of the whole region is Islam. However, 
after the emergence of the state and the discovery of oil, the Emirates has become a 
focus of attention for many nations and has begun to attract people from more than 120 
countries, according to the statistics of the Ministry of Labour. In particular, the 
legislator in the United Arab Emirates has begun to be affected in criminal legislation 
and shown some inclination to abolish capital punishment. 
As has been noted, the legislator drafted the Penal Code over several years. His 
intention was to include the Islamic sharia rules concerning divine ordinance, retaliation 
and blood-money (diya), but he condensed them into a single article, which included 
them without sufficiently interpreting them. He could not be said to have been remiss in 
citing the sharia as a source of law. However, he has not in practice required judges to 
abide by them. It is as if he had been driven, or had yielded to the demands of others in 
the federation. This may have been in order to make the law more flexible so that the 
state does not lose attraction to investors, by projecting the idea that this is not a country 
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that violates human rights. This question is especially sensitive in a Western 
perspective, as, in particular, the rules of retaliation, Al-Hudud, and blood money (diya) 
may appear extremely strange. 
Many sentences of execution have been passed, but few implemented. Up to the year 
2011, the number of sentences carried out in Dubai was seven, with a total of seventeen 
for all the other six Emirates in the Union. This provides hard evidence that the general 
situation has been affected by the universal context, especially that of the situation in 
Britain, since most if not all the heads of security and consultancy in Dubai were from 
the UK. In stating that the Islamic sharia is a ‘main’ source of legislation, but not the 
major or the only one, it is as if the legislator wanted to signal that the provisions of the 
Islamic sharia would be supplemented and make room for other legislation, especially 
those with Western features. Thus, it did not mean that the Emirates’ legislation had 
abandoned the rules of Islamic sharia, but that it was trying to adjust to a new, universal 
situation. In consequence, this legislation also gave the rulers and judges the right not to 
implement sentences of execution in discretionary crimes. It also gave the right for them 
to mediate with those who have the right to blood money or to cede punishment in 
retaliation crimes, all of which is in accordance with the Islamic sharia. A problem 
remains, however, with the Al-Hudud crimes which cannot be pardoned if the crime is 
proved. These include the crime of adultery which, as the statistics indicate, has not in 
practice attracted the death penalty. 
The legislator has surrounded the person sentenced to capital punishment with 
numerous safeguards, whether at the investigation stage, in the trial, or even at 
implementation. This demonstrates his concern not to execute an innocent person. All 
these aspects underline the fact that execution is carried out only within the strictest 
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limits. We should not forget, moreover, that clemency is an inherent principle of Islam 
and not only, as we have seen, may an offender be reprieved at the last moment by the 
blood relatives of the victim, but the ruler may also show mercy to the condemned man. 
However, the principle of capital punishment is indispensable both in observance of 
Islamic law, and as a feature of deterrence in the punitive legislation of the United Arab 
Emirates. 
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                 CHAPTER SEVEN    
Discussion of the differences in the approaches to serious crimes of 
Western and Islamic laws and the use of the death penalty 
 
Introduction  
We have examined the concepts of crime in Islamic law as they involve obligations upon 
ruler and ruled and in the particular application of the death penalty. And we have noted 
the variation in current practice within the United Arab Emirates and in relation to other 
Muslim countries. But a general thesis on capital punishment should not neglect the 
wider international environment.  
 
As we seen in the previous chapter, foreign laws have clearly influenced attitudes in the 
UAE. Moreover, there is a domain in which a nation’s law and jurisdiction now come 
into contact with those of others directly and frequently for international questions to be 
ignored. This new legal environment does not or should not, as will be argued here, 
overthrow the established national and religious law. But it does require that 
jurisprudents, especially in a country as cosmopolitan as the United Arab Emirates, 
explain and justify its laws to those whose principles are different. This may be far from 
easy. With few exceptions, non-Islamic countries lack the basis of belief that the sharia 
affords to Muslims. Non-Muslims enjoy greater flexibility but at the cost of steady 
conviction. Towards the death penalty, the Islamic world is presented with a strange 
collection of foreign attitudes, ranging from fully support and usage, to a loud campaign 
for its abolition. These attitudes, and some of the underlying history that may explain 
them, form the discussion of this chapter. In particular, it will be necessary to show and 
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explain some of the abolitionist movement’s thoughts, as seen in the Human Rights 
lobby at the United Nations as well as in academic literature generated by this powerful 
group. 
 
Although, the campaign has been often made at the United Nations, abolition is not a 
condition of UN membership and accession to a treaty of abolition remains voluntary.1 
In the more radical environment of the European Union, however, states whose principle 
to retain the death penalty has to give up this principle as a condition of membership. 
Turkey, an EU applicant since the 1990’s, was effectively obliged to surrender its 
independence in this policy.2 For the United Arab Emirates, no pressure of such an 
extreme kind exists till now. Yet, as has already been seen, both the history and present 
social composition of the federation make members like UAE especially sensitive to the 
currents of international opinion.  
 
7. 1 The historical background  
We should consider the context of the abolitionist movement. Undoubtedly, it received 
its energy from the formation of the United Nations, and this is the main issue through 
which it continues to operate.3 Yet the location is troubling to those whose views and 
                                                 
1 Although Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN Doc. A/810, 1948) protects the 
right to life, it makes no reference to the death penalty which is thus taken to be an exception to this right. 
Likewise, under Article 6 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (drafted several times 
from 1947 on; adopted by the General Assembly in 1966) there are specific caveats to the general 
presumption of the right to life. The most important of these are that the death penalty may only be handed 
down by ‘a competent court’ for ‘the most serious crimes’; that the condemned has the right of appeal; 
(hence) that no one shall be ‘arbitrarily deprived of his life’ (UN GA Res. 2200 A (XXI). 
2 Turkey removed the death penalty from its constitution in compliance with terms and preconditions for 
signing the New European Protocol; it has abolished this punishment in all circumstances. (Alittihad 
Newspaper, issue 10223, 2.7.2003, p. 35). 
3 Some commentators also attach considerable importance to the influence of the Royal Commission on 
Capital Punishment (1949-53), whose report not only prepared the way for eventual abolition in Britain 
but led to abolition in a number of other countries such as Canada and Australia. Zimring, an abolitionist 
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practices place them outside the compass of what the movement is trying to achieve. The 
United Nations, by its title and status in the modern world, projects an image of achieved 
consensus. Though its goals, as, for example, to end international conflict and mass 
starvation, may be no nearer fulfilment than they were sixty years ago, it has provided 
the world, and especially its newly-formed states, with a sense of direction. If not 
beyond criticism in particular situations, it represents the groundwork of a constructed 
social morality that has implications for law-makers everywhere. Yet for any enterprise 
to assume it always know best is dangerous. It restricts lateral vision. What adjustment 
can the UN make if one of its declared objectives is in conflict with the rooted principles 
of a great number of the peoples and states it claims to represent? Since it derives its 
existence from these peoples and states, it can hardly set itself above them. Either it 
scales back its ambition in areas of difference that cannot reconciled or it becomes a 
standing contradiction. This basic situation explains the difficult comings and goings of 
proceedings at the UN on abolition during the last half century.4 
 
But does the movement for the universal abolition of capital punishment reflect a 
common feeling throughout the world?  Is there evidence of a growing consensus to this 
end? Despite the claims of abolitionists, we find that globally four out of every seven 
people inhabit states in which capital punishment has not been abolished. Of course, this 
statistic sheds no light on whether the death penalty has popular support in those 
countries but, by the same token, it is impossible to measure actual consent in countries 
                                                                                                                                                
in the US, takes this to be a model document. (cf. Zimring, F.E., American Capital Punishment, 2003, 
pp.20-22) 
4 In the accounts of academics who take on a crusading role in this matter, such as Professor William 
Schabas, we hear almost as much frustration voiced over the drafting of definitions as over those who 
stand out as retentionists. (cf . Schabas, W., The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law, 
Cambridge: CUP, 3rd ed., 2002, pp. 23-39 & passim). 
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that have abolished it. A rough as this indicator is, it is all that we have to calculate the 
will of nations.  
 
Based upon a head-count measurement, therefore, we can say that the abolitionist case is 
misleading. But the faults go deeper. Abolitionists put together retentionist countries as 
though they represented some uniform cultural standpoint.5 This is far from being true. 
Countries choosing to keep the death penalty on their statute books are among the largest 
and most diverse societies on the planet.6 So far from having achieved a jus cogens7 of 
international jurisprudence, as some abolitionists like to claim, there is a plain 
misrepresentation of status.  
 
Yet what were the circumstances that allowed such an impression to be formed? 
Understanding the process by which a particular moral climate was played upon and 
persuaded to bring in declarations, charters and treaties at the United Nations is essential 
to understanding what was produced in the immediate post-1945 environment. These 
declarations did not spring from a forum in which diverse standpoints were represented, 
or views put and received equally. Large areas of the world were still at that time the 
colonies of the historical Great Powers, and much of Africa, Asia and elsewhere had, 
broadly-speaking, no voice whatsoever. Moreover, the war that brought the UN itself 
into existence had resulted in a narrow cartel of power and influence. At the Nuremberg 
trials, where death sentences were demanded, a victor’s justice was firmly in the hands 
                                                 
5 As documented hereafter, it is also frequently implied that the only serious opposition to abolition of the 
death penalty comes from the Muslim states. 
6 Examples that may be given are Nigeria, India, The United States of America, China, Egypt, Indonesia 
and Japan. These are societies which have little in the way of common heritage and no unified belief-
system. 
7 A customary assumption in law 
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of the so-called Big Three.8  The legal perspectives of countries in East Asia or Latin 
America were of no account. As for the Islamic world, in which societies of the Middle 
East and North Africa were subject, to a greater or lesser degree, to an alien 
jurisprudence, it is doubtful whether sharia law was ever recognised in the 
understanding of the imperial powers. Nevertheless, determinations were being made in 
New York which reflected a new concern for humanitarian and universal rights.9  
 
 As with the League of Nations (from 1920), and ambitious non-aggression charters 
going back to the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), the United Nations grew in response to 
an international war. First created by a coalition of nations pledging to defeat its 
common enemies, when the Second World War ended, it rapidly developed into a 
Congress of more than fifty founding states.10 Their purpose was to promote peace, 
international cooperation and security, an intention predicated on reducing or removing 
the circumstances that led to aggression.11 It reflected a natural desire to avoid a return to 
the excesses of the recent, painful past.12 By the middle years of the twentieth century, 
extreme forms of cruelty and genocide had occurred in many parts of the globe, 
including societies that continued to see themselves at the forefront of economic, 
scientific and even cultural achievement. Yet to understand this inheritance, which gave 
rise to many of the assumptions made at conferences in Geneva and New York, we must 
go further back in time.  
                                                 
8 France also contributed judges and prosecutors to those of Great Britain, The United States and the 
Soviet Union. 
9 In December 1946, for example, a Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) was set up to alleviate the 
massive deprivations and displacements to women and children caused by the Second World War. 
10 In January, 1942. 
11 Fifty-one states by 24th October, 1945. 
12 A rational anxiety in view of the failures of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations after the 
First World War. 
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For five hundred years, innovations in sea-power and military technology gave European 
societies the means to oppress others throughout the world.13 Societies at a low, or 
simply at a local, level of organisation were driven out or killed, mostly without 
consideration of their right to exist. Others, as in the Islamic world, with a settled 
civilisation of their own, were forced to modify their laws in conformity with those of 
new overlords.14 This basic situation lasted for nearly five hundred years, from the 
earliest Spanish conquests to the last decades of the twentieth century, when branches of 
this loosely-knit cultural empire began to fall apart and new centres of economic power, 
in east Asia and the Middle East, gradually emerged. Not surprisingly, perhaps, there is a 
legacy of innate superiority in the legal outlook of this long-dominant grouping.15  
 
To the European, or ‘Western’, mind, this characterisation of history may seem harsh 
and one-sided.16 It appears to ignore the debt owed to the civilisation and creativity of 
the period. It ignores the Italian renaissance, the French enlightenment, English science 
and industrial innovation, German technology. It ignores the rise of representative 
institutions and of free speech – which still persuade the ‘European’ that he stands at the 
forefront of civilisation. Above all, in this context, it ignores the progressive, secular 
                                                 
13 The term European is taken here in its broadest cultural sense. It includes, therefore, societies we might 
call ‘neo-European’ such as the United States of America, Brazil and Soviet Russia, many of which, like 
Greek city states before them, were the colonising colonies of an expanding nationality. 
14 Although few of the Arab lands became colonies in a formal sense, the only territory that was not 
subject to diktat by the imperial powers belonged to tribes of the Arabian peninsula. 
15 It may, for example, still be as hard for a high-ranking French official to see true equivalence with his 
Lebanese counterpart as it is for a Jewish Israeli to recognise the moral or legal claims of an Arab 
Palestinian. 
16 The term ‘Western’, here and elsewhere, is cultural not geographic. Thus, it applies as much to Australia 
as to Canada. It is analytic, not self-descriptive, since a Russian, for example, might see himself as 
‘European’ but not ‘Western’. Yet despite this lack of precision, it does correspond to the broad definition 
of ‘European’ discussed above and, in line with both common and academic discourse, is normally 
preferred to it in this account as giving rise to less confusion. 
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character of European law, which allows the social norms of one generation to be 
overruled by the next. 
 
Nevertheless, this was an era of violent interference in the lives and lands of non-
European peoples, transforming or uprooting their cultural outlook.17 Law and religion - 
intertwined in pre-modern society - were among the first and most significant casualties 
of this interference.18  In the closely linked States, unlike much of Europe, there is still a 
boundless enthusiasm for the narrative of expropriation, seen entirely as a process of 
settlement.19 Taken as a whole, however, the ‘Western’ world was shaken to the core by 
the events of the 1930’s and 1940’s. It had good reason to drive away the past and make 
all new. But unless a people is massacred in its entirety, as happened to the people of 
Tasmania20, a memory remains. It is many centuries since European armies committed 
indiscriminate violence in their Crusades on Palestine, but these narratives still condition 
relations between peoples of the Middle East and Europe. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
17 Those living on the plains of both halves of the American continent were subject to systematic 
extermination. Others, as in central America, after prolonged brutality and slaughter, were assimilated to 
the religion of their conquerors. 
18 Writing of the radical difference to be found in native legal traditions, Professor Glenn makes some 
interesting observations: ‘Chthonic thought in matters of crime and criminal repression also provides an 
ongoing alternative to Western practices of individual guilt and incarceration. The costs of prisons are 
enormous, and accelerating. Chthonic people don’t have any. The Cree do not have a word for guilt.’ 
(Glenn, H.P., Legal Traditions of the World’, Oxford: OUP, 4th ed., 2010, p.91.) 
19 Though less may be heard of divine assistance in concepts such as ‘Manifest Destiny’, the triumphalism 
is still evident in variations on ‘the American Dream’. cf. Baron, R.C. (annual selection) ‘America: One 
Land, One People’ (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum) in which can be found, for example, Catton, B. & Catton, 
W.B., The Bold and Magnificent Dream, America’s Founding Years, 1492-1815, 1987, pp. 23- 49.  By 
contrast, it is hard to imagine that today’s readers in Germany would be comfortable with such a title as 
‘One Land, One People’. 
20 In the years following the first European settlement in 1803 
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7.1.1 Commitment and guilt 
Europe’s commitment to the universal abolition of capital punishment is not simply one 
project among many, but an issue connected to the guilt felt over its own history.21  
 
Until quite recent times, the European penal tradition was not one that dealt leniently or 
compassionately with offenders. The threshold for capital crime was, even in the more 
advanced European states, surprisingly low.22 In England, confession extracted under 
torture, corporal punishment and capital sentencing were commonplace. The death 
penalty was passed on the very young, the aged and the mentally ill.23  It was applied to 
crimes such as petty theft, often upon evidence that in modern terms would be regarded 
as untested, without an established right to legal representation, and usually without 
appeal or the possibility of clemency.24 Frequently these resulted in execution of an 
offender by methods that were technically incompetent.25 In the light of this, it might not 
seem unreasonable to suggest that the practice of the death penalty in Muslim countries, 
which European society apparently now finds so terrible, is relatively humane, fair-
minded and characterised by due process.  
 
Over the last thirteen centuries, what is most striking in the contrast between the 
jurisprudence of Christian and Islamic countries are the sudden shifts of viewpoint in 
                                                 
21 As the displaced people of Palestine have learnt, such guilt can inflict a heavy punishment for the crimes 
of others upon the unknowing and the innocent. 
22 In English law, theft above the value of one shilling (not more than £10 in current value) was long fixed 
as the threshold of capital crime. (cf. Pollock & Maitland, ‘History of English Law’, vol ii. p. 459) 
23 In England, in the eighteenth century, the death penalty was imposed for 222 crimes. Even children 
could be sentenced to death until 1908, when execution was outlawed for people under the age of fourteen. 
(cf. Laurence, J., ‘A History of Capital Punishment’, Kennikat Press, 1971, p.4)  
24 From the standpoint of Islamic legal practice, the apparent unwillingness of Western judicial systems to 
use the instrument of clemency looks surprising and, in some contexts, inhumane. 
25 So incompetent, in fact, that the introduction in France of more efficient methods attributed to Dr. 
Guillotin (1790) was regarded as a humanitarian advance (cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13ed, 1926, 
pp.694-695). 
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Christian states. ‘Cruel and unnecessary punishment’, a standard phrase in the 
abolitionist’s vocabulary, effectively proposes that capital punishment, even for the 
worst of crimes, is more brutal than any other form of punishment, and that the death 
penalty has no usefulness to the state. Then how can we rely on this sudden conviction 
that the death penalty is a pointless denial of human rights? It is only a few generations 
since quite opposite beliefs were reflected in the laws of Europe. Restriction upon the 
subject, the right to capture and own slaves, and the transportation of convicted 
criminals as forced labour, were accepted norms of European society.26 Although these 
practises have now been abandoned in jurisprudence, as in common feeling, 
humanitarian progress has not meant a willingness to give up the right to wage war, or a 
compulsion to abandon military and extra-judicial killing – activities that might properly 
be called ‘cruel and unnecessary’.27  
 
How, in any case, are we to decide what constitutes inhumane treatment or social 
ineffectiveness: what are the criteria? Assuming that for the most extreme crimes the 
only alternative to the death sentence is life imprisonment, we must weigh the mental 
and physical conditions involved in this preference.  
 
                                                 
26 Practised under French law until 1938. 
27 A phrase attributed to Pope John Paul II, speaking in St. Louis, Missouri (report New York Times 
28.1.1999, p. A14). There are several variants of this charge against retention. ‘Cruel and unusual’ and 
‘cruel, inhuman and degrading’ are prominent among them. But these are no more than flags planted in the 
sand. Not only should we question the meaning of cruelty and inhumanity in relation to any possible 
alternatives to the death penalty, we might wonder whether ‘unusual’ is a proper description for a penalty 
regarded as appropriate to the most extreme forms of crime since the beginning of recorded history.  
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‘Prison’ is shorthand for a hugely variable set of conditions, the only common factor in 
which is the loss of individual liberty.28 It is generally believed that for long-term 
prisoners this deprivation is mental more than physical. Yet life sentences raise 
fundamental questions of morality, such as whether it is right to inflict a punishment that 
removes all hope of forgiveness and re-admission into society.29 Cruelty takes many 
forms. The abolition of the death penalty is mandatory and taken for granted in national 
jurisdictions within the European Union. So should this relieve those societies of the 
duty to consider the morality of indefinite imprisonment? This question may be of little 
interest to those who passionately defend universal abolition of the death penalty30. Is it 
really noticed that their efforts may have contributed to the arguably much less humane 
outcome of life imprisonment, and to the years of mental torture and isolation on death-
row?31 For societies which do not find capital punishment morally problematic, there 
                                                 
28 The contrast between cages of multiple occupation for petty criminals in some countries and the types of 
privilege granted to Hans Breivik, a Norwegian convicted of mass murder in 2012, is an obvious example. 
Even within a single country, the reality of prison is far from being the same. 
29 Sentences which may, admittedly, be quite short in some European states. But most if not all criminal 
codes, where the death penalty has been abolished, have reserved categories that enforce what are 
effectively perpetual terms of imprisonment. (cf. Dagger, R., Playing Fair with Punishment, in ‘Ethics: An 
International Journal of Social, Political and Legal Philosophy, 103, no.3, Univ. Chicago Press, 1993). 
30 Certainly, Professor Schabas, 2002, op.cit., finds little to detain him here. Hood &.Hoyle,  on the other 
hand, make a passionate case for seeing Life Without Parole as inhumane as the use of capital punishment: 
‘To replace the death penalty by life imprisonment without any prospect of release is to replace one human 
rights abuse, the lack of respect for the dignity of the individual, with another.’ (Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., 
The Death Penalty, Oxford:OUP, 2008, p.402)  
31 The literature in which this particular inhumanity is noticed is usually to be found only in writers with 
direct observational experience of the ‘death-row phenomenon’. Typically, this is in the USA and coming 
from a retentionist standpoint. For example, in discussing the case of a convicted murderer, Thomas Baal, 
who pleaded for his own execution rather than undergo a process of repeated appeals, Kozinski writes: “It 
has been said that capital punishment is cruel and unusual because it is degrading to human dignity, but 
the dignity of human life comes not from mere existence, but from that ability which separates us from the 
beasts – the ability to choose; freedom of will ... when we say that a man – even a man who has committed 
a horrible crime – is not free to choose, we take away his dignity just as surely as we do when we kill 
him.” (Kozinski, A., Tinkering with Death, in Bedau, H. & Cassell, P. 2004, ‘Debating the Death Penalty’, 
Oxford: OUP, 2004, p.9) 
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may be rather more to say about cruelty in a state where the legislator is not able or not 
willing to exercise clemency.32  
 
Effectiveness, also, is a question on which quite different standpoints exist. If no effort is 
made to reform the prisoner, the only benefit of his or her imprisonment is removal from 
society. From a utilitarian perspective, these years of imprisonment represent a net loss 
to the state.33 
 
7.2   The discourse of human rights  
For nearly seventy years, the abolitionist cause has centred on assertions of human 
rights. This has been promoted by a combination of academic writing and active 
lobbying. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two. Scholarship on the 
subject often has the character of ‘committed’ writing and a number of self-appointed, 
monitoring bodies draw strength from academic research. Discourse of an official 
character was first seen in the consultations that led to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UN, 1948) and has continued through subsequent conventions, 
covenants and protocols. Any discussion of the death penalty in an international context 
must take account of human rights. Yet it is far from clear how this phenomenon should 
                                                 
32 In the case of the British child murderer, Myra Hindley (convicted 1966), over forty years’ evidence of 
reform to the prisoner’s character and outlook were not sufficient to persuade the British Home Secretary, 
Jack Straw, to grant her parole. In explanation, the minister cited ‘the public interest’ as his chief concern. 
This was, perhaps, in reference to a politician’s fear of adverse publicity.  
33 In countries with a high level of imprisonment, such as the US and Britain, the cost to the revenue is 
economically significant. This is commonly referred to but poorly quantified. Mark Cohen, who dedicates 
an entire book to estimating multiple examples of the costs of crime and justice in the US, manages to 
ignore this most obvious of issues almost entirely. He does, however, estimate ‘corrections’ at 
approximately 75% of the overall costs of police work. (cf. Cohen, M.A., The Costs of Crime and Justice, 
London, Routledge, 2005, p.84) 
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be defined. In various contexts, human rights appears as a set of concepts, a campaign, a 
regulatory body, and a number of supposed international laws.34 Its appeal is to ‘natural 
justice’, but also to ‘rational justice’ since it claims both legal viability and usefulness to 
the state.  
In some respects, human rights seems little different to other hopeful legal doctrines. 
Declarative statements of an optimistic and universal nature can even be found in pre-
modern society.35 Human rights, like Roman law, is an intended advance on existing 
practice and purposely incorporates peoples previously subject only to their own 
customs.36 By its own lights, it represents superior values. Yet it is surely fair to ask if 
this appeal to universal recognition is genuinely inclusive, and whether its charter of 
human protection reflects the jurisprudence of existing states. Moreover, we may find 
ourselves wondering whether, as a project, it is both realistic and honest. Are the 
protections it demands of others consistently applied within states where this advocacy is 
most heard?  For a long-established society to surrender its laws, it must first be 
persuaded that the path being urged is really better than the one it already uses. There are 
many historical instances of societies regretting their departure from existing norms by 
listening to fashionable appeals.37  
                                                 
34 At the moment when Eleanor Roosevelt’s UN committee was working on rules concerning the 
inviolability of the individual, however, allied military tribunals were straining the laws of evidence to 
deliver death sentences on the captured leaders of Germany and Japan. 
35 In its definition of justice, The Digest of Justinian  begins: ‘Law is the art of the good and the fair ... we 
profess a knowledge of what is good and fair, separating the fair from the unfair ... desiring to make men 
good not merely from fear of penalties ... we lay claim, if I am not mistaken, to a true philosophy.’ (From 
Digest of the Corpus Iuris Civilis (published 533 CE) quoted in Barrow, R., The Romans, London: 
Penguin, 1949, p. 206) 
36 The Romans spread law-giving as a crucial instrument spreading citizenship, firstly to the other peoples 
of Italy, then more broadly throughout the empire. (ibid, pp. 205-214) 
37 This is obviously true of societies in a revolutionary phase, as in the acceptance within the USSR of 
Lenin’s doctrine of ‘revolutionary legality’ after 1917, and Hitler’s suspension of the Weimar Constitution 
of Germany (cf. Hobsbawm, E., ‘Age of extremes’, London: Michael Joseph, 1994). It can also be said of 
more settled societies where a new current of expert opinion is out of step with what most people believe 
or want.  
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One of the most striking aspects of the human rights movement is that, from a certain 
perspective, its cause is unchallengeable. Being seen as ‘enlightened’ makes all contrary 
opinion appear backward. But worthy causes can do harm as well as good. In times of 
crisis, appeals to pacifism, for example, may pose a serious threat to the values they are 
trying to protect. Every society looks to its own protection.38 If threatened by mass 
disobedience or invasion, the state, acting rationally, will quickly suspend laws that 
assist those trying to undermine or destroy it.39 In Britain, the brutal judicial killing of 
certain conspirators in 1605 is still a matter of national celebration. Despite the abolition 
of the death penalty and the compassion of the law in more peaceful times, it is 
reasonably certain that if the lawlessness which broke out in English cities in 2011 had 
continued for more than a few nights, a sharp escalation of response would have 
followed, and deaths resulting played down by government as ‘collateral damage’.40 At 
this level of threat, all security forces are alike. Britain, no less than Bahrain, will defend 
itself against lawlessness. This response extends to the judicial authorities. Magistrates, 
after the events of August 2011, were instructed by government to apply exemplary and 
deterrent sentencing. The law is a fragile thing and its maintenance a matter of constant 
struggle.41 However, reading the literature of human rights, we find ourselves 
transported into a world of reasonableness and compliance. Here a higher social morality 
                                                 
38 According to Hobbes, the very purpose of the office of the sovereign and the ‘supreme law’ is the safety 
of the people. (cf. Hobbes, T. 1651, The Leviathan, Part 2, ch. 30, London: Dent,  ed. 1973, p. 178) 
39 Perduellio (hostile activity against the state) is the first capital crime of the XII Tables of early Roman 
law and was, at all times, punishable by death.. 
40 This is an assumption, since no deaths occurred as a direct result of these riots, but there are sufficient 
precedents to justify the remark. In a military context, collateral damage may be an acceptable term for the 
unintended victims of an action, but it is surely problematic when used as a cover for enforced repression. 
(cf. explanations given by the Damascus government in the current struggle in Syria) 
41 This reflects a consistent theme of Western political thought that it is the rule of law, rather than the 
representative aspect of any particular system, which underpins the health of the state. (Cf. short article by 
Bedau, H. in ‘The Oxford Companion of Philosophy’, Oxford: OUP, 1995, pp. 780-781).  
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prevails. There is, apparently, neither the need nor scope for argument. The persistent 
tone is one of ‘how can anybody possibly disagree?’  
 
The universal abolition of capital punishment is a central programme of the human 
rights in which a presumption of the right to life is held to be self-evident. It is assumed, 
rather than debated, that a right to life outweighs a right to punish the wrongdoer in 
equivalent terms. Thus the principle of lex talionis is taken to be no longer valid. Any 
invocation of this ancient legal concept is seen as blameworthy42.  
 
Those unhappy at the absence of any further discussion may feel they are being told that 
the rights of the individual, irrespective of his crime, are of more concern than the rights 
of the victim.43 They may sense this opens the door to the wholly unreasonable 
proposition that the rights of the wrongdoer are more important than the claims of 
justice. The human rights advocate will, of course, protest that equating the absence of 
the death penalty with an absence of punishment is unfair and untrue.  
 
 
                                                 
42 The principle of appropriate retaliation in lex talionis (‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’) is found in 
the customary laws of traditional societies throughout the world. Hence it might be said to have a rather 
better claim to being representative of punishment for extreme crime than the supposedly more 
enlightened precepts of the abolitionist faction at the UN. 
43 Or, indeed, victims: in a murder, the chief wrong that survives the act relates to the families and friends 
of the person killed. It is significant that Western society has mostly given up the principle of 
compensation, whether to the individual victims of a crime or to the state. This is a contrast to earlier 
codes of law – Egyptian, Greek, Roman – as well as to the sharia. 
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7.2.1 Human rights discourse and the boundaries of critical discussion  
At this point it may be difficult to see any common ground between the abolitionist and 
the retentionist. Yet, with respect to the Islamic law, we have noted that the sharia 
contains two well-defined types of capital crime, and that since they are not of the same 
standing, some aspects of retaliation are open to scholarly scrutiny and interpretation. It 
has also been shown that it is in the character of the sharia to avoid demanding the most 
severe penalty whenever possible.  
 
If we set ourselves the objective of reconciling opposed views on capital punishment, we 
might expect to explore attitudes to the punishment of crimes which, until recent times, 
attracted the death penalty in every society. Though this type of evidence must be 
addressed with caution, statistical comparisons can be made of the effectiveness of 
deterrence under different penal regimes44. Approached impartially, scholarship offers 
the basis for rational discussion. Yet no enterprise is possible when fixed beliefs make 
one party feel it is indisputably in possession of the higher moral ground. Within human 
rights discourse and at forums45, abolitionists flatly deny any equality of viewpoint46. 
They appear to be so convinced of their cause, of their progress and ultimate success that 
                                                 
44 Statistics can be found on both sides in the literature on capital punishment and may be distorted by the 
language used as by the data itself. (cf. UN study 1988, updated 2002, quoted in Steiner, H.J. et al, 
International Human Rights in Context, Oxford: OUP, 3rd ed., 2007, p.20).  
45 Notably at the Rome Conference (1998). 
46 States with a mostly Muslim population argued that for a statute to be regarded as representative, it 
should include reference to the death penalty. In response, the Norwegian chair of the Working Group on 
Penalties showed his personal opposition by drafting a text that excluded all mention of it. Muslim states 
were rebuffed despite making an ‘honest, genuine effort to bridge the gap’. (cf. Chairman’s Working 
Paper, Art. 75, Para 1,’ UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/L.3/Rev.1, 1998, pp. 2-3). 
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they seem to think it pointless to listen to any other case that can be made47. With 
opponents of supposedly equivalent status, it might be assumed that debate can be 
engaged without one side trying to fix the outcome in advance48. This is the procedure 
that makes debate possible at the United Nations. Without at least the formality of 
respect, projects of an international character break down, losing their representative 
value, as well as any chance they may have of success. Yet in human rights discourse, 
proponents like Professor William Schabas apparently feel quite free to characterise 
Islamic opposition to universal abolition as the regressive doctrine of an out-of-date 
belief system. 
 
False claims of consensus, jurisdiction and advocates do little to help the cause of 
international law. With respect to the death penalty, prominent Western commentators 
on international jurisprudence are clearly so committed to an agenda that it is common to 
find them writing as though their project had already been achieved. This appears to be a 
conscious strategy. Thus we find, in Professor Schabas’s account, for example, a strange 
kind of contradiction: “Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is totally 
compatible with the abolition of the death penalty, a testimony to the foresight of its 
authors, even though they stopped short of stating this expressly”49. But can we ever say 
that there is total commitment from someone who remains silent? Even the old trick of 
                                                 
47 Writers such as Schabas, Hood and Hoyle actually begin their ‘scholarly enquiries’ with announcements 
of the campaign’s progress. For example: “The day when abolition of the death penalty becomes a 
universal norm ... is undeniably in the foreseeable future”. (Schabas, W., op.cit., p.3). ‘Six years have 
elapsed since the third edition...and there have been major developments in the progress towards world-
wide abolition of the death penalty.’ This is the very first sentence of the influential academic study, ‘The 
Death Penalty’ (Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op.cit., p.vii) It leaves the reader in no doubt that he should expect 
a one-sided advocacy not informed discussion in what follows. 
48 Equality of status may be a polite fiction in international diplomacy, but in organisations such as the 
U.N. it is a fundamental aspect of their existence. 
49 Schabas, W., op.cit., p.20 
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maintaining that “silence gives consent” seems inadequate to such a claim. Yet, as we 
soon learn, this case is not to be compared with any other: “Its very general wording 
permits it to grow and evolve in tandem with international custom. Dynamic or evolutive 
interpretation is fundamental to international human rights law”50. In view of such 
remarks, perhaps it is understandable that Professor Schabas is never unwilling to apply 
damaging descriptions and tags to adverse opinion, and in particular to Islamic thinking: 
“very rudimentary”, “aggressive” and “obstinate” are his routine observations.51 Some 
writers in the field apparently see themselves as catalysts quite as much as scholarly 
researchers. Yet, given the standards demanded of academic enquiry, this is surely 
unacceptable. Use of emotive language, whether in praise of abolitionists or against 
retentionists, undermines their credibility. A casual historical approach and distorted use 
of statistics may indicate a weak understanding of the subject. But these are pardonable 
defects when compared to the arrogant exclusion of the basis of other reasoned 
viewpoints, and the easy assumption that as a moral question there is really very little to 
be discussed.  
Showing little understanding of the historical forces that shaped them, abolitionists fail 
to see the presumption in their own case. They display impressive passion and 
persistence but in a subject of such importance, and from a non-Western perspective, 
these attributes may not in themselves be persuasive.  
 
Somehow we must form a view as to whether the abolitionist movement amounts to 
more than the opinion of a certain group, at a particular moment in time, in a relatively 
                                                 
50 ibid, p.20 
51 ibid, p.16 & passim 
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small part of the world.52 The self-centredness of some of today’s leading nations adds 
to the difficulty of accepting the human rights agenda. Representatives of these states 
apparently find it impossible to understand why they are not admired for their 
humanitarian concern. Yet to others they may look like someone who, escaping the 
consequences of his own crime, turns round to declare that from now on the entire 
community must live by different rules, and that he will be the person to say what these 
are. 
 
7.3   Where international legal consensus is normal 
It may be difficult to avoid the suspicion that the post-war campaign for “universal 
rights” was in part window-dressing for a victor’s justice, and that a superiority has been 
sustained by appearing to include the interests of others while rarely doing so. Yet 
setting aside these doubts, we are bound to recognise that universality is not a false or 
unimportant issue in the life of nations. Certain working assumptions about justice do 
and must exist53. This has been true at least since the movement of peoples and trade 
first required it.  
Even in pre-recorded times, it is likely that the rights of free passage and the customs of 
hospitality were practised54. Enough is known of the pre-Christian Mediterranean, and of 
the Mesopotamian and Arab worlds, to show that a hallmark of civilisation has been a 
                                                 
52 The claim of abolitionists to represent a much higher proportion of the world’s seven billion people than 
they really do is based on statistical distortions that will be examined later. 
53 The post-1945 settlement, in their recognition of the principles of non-interference and human rights, 
were clearly an advance on the terms of Versailles and the League of Nations, or of any other international 
treaty in modern times. (See Steiner, H.J. et al, op. cit., pp. 134-136.) 
54 Evidence can be found through analysis of the so-called ‘iceman’ (found in Italy berried under the 
snow). The discovery of his remains on an Alpine pass shows how it might have been possible to travel 
freely between widely-contrasting habitats in Europe ten thousand years ago. 
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developed sense of rights and obligations55. Privileges held to be typical of the modern 
world should not make us think that migration and individual mobility are new. In recent 
declarations of how people should behave towards each other, there is therefore a re-
inventing of the wheel.  
A great deal of social behaviour is rooted in the customary laws and practices of settled 
peoples. These define civility, and derive from religious principles. For example, non-
judicial killing and highway robbery are inevitably outside the norms of an ordered 
society. A belief in their prohibition extends typically to outsiders as well as to the 
people for whom the laws were laid down. Moreover, it can be seen that many recently-
proclaimed freedoms are, in fact, hidden restrictions. The right to travel, study and work 
abroad were enjoyed more fully in some parts of the world before the “privilege” of 
being granted a passport or visa was introduced56. For the righteous Muslim, this 
traditional freedom is exemplified by the coming together of nationalities at the hajj, the 
annual pilgrimage to Mecca.  
 
Much of the novelty in today’s regulatory world lies in the working out of laws in 
response to communication and trade. Legal codes multiply and adapt. Rules concerning 
the exchange of goods and the formation of contract, for example, are made complicated 
to an extent commensurate with the possibilities of trade. The introduction of the 
telegram, telephone, telex and fax produced challenges to existing law that have 
                                                 
55 The journeys of the Herodotus, reporting from the Persian and Egyptian empires in the C5th B.C., are a 
clear indication of this (cf. Herodotus, trans. Rawlinson, G., Ware: Wordsworth, 1996). In pre-modern 
texts, there are references to the ‘ancient laws of hospitality’ practised towards peoples of another race or 
kingdom. 
56 ‘Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the 
existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman. He could live where he liked and as he 
liked. He had no official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his country for ever 
without a passport or any sort of permission.’ (Taylor, A.J.P., The Oxford History of England, vol. XV, 
1965, p.1) 
 232
provoked adaptation or new regulation in definition and international control. Today, the 
virtual world of “cyberspace” is making contract formation complex and argued over in 
ways not previously imagined57. In modern Arab business practice, we are now very far 
from being able to enjoy the civilised majlis alaqd, or sitting together of parties, which 
defines the basis of contract under Islamic law. Today, reference to the majlis alaqd is to 
a legal concept rather than to a literal action58.  In such technical matters, the laws of all 
countries keep up with changes in the way we live. The conduct of the driver of a 
vehicle is necessarily complicated by the mechanisation of transport, in which both the 
mass production of vehicles and congestion on the highway require the constant 
modification or refinement of regulations. They not only require legal uniformity within 
a single state but agreement between neighbouring ones. Barriers to human traffic, like 
the deserts of Arabia and the waters of the English Channel, are reduced or made 
meaningless by new forms of physical and electronic communication. 
 
In an age when human interchange is as important as that of goods, the need for 
international norms is keenly felt. Yet how particular legal traditions are received, and 
how they work, often defeat attempts to reconcile one national system with that of 
another. In the case of the criminal code, the obvious explanation for this is that criminal 
law is not merely technical and administrative in nature. It deals with human behaviour 
at a deep level. Its fundamental regulations, concerning the sanctity or violation of 
human life, touch identity and belief. These are areas of the law which play an important 
role in distinguishing one society from another and which, we might suggest, are not 
                                                 
57 As in difficulties over authentication (e-signature) and fraud (e-money), ‘cyberspace’ is problematically 
both trans-national and intangible. 
58 cf. Saleh, Nabil., 2001, ‘Freedom of contract: what does it mean in the context of Arab laws?’ in Arab 
Law Quarterly, ALQ 16(4), pp. 346-357  
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easy or safe to overturn59. This is especially true in Islamic society. For the believer, 
there is the unchallengeable category of divine ordinance crimes.  
 
In the arena of conferences on the death penalty, however, such dimensions are 
generally ignored. Making a show seems to be more important than the need to 
understand a radically different point of view, and the emergence of a new legal norm is 
sometimes falsely claimed60. To ignore deeply-held convictions in such a way only 
exposes the shallowness of the project, yet this is not untypical of written advocacy in 
human rights discourse. Removed from the deal-making of conventions, there ought to 
be scope for a comprehensive approach. But when, for example, the concept of 
equivalent retribution is made fun of as self-evidently backward thinking, it can be seen 
that the writer’s own prejudice has infected the argument. With its extraordinary neglect 
of the historical record, and naive unconcern towards other forms of state-endorsed 
homicide, in both extra-judicial punishment and war, we may be forced to conclude that 
human rights discourse is in a far from healthy state61.   
 
7.4   Analytical objections to human rights discourse  
In addition to the unrealistic attitudes taken by abolitionists over capital punishment, 
there are other fundamental objections to their arguments. These may be less familiar to 
a Western than to a Muslim viewpoint.  
 
                                                 
59 The recent case (heard in Italy 2010) of the murder of Ms. Kirchner, a British student in Perugia, 
illustrates how three closely-related societies (Italian, American and British) have quite different 
expectations, as well as norms of procedure, in a judicial investigation and murder trial. 
60 Without offering any real evidence, William Schabas sees the position of the United States on the death 
penalty as moving satisfactorily towards a jus cogens of ‘mainstream opinion’. (Cf. Schabas, W., op.cit., 
p.376) 
61 Discussed at some length in the following chapter. 
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Firstly, a legal right may be held to be a right within society because it is felt to be an 
unchallengeable moral right. A legal right of this kind is likely to be supported by 
historical and constitutional associations which have made it widely accepted. An 
example might be the right to live peaceably without fear of arbitrary arrest. Although 
circumstances may arise that breach the exercise of this right, such as war against the 
state, they do not vitiate the claim to an existent moral right. Rather, the function of this 
right has been suspended as a result of circumstances beyond the power of an individual 
to control, and the individual must bow to these circumstances. However, for a Muslim, 
where an unchallengeable moral right derives from divine law, or a prophetic saying, it 
is something more than a legal right. To the defender of a particular religion, a right of 
this kind may be no less than a duty, observance of which is mandatory on his belief. It 
cannot be suspended through adverse circumstances, or open for the individual to 
surrender. Hence, a devout Muslim will not consider pronouncements of the sharia 
concerning divine ordinance crimes as simply legal rights to be followed or dispensed 
with according to circumstances. They are obligations that can never be set aside. 
 
Principles such as these do not necessarily prevent alterations to the law. Clearly, laws 
vary in their degree of permanence as well as in the scale of their importance. No nation 
will resist forever the need to adjust traffic regulations in line with advances in 
technology, or fail to make its practices compatible with the laws of neighbouring 
states62. No Muslim country can exclude itself from trade on the grounds that e-contracts 
                                                 
62 Those which, like China, tried to hold back the introduction of railways and motor cars paid a heavy 
price in decades of arrested development. (see Rodzinski, W., ‘The walled kingdom’, London: Fontana, 
1984, p.212)  
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violate the prescribed form of the majlis alaqd63. Yet states are founded on legal 
precepts as much as on their territory or language. These were at some time called the 
“tablets” of the law-statutes written in stone, and imprinted on the minds of the people 
through visual recognition and recitation. Such practices, lost to Western culture, exist in 
Islam. They come to us as edicts, not bills before parliament, passed down from ancient, 
unchallengeable sources64. If divinely inspired, they cannot be denied by the believer.  
 
How one people’s set of beliefs is legally understood by another is central to this study, 
and its principal problem. If we hope to resolve incompatibilities, a mere understanding 
of difference is not enough. We need to recognise the precise force in the tradition that is 
unfamiliar and quite different to our own. This is true even where traditions overlap and 
have conditioned each other. The essence of this is not the form of the laws but the 
values that lie behind them. When it is the belief of one society that its fundamental laws 
are inspired by God, but of another that human intelligence has the unrestricted power 
and competence to invent or give up whatever laws are required, there is a deep contrast 
in jurisprudence, as between fixed and impermanent values. In a secular society, laws 
covering abortion and suicide can be varied at will. But in a state founded upon religious 
principles that proscribe these behaviours, acceptance of changes in the law is an 
indication of moral decay. In the question of the death penalty, human rights 
commentators and pressure groups seem unable to understand why states rooted in 
religious principle cannot simply abandon their objections.  
 
                                                 
63 A matter recently resolved after much discussion in Saudi Arabia, the most conservative of Islamic 
states. 
64 It is true that this direct apprehension of divine law is still followed by certain Orthodox Jews as well as 
Christian sects, but this that marks them out as not belonging to the mainstream of Western society. 
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It may be, of course, that some intellectuals do not regret the inter-generational tension 
and suffering that frequent changes to the law provoke. It is even possible to argue that 
they provide a productive dynamic in society, an expression of natural growth and 
responsiveness. On closer inspection, however, change is usually the product of a 
particular militancy, and marks the triumph of a minority interest group. Can it be 
claimed, for example, that the de-classification of explicit pornography has been 
supported by a popular movement or by any campaign in Western countries? Or would 
there be general agreement with the view that publicly-financed schools should promote 
an attitude of normality in relation to homosexual behaviour? Controversial issues such 
as these are untested, which makes assertive terms like “liberal democracy” and 
“progressive thinking” seem odd. It is surely inconsistent that European states which 
embrace radical shifts in social morality have rarely looked for popular endorsement. 
Abolition of the death penalty in Europe is a particular case in point, and a subject on 
which most citizens can be expected to have formed an opinion. How can it be that 
nations which are proud of their democratic institutions are unwilling to settle questions 
of the highest importance by referendum?65 Yet these same nations expect to put 
themselves above others by their claim to having a higher democratic status. 
 
7.4.1 Culturally-specific objections to human rights discourse  
Differences of legal outlook do not just concern nations that belong to separate religious 
traditions but those that possess the same core structure. Islam adheres to Holy Scripture 
and the sayings of the Prophet, peace be upon him, but it is not unchanging in its range 
                                                 
65 The mechanisms for popular voting on specific issues are not prohibitively difficult or costly, as is 
shown by the frequent use of referendum in Switzerland and the United States of America. 
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of legal prescription. Aside from schisms within the faith, there is a variety of 
jurisprudential response to influences from outside the Islamic world.  
 
It may seem contradictory to a non-Muslim to be told that the Islamic sharia, though 
resistant, is essentially flexible. Yet this is to distinguish the inner core of faith from the 
outer frame work of legal regulations. As we have seen, appropriate forms of retaliation 
are not all that the laws of Islam have to say about the treatment of convicted murderers. 
But it is an unchallengeable part of what our faith teaches us, which cannot be set aside 
for the convenience of non-believers. Allah Almighty is merciful, and every avenue is 
explored to save a person’s life in ways that are permitted. The judicial instinct of the 
Legislator under the sharia is to show mercy and this may be more compassionate than 
that of the judiciary in non-Islamic countries. It must not be taken to imply, however, 
that a believer is ever able to accept that capital punishment is wrong. Simply, it is better 
to preserve life than to take it. 
 
What is particularly damaging to the human rights cause, in relation to the use of the 
death penalty under Islamic law and in other retentionist states, is the refusal to 
recognise that those who do not share these beliefs have nevertheless human rights 
protections of their own. Nothing is less persuasive, or weaker as a strategy, than to 
show disrespect for those you wish to convince. What, for example, is to be made of the 
following? 
 
“Perhaps there is a case for Islamic legal scholars who can demonstrate an 
alternative and progressive view of religious law. The intransigence of 
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Islamic States on the subject raises the whole issue of cultural relativism. If 
there is no universal agreement on the most fundamental of human rights, 
the right of life, how can anything more be expected in the rest of the 
catalogue of human rights?”66 
 
For this writer, it is clear that a “progressive” view is no different to an “alternative” 
view, i.e. one that requires the Muslim to surrender articles of his faith. But this is not 
all. The established practice of Muslim states is ‘intransigent’- so extreme, apparently, 
that it calls into question the principle of accommodating or making allowance for 
customary difference between societies. It goes beyond the boundaries of acceptability, 
of what we, in the more enlightened world, can tolerate, according to Professor Schabas. 
The final challenge is that, failing such a basic test of humanitarian principle, Islamic 
law has no understanding or respect for human rights. Can any kind of justice be looked 
for in such places, asks Schabas, in a tone of annoyance.  
 
The reader might imagine from the above that any inhumane and arbitrary behaviour is 
possible in Islamic countries. A state that offers no guarantees of protection to its 
citizens is, at a fundamental level, lawless. Yet the reader might also wonder how 
Islamic society has cohered and maintained itself for the last fourteen hundred years67. Is 
he supposed to imagine that it was held down by force in the exercise of arbitrary and 
strange rule? If so, Islamic dictatorship has been extraordinarily successful in historical 
                                                 
66 Schabas, W., op. cit., p. 377. Throughout his lengthy account of the history of the abolitionist cause 
from 1945, Professor Schabas not merely refuses to engage contrary opinion but does his best to omit any 
mention of Islamic states and their own response to human rights initiatives. 
67 Islamic civilisation is a longer project, it could be said, than even the law-giving Roman state or any of 
its successors such as the Byzantine and Holy Roman empires.  
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terms68. But is he also asked to believe that Muslims are so incapable of understanding 
fundamental social propositions, or of thinking for themselves, that they simply put up 
with a hatful system?  
 
Surely Professor Schabas totally misconceives the meaning of rights to a Muslim. Islam 
is predicated on a compact between ruler and ruled, the terms of which are lasting, 
clearly developed and binding on both parties. A Muslim’s guarantees of immunity from 
the arbitrary behaviour of a ruler, depending, as in every society, on the individual’s 
willingness to obey the law, are in fact precise and universal. They contain much less 
uncertainty and potential difficulty for the individual citizen than the shifting regulations 
of Western society69.  
 
It is true that some Islamic scholars explore ways to restrict the use of capital 
punishment. Professor Bassiouni points to the essentially merciful character of Islam and 
calls for a re-opening of interpretive guidance in ijtihad,70 both on this and other 
matters71. Yet commentators like Professor Bassiouni are quoted selectively and out of 
context in human rights literature. They are falsely displayed as Arab intellectuals fully 
signed-up to the “progressive” agenda of the abolitionists72.  
 
                                                 
68 Force alone offers little prospect of sustainability. In a superbly-equipped state, the emperors of Rome 
(after the Antonine period) rarely survived for more than two or three years. 
69 The argument here is that since the sharia has an ancient and settled ethical basis, diffused through the 
diffused through religion, an understanding of the law is more general in the Islamic world than in the 
largely secular West. It follows that a Muslim is much more likely to feel his guilt and accept his 
punishment than his Western counterpart. 
70 Ijtihad is the attempt by Muslim jurists to find a new answer or remedy for an unresolved  problem.  
71 Professor Bassiouni does not argue against the principle of the death penalty, noting that it is mandatory 
for the crime of al harabah. (see Bassiouni, M.C., Death as a Penalty in the Shar’ia, in Hodgkinson, P. & 
Schabas, W. (eds.), Capital Punishment: Strategies for Abolition, Cambridge: CUP, 2004, pp. 169-185) 
72 Writers guilty of this particular deceptive strategy are, for example, Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., 2008, ‘The 
Death Penalty’, Oxford: OUP, pp. 34 & 72-73.  
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For people from one particular region to set themselves up as moral decision makers of 
the entire world is an imperialistic project which, to a Muslim, may recall the aggression 
of former times. It wages war for our hearts and minds. Both dangerous and counter-
productive, the consequences of this are everywhere to be seen. From the incoherent 
rage of street demonstrations in recent times, to the emergence of new, deeply-
reactionary religious states73, we see the fruits of incomprehension and intolerance.  
 
7.5 The difficult case for the international jurisprudence  
The human rights movement provides a large and sometimes confusing forum in which 
actors, both official and unofficial, play a part74. Its public statements frequently bear the 
imprint of international agencies. These vary greatly in range and status. They may be 
appeals and resolutions at conference level, declarations of agreed policy with or without 
reservations, or formal treaties ratified and in force.  
 
Broadly-speaking, treaties impose direct obligation upon private citizens of a state 
adhering to an agreement that the state has ratified and incorporated within its own legal 
framework. This alone constitutes viable law since statehood implies sovereignty75. Law 
cannot exist in, as it were, a weightless condition where there is neither mass nor gravity 
to enforce it. Hence, it is commonly said that international law is notional or non-
existent.  
                                                 
73 For example, since the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy (2.2.1979) and the coming to power of the 
religious regime (mulla’s regime).    
74 This comprises all “post-1945 governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental developments in 
both national and international contexts in the recognition and protection of human rights.” Steiner, H. et 
al, op.cit., preface. 
75 This, of course, goes to the heart of the political difficulties member states have faced since the 
formation of the European Economic Community. Yet whether as a free-trade bloc, Community or Union, 
the fundamental dilemma of sovereignty remains. However difficult the circumstances (such as the 
interregnum in Greece in May, 2012), even the most powerful of member states cannot legislate for the 
weakest. 
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The exception to this are circumstances in which the national legislature has become 
inoperative and the functions of the state are in suspension. Trials of individuals for 
crimes against humanity after armed conflicts have given rise to assertions of universal 
jurisdiction and operative international law76. But as at Nuremberg77, Tokyo and The 
Hague, they necessarily imply the complete breakdown and suspension of a regime and 
the direct intervention of other states78.  
 
Today, there appears to be a strong lobby in the UN for humanitarian intervention where 
genocide is threatened. But the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, by reactionary and 
despotic governments against sections of their own population, is not infrequent. 
Desperate efforts to hold onto power within the recognised borders of the state have led 
to external military intervention, as has recently occurred in Yugoslavia and Libya. Yet 
equivalent levels of barbarity in Chechnya and, to date, Syria have not provoked 
invasion. The stand-off over unresolved conflicts, even those that result in the misery or 
flight of an entire people, has no time limit. No superior power, asserting the obligation 
of human rights law, has been effective in Palestine. Israel successfully defies UN 
resolutions against its conduct towards non-Jews, which have condemned generations of 
displaced people to the status of indefinite refugees79. It would be unrealistic to pretend 
                                                 
76 The precedent for universal jurisdiction set at Nuremberg was invoked by Israel in Israel v. Eichmann 
(1961) without giving rise either to counter-claims for extradition or international protest. Its bearing on 
subsequent cases, however, is unclear, especially where less moral certainty exists over the heinous nature 
of mass political offences. This is evidenced in the conflict of opinion among UK Law Lords, in relation 
to Spain’s unsuccessful attempt to gain the extradition of General Pinochet (1998) (See contrasting 
opinions of Lord Phillips and Lord Millett, in Steiner, H. et al, op.cit., pp. 1167-1169) 
77 At the time of the Nuremberg trials, Germany had become an historical or geographical expression: it 
had ceased to exist as a state. 
78 This is rarely, if at all, stated openly in ‘committed’ human rights writings. Yet their constant points of 
reference are either the legal innovations in the immediate aftermath of WWII or more recent collapses 
like that of Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. 
79 Displacements which have, in their turn, inevitably given rise to further conflicts, as in Lebanon (1975-
1990) and currently Palestine. 
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that suffering is the deciding factor in whether direct intervention is made in the name of 
the “international community” and in compliance with “international law”. Alliance, 
private interest and the willingness to use military force, are the determining factors. 
These considerations provoke or restrain those few states that have the means to project 
power beyond their frontiers.  
 
Unless governed by bilateral treaty, states will normally act to protect citizens from trial 
outside their own jurisdiction. Within almost any self-conscious political society, a 
failure to do so would be likely to cause uncertainty and unrest. Thus, it is only at the 
point of individual ratification, incorporating the substance of a treaty into national 
legislation, that international agreements can be said to have the status of law. 
Reviewing the current human rights literature, however, we might easily gain the 
impression that the reverse is true. In this make-believe world, international agencies, 
though often no more than nominated committees, dictate terms to national 
governments. With the security of those who do not require popular consent nor have to 
face the consequences of their own ideas, they lecture those who do not follow their 
prescriptions. In passing, they show no respect for the civilisational values which block 
their path to successes. Since much of what passes for international jurisprudence is a 
work in progress, it is perhaps not surprising that the approach of some writers is 
adversarial. Nevertheless, for their idealisation of a forward march towards an inevitable 
universal agreement, these activities should display a prominent health warning: 
“achievement here is mixed, progress far from certain”80. 
                                                 
80 Most of the commentary referred to here slightly pre-dates the financial and economic crisis, beginning 
2008, which is currently not only causing panic in the West but effecting an actual shift in power towards 
non-Western countries. The reduction of confidence in Western values is already apparent in journalistic 
writing. 
 243
 7.6 Categorical confusions in the human rights movement 
Through its own considerable energy, the human rights movement has spread itself into 
various categories of human rights law, international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law. Quite where the boundaries begin and end is a matter of speculation. It is 
far from being satisfactorily resolved even by those whose work centres on applying 
these distinctions. Professor Provost, who writes on this topic, makes the following 
comments:  
‘The [UN] Secretary-General’s two reports represent a significant 
contribution to the position that no fundamental distinction exists between 
human rights and humanitarian law.” (p.4) “While human rights law derives 
from humanity understood as the defining characteristic of the human race 
(menschheit), humanitarian law is coloured not only by that aspect of 
humanity, but also by humanity understood as a feeling of compassion 
towards other human beings (menschlichkeit), so that in humanitarian law 
humanity–menschheit is safeguarded through humanity–menschlichkeit. It 
seems in fact possible to discern elements of humanity-menschlichkeit in 
human rights as well, particularly in economic, social, cultural and collective 
rights.’(p.5) ‘The classic conception of human rights and humanitarian law is 
that they apply in different situations and to different relationships. That is, 
human rights are understood to regulate the relationship between states and 
individuals under their jurisdiction but are inapplicable in times of 
emergencies.’ (p.7) ‘There is an observable tendency in the literature inspired 
primarily by human rights law to consider humanitarian law as merely a 
subset of human rights.  Conversely, some writers in humanitarian law have 
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argued for an overly rigid differentiation between human rights and 
humanitarian law, as a defence against the perceived threat to subsume the 
latter into the former.’ (p.9) 81 
The final point shows the territorial nature of academic enterprise, but it is surprising to 
find writing quite so unclear. It might make us to ask what interest or principle 
condemns matters that seem perfectly straightforward to such unclear categories. Put 
simply, human rights is a discussion; humanitarian law a looked-for or agreed procedure. 
Further sophistication of the subject only confuses the matter at hand.  
 
Yet whether it is international humanitarian law or international criminal law, we should 
be addressing is made problematic in the work of Professor Cassese. As a jurist of long-
standing and practical experience, we might expect more substance than playing with 
categories. His first estimate is sober:  
‘International Criminal Law is a body of international rules designed to 
proscribe certain categories of conduct ... and to make those persons who 
engage in such conduct criminally liable. They consequently either authorise 
states, or impose upon them the obligation, to prosecute and punish such 
criminal conducts.”’82  
The signal feature, then, is that International Criminal Law rules impose obligations on 
individuals as well as on states. However, we soon find that the onward march of 
regulation is heavily obstructed. Firstly, different legal traditions, notably English 
common law and those derived from Roman law, govern the understanding of criminal 
law in the courts. Thus, International Criminal Law is not a readily-comprehensible 
                                                 
81 Extracts taken from Provost R., International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Cambridge: CUP, 
2002.  
82 Cassese, A., International Criminal Law, Oxford: OUP, 2008, 2nd ed., p..3.  
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extension to a domestic criminal code but “essentially hybrid”83. International Criminal 
Law, we are told, is itself an outgrowth of public international law, springing from 
“treaties, customary, law etc”84. It is “impregnated with notions, principles, and legal 
constructs derived from national criminal law, international humanitarian law as well as 
human rights law”85.  
 
It seems we are in greater difficulty than ever. But we can surely satisfied argument over 
which branch or category is senior. On the applicability of international law, what 
Professor Cassese appears to be admitting is that adherence to what he calls a 
“rudimentary” and “indeterminate” set of rules is questionable. International Criminal 
Law can proceed on cases of “large-scale” crime only where national jurisdictions are 
too weak to insist on their own rights. Again, we find that the cases cited refer to citizens 
of defeated or fallen states86. There is no mention of the competence of international 
courts to try citizens of countries powerful enough to resist extradition. Indeed, their 
representatives can be found exempting themselves even as they declare their public 
support for more “effective” rules of extradition87. This is entirely consistent with the 
realities of international deal-making. Powerful individuals and powerful states are not 
brought to account even when, as in the case of documented massacres, the truth may be 
finally admitted88.  
                                                 
83 Neither here nor elsewhere is there any mention of other legal traditions representing at least half of 
mankind, as in Islamic, Hindu and Confucian laws, as well as in thousands of native traditions. 
84 International public law is not further defined, presumably to give place in this account to international 
criminal law, whose principal ‘unique feature’ (despite arising from identical origins) seems to be that it is 
‘new’. (cf. Cassese, op.cit. p.4) 
85 ibid p.7 
86  These were Germany, Japan, Lebanon, Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
87 cf. the public statement made by ex-president G.W.Bush on the use of ‘waterboarding’ (Television 
interview, 5th November, 2010). 
88 Referring to the 14,500 Polish officers murdered on the orders of the Soviet government in 1941. This is 
still an affront to the people of Poland, more especially as the USSR sought the prosecution of Germany at 
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7.7 Legal competence in international disputes 
Taking a “realist” view of the dimensions of international legal proceeding brings us to 
the question of competence. Here the jurisprudent is frequently embarrassed by what he 
finds to be the actuality. For example, commenting on the decision of a war crimes 
tribunal, in US v Frick (1947), Professor Provost finds the rejection of the defence 
“surprising”. In this case, six German industrialists were prosecuted under the Hague 
and Geneva conventions for using captive prisoners as forced labour. Whereas, 
previously, governments alone had been thought liable, individuals in this case were 
prosecuted89. This involved a notable degree of retroactive justice, since the terms of the 
conventions were no longer accepted as legal norms in Germany after 1933. Yet the 
power of the prosecutors and the hatred attaching to Nazi war criminals were sufficient 
to overcome any legal difficulty. The verdict was subsequently relied on in similar cases. 
 
The implications of this are plain90. A newly powerful state, claiming universality for its 
own definitions of humanitarian law, may assert a right to universal jurisdiction and 
retrospectively apply those standards to a beaten enemy. Despite recognising this 
difficulty, Professor Provost, in his comments on reservations, puts himself on the 
dangerous ground of having more regard for the spirit than the composition of the law91. 
                                                                                                                                                
Nuremberg and, for over forty years, succeeded in blaming the Nazi regime for a massacre that it had 
carried out. (cited in Provost, R., op.cit., p. 234) 
89 The judgement of the US Military Tribunal stated: ‘It is asserted that international law is a matter 
wholly outside the work, interest and knowledge of private individuals. The distinction is unsound. 
International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal 
when done by an officer of the Government are criminal also when done by a private individual.’ (US 
vFlick [1947] 9 L Rep. Trials War Crime. 1, 6 USMT 1 [US Mil .Trib., Nuremberg] cited in Provost, R., 
op. cit., p. 87) 
90 If taken as reliable example, what is there to prevent the future prosecution of the directors of 
Haliburton Oil for crimes committed after the Second Gulf War and the occupation of Iraq under the same 
rules? The answer is, of course, the power of the United States. Yet this is unlikely to last for ever. Even 
the strongest of states should beware of history. 
91 cf. Provost, R., op. cit., pp. 140-146 
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On a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights allowing a claim against 
Austria even though it related to a violation prior to Austria’s ratification of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, he writes:  
‘If a state can bring a valid claim with respect to a violation committed at a 
time when it was not at all obligated under a human rights convention, then a 
state can clearly do the same despite having made a reservation and thus 
limited its claim under the convention. Adherence to the system, rather than to 
a specific norm, is the requirement to have standing.’92  
Such thinking surely raises subjective interpretation to a dangerous level, but it is far 
from untypical of discussions brought about by great international causes. Amongst 
these is the abolition of capital punishment. It can be allowed that jurists were strongly 
influenced by the horror of what took place in German-occupied Europe during the 
Second World War, and keen to convict those few individuals brought before them, yet 
to admit as legal precedent the reduced standards then prevailing at military tribunals 
hardly serves the interests of international jurisprudence. 
 
Adherence to established precedent and long-held tradition has been a recurrent theme of 
international disputes. It has often been pointed out that what is called international 
humanitarian law is the product of customary law. In the opinion of the US Supreme 
Court on the ‘Paquete Habana’ dispute (1900), the custom of non-interference with 
“poor and industrious” fishermen was bound up in a precedent set by an English king of 
the Middle Ages. It had become the established practice of “civilised nations”93. This 
                                                 
92 In Austria v. Italy (1961), op. cit., p.146 
93 Drawn from the remarks of Mr. Justice Gray in overturning the lower court’s decision that the 
customary principle should prevail. (cf. 175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct. 290, quoted and discussed in Steiner, H. et 
al, op. cit., pp. 61-71) 
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opinion overturned the decision of the Florida district court that first tried the case, and 
which had found no law protecting the Spanish-flagged vessel. In the view of the 
Supreme Court, however, where the country’s behaviour was under examination by its 
peers, the seizure violated an important tradition. It might not be a jus cogens of 
universal standing, but it dictated a certain standard of behaviour. If the United States 
wished to belong to an exclusive club of nations pleased to call themselves “civilised”, it 
was obliged to conform. Two things can be said about this. Firstly, for thousands of 
years nations have exercised a similar discipline, wishing to see themselves, and to be 
seen by others, as “civilised”94. Secondly, acts of magnanimity cannot conceal an 
injustice when a greater theft lies behind them. In their time, politeness would not have 
excused the dispossessions and exterminations of the early Roman Empire any more 
than they have the equivalent behaviour by Nazi Germany. Though its continued 
authority makes the assertion seem contentious, the US confiscation of Spanish 
possessions after 1898 belongs to this category. 
 
Reservations and interpretative declarations present an obvious frustration to the proper 
functioning of international agreements. They may be transparently dishonest when they 
seek to protect an interest hostile to the spirit of the agreement signed95. Yet their 
persistence may simply bear witness to the depth of conviction felt within a particular 
society on a given topic. Abolition of the death penalty is a typical example. 
 
                                                 
94 Herodotus (op.cit) writing in the C5th B.C., gives examples of a comparable, self-conscious civility and 
forbearance. 
95 An example given by Professor Provost is when India made a reservation to Article 1(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ‘that the words “the right to self-determination” .... 
apply only to the peoples under foreign domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign 
independent States or to a section of a people or nation – which is the essence of national sovereignty.’  
(ibid. p.145). 
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 7.8 The dangers of universalist argumentation 
It should be noticed that today’s human rights covenants have antecedents whose 
lifespan was remarkably short. The 1789 revolution in France, the 1917 revolution in 
Russia, and many less regarded, truth-claiming declarations like that of Cuba (1959), 
were not domestic in intention. Their aim was to re-model the world. This radical 
message stimulated the creative artists of Europe after 1789. With a similar desire to set 
the calendar at Year Zero, the Maoist zealots of Cambodia went a step further than even 
the French Jacobins had contemplated, by condemning every body who lived in a town 
or was educated to internal exile and forced labour96. What characterised the madness 
behind these radicals was a false sense of their own uniqueness, and the short cut they 
took by way of violence. Extreme force, including extra-judicial murder, was made 
acceptable, according to Lenin’s dark phrase, as “revolutionary legality”. Nice-sounding 
terms such as this are typical of argumentation designed to prevent the individual from 
seeing that he may be engaged in wrongdoing of the worst kind. In particular, they 
anaesthetise the conscience from recognising that extra-judicial killing is an act of 
homicide. Yet even in countries like Russia, with its long tradition of dictatorial rule, 
this has mostly led to loss of confidence, failure and collapse. Far from receiving the 
applause that revolutionaries expect for their idealism, these self-appointed legislators97 
are soon condemned for breaching the essence of what they thought they were 
representing: a superior view of human rights98.  
 
                                                 
96 After the Khmer Rouge revolution of 1975, the possession of reading glasses was sufficient evidence for 
a person to be condemned as a class enemy. For offences such as the wearing of long hair, random 
executions were so common (carried out by the badly-trained soldiers) that estimates of 400,000 deaths 
have been given for the first few weeks after the forced evacuation of Phnom Penh (see Stuart-Fox, M. & 
Bunheang Ung., The Murderous Revolution, Bangkok: Orchid, 1998, pp.17-19) 
97 Often coming from the professional classes, especially lawyers and teachers. 
98 It is interesting that Robespierre, French national leader in the most violent period of executions, was a 
convinced abolitionist at first. 
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Among the most progressive and, in its time, respected announcements of the twentieth 
century was Stalin’s 1936 Constitution of the USSR99, issued at the height of  deliberate 
mass starvation in the Ukraine and the lethal purge of officials throughout the Soviet 
Union100. It was the year in which every member of the Communist Party in Leningrad 
was assassinated. Outwardly concerned with a guarantee of fundamental rights, the 
Soviet Constitution demonstrated how the perversion of reality can be perfectly achieved 
in an atheist society. It has been said that its real purpose was “to make people forget ..., 
to force them to see what wasn’t there, and to maintain the contrary of what their eyes 
told them”101. 
 
Of course, it may be argued that in less radical revolutions, like that of England in the 
late seventeenth century, the old fabric was not torn to pieces but adapted and improved, 
and that this essentially non-violent model of reform gives the character to human rights 
projects today102. But in changing times, and for an evolving jurisprudence, such models 
are not without their problems. The founding laws of the federal United States, for 
example, are set forth as self-evident and lasting truths, yet have proved a great barrier to 
legal reform. Examples are the right of American states to determine their own penalties, 
and the right to bear arms. Worse, they ignore the claims of subject peoples not 
considered worthy, at the time they were drawn up, of a place within the polity. This 
                                                 
99 Chapter 10 of the 1936 Constitution both declares and guarantees the ‘fundamental’ rights of citizens, 
binding on all the authorities of the state. An early estimate of these arrangements can be found in Barker, 
E., Reflections on Government, Oxford: OUP, 1942, pp. 319-327. ‘Since 1936 an actual dictatorship has 
been acting in combination with a system of formal democracy’ (ibid p.321) 
100 Robert Conquest’s cautious estimate puts the number of those dying of famine at around seven million. 
(cf. Conquest, R., The Harvest of Sorrow, London: Hutchinson, 1986, p.303) 
101 The passage continues: ‘Hence the unparalleled harshness of the terror, and the promulgation of a 
constitution which was never intended to be applied...’ (Pasternak, B., Doctor Zhivago, Glasgow: Fontana 
, 1958, p. 495) 
102 Referring to the 1689 Bill of Rights in England, guaranteeing the liberty of the individual subject, 
following the ‘Bloodless Revolution’ of the preceding year. 
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gave cover to the very worst practices that can occur between people of different races. 
It is especially, in the present time, when we see how genocide and slavery may go hand 
in hand with expressions of goodwill and the declaration of universal rights.  
 
Broadly-speaking, the more recent history of attempts to set universal human rights in 
stone has not been promising. That it remains an urgent project cannot be discounted or 
ignored, yet a persistent underlying defect lies in the extent to which international law is 
rooted in the particular experience and interests of a select group. Inevitably, perhaps, 
international jurisprudence will take on the character of the ideology of a dominant 
power. Their convictions will be privileged above others. It may seem difficult to 
understand that in the matter of the death penalty the USA is retentionist. But, as will be 
explored, the American case is one of a very particular exception in which the 
combination of a settled body of constitutional law and the power of local voting are 
able to defy the will of the nation’s intellectual and ‘liberal’ establishment.  
 
The values of what called “liberal democracy” have been the drivers of international 
conventions on human rights since the founding of the United Nations. Recent 
declarations of human rights derive from a post-1945 leadership. However, as in the 
collapse of the Soviet system after 1989, the cultural or economic plates can shift 
unexpectedly and with dramatic consequences. They may advance quite different 
evaluations of fundamental rights103. It is far from clear how the set of values now 
                                                 
103 The focus and justification of Marxist-Leninist thinking is economic and collective, as distinct from 
libertarian and individual. Hence the juridical rights ‘guaranteed’ under the 1936 Soviet Constitution were 
aimed at making permanent the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ as understood within an all-powerful state.  
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dominant in international jurisprudence will fare in relation to the new importance and 
spread of Islam, or the rising influence of neo-Confucian values104.  
 
Conclusion 
International law is a term we can safely employ for fully-ratified, multinational 
agreements. The requirement for it has a basis in practicality and commonsense. But 
law-making driven by the human rights movement, as presently understood, is neither 
watertight nor durable. Based on historical contingency, it is partial in scope and, in this 
case representing only a minority viewpoint, fails the most obvious test of universality.  
 
Even the best-devised and well-intentioned projects are unlikely to achieve a standpoint 
that is genuinely universal. To achieve international agreement on the most particular 
and sensitive aspects of national law is not like persuading states to participate in a trade 
deal. Sovereignty is, among other things, a token of difference, a frontier by which 
nationalities define themselves against their neighbours. Hence, difference is an inherent 
aspect of nationality. Secondly, international law reflects the existing order of a 
particular time in history. Its bias and preferences are inevitably determined by the 
outlook of a dominant group. Just as the cultural and economic circumstances of nations 
are not fixed, so we can expect there to be changes and even reversals in the field of 
international law. Powerful secular societies in that are slaves to new millennial dreams 
and self-evident truths offer a fairly reliable indication that their ambitions will not 
trouble the world for long.  
 
                                                 
104 Given demographic projections in the first instance, and the economic power of East Asia in the 
second. 
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Inclusivity is the only ethic, or procedure, that gives international law any prospect of 
success. Again, this implies rather more than getting national representatives to come 
together at a conference. It should be like members of a family trying to agree on a 
common course of action under circumstances in which each has an equal right to hold 
to their opinion. This may seem idealistic and impossible to achieve, but any less 
respectful way of proceeding is certain to end in resentment and quarrelling.  
 
Exposed to accusations of double standards and special pleading, the process of 
international decision-making has no value105. In much the same way, when a particular 
cause claims a higher morality or superior vision it quickly becomes unacceptable to 
those whose own beliefs lead them to disagree.  
 
Some human rights scholars do not apparently accept that a rational argument still exists 
for capital punishment.  They silence debate by sidestepping it entirely. But those writers 
whose focus is on the cause of abolitionism often ratchet their case without conscious, 
practising coercive tactics against those who are unsure or who disagree. This has been 
plainly demonstrated from the literature106.  
 
There is also an unfortunate tendency to rely upon contemporary, or near-contemporary, 
examples which the writer knows personally107. As methodology, this is less than 
convincing. Not only is there a lack of historical perspective but a failure to notice large 
                                                 
105 A well-documented and sad illustration of this point can be found in ex-Yugoslavia, whereas the 
incoherent, if ultimately decisive, intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina has left a dangerous cold war 
Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox communities. 
106 Chief among these is the invitation to contempt, i.e. manipulating the reader to despise those who 
cannot agree with the human rights agenda on capital punishment. 
107 Professor Cassese (op.cit.) draws most of his material from the Yugoslav War trials in which he was 
directly involved as a jurist.  
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portions of the world where the types of legal scenario mentioned do not apply, or where 
the measures of international law are untested and unknown108. It is scarcely necessary 
to insist on claims for Islamic practice when so much of the world’s largest and most 
populous continent is left out of the picture. 
 
The question that continually repeats itself in relation to the current international 
pressure to abolish the death penalty is whether it amounts to anything more than a 
particular historical experience. But given the degree of investment, it is difficult to shift 
what now appears to be established precept. With the dignity of being called 
“international”, criticism seems almost perverse. Yet our purpose here, and in the next 
chapter, is to look critically at this supposed consensus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 Unfortunately, errors of fact underline reinforce this impression of weakness. For example, the reader is 
offered utterances by Mahatma Gandhi in 1958 (actual date of death, 1948) and the report of a UN 
Commission in 1942 (actual date of formation, 24 October, 1945) (cf. Provost, R. op.cit., pp.10 & 228). 
Also, it is interesting to learn from Professor Cassese that piracy is now obsolete. This may surprise 
survivors of the Vietnamese boat exodus of 1975, and the crew of vessels passing around the Horn of 
Africa (cf. Cassese, A., op.cit. p.4). 
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                      Chapter Eight 
Conditions and prospects for international agreement over the 
death penalty 
 
Introduction 
Up to this point, capital punishment has mostly been referred to in abstract terms. It has 
been assumed that whatever categories give rise to this sentence in a particular 
jurisdiction, and whatever standards of evidence, trial, appeal or methods of execution 
may apply, we can be fairly confident that we understand the phenomenon of the death 
penalty. A standard set of events describes how and in what circumstances an offender is 
rendered liable to it. Yet there are many objections and exceptions to this typical 
scenario that should be considered. 
 
Firstly, a legal problem may occur when there is significant variance between the 
criminal code in the state where the crime was committed and that of the state in which 
the offender has nationality109. How, for example, is a crime of drugs trafficking to be 
thought of if the offence is committed in a country where the death penalty is imposed 
by a foreigner whose own country would only punish him with a temporary 
imprisonment?110 Or is it possible in the case of a homicide committed in an abolitionist 
                                                 
109 Claims to protection in this category are rarely settled by judicial process, but give rise to political 
‘deal-making’, trial by media and out-of-court settlements. Powerful nationalities persuade weaker ones to 
release their own citizens under circumstances they are unlikely to do the same in return. 
110 As has happened in several cases over the last ten years in retentionist Malaysia and Indonesia with 
respect to citizens of Australia and other states. 
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country to speak of a capital crime?111 What term should be applied to the deliberate 
ending of a pregnancy: ‘infanticide’, as Muslims and many others believe, or ‘abortion’, 
preferred by others as a word which also describes the non-deliberate ending of life? 
These difficulties call into question the very nature of international law. In the reality of 
legal jurisdiction, a crime is only what a given society chooses to say it is. This may not 
only change over time, as in the West, but be at the same time quite different under 
different jurisdictions. Hence we are faced at the outset with a serious problem of 
definition.  
 
This problem is surely only resolved by the recognition of certain conditions, namely, 
that for crime to have meaning, it must have location; that the nature of a crime is 
defined by its precise circumstances; and that for a crime to be subject to one or more 
conflicting jurisdictions is inherently unstable. This third condition is made obvious 
when we consider that the international context of competing jurisdictions can lead to an 
effective trouble. This may be a predictable outcome where legal authority has 
multiplied historically and jurisdictions, in consequence, overlap112. To take an extreme 
but real example, an individual can claim protection as a citizen from two different states 
for a crime committed in a third, against extradition proceedings carried out by a fourth? 
113 
 
                                                 
111 The subjective nature of definition has been a major problem since the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (see exceptions to the right to life under Article 6 as, for example, in US 
preference for the lack of precision in ‘the gravest of crimes’ at UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, p.10) 
112 In Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, a case for the violation of procedural rules was played out over 14 years 
between the Jamaican Court of Appeal, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Privy 
Council of Great Britain. (Death sentence issued January 1979; commuted November 1993) (Nos. 
210/1986, 225/1997; UN Doc. A/44/40, p.222; 11 HRLJ 150)  
113 As in Soering v. United Kingdom and Germany (1989)  Series A, Vol. 161, 11 EHRR 439 
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Secondly, there are difficult categories of domestic law that do not fall within the 
framework of legal killing. In these areas, we have clear sight of the change and 
uncertainty in Western society over the right to life. In Europe, citizens of one country 
may seek the legal protection of another to practise abortion or assisted suicide 
(euthanasia). Even within a single state, one particular sect or social group may regard 
these as a crime, while another claims them as a human right. The same is true of 
differing societies and jurisdictions within the USA. It is a measure of this uncertainty, 
surely, that human rights activists generally sidestep the deliberate extinction of life in 
what are called mercy-killing and abortion114. But is this an adequate response? Are 
those whose religious teaching and laws regard infanticide as deliberate homicide 
expected to close their eyes to killing on such a massive scale? They might, of course, 
exercise an attitude of giving in to local custom if they found their politeness retained115. 
In countries desperate to control population growth, forcible sterilisation116 and 
infanticide117 have been the unexpected consequences of state policy. This has been 
particularly seen at times when governments have issued legal sanctions, or offered 
material encouragements, in their efforts to reduce family size.  
Thirdly, in times of war, there is an uncertain line to be drawn on the questions of giving 
aid and comfort to the enemy, the pacifist refusal to serve, the execution of deserters in 
                                                 
114 On abortion, writers take their cue from the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: ‘The other difficult issue was abortion. Many delegations would have preferred some mention that 
the right to life began ‘from conception’, thereby protecting the foetus. On this point, too, compromise 
dictated silence.’ ‘There was almost no discussion of the abortion issue, which had so troubled the 
members of the Committee.’ (cf. Schabas, W., op.cit. pp.25 & 35) Abortion is a divisive issue. In some 
contexts it is discussed as murder, in others as a human right. 
115 This is rarely found in human rights literature. For example, in their 1,500 pages, the authors of 
‘International Human Rights in Context’, pass over the abortion almost without discussion, but focus on a 
misguided view of the status of women in Islamic society. (cf. Steiner, H. et al, op.cit.) 
116 In the mostly Hindu, Indian state of Bihar in the 1970’s, where the state health authority was unable to 
meet the quota set by the federal government for voluntary male sterilisation. 
117 This remains a consequence of China’s one-child policy. Gender-selective infanticide has been 
estimated hundreds of millions. After forty years, it has produced a serious imbalance between males and 
females. This is reported as running at a ratio of 114:100 in favour of boys in 2001 (cf. Steiner, H. et al, 
op.cit., pp. 191-201) 
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time of war, and the treatment of foreign prisoners-of-war. A host of specific problems 
arise in the form of reservations to treaties of abolition, even by states in which the death 
penalty has long been given up de jure for the crime of homicide118.  
 
Lastly, the issue of extra-judicial killing raises fundamental questions of honesty in 
states that declare abolition. There are so many recent instances of countries which have 
abolished de jure the death penalty, yet have practised extra-judicial killing, that this 
could be said to amount to a pattern119. In regimes where authority is failing or not 
legitimated, or where gangs have overthrown constitutional practice, extra-judicial 
killing is almost usually the result. In such circumstances, conditions for the accused are 
likely to be far worse than in a retentionist state where the individual is tried before a 
legally constituted court. Typically, laws of evidence and the right to a defence will be 
inoperative, and supposed offenders condemned out of private interest even when they 
have not violated the laws of the state. In cases of this kind, a de jure abolition of capital 
punishment provides a convenient cover for a regime that is bent on illegality. Firstly, it 
gains credibility before the UN and similar regional bodies by appearing to conform to 
humanitarian principles. Secondly, since no court in that country is able to deliver a 
capital sentence, the corrupt regime can dispense altogether with the difficulty and cost 
of securing conviction through the courts. 
 
                                                 
118 It is interesting to note the reservations that abolitionists may put. In relation to Protocol No.6 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe, 1985), 
The Netherlands, under Section 103 of the criminal code, gave notice of the following: ‘If the hostilities 
are carried out, or a state of war occurs, any person who enters into an understanding with a foreign power 
with a view to inducing that power to engage in hostilities or war against the state, to strengthening its 
resolve to do so, or to promising or providing assistance in the preparation of such acts ... [may] be liable 
to the death sentence.’ 
119 This is obvious in states that fill abart to the extent of El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia and Somalia, but even 
in stable democracies panic by the authorities can lead to extra-judicial killing (cf. rioting of the 1960’s 
and 1970’s in Londonderry and at Kent State University). 
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8.1 Definitions of the death penalty 
In the light of these remarks, we need perhaps to adjust our perspective on the death 
penalty.  
 
On the one hand, to accept a definition that includes, in some countries, the lawful 
actions of a large number of people is surely unrealistic. Whatever, as Muslims, we may 
believe and choose to apply within our own societies, we cannot put ourselves in the 
position of demanding the death penalty for all those who practise infanticide/abortion. 
We may want to discuss it as a moral or social question, and seek to persuade others that 
the act itself is sinful. We can note that it is a conduct which divides jurisdictions and 
makes the individual liable to criminal prosecution in many. But in societies that have 
abolished abortion as an offence, it is beyond the legal supervision of the state to classify 
it as unlawful killing120. Many deliberate human actions licensed by the state are known 
to cause death. If subject to criminal prosecution, a number of activities considered 
normal and productive would be banned. Judged by the incidence of deaths, for 
example, the use of motorised vehicles on roads might not be permitted. Yet it is almost 
impossible to imagine any state imposing such a ban. Modern society accepts this cost in 
human lives for its overall convenience, and chooses to regard most road deaths as 
resulting from accident not slaughter.  
 
On the other hand, there is clearly a danger in looking at capital crime from a narrow 
angle. As we have seen, a restricted definition or indeed a complete abolition of capital 
                                                 
120 The speed with which Western society gives up, then forgets, its prohibitions is astonishing to people 
from a religious tradition. Many former beliefs were held in common with Muslim society up to recent 
times. But who now, in any part of Europe, would consider fornication, blasphemy, sorcery or suicide to 
be serious offences? 
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punishment can serve the interests of corrupt agencies of the state. If it is the practice of 
a state to murder its inconvenient citizens, it may be important for that state to balance 
its international reputation by abolishing judicial killing121. The governments of certain 
countries are known to agree to things in principle that they have no intention of 
carrying into practice. We should be alert to the possibility that states which accept the 
principle of capital punishment may be more rule-based and judicious in their 
administration than states which have disingenuously abolished or suspended the death 
penalty.  
 
8.1.1 The practice of the death penalty 
Of the sanction itself, it can be said that the death penalty is an act requiring a minimum 
of three agents: the offender, the representative of a judiciary, and the person carrying 
out the sentence of a court.  
 
It has often been argued that it is immoral to ask an individual to deprive someone of his 
life. In Christian teaching, scripture states that it is wrong to take the life of another 
person or to commit violence against him: “It is the Lord who gives and the Lord who 
takes away”; “Let the person who is without sin throw the first stone”; “If a man strikes 
you on the face, turn the other cheek”; “Do not answer evil with evil”. These injunctions 
against violence are based on the commandment given to Moses: “Thou shalt not kill”. 
But does the law of Moses mean to kill or to commit murder, both translations are used? 
If to kill, how can this be reconciled with the specifications of capital crime, also in the 
form of commandments, in the Book of Exodus? “A person who strikes a man so that he 
                                                 
121 In any list there might be journalists who, in states like the Russian Federation, are remarkably short-
lived. 
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dies,” it is stated, “is to be put to death without fail” This is followed by: “If a fatal 
accident should occur, then you must give soul for soul, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot, branding for branding, wound for wound, blow for 
blow”122. There are many categories of capital crime, both in Exodus and the Book of 
Leviticus, as part of the vision given to Moses. There are laws which prescribe the death 
penalty and laws which expressly forbid it. They cover particular, detailed offences as 
well as arbitrary or non-judicial killing. These regulations of Moses established the 
Hebraic law.  
 
Christianity may be admirable for its teaching that men should live without violence, but 
if, as the prophet Jesus states, his purpose was not to overturn but to fulfil the old laws, 
this Christian teaching of non-violence is in conflict with the wider body of its own 
scripture. As to its realism, the treatment of the prophet Jesus himself, like that of 
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, is surely sufficient evidence that passive 
resistance offers no safeguard against the practice of evil. The Christian message offers 
something like a declaration of universal human rights but, like these recent expressions 
of the ideal, it denies the need to punish certain behaviours by use of the most severe 
penalty. Although it is a powerful encouragement to virtue, it fails to address the reality 
of how men frequently treat each other. 
 
The question of whether it is reasonable for society to ask one human being to kill 
another can only be answered by defining, first, the nature of the society in which that 
person lives. If it is one whose fixed beliefs are that certain crimes must be punishable 
                                                 
122 Book of Exodus 20:12 & 20:23-25 
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by death, then the morality of asking a person to undertake this responsibility is not 
different from asking him to perform some other duty prescribed by his religion123. This 
may also be true of a secular society that believes in capital punishment124. Yet it is not 
difficult to see why a secular society, grown sick of all forms of killing, as in post-war 
Germany, should rush to adopt a Basic Law that outlaws every category of capital 
crime125. Citizens of that country are likely to feel the death penalty is wrong, whether to 
perform such a deed themselves or to look for someone to act for them126. 
 
On the other hand, enquiring more widely into what society may find it reasonable to ask 
of its citizens produces an entirely different picture. No state appears to find it difficult, 
morally or practically, to raise recruits to fight and kill in its name. Young men, and 
even in some countries women, seem to be rather easily persuaded that this may be their 
duty. Neither the historical experience that wars are mostly pointless, nor the setting 
aside of the freedom of individual decision, weighs sufficiently against the attraction for 
young people of putting on uniform and conforming to a strict code of conduct. Taught 
not to question authority, and shown the harsh sanctions against disobedience, this self-
denial may seem like submission to religion. Certainly, a faith blindly acquired, and 
demanding acts of extreme sacrifice, can create an environment like that of an army. 
                                                 
123 This might be compared to the blood sacrifices specified in Leviticus, and carried out throughout the 
ancient world which few people in ‘advanced’ countries would now be able to imagine. Though religious 
laws do not necessarily imply a morality we would recognise as acceptable, its more extreme forms, such 
as live human sacrifice, show that people will accept almost any kind of suffering prescribed by religious 
laws. We can say, however, of the Muslim, Christian and Hebrew religions that there have been radical 
shifts in practice and belief. 
124 A person who believes in the atheistic materialism of a totalitarian state, for example. 
125 Between 1933 and 1945, Germany carried out 16,500 judicial sentences of execution, using the death 
penalty as an expanded instrument of policy. (Evans, R., Rituals of Retribution: Capital Punishment in 
Germany, 1600-1987, Oxford: OUP, 1996, ch.5) 
126 The German situation was made more difficult by re-unification, after nearly half a century, with 
people scarred by experience of state illegality. In abolitionist Democratic Republic of Germany (1945-
1990), government operated on an obsessive scale outside the law. 
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Partly for this reason, secular society may be afraid of religion. But that would be to 
confuse religion with a divisive sectarian. Belief in God is belief in a fundamental 
goodness. Islam is a comprehending, merciful vision of the world, and Allah requires us 
to develop our intelligence to improve it. 
 
8.2 Deterrence or not: the profit and loss of capital punishment  
Allowing that people are nowhere sufficiently reformed to release society from the need 
to apply severe penalties, but continue to carry out terrible crimes against others, what 
can be done to prevent extreme lawlessness and serve the interests of justice?127 
 
Defenders of capital punishment in the United States have little doubt that the existence 
of the death penalty reduces the incidence of the most serious crimes. Some statistical 
comparisons favour their argument128. A short moratorium on capital punishment in the 
US, between 1968 and 1976, provided an opportunity to test suppositions on both sides 
of the argument129. Yet even this evidence has been hotly contested130. At the same time, 
                                                 
127 Some argue that, at the present time, crimes of the most serious nature are becoming more and not less 
extreme. Examples are ‘drive-by’ killing; the slaughter of students by gunmen; and the rise in the cult of 
suicide-bombing. 
128 Particularly in the work of Isaac Ehrlich and Stephen Layson who show that between 20 and 28 fewer 
murders were committed in retentionist states. (cf. Ehrlich, I., 1975, ‘The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death’ in American Economic Review no. 65; and Layson, S, 1985, 
‘Homicide and Deterrence: A Re-examination of the United States Time-Series Evidence’ in Southern 
Economic Journal, no. 52) 
129 In states that resumed with the death penalty after the federal moratorium, the balance appears to favour 
retentionism. Retentionists argue that there was a marked decline in the murder rate, in most comparable 
states, after resumption of the death penalty. Reviewing the evidence from southern states, Judge Cassell 
writes: “These state-by-state comparisons are bolstered by more sophisticated and recent econometric 
analysis that controls for the variety of demographic, economic and other variables that differ among the 
states. The best of these studies suggest that the death penalty has an incremental deterrent effect over 
imprisonment – in plainer terms that the death penalty saves innocent lives”. (cf. Cassell, P. ‘In Defence of 
the Death Penalty’, in Bedau, H & Cassell, P., Debating the Death Penalty, Oxford: OUP, 2004, p.194) 
130 As in Dezhbakhsh, H. et al, 2003,’Does Capital Punishment have a Deterrent Effect? New Data from 
Postmoratorium Panel Data’. (see American Law and Economics Review, no.5, pp. 344-376; and 
Shepherd, J., 2004, ‘Deterrence versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts among 
States’ in Michigan Law Review, no. 104, pp. 203-255) 
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abolitionists cite figures from Canada and Australia, as well as European states, which 
they see as proof that the death penalty in itself has no significant deterrent effect131.  
 
Clearly, statistics on this subject should be approached with extreme caution. 
Methodology becomes problematic when highly sophisticated sampling and modelling 
techniques are relied on by criminologists. Not only do they fail to come up with any 
safe conclusions, they soon appear to lose sight of the issue itself. What exactly is the 
terror being measured when the death penalty is seen against the alternatives of the 
death-row experience or life without parole? Can we begin to grade their relative 
deterrent value?132 Or, to take another example, why should reliable correlations or 
anything of statistical value be expected when the period of variable punishment is less 
than one year?133 The idea that a criminal may choose to commit a robbery in one state 
rather than another, because he believes the level of punishment is lower there, may have 
some limited application, though the criminal may be just as likely to act on his 
understanding of local police efficiency and rates of conviction. But the idea that 
someone about to commit a murder will have in mind the latest shift in state policy is 
perhaps unlikely.  
 
                                                 
131 In Canada, the homicide rate in 2003 was 44% lower than it had been in 1975, the year before 
abolition. (cited in Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op.cit., p.325)  
132 This is open, surely only to evidence taken from in-depth interviews. This offers some prospect of 
assessing deterrence, in relation to the fear an offender has of execution compared to imprisonment. A 
former prison warden from Florida, Ron McAndrew, was arguing for the death penalty to be abolished in 
favour of the much more severe punishment of life imprisonment when he wrote: ‘The most severe 
penalty you could give anyone would be to lock them in a little cage made out of concrete and steel, with a 
steel cot, a mattress that is two inches thick, a stainless steel toilet that does not have a lid, and you leave 
them there for the rest of their natural life.’ (Quoted in Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op.cit., p.397) 
133 A ‘trend’ was expected from a suspension of executions in Texas between 1996 and early 1997: ‘Again 
we find no abnormal rise (or fall) in Texas homicides during this period.’ With little sense of proportion, 
this information is included by Hood & Hoyle, presumably because they feel it adds something to their 
case (see Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op.cit., p. 328) 
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Searching for correlations by purely quantitative methods seems deluded. Without a 
clear understanding of the mind of the homicidal criminal, it is surely unreasonable to 
make generalisations. Yet, as countless studies have shown, there is far too great an 
aspect of irrationality and unpredictability in the committing of the most serious forms 
of crime, such as murder, rape and terrorism, to be able to form a picture of ‘the criminal 
mind’.134 Moreover, underlying this doubt lies the question: how can we guess what 
would have happened from what did not happen? J.S.Mill puts the same objection: ‘Who 
is there who knows whom [the death penalty] has not deterred, or how many beings it 
has saved who would have lived to be murderers if that awful association had not been 
thrown round the idea of murder from their earliest infancy?’135 
 
It is plain from recent literature on the subject that numbers alone are not the driving 
force behind the passionate arguments of retentionists and abolitionists. It has not proved 
to be a quantitative argument in the way the utilitarian philosophers found logical and 
expected would settle the matter. The calculus in Western society is based on 
differently-structured perspectives that cannot bring capital punishment into measurable 
comparison. On one side, there is popular instinct and informal evidence which, for 
retentionists, represent commonsense. On the other, abolitionists look to a higher 
morality, which they see as entitling them to develop an advanced jurisprudence. Each 
side claims to understand the deterrent value of sentences and neither accepts statistical 
evidence presented by its opponents. This is where the battle lines are drawn most 
sharply, particularly in the bear pit of debate in the United States. Rational criteria are 
                                                 
134 The concept of ‘the criminal mind’ is at least fifty years out of date. Experience suggest that almost 
everyone is capable of committing a serious crime, though in the case of murders described as ‘the worst 
of the worst’, there may be a perverted sexuality and politics. 
135 From Parliamentary Debates, third series, April 21st, 1868, cited in Singer, P., ed., Applied Ethics, 
Oxford: OUP, 1986, pp. 97-104 
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powerless to decide the issue since each side is predisposed to believe only the evidence 
that favours its standpoint. It is exceptional to find any writing on the question that is not 
severely compromised by the view of the writer. As in the televised trial of O.J. 
Simpson, nobody seems able to look simply at the facts.136  
 
8.3   How is justice served? 
A consideration that weighs heavily with those who uphold the death penalty is the 
feeling that only by retaining the power of capital sentencing can justice be properly 
served. For Muslims, the law is denied if crimes are not subject to the rules laid down, 
although, at the same time, sentencing must follow the ordinance to do all that is 
possible to avoid taking an offender’s life. In a secular view, it is society that is cheated 
and undermined by a failure to demand punishment. These attitudes are entirely 
compatible from a practical standpoint. Against this thinking, however, abolitionists are 
pre-occupied by the violation of the rights of the individual rather than the rights of 
society. They are strongly motivated by cases where an injustice is known or believed to 
have been committed. This attitude can be summed up as ‘better a hundred go free than 
that an innocent man suffers the death penalty’.  
 
In Professor Stevenson’s account of State v. MacMillian, a classic case of multiple 
injustice is played out137.  The defendant MacMillian, a poor black, is entrapped by a 
corrupt, racist police sheriff in a rural district of Alabama. This sheriff, thought to be 
motivated by knowing MacMillian was involved with a white girl, arrests him for a 
                                                 
136 Among the general public, watching live televised hearings, there was a divide along racial lines, 
notwithstanding that millions followed an identical presentation of the evidence. 
137 Summarised from MacMillian v. State, 616 So.2d 933 (Alabama Criminal Appeal Court) 1993. Both 
the judge and the state prosecutor are said to have conspired in the miscarriage of justice, and though 
MacMillian was eventually released, the prosecutor became an appellate judge. 
 267
murder he knows he could not possibly have committed. He hides witness statements, 
plants evidence and forces a white man called Myers, a convicted felon in custody, into 
implicating MacMillian in the murder. He does this by illegally placing Myers and 
MacMillian on death row and threatening them both with the electric chair. A circuit 
court judge takes just two days to hear the case and, accepting Myers’s evidence, as well 
as corroborative testimony invented and paid for by the sheriff, sentences McMillian to 
death. This is despite a recommendation for imprisonment by a mostly white jury138.  
 
Professor Stevenson gives a powerful account of cruelty and injustice, especially as it 
concerns white-black relations in the southern states of America. Yet, as evidence for the 
cause it is intended to serve, it is less than convincing. Stevenson includes the story, 
along with several like it, in a monograph setting out his case against the death penalty. 
It is one he knows at first-hand, having represented MacMillian himself at an appeal 
stage139. But his general argument is surely too simplistic. Is it really a great surprise to 
find that all the wrongdoing has been committed by the authorities? That they escaped 
unpunished, while an innocent man had a threat of death held over him for six years, was 
a great injustice140. But how can Stevenson claim that this constitutes an argument 
against the death penalty? As Professor Pojman puts it in relation to cases of unfair 
discrimination against the poor and ethnic minorities: “It is not true that a law that is 
applied in a discriminatory manner is unjust. Unequal justice is no less justice, however 
                                                 
138 A large number of Hollywood films, inspired by the civil rights movement of the 1960’s and 70’s, have 
a similar scenario. Two from this era (‘In the Heat of the Night’ and ‘Mississippi Burning’) were based on 
actual cases. 
139 Bryan Stevenson, professor of clinical law at NYU School of Law and executive director of the Equal 
Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama. He has made a career out of ‘challenging bias against the poor 
and people of colour in the criminal justice system’. (see Stevenson, B., ‘Close to Death: Reflections on 
Race and Capital Punishment in America’ in Bedau, H. & Cassell, P., 2004, op. cit. pp. 76-117) 
140 In many jurisdictions, past and present, these actions of the law officers would be treasonable and liable 
to a capital sentence. 
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uneven its application. The discriminatory application, not the law itself, is unjust”141. 
Inequity, as we know, must be fought against and, where systemic, made subject to 
reform. Like every form of corruption, it threatens the integrity of the law. But such 
principles uphold the rule of law, they are not an argument against it. If human 
misconduct was an argument against the law itself, then no law could be administered 
other than in a state of perfection142. The supposition that the law, not the administration, 
is at fault has a familiar ring. It can be heard when ideal has taken over from reality. 
 
What punishment is appropriate for someone who deliberately takes the life of another 
human being? This is an ethical question usually avoided by abolitionists. If the answer 
is imprisonment, we must ask the purpose of imprisonment. In a liberal rationale this is 
reform, not retributive justice. If a prisoner can demonstrate he has reformed and it is 
thought he will not repeat the actions that were the cause of his imprisonment, he is 
eligible for release from his exclusion from society. That, at least, is the principle. 
Sentencing in most countries is structured to take account of the prisoner’s behaviour143. 
Yet if the certainty of reform is taken to be the sole criterion for imprisonment, the 
aspect of punishment might be got rid off. If, for instance, a therapy existed which could 
guarantee that an offender was no longer a threat to society, what would stand in the way 
of his immediate release? Yet would justice have been served? Futures have been 
                                                 
141 Pojman, L., ‘Why the Death Penalty is Morally Permissible’ in Bedau, H. & Cassell, P., op.cit.,  2004, 
p. 70 
142 This is not  a new problem: ‘Put the case now, that a man is accused of a capital crime, and seeing the 
power and menace of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and partiality of Judges, runs away for fear 
of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legal trial, and makes it sufficiently appear, that he 
was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods; this 
is a manifest condemnation of the Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this 
can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the Sentences of precedent Judges, that 
had done the same. For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of 
Judgement to succeeding Judges.’ (Hobbes, T. 1651, op.cit., pp. 147-148) 
143 Normally, this is reduction of a half the sentence for good conduct. In UAE, for example, good conduct 
reduces a quarter the sentence. 
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imagined in which delinquent personalities are simply referred for treatment, then 
released as persons cured: the biological engineering and the use of drugs were at fault 
but could be rebalanced144. But would that satisfy our notion of justice?145  
 
Conversely, if the purpose of imprisonment is to punish, how is this achieved? A person 
may live quite comfortably in prison with loss of few rights other than his physical 
freedom146. Yet the cost to society of providing him with something like the care of a 
hospital seems inappropriate. It places the state’s concern and responsibility for a 
prisoner’s needs higher than the consideration shown to many who have not committed a 
criminal offence. It is certainly disproportionate to the offender’s value to society, based 
on his former life, and to the condition in which he left the victims of his crime. Yet, at 
the same time, if imprisonment is made indefinite there is an inherent cruelty which in 
itself breaches the duty of care that a state owes to its citizens.  
 
Whatever the material provisions of a prison, a person struggles to live without hope of 
release. He is condemned to a death in mind and spirit, which, if it does not lead him to 
further rebellion, is likely to manifest itself in mental illness rather than reflection or 
feeling sorry for what he has done147. By what law that has any claim to being called 
humanitarian, and in function of which right that is said to be universal, can an 
individual be forced to live in a condition of complete hopelessness? “We’d prefer an 
immediate end to our lives than being cooked slowly under a flame”, are words taken 
                                                 
144 Aldous Huxley’s engages this type pf scenario in Brave New World , (London: Penguin, 1932) . 
145 Neither our sense of justice nor our sense of human independence. The range of mitigation is confusing 
the Western sense of right and wrong. 
146 Movement in that direction seems clear in the rights granted to prisoners under European Union 
legislation. Entitlements include even the right to vote in elections. 
147 The common use of illegal drugs in prisons also demonstrate this. 
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from an open letter to the French prison authorities by ten men, serving terms of life 
imprisonment, appealing for a return to the death penalty148. 
 
Here, the contrast between the despair experienced within a secular society and the 
balance and equity offered by a religious one could not be more clear. In a legal system 
founded upon belief, the offender is fully aware of his offence. Since it is largely based 
on what has been prescribed, the individual can accept his punishment. Like the offender 
found by the Prophet to have committed adultery, he may even demand it149. Belief in 
God holds out the hope of redemption for the person who asks forgiveness, whereas 
imprisonment in a secular, atheist world is infinitely more cruel150. In Western countries, 
legislators may be content that the wrongdoer is hurt by anger and complaint. These are 
surely the product of a society that listen to every excuse. For the Muslim, this is not the 
case. The believer who knows he has sinned under Islamic law is sorry for what he has 
done. Is it not merciful to punish the very worst of offenders by a death that is a release 
from their suffering and guilt? 
 
These arguments would not have seemed strange to a European in an age of belief. 
Indeed, they are to be found repeatedly in the written history of his continent151. What 
                                                 
148 Quoted in Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op.cit., p. 398 
149 In the hadd crime of adultery, judged by the Prophet himself, Ma’iz (the offender) confesses his guilt 
four times to bring punishment on his own head. 
150 Cases such as that of Myra Hindley, who for political reasons was never paroled, show evidence of a 
systemic cruelty (see no.32,chapter 7). 
151 ‘The Roman penal system was peculiar in its distinction between public and private penalties, 
reflecting the division into public and private offences. The private penalty was originally a substitute for 
private vengeance and retaliation (talio = infliction on the delinquent of the same injury as that done to 
him). Pecuniary compensation between the parties (pacisci), always permissible, had become compulsory. 
The private penalty consisted in payment of a sum of money to the person wronged, and is to be 
distinguished from a multa, a fine inflicted as a coercive measure by a magistrate and paid to the State. 
The public penalty originated in the idea of public revenge, or religious expiation for crimes against the 
community, or religious conceptions (‘sacer esto’), and could not be other than the death of the 
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factors of consideration, then, have shifted the moral landscape so radically in countries 
like Britain? One answer, certainly, is the fear of error. In post-war Britain, the horror of 
hanging the wrong man weighed heavily with those who wanted to bring about 
abolition. Great attention was given to the situation and presumed feelings of the public 
executioner. In some cases, after an execution had taken place, investigations and 
campaigns to prove the innocence of the person hanged were carried on for years, even 
decades, after the event152. Also, it was widely reported in countries of a similar 
composition which had abolished the death penalty that there had not been a consequent 
rise in the murder rate. The case for general deterrence began to fall away. Despite the 
evidence of sample polls showing that only a minority of adults at the time supported the 
change, abolition, when it came, was not met with widespread protest. The average 
person, it could be said, had been persuaded to accept that capital punishment might not 
be necessary to the continuance of civil society. 
 
As we have noted in post-war Germany and Britain, however, the impulse behind 
abolition in one state is not necessarily the same as in another. A particular authority 
may be satisfied that the penalty is no longer required in its jurisdiction, but it does not 
follow that another will be influenced by the same criteria. That there is wide difference 
on the balance of the argument in Western society, weighing necessity and morality, is 
best exemplified by the incoherence of jurisdictions in the USA153.  Though more 
specific and less kind motivations have been given, what seems most to influence 
                                                                                                                                                
delinquent.’ (see Berger, A., Essay on Roman Law and Procedure in ‘The Oxford Classical Dictionary’, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, pp. 484-491) 
152 An important case, written about extensively, was that of Timothy Evans. Hanged in 1950, granted a 
pardon after death in 1965. (cf. Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op. cit. pp. 42-47).  
153 Since the ending of the brief moratorium (1968-76), 38 out of 50 states have the death penalty on their 
statute books. (cf. Bedau, H. & Cassell, P., op.cit., 2004, p.82) 
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retentionists in the USA is the aspect of deterrence 154.  At least two distinct meanings 
are implied here. Firstly, there is the argument for incapacitation, which is to say, an 
offender so punished cannot repeat his crime. Known also as specific deterrence, this 
argument rest on a claim of simple effectiveness and applies equally, of course, to 
imprisonment which, whatever its failings, serves to keep criminals behind bars155. 
Secondly, a point already made, there is informal evidence that American criminals may 
be deterred from carrying loaded weapons in a retentionist state, and prefer to commit 
their crime in an abolitionist one. Criminals, it is argued, are not radically different from 
the rest of mankind, in that they may calculate the cost of an offence and minimise their 
personal risks156.  
 
It has also been asserted that capital punishment is simply the “best bet”157. Since we 
cannot know what constitutes deterrence in matters of homicide, it is rational to bet that 
capital punishment works, since this is to bet against the murderer and for the innocent: 
“If we’re right, we have saved the lives of the innocent. If we’re wrong, unfortunately 
                                                 
154 A very high proportion of those sentenced to death are poor and black. Some commentators suggest 
that retentionists want the death penalty as an instrument of social and racial control. ‘Closer scrutiny of 
the operation of the death penalty has also resulted in greater awareness of some of the capital punishment 
system’s other abuses. These include the imposition of capital punishment on the most vulnerable 
offenders ... One out of every three African-American men between the ages of 18 and 35 is in jail or on 
parole in the United States. Evidence of disparate treatment of racial minorities becomes more pronounced 
at each juncture of the criminal justice process as systemic decision makers, who tend to be predominantly 
white, frequently exercise their discretion in ways that disfavour people of colour.’ (see Stevenson, B., 
‘Reflections on Race and Capital Punishment in America’ in Bedau, H. & Cassell, P., op.cit., 2004, pp. 
84-85) 
155 Judge Cassell makes much of the case of a serial killer, Kenneth McDuff, whose career continued when 
he was released after the suspension of the death penalty in 1968. He was later paroled to resume killing 
until finally executed in 1998. (cf. Cassell, P. ‘In Defence of the Death Penalty’ in Bedau, H. &  Cassell, 
P., op.cit. pp.183-185) 
156 As Cassell points out, the argument that crimes of passion murders cannot be deterred is answered by 
the fact that these are not aggravated, but second degree murders which are not subject to the death 
penalty. (ibid, pp. 189-191) 
157 Notably by Ernest van den Haag. (Discussed in Pojman, L. op.cit., pp. 65-67). 
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we’ve sacrificed the lives of some murderers”158. Nevertheless, the capacity of the death 
penalty to split opinion in Western societies is matched by few other issues.  
 
8.4 The emergence of the abolitionist case  
Abolitionists cite the C18th Italian jurist, Cesare Beccaria, as the first to offer 
philosophical objections to the death penalty on the grounds of human rights.159 These 
can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the authority of a society operates on the basis of 
an unspoken transfer of the rights of the individual. Since no individual will freely 
choose to transfer power over his life to another, no agent of society such as government 
can take the life of a member of society in punishment. Secondly, since law, as the 
expression of the public will, detests and punishes homicide, it cannot expect to deter 
others from murder by sanctioning murder itself. Thirdly, judicial murder gives to men 
the example of cruelty. The first proposition, however, is open to the objection that only 
under ideal conditions of direct democracy could the individual expect to have the type 
of relationship with society’s laws that is implied here160. As to the second proposition, 
an identical objection can be made to other forms of retaliatory punishment, such as 
confinement within a prison, to which Beccaria does not apparently object. Thirdly, 
although the last of these sounds impressive, the argument is weak161. Capital 
punishment is a sanction against not a promotion of cruelty, and human behaviour does 
not lack examples of cruelty, supreme among which is murder. Yet however imperfect, 
Beccaria’s thinking contains germs of the abolitionist argument still regarded as viable. 
                                                 
158  ibid, p.66 
159 cf. Beccaria, C., 1764, ‘On Crimes and Punishments’, trans. Paolucci, H., Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1963. 
160 In a direct democracy such as fifth-century Athens, even its leading citizens were not protected in the 
way that is presumed here. (cf. Stone. I.F, The trial of Socrates, London: Cape, 1988).  
161 Even to the Professor Bedau (cf. Bedau, H., Killing as Punishment, Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 2004, pp. 76-79) 
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By the mid-nineteenth century, a number of smaller European states had accepted the 
new calculus that capital punishment was not merely abhorrent in itself but unnecessary 
as a deterrent162. This was taken up in jurisdictions in the Americas, both north and 
south163. It is revealing to look at how far the abolition movement had gained ground in 
the years up to the First World War. The thirteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, which gives statistics for the first decade of the twentieth century, shows a 
number of states that were, according to the criterion of ten years’ moratorium, 
abolitionist de facto. Yet, as we know, several of these went back on their decision and 
carried out executions up to or beyond 1945164. 
 
With the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the intention was to draw a line 
under behaviours of the recent Western past165. The Declaration is analogous to 
declarations of optimism and legal virtue in Magna Carta, and Bills of Rights announced 
after the English Civil War, the American War of Independence and the first deposition 
of the French monarchy. As many commentators have pointed out, it echoed these 
antecedents166. Yet those historic appeals to virtue were intended as programmes for the 
future government of a sovereign state. Are we to understand that there is now a kind of 
borderless, unlimited law-making in progress?  
 
                                                 
162 Following the wars in Europe between 1791 and 1815, the feeling of rationalist and utilitarian 
philosophy turned against the necessity of capital punishment. Although not denying support for the death 
penalty in his 1775 ‘Rationale of Punishment’, by the time of his death in 1832, Bentham was an 
abolitionist (cf. 'Principles of Penal Law’, Part 2, in Bentham, J., 1843 (ed. Bowring, J.),  ‘The Works of 
Jeremy Bentham’)  
163 The earliest being Michigan, in 1846. 
164 Notable examples in Europe are Belgium (abolitionist de facto from 1863, last execution 1950); 
Finland (abolitionist de facto 1824, last execution 1944); Romania (abolitionist de jure 1864, last 
execution 1989) (Sources: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 13th ed. 1926, vol.5, pp. 279-282; and Hood, R. & 
Hoyle, C., op.cit., pp. 405-407) 
165 GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810 
166 cf. Schabas, W. op.cit., p.9 & ff. 
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8.5 International opinion-forming and the abolitionist lobby at the United Nations  
The chief domain of activity over abolition is the United Nations which, since its first 
appearance, has not been slow to represent itself as permanent and unchallengeable. Not 
being a house for some nations but a home for all, its declarations and covenants are 
universally prescriptive167. Yet it is difficult to see how, since 1945, the conduct of its 
primary business has justified either its claims or its title.  
 
The UN is governed by a charter that recognises a power of veto for each of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council. For the first forty years of its existence, the 
organisation was preoccupied by a running hostility between its two most powerful 
members. These resulted not only in the universal threat of a nuclear weapons race but in 
wars of great brutality. Failing to maintain a peace between member states, the UN has 
been equally powerless to restrain the growth of social and economic inequality between 
them. Numerically, far more individuals are in need of a successful conclusion to the so-
called “wars” on want, refugee status and child poverty than in 1945, yet these 
objectives seem further from achievement than ever. What, apart from rewarding its own 
political leadership and secretariat, is the point of supporting this huge institution which 
appears to consume as much as it contributes to humanity?168  
 
The obvious answer is that, aside from advancing or withholding financial support 
through the IMF and the World Bank, the UN invests some of its considerable resources 
                                                 
167 Referring specifically to articles under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDR, 1948, op. 
cit.) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1976, 999 UNTS 171). 
168 Estimates of numbers employed are of over 50,000 in 620 posts in New York and overseas (cf. 
Bogdanor, V. (ed.), 1991, ‘Encyclopaedia of Social Science’, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 626). Once begun, the 
greatest enterprises have often contributed to the downfall of the societies that built them (as, for example, 
Ceauşescu’s House of the Republic). 
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in cultural projects like the human rights movement. Unequal to the task of creating real 
harmony in matters of the highest importance to nation states, it manufactures artificial 
ones in lesser spheres. Unfortunately, these have the tendency to meddle in, and violate 
cultural identity. For the United Nations to assume a right over such matters as capital 
punishment would imply a giving away of authority and the right to take over the 
defining statutes of existing states. But this has not been given. For a thousand million 
Muslims, it is a power that could not be given out of mere politeness or the desire for 
cohesion. To adapt Beccaria’s observation, a willing surrender of our cultural identity is 
so unlikely a proposition as to be discounted immediately. 
 
The UN’s first great cultural project, the Declaration, offers under Article 3: “Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person”. But what does this mean? Human 
beings may assume a right to life until they lose it. Expectations of liberty and security 
are normally met unless we are particularly unfortunate, or give up the benefits of 
society by the lack of wisdom in our own actions. Article 3 is essentially meaning less. 
We might search for a closer definition of what these rights are. Different societies can 
mean different things by liberty and security, but will they be statements of reality, 
promises for the future, or mere aspirations? Do they suppose any tangible jurisdiction? 
They appear to be visions of a better world. Yet even their optimism is of a brittle 
quality. Arising out of fracture and lawlessness, Western society has already begun to 
experience repetitions of the social behaviour it fears most169. 
 
                                                 
169 Ethnic cleaning and genocide in the Balkans, for example. 
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A clear idea of what was being aimed at, however, can be found in a number of further 
declarations, conventions and additional protocols in the half-century that followed the 
Second World War. Though these might be national, regional or international in context 
and inspiration, Western jurists have made a conscious effort to advance in stages. A 
pattern has been established of increasing demands upon states that may or may not have 
been willing to give up their former positions. This was most apparent in Europe and the 
Americas170. Through post-colonial and differential power relations, weaker states found 
it much harder to resist pressure at the UN than those that enjoyed a greater cultural 
power171. Whatever motive lay behind accession to a treaty, there has rarely been any 
indication that change was brought about through popular opinion172. Where a specific 
group turned actively against the death penalty, it is a reasonable assumption that an 
intellectual or social leadership was responsible173. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
170 This is an on-going project. In 1999, the Council of Europe threatened to cancel the rights of the 
parliamentary delegation of the newly-formed state of Ukraine unless it signed up to abolition without 
delay. (Council of Europe, Resolution 1194) 
171 This is clearly exemplified by the standing of the Jamaican courts (for example, in the long drawn-out 
contest in Pratt v. Jamaica, 1979-1993; cf. n.51 above) before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights when compared to the attitude of the USA over similar complaints. In denying a request from 
Special Rapporteur Ndiaye to visit US prisoners on death row, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee wrote to the US Permanent Representative to the UN: ‘Bill, is this man confusing us 
with some other country or is this an intentional insult to the US and to our nation’s legal system?’ 
(reported in The Washington Post, 8.10.1997, p.AO7). See also the Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s 
repeated frustration with the Inter-American Commission over the stalling of decisions, fearing it was 
being used as a means to deny implementation of a lawful penalty (in Hilaire (Case No. 11.816); 
Constantine (Case no. 11.787 through 12.141); and Benjamin et al (Case no. 12.149) 
172 Polls conducted in the USA on the death penalty in the early 2000’s give a range of 73-82% in favour 
of retention (see Marquis, J. ‘Truth and Consequences: the Penalty of Death’ in Bedau, H. & Cassell, P., 
op.cit., p.123) 
173 Professor Schabas comments: ‘One of the most common arguments opposing the abolitionist 
movement is continuing public support for the death penalty. Public opinion polls have not inhibited many 
legislators in voting to abolish the death penalty.’ (Schabas, W., op. cit., 2002, p.376) 
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8.5.1 Forceful tactics used within international associations 
The unbalanced relationship between countries is also shown by how the sharia is held 
up as being uniquely difficult174. It is as though Islamic law alone presented blocks to 
international covenants on human rights. Yet, by reference to retentionist countries in 
other parts of the world, it can easily be demonstrated that this is not the case. We might 
imagine that if the death-row phenomenon existed in Arab countries but not in the USA, 
the practice would have been universally condemned as a cause of unnecessary 
suffering. Nevertheless, in their anxiety to avoid the death penalty, some abolitionists 
and jurists have defended the use of death-row imprisonment and life without parole175. 
Conversely, in retentionist Trinidad and Tobago, there has been a strong debate over 
whether condemned prisoners should be dealt with more quickly176. 
 
The earliest indication of UN forcefulness is in the use made of the Declaration. We are 
told, in an argument that does not seem logical, that it was “not a binding treaty but a 
statement or codification of customary international law and an authoritative 
interpretation of the human rights clauses in the Charter of the United Nations ... General 
Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative 
                                                 
174 After expressing its satisfaction with Europe: a Death Penalty-Free Continent’ in the 43 member-state 
of the Council of Europe, it was reported that the only exceptions were ‘rebel-held areas’ of the Russian 
Federation because of their ‘fundamentalist interpretation of the Sharia’ (Council of Europe Doc. 8340, 
para. 44, quoted in Schabas, W., op.cit., p.299) 
175 ‘The Human Rights Committee has refused to construe Article 7 of the Covenant [proscribing cruel, 
inhuman and degrading punishment] as a prohibition of lengthy detention prior to execution, taking the 
view that, because Article 6 points towards abolition as a goal, it is preferable for death row inmates to be 
kept alive as long as possible.’ ‘Herndl and Sadi ... agreed with the Committee’s jurisprudence, whereby 
“the so-called death-row phenomenon” does not per se constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
even if prolonged judicial proceedings can be a source of mental strain for the convicted prisoners.’ 
(quoted in Schabas, W., op.cit., pps. 141 & 143)  
176 ‘The Government of Trinidad and Tobago felt obliged to denounce the Optional Protocol. Before doing 
so, however, it held consultations on 31st March 1998, with the Chairperson and the Bureau of the Human 
Rights Committee with a view to seeking assurances that the death penalty cases would  be dealt with 
expeditiously and completed within eight months of registration ... [Yet] no assurance could be given that 
these cases would be completed within the timeframe sought.’ (Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago (no. 
845/1999) UN Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999. 6.3)) 
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value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing 
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris”177. These are striking 
remarks. Central to them is the notion that the right to life had, by 1948, achieved the 
status of jus cogens, which is to say, can be inferred from customary law.  
 
There is the obvious reply that if a customary international law had been established by 
practices of the first half of the twentieth century, it must have been of a type that 
embodied massive insecurity and conditions of near anarchy. Even assuming that the 
coming of the United Nations expressed a confidence that the world would revert to a 
state of ‘eunomia’178, how can it be argued that the world’s multiple jurisdictions 
showed any clear bias towards abolition? The states which had definitively abolished the 
death penalty for all crimes at this time were Venezuela,179 Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Iceland, and a hilltop in Italy known as San Marino180. Setting aside the unstable state of 
Venezuela, long noted for its extra-judicial killings, the combined territory of these 
countries amount to roughly the size of Spain, though with just a third of Spain’s 
population. Could such a handful of isolated states represent a world-wide view? It is an 
illustration of the lack of rational proportion in the minds of abolitionists that this 
estimate has been made.  
 
A similar advocate’s use is made of the Geneva Conventions. Thus, we learn from 
Professor Schabas that regulations adopted on the treatment of prisoners-of-war, under 
Geneva 1929, have implicit content. “Implicit content”, as is soon apparent, is an 
                                                 
177  cf. Schabas, W., op.cit., p. 23 
178 Eunomia,’ well-lawed: the Greek concept of good governance. 
179 It might be thought, of course, that the various governments that ruled Venezuela in these decades were 
managing perfectly well without it. 
180 cf. Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op. cit., Appendix 1, pp. 404-408 
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essential feature of the process. Without making a clear objection, the abolitionist feels 
free to claim positive intent from a wording that is neutral or vague. This is an example: 
“[Whereas] international pressure and prisoner exchanges might reduce the incidence of 
the death penalty, it is evident on closer examination that the goal [of the drafters of the 
1949 Geneva Convention] is not regulation but elimination... States were subtly invited 
to abolish the death penalty”181.  
 
We should examine the foundations of this argument. Firstly, the specific limitations of 
Geneva, relating only to the treatment of prisoners-of-war, were mixed together with the 
Declaration of 1948. Moreover, the drafters of the Declaration were unwilling to declare 
their intention openly on the death penalty “because of contemporary State practice”. In 
other words, few, even among the European states, had yet made up their minds to 
abolish it. To have declared an intention to end capital punishment would have meant 
including reservations from states yet to be fully persuaded. This would have meant 
issuing the sort of caveats to be found in the US Constitution, exceptions to the right to 
life, as, for example, that a life must not be taken “arbitrarily” or “without due process”. 
Any caveat has, from the abolitionist’s point of view, the unfortunate effect of 
preserving the fact of the death penalty, hence of legitimising it. Thus, as an instrument 
of change, the work of the Convention would have been severely compromised. On the 
other hand, to remain silent on the subject “allowed the two declarations to retain their 
relevance and to grow as part of an abolitionist future that their authors only faintly 
discerned”182. Abolitionists, therefore, had everything to gain by a strategy of 
dishonesty. Making the declaration of the right to life as inspecific as possible meant that 
                                                 
181 Schabas, W., op. cit., pp. 366-367 
182 ibid, p.366 
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much more could be read back later into Article 3 than had been in the minds of the 
contracting parties. This tactic was well understood and, indeed, has been praised for its 
clever professionalism by commentators183. 
 
8.5.2 The use of false argument 
Another aspect of the abolitionist’s discourse is how every advance is counted a triumph 
and nothing a permanent reverse. History begins at the point most convenient to giving a 
sense that there has been a steady progress towards universal abolition. Mention of 
actual reversals, between the nineteenth and twentieth century, is routinely avoided. A 
construction is put on agreements to the effect that, once made, an accession to a treaty 
of abolition cannot be overturned184. Thus, according to its own suspect estimate, there is 
an inescapable and strong presumption for the universal abolition of the death penalty.  
 
All manner of support is put together for this, even of the most degrading kind. The 
human rights lobby enjoys the backing of states with a notorious history of human rights 
abuses. Extra-judicial killing, as a systemic function and clear feature of society, is no 
prevention of membership of the abolitionist’s association. So we find Duvalier’s Haiti 
and Duarte’s El Salvador, in a display of humanitarian concern, speaking up in support 
of a strengthening of the treaties of abolition185. Quite as surprising is the criticism made 
                                                 
183 ‘The general recognition of the right to life in 1948, without reservation, has proven far-sighted, for it 
has allowed the two declarations to retain their relevance and to grow as part of an abolitionist future that 
their authors only faintly discerned.’ (ibid, p.366) 
184 This is the case in The American Convention on Human Rights (1978), where it is stated in Article 3: 
‘The death penalty shall not be re-established in states that have abolished it’. But it is hard to see how this 
could ever be applied to the USA, with its many jurisdictions. The United States did not feel was not 
influenced by external opinion to end its moratorium. It did not consult any interest except its own when it 
repealed the prohibition on the sale of alcohol (1921-1933). 
185 In El Salvador alone, thousands of civilians were killed by government death squads (1979 to 1984). 
 282
by Stalin’s USSR of the circumspect, British view of abolition at the United Nations186. 
On this particular platform, the human rights lobby apparently takes the view that every 
state which nominally upholds abolition should be treated as a valued colleague187. 
Conversely, nations which stand out against abolition, however judicious and reputable 
they appear to be in their domestic conduct, are simply being difficult, and can be safely 
regarded as unreliable in any question of human rights. Singapore, for example, a state 
which by some criteria can lay claim to eunomia, has been a prominent and strong critic 
of the forceful tactics used by abolitionists at the UN188.  Its delegates express annoyance 
with the presumption that people who come from entirely different cultural 
circumstances know better than Singapore does about how to deter crime threatening to 
its state. The UK, though abolitionist de jure, is also often to be found on the wrong side 
of the argument in European discussions of international law, especially where there is 
pressure to shift the balance of the European relationship from a confederal to a federal 
arrangement189.  
 
Occasionally, the pretence is obvious. Responding to the storm created in the French 
National Assembly over the loss of sovereignty implied in the ratification of a 
                                                 
186 Both at Geneva and the UN. (cf. Geneva Convention, 12/8/1949,‘Relative to the Protection of 
Citizens’, Summary Record of Committee III, pp. 767-768. (Also at UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2, pp.10-
12). In the drafting of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference (Geneva) on the occupied territories, some 
countries argued that prohibition of the death penalty would provoke soldiers to take the law into their 
own hands. The USSR - at the time engaged in summary execution of returned prisoners, Ukrainian and 
Russian – argued for adherence to the articles in force for the Occupying Powers. (cf. Schabas, W., op.cit., 
pp.220-221) 
187 This, of course, follows the doctrine of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’. 
188 Judged by its freedom from arbitrary seizures, its court practice and low rates of crime. The Human 
Freedom Index report notes: ‘The administration justifies its firm management of society and the 
economy, enforced by a comprehensive Internal security Act, by the fact that Singapore is one of the most 
prosperous countries in Asia, there is little social unrest, and elections confirm the people’s choice of a 
managed system.’ (Humana, C., World Human Rights Guide, New York: OUP, 3rd ed., 1992, pp. 287-290) 
189 The Swedish special rapporteur, Bertil Lidgard, resigned ‘in bitterness and frustration’ because of the 
behaviour of the ‘intransigent English [sic] Conservatives’ in the Committee on Legal Affairs, Council of 
Europe. This is reported by Professor Schabas (ibid, p.282) as though these were representatives of aa 
outcast state that has no business expressing doubts about a ‘progressive’ resolution. 
 283
protocol190, the Conseil Constitutionnel declared that accession presented no great 
problem since “it could always be revoked at a later date”191. Dishonesty of this kind 
will be familiar to students of contemporary European politics. At the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, in discussion of the same protocol, the Turkish 
member, Mr. Askoy, announced that “had he been Swedish, Swiss, Norwegian, Austrian 
or German he would most certainly have supported the total abolition of the death 
penalty”192. This remark provokes no discussion in Professor Schabas’s account, yet it 
perfectly encapsulates a significant part of the problem. Mr. Askoy was trying to point 
out that the death penalty is necessarily dependent on cultural and historical conditions, 
and that not being a citizen of one of the afore-mentioned countries made anything he 
might wish to say on the subject inappropriate. 
 
In 1994, Italy sponsored a draft resolution before the UN General Assembly on capital 
punishment, “to encourage states which have not yet abolished the death penalty to 
consider the opportunity of instituting a moratorium on pending execution with a view to 
ensuring that the principle that no state should dispose of the life of any human being be 
affirmed in every part of the world by the year 2000”193. Was this mere show- drawing 
attention to a supposedly Christian country over the significance of the year 2000? 
Singapore’s response was immediate and focused: “It strongly opposes efforts by certain 
states to use the United Nations to impose their own values and system of justice on 
                                                 
190 Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Council of Europe, 1985)  
191 cf. Favoreu, L. 1985 ‘Decision of the Constitutional Council’ 22 May 1985, relative to Protocol no. 6, 
additional to the European Convention on Human Rights, AFDI 868  
192 Reported in Schabas, W., op.cit., pp. 280-285 
193 UN Doc. A/BUR/49/234 and Adds 1 & 2 (1994) 
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other countries”194. What in any case, the Singaporeans may have wondered, was the 
meaning of “disposing of the life of any human being” in a country where the body of its 
Prime Minister had been found in the boot of a car195, and where special investigating 
magistrates were in constant fear for their lives?196 Tactical manoeuvres failed to block 
the resolution, but an amendment proposed by Singapore contained a foreword 
“affirming the sovereign right of states to determine the legal measures and penalties 
which are appropriate in their societies to combat serious crimes effectively”197.  
 
The Chinese of south-east Asia may be credited with having a painful, historical 
awareness of what happens to a society when serious drug-addiction takes hold of it. 
Moreover, countries like Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have sufficient recent 
evidence to test and confirm their views on capital punishment. They have only to look 
at the lawlessness of states where drug-trafficking and drugs cartels are not controlled, 
yet which happen to have abolished the death penalty198. 
 
Failing to carry the resolution in its intended form, support for the 1994 project began to 
fall away. Though another arrow aimed at the retentionist states had failed, it would not 
                                                 
194 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/113 
195 Aldo Moro, formerly professor of law and five times prime minister of Italy, was assassinated by the 
Red Brigades in 1978 (source: Cambridge Encyclopaedia, Cambridge: CUP, 2nd ed., 1994, p.748) 
196 Notorious in the 1990’s, after the setting up of special magistracies in the south, and particularly at 
Palermo to control the political and legal subversions of the Sicilian Mafia. The degradation of human 
rights in such cities as Naples and Palermo is apparently of no interest to the editors of ‘International 
Human Rights in Context, Law Politics & Morals’ (op.cit.) in which, in all its 1,492 pages, there is no 
mention of human rights failing in countries that have given up the death penalty. Italy has, of course, 
always supported abolitionism at the UN and in the Council of Europe. 
197 UN Doc. A/C.3/49/L.73 
198 This refers most obviously to Colombia (death penalty abolished for all crimes, 1910), where the 
authority of national government has scarcely existed in some regions since independence from Spain in 
the early nineteenth century. In Mexico (date of last judicial execution, 1937; total abolition, 2005), there 
is currently an even deeper crisis of street massacre and extra-judicial killing related to drug-trafficking. 
There are also several areas of south and south-east Asia where government is very weak and drug-
production has degraded society: examples, northern Laos; Burma outside the central lowlands; north-west 
Pakistan; Afghanistan. 
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be the last. Indeed, through a variety of international bodies, the pressure to reform never 
stops199. Three years after Italy’s initiative, a similarly forceful resolution was passed in 
the UN by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (1996), endorsed 
by the Economic and Social Council (1996), and finally by the Commission on Human 
Rights (1997). Noting that Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1976) refers to abolition as ‘desirable’, the Commission called upon parties that 
had not ratified or acceded to the Second Optional Protocol (1991)  
“to comply fully with their international treaty obligations on the subject to 
observe the ‘safeguards’ guaranteeing protection of the rights of those 
facing the death penalty, to restrict progressively the number of offences 
for which the death penalty may be imposed and to make available to the 
public information on imposition of the death penalty. It also called upon 
such states to consider suspending executions with a view to completely 
abolishing the death penalty”200.  
It appears that retentionist states have somehow failed to understand the proposition put 
to them and that, like immature people, they must be asked the same question over and 
over again until they produce the right answer. We also find an implicit accusation that 
these states apply the death penalty in an arbitrary and indiscriminate way201. This is a 
familiar tactic.  
 
                                                 
199 The High Commissioner on Human Rights regularly calls for a moratorium on or the abolition of 
capital punishment.  
200 Singapore’s reaction, referred to above, was in response to a particularly forceful piece of behaviour at 
the UN. This came in the form of a draft resolution, tabled by Finland on behalf of EU delegates. Urging 
all states that still maintained the death penalty to ‘comply fully with their international obligations’, with 
respect to either a moratorium or definitive abolition, was, of course, a contradiction in terms. Singapore 
had undertaken no such obligations, nor was it going to. (A/C.3/54/L.8, quoted in Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., 
op.cit., p.33) 
201 What else can be the meaning of ‘to observe the safeguards’? 
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8.5.3   The targeting of Islam 
Dishonest hints and suggestions that the death penalty may not have limited application 
in Muslim countries are to be found throughout the European literature on human rights. 
Islamic countries might well be tempted to reply like Jesse Helms: “Are they confusing 
us with some other place or is this a deliberate insult to our legal system?”202 Authority 
to use the death penalty under the sharia is more rule-based and restricted than in the 
penal codes persisting in European states up to recent times. Yet as we have seen, an 
Islamic scholar who stresses the limited scope of the death penalty under Islamic law, 
even if he does not abjure the penalty itself, can be cheerfully inscribed as belonging to a 
school of so-called “moderate Muslims”. These, presumably, are the type of Muslims 
reported to have been overjoyed not to see the principles of the sharia accepted by the 
Canadian courts203.  
 
In this distinction between moderation and fundamentalism in relation to the sharia, we 
see manipulation by means of a false choice204. The specification of crimes punishable 
by death under Islamic law, as outlined in this thesis, admits neither doubt nor room for 
variable interpretation. The Islamic position on the use of the death penalty could not be 
made more clear than in the statement of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (1997), 
Article 10, which shows that its actual practice is anything but indiscriminate. “The 
                                                 
202 Pojman, L., Why the death penalty is morally permissible, in Bedau, H., & Cassell, P., 2004, op.cit., 
p.70   
203 cf. ‘McGuinty, ‘Government rules out use of Sharia’ in Steiner, H. et al, op.cit., pp. 9-10. 
204 In which reference is made to ‘the consequence of a fundamentalist interpretation of the Sharia’ 
(Council of Europe Doc. 8340, para.44) 
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death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and anyone sentenced to 
death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence”205. 
Another dishonest conflation is to be found in the frequently-made analogy of the death 
penalty to slavery. This informs a narrative that damns the practice of others while 
declaring the virtues of one’s own, for here again we find the proud image of Western 
civilisation on the march. It was only thanks to the brave, campaigning efforts of figures 
like William Wilberforce, we are told, that slavery was outlawed throughout the world. 
Just a few dark places have remained beyond the reach of freedom in the Arab lands and 
in Africa206. Once again, the source and the direction are clear. Legal enlightenment 
springs from the West, specifically the Anglo-American West, and flows, not without 
difficulty, in a single direction. In such a discourse, it would not be surprising to learn 
that Western ethical teaching had invented charity, or that the practice of giving has only 
recently been exported to Arab states. Is it impolite to point out that after the formal 
abolition of slavery in the British Empire (1833), large numbers of labourers were 
transported from the Indian sub-continent to colonies in Africa, and of prisoners to penal 
colonies in Australia, or that the real freeing of black people in the USA did not occur, 
as supposed, in 1865, but began to take effect in the southern states only during the 
1960’s?207 In contrast, Islamic society was governed by a legal code, regulating the 
                                                 
205 cf. Arab Charter on Human Rights, 18 HRLJ 151. A more ancient and satisfying expression of Islamic 
law’s dislike of punishment that is cruel and arbitrary can be found in the writing of Ibn Qayyim: ‘The law 
is pure justice, pure mercy, pure benefit, pure wisdom. Hence, anything which embodies injustice rather 
than justice, cruelty rather than mercy, harm rather than benefit, or folly rather than wisdom, does not 
originate from the law even if it happens to have been interpolated therein.’ (Quoted in Attia, G., op.cit., p. 
14) 
206 ‘Islamic sharia says a great deal about slavery, but does not require it, so as the practice of slavery 
disappeared the Islamic law of slavery became an inoperative part of Islamic tradition.’ (cf. Glenn, H., 
op.cit., 2010, p. 213) 
207 Following the Campaign on Racial Equality and the inspirational teaching of Martin Luther King in the 
United States. It is noteworthy that, after the assassination of Dr. King, many leaders of the black freedom 
movement found their inspiration in Islam. 
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treatment of slaves, who were not, as in early modern Europe, regarded as sub-human 
types.  
 
Yet the most important point, surely, is that the practice of slavery was not succeeded by 
any morally superior behaviour on the part of Western countries. The history of 
European expansion shows how the imprisonment and destruction of nations in every 
corner of the globe kept pace with the abolition of formal slavery.  
 
The banning of slavery and torture, under the Geneva and UN conventions, has not led 
to a discontinuance but rather to their refinement. Slavery takes many forms. Estimates 
made by international organisations of the extent of human trafficking, enforced labour 
and captive prostitution indicate that the worst forms of slavery are not a thing of the 
past. The directional flow of this traffic, like that of illegal drugs, is not away from but 
towards the richer societies of the West. The limited efforts to acknowledge, much less 
prevent, the scale of this human tragedy do not support a claim to higher ethical 
standards in European states. Likewise, we find in ‘special economic zones’ that even 
the basic protections afforded to citizens of the poor states in which they are situated do 
not apply to labourers within these zones208.  
There is here a certain parallel with the behaviour of states over the abolition of capital 
punishment, but not one that fits into the direction of the Western abolishing of slavery. 
On humanitarian grounds, the richer societies of the West have abolished many brutal 
work practices. Yet wishing to consume goods at an ever more favourable price, they 
have transferred manufacture to countries where poverty is so deep they can find an 
                                                 
208 These special zones, in countries like The Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, are a form of 
unlicensed business from which the Western consumer profits. The same can be said of the prostitution 
industry that exists in the poorer countries of non-Muslim, south-east Asia. 
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endless supply of labour willing to work under the same degrading conditions they have 
outlawed for themselves. This, then, is no more than displacement. It destroys the claim 
of universality in the application of humanitarian principles. It shows that these concerns 
are selective and that European society, while demanding universal application over the 
death penalty, has no such feeling about the enslavement of workers. Yet the issue of 
death penalty involves questions of belief and public safety, while fair employment law 
sacrifices cost and convenience to societies already rich and well supplied.  
 
As for human rights concern with torture, several recent cases of illegal detention have 
shown how this may be carried out in special camps screened from outside 
interference209. If, as Professor Schabas claims, a ban on the use of torture is now a 
peremptory rule of international law, trumping an inconsistent treaty, how has it failed 
to protect Iraqi prisoners after the second Gulf War?210 These detainees are beyond the 
protection of international conventions or the assistance of international welfare 
organisations such as the Red Crescent and the Red Cross. Citizenship affords them no 
protection, since the governments of countries to which these individuals belong may no 
longer exist or have the power to act211. Both the USA and the Russian Federation have 
greatly expanded their facilities and opportunities to conduct ‘cruel and unusual 
punishment’ to accommodate the needs of their so-called wars on terror212. 
 
                                                 
209 Reference here is to illegally captured and detained people, held in the US camp at Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba.  
210 There is a report that British soldiers tortured Iraqi detainees in secret prisons in the Iraqi desert, and 
that one died as a result of torture. (Alkhaleej Newspaper, Issue 12090, 25.6.2012, p.21) 
211 Even further removed from the possibility of aid or humane treatment have been the people of 
Chechnya since the systematic reduction of Grozny by Russian bombing in 1994-5 (source: The 
Hutchinson Encyclopedia, 1999 ed., p.469) 
212 It is still insufficiently understood in the West how far the ‘war on terror’ is seen by Muslims as a ‘war 
on Islam’. A lack of understanding or respect for the sharia is obviously a factor in the spiral of hostility 
that is steadily poisoning relations between these worlds. 
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Looked at in a constructive sense, we can see that slavery and torture have something to 
offer as comparisons for measuring the practice of capital punishment. They indicate the 
structural and underlying problems for law and supervision in an international context. 
Firstly, it can be agreed that both slavery and torture are banned by most, if not all, 
societies, and that the disgust felt towards these brutalities is not confined to opinion-
forming leaders. Secondly, these brutalities occur, and get worse, in an international 
context. Thirdly, they are not prevented by any exercise of international law, supposed 
or real. Fourthly, they occur in an environment where there are great differences of 
wealth or freedom within and between different societies. Finally, and most importantly, 
they are made worse by the absence of moral restraint.  
 
What may be drawn from this is that the kind of show seen in idealistic human rights 
projects is powerless to deal with these problems. Indeed, the pretence of forming a 
barrier worsens the situation. It might preserve a nation’s reputation at an international 
forum, but even where the intention is more serious it may make the mass of population 
believe that abuses no longer exist. Jurisprudence is not satisfied with what merely 
comes before the courts, but with understanding all delinquent behaviour. As with the 
question of capital punishment, narrow definitions of slavery and torture prevent us 
from addressing, or even seeing, what is happening below the surface. The comparison 
of slavery and torture with the death penalty will not work as an instrument to encourage 
Islamic countries to follow a Western lead on capital punishment. Rather, it underlines 
the dangers of pushing aside difficult and painful questions of commensurate justice, in 
the optimistic belief that we might be distracted by a show of fanciful ideas. 
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8.6   International opinion-forming: the statistical tricks 
 Statistics are an important part of the abolitionists’ resources in the attempt to make 
their case seem unchallengeable. This takes several forms. As we have seen in reference 
to San Marino, the smallest of states is given parity with the largest. The fact that, taken 
together, the people of Antigua, Andorra, Cape Verde, the Cook Islands, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, Nauru, São Tome and Principe, San Marino, and Seychelles might not 
populate the suburb of a city in China does not apparently occur to those who race to 
declare the large number of accessions to treaties of abolition213. It may be a polite and 
understandable fiction within the United Nations that member states have equal status, 
but it does not serve the interests of any cause to find the word “majority” used loosely. 
The fact that approximately four out of every seven people on the planet inhabit 
countries whose legal systems admit the death penalty is surely of greater significance 
than a simple head count of UN states214. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of recent 
accessions requires some explanation. 
 
A large proportion of those listed are successor states to the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, whose history of state repression made new governments keen to declare a 
humanitarian standpoint. The end of state atheism also revived religion. Thus, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, East Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
                                                 
213 This is to name just ten states given equality with China in the abolitionists account. Hood & Hoyle list 
each abolitionist state by a single line, then repeat it with variations, so that the abolitionists are given far 
more importance in their appendix than the retentionists, whose names appear in a boxed section and once 
only. Is this intended to have a subliminal effect on the reader, or merely a crude exaggeration of the 
triumph of abolitionism? (cf. Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op.cit., pp. 409-416)  
214 This list does not include most of the numerous Muslim and African countries that retain the death 
penalty such as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and The United Arab Emirates. 
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Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan abolished, or partly abolished, the use of the death penalty 
between 1989 and 2007215. The release from oppressive regimes after 1989 is analogous 
to the European situation after 1945. It represents something like a second wave of 
nations promising a brighter future for themselves. A similar effect can be found in the 
history of decolonisation, notably in Latin America during the nineteenth century and 
large parts of Africa in the twentieth216.  
 
Taken together with the likes of Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Vanuatu - in which 
political sovereignty may be the only freedom one may refer to, these newly-liberated 
states, comprise almost all the additions referred to by the abolitionist cause. Yet even 
some of these do not bear close examination. The abolitionist lobby suppresses the 
ordinary definition of a constitutional measure by claiming for its own states that have 
not carried out an execution for ten years. These, we are cheerfully informed, may be 
called abolitionist de facto. Yet this interpretation is misleading. It is known that several 
of the states so categorised have ended their moratoria by carrying out executions in 
subsequent years217. As was shown by instances of re-enactment in the early twentieth 
century, a decade is too short a time to judge the permanence of such a change. In a 
secular society, only the relative safety and health of the state will determine this policy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
215 Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op.cit. pp. 406-416. The narrow band of time indicates the atmosphere at the 
time this change was made, and suggests that the legislators allowed little time for reflection. 
216 South Africa is perhaps the most significant example (abolition for ordinary crimes, 1995; abolition for 
all crimes, 1997). 
217 Four African states, that were formerly abolitionist according to this criterion, carried out executions 
between 2003 and 2007. It is interesting to note that Burundi was registered as abolitionist at a time when 
massacres of the Tutsi nation were taking place. (Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., op. cit. p. 78) 
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8.7   How law is achieved  
To this point, we have examined the thinking and tactics of the abolitionist more than the 
manner in which its proponents have set about turning it into law. We have noticed, 
however, that it is essentially fashioned from three elements, beginning with the 
recognition that killing is wrong. Next there is a phase of exhortation, urging others to 
think as you do. Finally comes the declaration that matters are further advanced than 
they really are. These steps towards enactment have created some dramatic occurrences 
without proving particularly reliable in their long-term effect218. Does this suggest a 
defective process or that the foundations themselves are weak? 
 
The issue can be approached, perhaps, by comparing the nature of society with the 
nature of the individual. It is said that all men are created equal. This may mean to a 
believer that, in the eyes of God, we are born without distinction and expect to be treated 
fairly or indifferently. However, it is manifestly not Allah’s purpose to create all men 
alike. The principle of equality lies in being subject to the same rules, not in having the 
same powers or attributes. These rules dictate that we accept the wisdom revealed to us, 
and use our God-given abilities to improve on what we have. In other words, our task is 
to understand God’s purpose and to do our best. Alternatively, that all men are created 
equal can be taken as a proposition to mean that, at the time of our birth, and as far as we 
can tell, one individual has the same chance and potential as any other. Yet this is 
unlikely to amount to more than a partial conviction. Unless we are entirely innocent of 
the world, we can see that both nature and nurture favour some individuals over others. 
                                                 
218 We have already noted several examples of when contracting parties have brought back the death 
penalty. The general point is that extreme pressure on almost any administration can result in a suspension 
of human rights with respect to capital punishment. 
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What is really meant, in a secular view, is that individuals ought to have equal 
possibilities in life.  
 
Whether because they believe they can make this true or, at least, make themselves 
popular, legislators are tempted to offer decrees and declarations to this effect. But how, 
if at all, does it advance the cause of equality to declare that all men are equal? The 
individual, seeing that he has either more or fewer advantages than his neighbour, may 
accept this as fateful and God-given. Conversely, he may resent the difference of fortune 
as an injustice. Told by decree of the legislator that he is the equal of anyone else, he 
may react against the actual inequality he sees himself as suffering. This can have 
serious consequences. They may be violent disruptions, since to be one of the masses is 
sufficient authority for the individual to rebel in a state that sees everybody as equal. 
They may be a decline in standards, since the lowest common denominator is favoured 
in a society that does not allow competition. The legislator, meanwhile, believing that 
only good will flow from a decree of virtue, is also certain to be disappointed. When it is 
seen that corruption, nepotism and the suppression of talent are beginning to undermine 
the needs of society, and damage even the principle of equality he has tried to uphold, 
the legislator must either give way, allowing his decree to become a dead letter219, or 
resist these effects by threats or violence of his own220. 
 
To legislate on the basis of optimism and idealism, rather than on the basis of how things 
actually are, creates unreasonable expectations. If existence is not in this world 
                                                 
219 This is likely to be put into effect by trickery as in ‘all men are equal but some are more equal than 
others’ (cf. Orwell, G., ‘Animal Farm’ London: Penguin, 1945, p.90) 
220 In the manner of Robespierre, St. Just and the curiously named ‘Committee of Public Safety’. (cf. 
Mathies, A., The Fall of Robespierre, London: Williams & Norjate, 1927)  
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perfectible, then the very act of pretending it can be is damaging. To offer as a universal 
statement of belief that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person” 
invites the despair of those denied these benefits221. It may also come with the 
qualification: “by ‘everyone’ we mean, of course, everyone sufficiently advantaged to 
get away with it”.  
 
Men commit crime. In response, other members of society demand their punishment. 
The precise terms of retaliation we can leave aside, allowing that societies have clearly 
thought differently at different times. Yet commonsense and safety dictate that sanctions 
need to correspond to what a particular society feels is appropriate. To deny this, and to 
assert some other principle, is an invitation to double-dealing.  
 
There certainly appears to be a correspondence between states keen to promote a sense 
of their own well-being, by signing up to abolition, and states which cheerfully ignore 
the rule of law altogether when it comes to handling their own rebels222. At the same 
time, there seems to be a connection between nations that share a long judicial tradition 
and tend to resist the attractive call of abolition. This may not come from any particular 
feature, other than a respect for the law itself, and an understanding of how law is 
achieved. Indeed, a variance of actual provision may have little bearing on the matter. It 
is surely the solidity and reliability of a system, not its specific laws, that produces social 
strength and confidence.  
 
                                                 
221 Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (GA. Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810). 
222 The Russian Federation has the a record of crushing internal opposition since the moratorium, 1996 
(see Steiner, H., et al, op.cit., pp.1008-1009 & passim) 
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The laws of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and Islamic states, may appear so much at odds that to 
suggest a similarity between them sounds unlikely. Yet much of the apparent difference 
is superficial. In the Islamic tradition, law is handed down by a supreme legislator, likely 
to be a hereditary figure in the states of Arabia, after first being proposed, examined and 
discussed by a succession of councils and offered to open consultation with the people. 
In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, new legislation is offered for approval to a monarch or 
president after first being proposed. It is then argued over and examined by elected as 
well as nominated chambers, and passed through special committees to question its 
implications. The names and titles may be different, but there is a commonality of 
process223. On the other hand, it is not easy to refer to a Western tradition of law-making 
in quite the same way. Though the states of Europe now follow an equivalent pattern, 
the recent history of so many of them has been of an existing authority suddenly 
shattered, and a radical change of the laws. There is, it could be said, a counter tradition 
in Europe: one of edict and decree, and of declarations that turn out to be disappointing.  
 
It cannot be denied that an unbroken tradition of the rule of law is the most deserving of 
respect. The citizen is confident that if he abides by the law he will not arbitrarily be 
deprived of its benefit. His society is unlikely to substitute extra-judicial for judicial 
forms of retaliation. In this, again, there is some comparability between Islamic and 
English tradition. On the one hand, Muslim countries possess a strong and portable basis 
for their law. Derived from sources that no believer can challenge, they are learnt by 
                                                 
223 The same point might be made of other systems. In the office of the praetor in the later Roman 
Republic, for example, the right of setting an annual edict (or legal agenda) appears to imply a dictatorial 
practice yet, through advice (of his consilium) and legal limitation (of the ius civile), it became an effective 
method of advancing new law: ‘There were certainty and definition, but also close touch with realities, 
constant testing by forensic and commercial practice.’ (see De Zulueta, F., ‘The Science of Law’ in 
Bailey, C. (ed.), The Legacy of Rome, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923, p. 191) 
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heart in a tradition that is still partly one of oral transmission. They are much less 
dependent on the complicated provision expected in a Western court. At the same time, 
English legal culture has a complementary aspect. A practical outlook makes English 
jurists suspicious of grand-sounding and novel declarations. There is an educated 
suspicion that these may conceal rather more truth than they embody. A long historical 
perspective makes it possible to see that an outbreak of some new enthusiasm often goes 
before a suspension of the law itself.  
 
8.8   The strange case of the USA  
The USA has a tradition of independent rights and direct democracy. It seems doubtful, 
particularly in states of the federation with a history of persistent, serious crime, that the 
case for abolition will ever successfully be made. It may be argued that support for the 
death penalty is the consequence of a fundamental instability. In some parts of the 
country, displacements resulting from forced and economic migration have encouraged a 
reactionary fear of change. Yet even allowing such explanations does not make the 
American attitude to capital punishment irrational. If citizens, able to express their will 
by direct vote, are not persuadable, then it seems likely that the death penalty will be 
retained.  
 
The United States is, however, perhaps the last country in the world about which to 
make confident predictions. Even before independence from Great Britain, its early 
jurisdictions had created a large number of different laws related to the death penalty. In 
the Royal Charter of Jersey (1646), for example, capital punishment does not appear on 
the statutes for nearly half a century. In the Massachusetts Bay Colony, by contrast, the 
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death penalty was exercised for thirteen separate crimes. It is an indication of its 
philosophical instability that so many of the categories for which offenders could be 
executed in Massachusetts are not even criminal acts today224. Early settlers were largely 
guided by interpretation of Christian religious teaching. It is, no doubt, a measure of the 
uncertainty in their scripture that there has been so much variance in the law. It appears 
to be this fundamental instability that gives rise to a continuing change on this and other 
social questions.  
 
A movement to replace the death penalty with radically new correctional facilities in 
cities such as Philadelphia began in the eighteenth century. The view of the early 
reformers like Benjamin Franklin was that even the most serious offenders should be 
treated with a combination of strict terms of confinement and the provision of an 
opportunity for personal change. This Enlightenment position is still at the heart of 
abolitionist thinking. It displaced the spiritual aspect of recognising and accepting 
punishment for the denial of God’s ordinance. Wickedness and sin have ceased to be 
concepts recognised by the criminal law225.  
 
At the same time, the putting together of society into large urban masses has negatively 
affected the norms of a peaceful society. It has produced striking contrasts, each forming 
strands of the nation’s historical narrative. The country’s powerful self-image, it might 
be thought, struggles to contain such diverse and contradictory elements226. There is 
substantial abolitionist feeling, both among jurisprudents and, more diffusely, its liberal 
                                                 
224 These are idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, adultery and sodomy. (Baird, R. & Rosenbaum, S., op. cit., 
p. 103) 
225 They still appear in terms like ‘heinous’ in the language of English criminal law, but the sense that a 
wrongdoing may be a denial of or blasphemy against God no longer has force. 
226 From the American Dream of perfect opportunity to night mare society of many modern films. 
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leaders. It is not a surprise that capital punishment produces far more debate in America 
than elsewhere. Yet what is notable about this discourse is the narrowness of its terms of 
reference. Apart from some interest in what took place in post-war England, there 
appears to be little awareness of what has happened outside the United States227. It is as 
though the country exists in isolation on the issue of capital punishment. The 
moratorium of the 1960’s and 1970’s was, in fact, only the latest in a series of policy 
reversals in the history of American states228. This particular legislative uncertainty 
deeply affected the question of deterrence. Yet it is surely the inner uncertainty of 
society that has more significance. This has given rise to another originating feature of 
the American criminal justice system, namely the length of its appeals process.  
 
The impact of the death-row phenomenon in the USA is disturbing and strange in 
relation to the stated humanitarian concern that each case must be treated judiciously, 
and that every effort should be made to avoid condemning an innocent man. To the 
outside observer, it may seem a strange idea of justice that a decade or more of a 
prisoner’s life can be taken up by a series of appeals229. In these circumstances, there is 
neither an admitted state of guilt nor a sense of retributive justice to occupy the mind of 
the offender. Instead of regret, or the search for forgiveness, there is something like a 
continuous court case to be attended to. This process is almost always conducted under 
conditions that strongly disfavour the appellant, and so the prisoner is likely to be in a 
                                                 
227 On both sides of the debate, there is an interest in what has happened within the legal system that most 
closely resembles the other but provides a wider perspective. We find citations of English legal philosophy 
going back to Hobbes, Bentham and Mill, up to and including modern thinkers like Wootton (cf. 
Wasserstrom, R., ‘Punishment and Rehabilitation’ in ‘Philosophy and Social Issues: Five Studies,’ Univ. 
Notre Dame Press, 1980). 
228 The state of Maine changed its laws three times in twenty years between 1865 and 1887. The lynching 
of convicted murderers led Colorado to re-instate the death penalty. Of the nine states plus Puerto Rico 
that had abolished between 1907 and 1917, five had re-instated it by 1921. 
229 Seven years is taken as the current average length of time for US prisoners to spend on death row. 
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constant state of fear and upset. At each turn of events, the prisoner’s life must appear to 
hang by a thread, and his family and friends are made to endure the same agony. It is not 
surprising that some argue that this treatment is far less humane than execution. This is 
rarely, however, is the view of the condemned person.  
 
The usual response to complaint about the law’s delay, namely that, offered a choice, 
almost every individual will prefer life over death may be true. But it leaves out of the 
discussion that, in a secular and increasingly normless society, the wrongdoer is not 
really made to feel the wrong he has done. He cannot enter a process of admission and 
genuine repentance if he has been taught that the circumstances of a person’s life and 
upbringing offer a sufficient excuse for what he has done. In historical terms, the 
damaged psychopath has taken the place of the bad felon; the damaged child pays for the 
omissions or commissions of his parents; and the wounded individual suffers for the 
crimes of society. Even in the category of homicide, courts are anxious to discover the 
underlying cause of an offender’s behaviour. Whether on death row or the short walk to 
the death chamber, the modern wrongdoer will often belief that he is the victim, and a 
bad society is the cause of his undoing230. 
 
8.9     The dangers of cultural transference 
It would be unreasonable to complain of the USA’s cultural isolation on this issue since 
it is the right to difference that is defended in this thesis. More specifically, it presents an 
argument against cultural transferability and effective loss of sovereignty. For what has 
                                                 
230 In many jurisdictions, especially in Europe, pleas of manslaughter on the grounds of reduced 
responsibility, as well as pleas of insanity, are frequently admitted. If killing is committed in the name of a 
political cause, the offender may not only find himself eventually released but cleared of guilt, in the name 
of reconciliation, and even become for high office. (as in the case of Second Minister of Northern Ireland 
Martin McGuiness) 
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become reasonably clear is that there are at least two grounds for defending sovereignty 
with respect to the death penalty.  
 
Firstly, since societies differ radically in their interpretation and treatment of extreme 
forms of criminal behaviour, it is unrealistic to propose a legal uniformity that will cover 
every cultural outlook and every practical need. Outlook and need can be been as 
coming from religious teaching or views that have been shaped by a particular history. 
Secondly, the mixed history of abolition suggests that, in secular states, both outlook and 
need are subject to the uncertainty of events, and can change rather quickly231. 
 
When change occurs, that is to say when some bad effect produces an intense pressure 
for alteration to the fundamental laws, the state faces a profound difficulty. If it has 
already given up the death penalty, it can suspend abolition and risk being ejected from 
international organisations. It will be treated as an outcast. Alternatively, it can follow a 
policy of extra-judicial punishment. The defective nature of extra-judicial proceedings 
lies in their willingness to employ every possible arbitrary abuse of power. Cruelty, error 
of identification, failure of representation or appeal, and the absence of clemency are 
typical of states that suspend the law. It follows, of course, that if this is the preferred 
option of a regime trying to defend itself, it risks losing the very values it is trying to 
protect. 
 
                                                 
231 Although Professor Fukuyama strongly denies he meant that the clock would actually stop, his ‘end of 
history’ is an indication of American thinking at the end of the twentieth century. His ideas are full of a 
sense of universal history. (Fukuyama, F., The End of History, London: Penguin, 1992, pp. 48-51 & 
passim) 
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Recognising the difficulty, it would surely be sensible for a retentionist state to avoid the 
problem altogether. Why would a country like the United Arab Emirates, for example, 
risk altering its laws by creating an opportunity for drugs cartels to flourish? This is not a 
question of whether it is better or worse to liberalise the laws on narcotics. It concerns 
the viability of law in a particular jurisdiction. In the United States, the prohibition on 
alcohol in the early part of the twentieth century proved a failure. Some in Europe feel 
that the ban on drugs is a mistake. They say that repression only helps criminal gangs to 
succeed. But if a society feels that only the harshest counter-measures will overturn a 
certain tendency it sees as wrong, and if that belief is supported by its own experience, 
why should it listen to the criticisms of societies that have had a quite different 
experience? Its calculation might be that even without evidence of deterrence, and 
accepting that mistakes of justice will occur, the general effect on society of maintaining 
the threat of capital punishment is a good one. Its reasoning might be that the state 
should not have to drag itself through a series of international quarrels; that keeping the 
sanction of the death penalty makes it less open to hostile accusations; and that it should 
not invite an illegality whose consequences are impossible to predict232.  
 
Abolitionists should recognise that the refusal of retentionists to agree to their demands 
may be out of their respect for law. It is wrong to refer merely to backwardness and a 
refusal to accept change. The Athenians did not approve of the harshness of the laws of 
Sparta, but they admired Sparta for its eunomia.233  Even the most stable societies can 
panic. There is a dark side of extra-judicial punishment in the history of all regimes. It 
                                                 
232 It would be fair to say that European societies, which adopted fascism in the 1920’s and 1930’s, were at 
the beginning unaware of the consequences of suspending the existing legal codes. 
233 The Delphic Oracle had approved the Laws of Lycurgus. They had served the state well: why change 
them? (Kitto, H.., The Greeks, London: Penguin, 1951, p. 94) 
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appears, as we have seen, at times when there is a sudden loss of control by the civil 
authorities. Even in countries where the rule of law is most firmly secured, we find 
instances of panic. State illegalities can quickly multiply and become a habit. An illegal 
shooting is likely to be investigated only within a closed form of judicial proceeding 
whose findings are not published. The truth about a particular situation may not be 
revealed before the principal actors are dead or very elderly, if at all. Authorities, 
responsible for carrying out acts of extra-judicial punishment, operate in a secret world 
in ways that may harm or compromise the state234.  
 
It is essential for abolitionists to recognise that by idealising the needs of society, they 
are refusing to look at a brutal alternative. Extra-judicial killing has waylaid a great 
many societies where a culture has suddenly become insecure. Zimbabwe, and now 
several of the states of Mexico, have recently followed countries like El Salvador to 
becoming criminal societies. These can be defined as places in which there is little or no 
attempt to reconcile the laws of a state with actual practice, and where the rule of law 
can be said to have been effectively suspended. In circumstances such as these, human 
life is eliminated in the cellars of a prison or picked up next day on a rubbish tip. 
 
Wreckage caused by the displacement of a previous colonial framework has created 
surprising incompatibilities. The African continent offers many examples of 
unravelling235. From a Western perspective this may be regretted mainly for a loss of 
                                                 
234 This has frequently been claimed both of the American FBI (founded 1908) especially under the 
direction of J.Edgar Hoover (1924-1972), and of the CIA (founded 1947). (source: The Hutchinson 
Encyclopedia, op.cit. pp. 203 & 387) 
235 Currently the worst of the African continent’s civil wars, leading to mass extermination, is in the 
eastern Congo and the neighbouring states of Rwanda and Burundi. These territories were arbitrarily 
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standards. But surely the worst aspect is that a loss of cultural stability made it difficult 
for governments to impose law of any kind236. When protection of the person or of 
property can only be effected through favours, bribes or bodyguards, a state of 
lawlessness has been reached. 
 
Conclusion 
In January, 1976, the Committee on Legal Affairs presented a report to the Council of 
Europe which began with these words: 
 
‘The abolition of the death penalty is one of those problems that involve the 
very principles of moral, philosophical, legal, criminological, political and other 
sciences, and yet the various questions it raises may ultimately be reduced to a 
single fundamental question, to that direct, crucial, blunt question which Cesare 
Beccaria asked more than two centuries ago: “What is this right whereby men 
presume to slaughter their fellows?”237 
 
This chapter attempts to answer Beccaria in two ways. Firstly, a right to punish by the 
death penalty may be a responsibility, assumed by a sovereign people, of their 
collective belief in God. It is only by denial of a divine ordinance, that is to say by a 
person’s rebellion against Allah, that someone may be punished in this way, and that 
only after every effort is made to bring him to his senses. Neither historical accident nor 
the attitude of other states can affect this. Secondly, since it is self-evidently wrong for 
                                                                                                                                                
divided to meet the demands of the European imperialists, and, like the Sudan, little or no attention was 
paid to questions of cultural difference or compatibility. 
236 This is perhaps most evident in the failed or failing states of east Africa, such as Somalia. 
237 Council of Europe Document 4509, para 1 
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men to slaughter each other, it is the obligation of every society to prevent this from 
happening. Those states which, by secular reasoning, decide that a lesser harm, in the 
execution of a small number of their worst criminals, may prevent the greater harm of 
murder, extra-judicial killing and general lawlessness have, in virtue of the 
responsibility assumed by a sovereign people, an absolute right to do this. 
 
Also in this chapter, we have questioned the meanings of killing. It has been suggested 
that the state cannot escape accountability for capital punishment by simply 
manipulating its methodology and description. Either a state admits the right to order the 
elimination of a person it considers to have offended sufficiently for the supreme penalty 
to be paid, or it surrenders on moral grounds any authority to do so. It has further been 
suggested that it is hardly possible to find a regime in recorded history which has been 
forgiving of its worst offenders and opponents. By what authority, then, does a group of 
nations feel it can overturn the long-held beliefs and the legal constitutions of other 
nations? By what right does one group of nations feel it can elevate its needs and 
priorities over those of another?  
 
That no court has the power to authorise a death sentence in a given country does not 
mean that no death sentence will be carried out in that country. To say this is not so, or 
that the fact is somehow irrelevant to the legal argument over abolition, is unreasonable. 
It is merely a tactic to restrict the terms of the discussion to those that suit the case of the 
abolitionist. Would the abolitionist be happy to accept the situation of a country where it 
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was reported that state officials were no longer in charge of dealing with serious crime 
because the task had been contracted out to a firm of cleansing operatives?238  
 
States are not so careful of their citizens’ rights that they will not put the individual in 
harm’s way239. Were this the case, the proponents of Human Rights charters could add 
the abolition of war to the abolition of the death penalty. States have always employed 
certain members of society, committing them to wars in which there is certain 
knowledge that there will be a cost in human life240. In this, they have a strong tendency 
to put aside the idea of “citizen” and re-establish the meaning of “subject”. There is no 
indication that this levy of human lives is about to end, and this writer is deeply does not 
believe that any campaign will make it end. 
 
Proponents of abolition wilfully ignore a number of important points. Firstly, the right of 
a politically self-conscious nation to follow its own historical tradition is at the heart of 
the United Nations Charter. This right cannot be superseded or overthrown by pressure 
from interest groups acting within that international body. This is most obviously true 
where a nation’s laws are deeply held, as in a wider religion or belief-system that it 
would require a violent apostasy to overturn241. Yet it is also true of nations which can 
                                                 
238 This is the case in Brazil (last official execution was in 1855). Limpamento (‘cleaning’) is carried out 
by death squads – consisting of out-of-uniform police officers and even local politicians. It is an 
instrument of terror in slum areas of the larger cities where the police forces may be afraid to operate. 
239 It is never very convincing for a constituted authority to try to excuse itself of this. When Socrates 
drank poison, his death could not be thought of as a voluntary suicide just because someone had whispered 
to him that he might not be prevented from escaping. Who placed the poison in front of him? 
240 This does not stop politicians from trying to reduce the impact of their decisions by claiming that ‘not a 
life will be lost’. (cf. the words of the British Defence Secretary, John Reid, at the beginning of the recent 
invasion of Afghanistan) 
241 The preference for our own laws and customs is often overlooked. But it has often been noticed in the 
past: ‘For if one were to offer men to choose out of all the customs in the world such as seemed the best, 
they would examine the whole number, and end by preferring their own; so convinced are they that their 
own usages surpass those of all others ... Such is men’s wont herein; and Pindar was right in my 
judgement, when he said, “Law is king over all.”’ (cf. Herodotus, C5th B.C., op. cit., III.38, p. 242) 
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see a clear threat to their own stability and maintenance. These too must be presumed to 
understand their own needs. On the basis of national sovereignty and non-interference, it 
is reasonable that they see the pressure on them as a threat of their right of self-
determination. Secondly, the failure of abolitionists to recognise that a rejection of the 
death penalty may be used as a cover to gain credit within international bodies is not 
merely naive but dishonest242. Academics who put themselves in this camp are open to 
the charge of a lack of poor reasoning if they do not at least acknowledge the 
possibilities of dishonest state diplomacy.  
 
Although abolitionists are keen to stick to their own terms of reference, other arguments 
have been found even within the narrow limits they have set themselves. To take one 
example, the phrase ‘in countries which have not abolished’ is said to prevent restitution 
of the death penalty in countries that have not formally abolished it. Yet nothing in this 
text justifies the assertion243. What it does indicate is that abolitionists see alteration to 
the law as a work in progress in a way that is both directional and inevitable. As we have 
shown, implicit content is a favourite tactic. An unfortunate effect of this lawyerly 
approach, however, is that they quickly lose sight of the broader principles of humanity 
their efforts are intended to promote.  Thus, determinative sentencing for those on death 
row is objected to on the grounds that it may set a deadline for execution244. Playing 
                                                 
242 It can be understood, though not proved, that abolition can be used as a deal-breaker by states not 
concerned about the formality of law.  
243 The text of this paragraph reads: ‘In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of 
death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law which is in force at the 
time of the commission of the crime and that is not contrary to the provision of this Covenant and to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of genocide. This penalty can only be carried 
out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.’ (Working Party report to the Third 
Committee of the UN General Assembly on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) at UN Doc. A/3764, para 102) 
244 This position is hard to reconcile with humanitarian concern for the prisoner. 
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with the meaning of ‘arbitrary,’ ‘intentional’ and ‘mandatory’ is unnecessary when the 
meaning of the draft is clearly ‘without due process of law’245. 
 
When Guatemala, at a moment of political crisis, re-introduced capital punishment in 
1982, its action was described by one national representative on the UN Commission of 
Human Rights as ‘scandalous’. Yet what abolitions may fail to consider is whether, by 
taking this action, Guatemala was attempting to move towards the rule of law or away 
from it. It is surely a far easier option - as years of assassination in neighbouring El 
Salvador have shown - to declare one’s virtue before the UN while dealing with 
opponents in the most arbitrary and cruel fashion246. To understand the real extent of 
capital punishment, how can abolitionists fail to reflect on extra-judicial killing by 
governments? State authorities are free, in this situation, from the rules of the courtroom. 
No law of habeas corpus or presumption of innocence is there as a safeguard when the 
active principles of the constitution are anaesthetised or have expired.  
 
If reference to these violations of justice in Latin America seem historic, can it be said of 
the last twenty years, when so many new states have been formed and brought into the 
abolitionist camp, that there has been an increasing rejection of extra-judicial 
retaliations? Can it even be claimed that the leading lights of Western society have set a 
good example? Sadly, it is easier to detect the opposite. We see detainees held for 
increasingly long periods of time before charges are brought; prisoners left unaware of, 
and without the right to be told, the suspicion laid against them; policemen shooting to 
                                                 
245 See discussion of the drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Schabas, 
W., op. cit., p. 45 & ff. 
246 Rubbish tips outside the city were used so that relatives of the murdered might find evidence of their 
loved ones. 
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kill in public, executing suspects without being answerable, on minor or mistaken 
evidence247.  
 
Many government forces in the West are now empowered by the very convenient excuse 
of “terrorism”. Prisoners can find themselves “rendered”, which is to say, secretly 
despatched to third-party states willing to offer discreet facilities for torture. Elsewhere, 
in a condition of undeclared custody, there are prisoners who do not survive the multiple 
effects of sensory deprivation and indeterminate sentencing248. In these regions of 
inhumanity, the abuse of rights far greater in cruel and unusual deployments than the 
judicious use of capital punishment. The law is made fun of by states which exercise 
power in ways not merely illegal but pre-legal in their brutality.  
 
Membership of the United Nations must not be used as a cover for the routine violation 
of fundamental laws that are common to all states249. Whether by states that retain the 
death penalty, or those that have dishonestly abolished it, such violations degrade not 
only our collective, social existence but the concept of law as the chief attribute and 
measure of civilisation250. 
 
In 1999, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged states not to impose capital 
punishment for non-violent financial crimes and non-violent religious practices or 
                                                 
247 These have been new trends in state behaviour in the UK during the last decade. 
248 The strange, death-row type phenomenon known as ‘Guantánamo Bay’ gives so many examples of this 
treatment during the last decade that it would reasonable to call the US ‘war on terror’ a ‘war of terror’. 
249 Such as laws of evidence, rights of trial and appeal. 
250 This refers to the large number of states that have acceded to treaties of abolition while continuing to 
practice extra-judicial killing of their own citizens. In the Philippines, the death penalty was abolished for 
all crimes in 1996, yet the country continues to eliminate its Muslim separatists in western Mindanao. 
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expressions of conscience251. This posed a direct challenge to the sharia, as it did to 
states that threaten narcotics traffickers with the death penalty. It questioned the right of 
a state to identify and condemn those risks it considers most prejudicial to its integrity. It 
also posed a difficult ethical question about the measurement of offences against society. 
Some commentators have felt that the deliberate fraud on a very high scale is more 
culpable than almost any crime that does not involve intentional murder252. Indeed, more 
than ten years ago, Professor Pojman argued that financial embezzlement on a large 
scale amounted to treason, and deserved to be treated as a capital crime253. Had it been 
so designated, it is possible that it might have deterred some of the behaviour that led, in 
part, to the current state of financial collapse in the West, with all its fateful 
consequences254. The least that can be said is that the definition of “most serious crime” 
is far from self-evident. It is surely not understood in the restricted and over-simple view 
that the UN Commission chooses to take of them255. Wilful infection of another person 
with the HIV/AIDS virus might also be thought to merit the ultimate penalty on the 
grounds of deterrence and social protection.  
 
                                                 
251 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/Res.61 
252 Financial crimes have affected the lives of a large number of people, as in the case of the New York 
financier, Bernard Madoff, who was sentenced of life imprisonment in 2009.  
253 ‘It [the death penalty] should also be considered for the perpetrators of egregious white collar crimes 
such as bank managers embezzling the savings of the public.’ ‘I have suggested that the death penalty 
include not only first-degree murder but also treason (wilful betrayal of one’s country), including the 
treasonous behaviour of business executives who violate the public trust.’ (Pojman, L., op. cit., pp. 67 & 
73) 
254 Such as human starvation on the streets of Athens. The UNHRC, however, took the opposite view in 
1999 when it urged states not to impose the death penalty for non-violent financial crimes. (cf. UN Doc 
E/CN.$/1999/ Res.61)  
255 Since the ‘most serious crimes’ test covers all instances of the loss of human life, including negligent 
homicide (manslaughter) and felony murder (unintended killing during the commission of another 
criminal act), they are consistent with the provisions for acceptable capital punishment within the terms of 
Article 6, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN, 1976). However, the Covenant does 
not concern itself with any other categories of serious crime. 
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When in a brief reference to the Arab Charter of Human Rights, Professor Schabas 
called the Islamic system of human rights “still very rudimentary in comparison with the 
other regional systems, one which does not even [sic] contemplate abolition of the death 
penalty”, his observation not only seemed immune to religious differences of viewpoint, 
but entirely arbitrary in its sense of what constitutes a region256. From a social point of 
view, China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia might be said to describe a 
distinct region, but Professor Schabas had a quite specific, geographical target: “Arab 
and more generally Islamic nations have been among the most aggressive advocates of 
the retention of the death penalty”257.  
 
In this arguments, the original point of departure remains. There is a conviction in the 
fitness of the death sentence to answer for the most serious crimes against society. Yet 
on this point, on how justice may be served, abolitionist literature falls silent with a bare 
assertion. We are left with such statements as: “This progressive restriction has been 
crowned, in recent years, by the emergence of a norm that effectively abolishes the death 
penalty. Although still far from enjoying universal acceptance, its very existence testifies 
to its significance”258. Thus, the importance of something not yet established is proved 
by the idea we may have of it. We may be tempted to think that poor logic is perhaps a 
reliable indicator of weak content. 
                                                 
256 Schabas, W., op.cit., p.16 
257 ibid, p.16 
258 ibid, p.20 
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       Chapter Nine 
The Impact of Western Legislation on the UAE Legislator 
 
Introduction 
In previous chapters it was shown that legislation in the United Arab Emirates has been 
significantly affected in its penal code by tendencies in Western and international law. This 
chapter further explores the extent of this influence in various aspects and at various levels, 
especially in respect of the main concern of this thesis: the death penalty. Without repeating 
too much of the substance of previous chapters, this issue will be looked at from a number 
of different angles. It will begin with a discussion of certain aspects of the UAE 
Constitution (1971), and the bearing upon it of Western as well as Arab-Westernized 
constitutions in its formation and provisions, and enquire how far these have affected the 
final form of the UAE Federal Penal Code (1987) and other criminal codes. 
  
Following this, our discussion considers the extent of this influence on the issuance of the 
death sentence itself, the level of application of this penalty, as well as the tests and 
measures of aggravation and commutation in pronouncing sentences of this severity. The 
attitude of the legislator regarding the implementation of the death penalty is also discussed 
in order to determine whether the UAE legislator is moving towards increasing or 
decreasing the use of the death penalty sentences, and whichever is the case, whether there 
is any relation between this attitude and what is happening in the rest of the world with 
particular reference to the abolitionist movement. 
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In the same context, the use of occasional pardon orders issued by Governors both for 
convicts sentenced to long-term confinement and the death penalty is noted, and the 
relationship between these exemption orders and the international trend that calls for the 
abolition of the death penalty is considered. 
 
In conclusion, the extent of the influence of Western legislation on the UAE legislator in 
determining methods of execution are examined, along with the question of whether these 
methods have their roots in the provisions of Islamic law, or whether in selecting its 
methods the legislator has been influenced by Western legislation in countries that practise 
or have reinstated the death penalty. 
 
9.1 When did Westernization start? 
As already noted, the federal legislation produced by the UAE legislator, following the 
establishment of the Union in 1971, was recognised as having been influenced specifically 
by Egyptian legislation. Intrinsic to this are several historical and actual circumstances 
peculiar to the situation of the UAE. These are that Egypt possessed a well-established, and 
hybridised, jurisprudence, based both on its reference and foundation in the religious laws 
of sharia and on its acceptance of the laws of other countries, being principally those of 
French ‘Latin’ law. It was clearly felt that Egypt provided a convenient and congenial 
model of law-making in relation to the newly-formed UAE, and its schools of law were 
open to and received many students from the Emirates1. When legislators came together to 
                                                 
1 From the days, when laws where at least partially codified, to the modern Egyptian Supreme Court, Egypt 
would have a strong influence on law and order in the Middle East. (Wilson, G., op.cit., p.134_ 
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devise a constitution for the federal union of the UAE, expert assistance was sought in the 
form of Egyptian jurists. The team that produced this constitution was headed by Jurist 
Rifaat Alsanhouri. Later, due to illness, he was replaced by another Egyptian, Wahid 
Raafat. Since the writing of the constitution rested largely in Egyptian hands, the laws that 
were prepared and written inevitably show the influence of Egyptian jurisprudence. It was, 
of course, entirely natural, for these federal laws to be constructed in a manner known to, 
and understood in practice, by those who framed them. The result was that UAE federal 
laws are identical, or at most with minor amendments, to the statute laws of Egypt. 
 
At the same time, however, the penal codes of Abu Dhabi and Dubai (both dating from 
1970), were issued under and during the time of the British mandate. For this reason they 
betray attitudes to particular types of law that have distinct English Common Law 
characteristics. One such area is the use of the death penalty, around which great debate 
existed in British society in the 1960’s culminating in a provisional abolition at the end of 
that decade, especially relating to the death penalty2.  
 
A clear trace of this Westernisation is to be found in Article 216 of the local penal code of 
Dubai. The Dubai legislator came to the conclusion that the death penalty enforceable for 
homicide must be accompanied by aggravated circumstances. Otherwise, life imprisonment 
would be the punishment. This decision goes against provisions of the sharia, which does 
not recognise a distinction between different types of homicide. The Dubai authority could 
have written the law according to Islamic law, as it is applied in neighbouring Saudi 
                                                 
2 First abolished 1965. See discussion in Hood, R., & Hoyle, C., op.cit., 2008, pp.42-47  
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Arabia, for example, but it chose not to do so. Instead it elected to follow the precepts of 
Egyptian jurisprudence in this and other laws.  
 
This leads us to the question of why the UAE legislator sought the assistance of Egyptian 
jurists. To answer this, the researcher has discussed the matter with several UAE jurists, 
among them the chairman of the Federal Supreme Court, Dr. Abdulwahab Abdul3. He 
offered a detailed historical overview of the matter, pointing out, firstly, the link between 
the Egyptian and French legal systems. He went on to explain that the UAE interest lay in 
conforming to Egyptian legislation quite as much as in pursuing a ‘modern’ Westernised 
legislation. After France occupied Egypt in the nineteenth century, it imposed its own laws. 
This was reinforced by many Egyptian law students undertaking their higher education in 
France. In consequence, the research work of these students was originally in French and 
only subsequently translated into Arabic. It was through this process that Egyptian 
legislation began to conform to French Latin Law. Several generations later, students from 
the Arabian Gulf, particularly those from the UAE, who wished to complete their university 
studies in the nearest politically stable Arabic-speaking country, went to the Arab Republic 
of Egypt. It was simply the logical outcome that they were influenced by these laws just as 
they were influenced by the current of Arab national thought. The Egyptians, through their 
studies in France, had published thousands of Latin-influenced legal research papers in 
Arabic. The UAE legislator, having absorbed the influential Egyptian Latin laws, shifted 
gradually to favour the imposition of similar laws, although local penal and procedural laws 
                                                 
3 The interview with Dr. Abdulwahab Abdul took place in his office at the Federal Supreme Court in 
Abudhabi, 26.9.2011  
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were at that time written according to English procedural law as a result of the British 
mandate. It is therefore, easy to understand why, when the UAE legislator needed a legal 
framework following the end of the British mandate late in the 1960’s, that a shift was 
made to Latin law modelled on the Egyptian system. 
 
At the same time, however, Dr. Abdulwahab Abdul affirmed that the local penal codes of 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai issued in 1970 were prepared in accordance with English 
jurisprudence. They quote from Indian and Sudanese laws arising from Great Britain’s 
occupation of both these countries. English Common Law jurisprudence was also 
transferred from these countries by means of the jurists coming from Sudan, Jordan and 
Palestine who were involved in writing the penal codes of Abu Dhabi and Dubai due to 
their fluency in both Arabic and English. Following the end of the British mandate, the 
UAE was obliged to issue several laws including the penal code, laws of criminal 
procedure, civil law, as well as other regulations. 
 
Dr. Abdul added that the first senior officers in the Justice Ministry, as well as in other 
important departments of government in the UAE, were those people who had studied in 
Egypt and were influenced by Arab nationalist thought. For this reason, and for those noted 
above, they asked Egyptian jurists to draft the federal laws. Dr. Abdul affirmed that it was 
not to conform with the will of politicians that the shift to Latin jurisprudence took place. 
 
From this complicated evolution, we can see that both authorities in Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
were influenced by a Western way of thinking when first preparing the local penal laws, 
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and that the federal authorities continued with the same frame of mind when they issued 
federal laws identical to the laws of Egypt4. The most significant aspect of this, perhaps, is 
that the legislators shifted from an English Common Law jurisprudence to a Latin-based 
jurisprudence without undertaking any kind of study to determine which one was more 
suitable for the country. All this occurred simply because the authorities had sought the 
assistance of Egyptian jurists to draft the federal laws.         
 
9.2 The UAE Constitution 
The Constitution of the United Arab Emirates was issued on 2nd December 1971 after the 
declaration of the formation of a federal state, which united seven constituent and formerly 
separate emirates. Under Article 7, the UAE Constitution has provided that the sharia is a 
‘main’ legislative source. As we have seen, the qualification in the term ‘main’ implies a 
secondary source that may turn out to be greatly influential in areas of the penal code. In 
this case, the door was opened to legislators and jurists, convened to formulate the UAE 
Constitution, to come from a nation heavily impacted and influenced by Western and 
particularly French legislation. Consequently all this is reflected in the UAE Constitution 
and in the federation’s subsequent laws. The specification in Article 7 that the sharia is a 
‘main’ but not ‘sole’ source of legislation has undoubtedly had a significant impact on the 
                                                 
4 A summary of this complex set of relationships can be found in Graeme Wislon’s account: “early on it was 
decided that the Dubai judicial system would be based upon the French model, with its core principles drawn 
from the Shariah. Indeed most legislation would comprise of a mix of Islamic and European concepts, having 
a common root in the Egyptian legal code established in the late 19th to 20th centuries. The French influence 
would emanate mostly through its civil law system, rather than the English common law system. This would 
seem a strange choice, given that Britain had such an overwhelming influence over the region. This was based 
on an array of reasons, one of the most important being that among the Trucial states, particulary Abudhabi, 
and others around the Gulf, a system underpinned by French law was predominating. This meant that Dubai 
would be in step with her neighbours, and the sheikhdoms that could be expected to be components of any 
future union”. (Cf. Wilson, G., op.cit., p.135)   
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subsequent elaboration and comprehension of UAE law. To this writer, is the clearest 
possible indication of the bearing that Western jurisprudence has on the UAE legislator. At 
the same time, it cannot be ignored that the leadership of the state might have felt a 
responsibility to direct the Committee which formulated the National Constitution to adopt 
this phrase in order to emphasise and ensure the flexibility of the Constitution. This can be 
explained by a need to take into consideration the general status of the UAE. From its 
inception, the country has embodied a large segment of foreign workers recruited to help in 
the construction and development of the state5. Consequently, the UAE legislator may have 
intended to stress the point that the sharia is not the only source of UAE laws, and that 
other legislative sources can be adopted within the framework of the Constitution to meet 
the rapidly-evolving needs of the federation. 
 
The Western bearing on the UAE Constitution is reflected in all subsequent legislation and 
laws, as will be noted later, and the UAE is not the only Arab country which has been 
exposed to these influences. The majority of the Arab States which formulated their 
constitutions before the UAE did adopt the same formulas expression, except for the 
Republic of Yemen which provided, in Article 4 of its Constitution, that the sharia shall be 
the ‘only’ source of all laws and legislation6. In addition to Yemen, the legislator in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pronounces under Article 2 of its Constitution that Islam is the 
                                                 
5 The proportion of expatriates living in the UAE, according to the 2001 Census, is given as 75% of the whole 
population (cf. Whitaker’s Almanack, 2004, A&C Black: London, p.1010)  
6 Under pressure of the international news media, however, the Yemeni Government commuted a death 
sentence passed on a woman for the crime of adultery is 2004. (Albayan Newspaper, issue 8691, 4.4.2004, p. 
22)   
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official religion of the State and that the sharia is the ‘key’ source of all laws and 
regulations in effect. 
 
9.3 The Federal Penal Code of 1987 
In spite of the fact that UAE was officially formed in 1971, the Federal Penal Code, which 
is in effect in all Emirates, was only issued in 1987 after many years of examination and 
discussion. There was a debate on the question of whether or how far to include the precise 
conditions of the sharia in this code. It was eventually decided that the Law Formation 
Committee should refer to all sharia provisions collectively under a single article, without 
supplying a detailed redaction in respect of punishments for divine ordinance and 
retaliation crimes. The legislator briefly states in Article 1 of the Federal Penal Code that 
Islamic law shall apply for divine ordinance crimes, retaliation crimes and legal blood 
money (diya), but elaborates no further and fails to provide any explanation for this 
curtailment. 
 
Despite the formulation in Article 1, most punishments stipulated by this code contradict 
the stated provision. Evidence for this can be found in the division made by the legislator 
when he divided homicide crimes into two types, namely homicide with or without 
aggravated circumstances and homicide without aggravating circumstances. This 
distinction reveals the influence of Western and Arab-Western legislations on the UAE 
legislator. For comparison, the sharia does not speak of aggravated circumstances in 
premeditated murder. As such, a case of murder can present no other explanation, 
interpretation or mitigating circumstance, and deserves nothing less than the legal 
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retaliation of the death penalty unless the right of punishment is waived by the blood 
relatives of the murdered person. 
 
In a partial attempt to rectify this error, the legislator has added and amended Article 332 of 
the Code by Law 34 (2005). This states that the punishment determined for premeditated 
murder with aggravated circumstances shall be one year of confinement as a discretionary 
punishment if the blood relatives waive their right of retaliation. As noted previously, this 
amendment does not add or constitute any new judgement. Firstly, the legislator is insisting 
that retaliation will apply in cases of homicide with aggravating circumstances. Then he 
turns to saying that if the retaliation is waived, then one year’s imprisonment shall be 
imposed as a discretionary punishment despite its being the prerogative of the governor to 
impose any such punishment. This would be the case even if he assumes that the murderer 
should not be released and even if the retaliation is waived. Thus, it is clear that the 
legislator insists on exercising a Western way of thinking regarding the punishment of 
homicide.  
 
Moreover, the legislator has imposed a discretionary punishment in Article 356 for the 
crime of adultery. This contradicts the first Article, which implied that this crime would be 
dealt with according to the punishment for divine ordinance crimes. Had the legislator been 
willing to impose the divine ordinance punishment for the crime of adultery, there would 
have been no need to mention it again among the crimes of discretion later on, since this 
crime is either proved or there is no punishment attaching to it. It cannot be compared to the 
crime of homicide, where the judge can impose a discretionary punishment if retaliation is 
 321
waived. In Chapter One of this research, it was observed that the Holy Qur’an stipulates the 
punishment for the crime of adultery. Thus, if the legislator is willing to apply Islamic law, 
there is surely no need to mention two punishments for the same crime. The redundancy 
here is itself an indication of an uncertainty within the current penal code. The punishment 
given under Article 1 falls squarely within the province of, and can be effected according 
to, the legal competence of sharia, yet we find a quite separate (discretionary) punishment 
prescribed under Article 356.     
 
9.4 Judgements given on capital crimes in the UAE 
The observer of court-issued judgements might easily conclude that they are mitigated by 
consideration of the judge trying his best to lessen severity of the punishment. This is 
especially evident in drug-trafficking cases, on which death sentences are pronounced but 
which are then commuted to indeterminate terms of imprisonment7. This is despite the anti-
drug enforcement code not granting the judge a right to choose punishment not specified in 
the code, since the sentences in question are determinate. For instance, in Dubai during the 
year 2005, 18 people accused of drug trafficking were sentenced to death commuted to life 
imprisonment.8 This number increased to 19 in 2006, and to 32 in 2007.9 Although the 
judges have in practice exercised discretion in these cases, the code itself gives them no 
authority to do so. The determinate sentence for the crime of drug-trafficking prescribes 
                                                 
7 Although there are cases where the prisoner’s tariff is stipulated, in most cases offenders are dealt with 
under the practice of discretionary punishment by which the offender must remain in prison awaiting an order 
of pardon.   
8 There is no definite period with respect to life imprisonment in UAE law. This means there is no statutory 
provision of parole. However, it is customary for the prisoner to submit a request for release, after twenty 
years in the case of a life sentence, if his conduct has been good. Otherwise he is liable to serve for a period of 
twenty-five years in total. 
9 Source: Judgment Execution Department, Dubai Correctional Institutions. 
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only the death penalty. Yet the code itself is surely to be criticised here. It seems 
unreasonable for a judge not to have discretionary power to opt for what he regards as the 
most appropriate sentence, based on all the circumstances and on the unfolding of a 
particular case in his court. It is difficult to blame the judges if they overstep the limits of 
their authority, since to them it may appear quite illogical to pre-determine punishment, and 
be expected merely to apply a mandatory sentence, knowing that this sentence will be 
overturned on appeal. This procedure clearly requires redefinition. The modern judge, 
versed and experienced in all the variable circumstances and psychology of crime, naturally 
expects his understanding to be reflected in a certain measure of personal discretion that is 
allowed him by legislation. 
 
The current situation involves two strongly contrasting circumstances. On the one hand, the 
judges themselves have been influenced by an international trend that calls for the death 
penalty to be replaced by other penalties, such as temporary or life imprisonment, which is 
consistent with homicide defined as a crime of discretionary punishment. At the same time, 
it may be a function of the leaders of the country to guide the judges towards considering 
lesser penalties, and to avoid the use of the death penalty unless it is a retaliation 
punishment. There are several recent instances of mediation resulting in the freeing of an 
offender, which have come about through government- to – government requests. In the 
case of a Filipina who murdered the wife of her employer, the President of the Philippines, 
Mrs. Gloria Arroyo, visited Kuwait to request extradition of the Philippine national. 
Mediation was admitted and the request granted despite the fact that this was a retaliation 
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case10. As we have seen, even the leaders and rulers do encourage blood relatives to give 
pardon and waive their right to retaliation, a position that is fully in accordance with the 
sharia since, as it is related in the Holy Qu’ran, believers are strongly encouraged to show 
mercy by pardoning those who have wronged them and to seek bounty from God. 
 
On the other hand, the increasing number of people accused of drug-trafficking is an 
important issue regarding deterrence. It was mentioned in previous chapters that, in 2006, 
26 people, convicted of drug-trafficking and sentenced to death, received a pardon from the 
ruler of Dubai. All of them were deported to their respective countries, since those 
convicted turned out to be foreigners. It was also mentioned that this kind of pardon might 
affect the element of deterrence. This is, of course, extremely difficult for the UAE 
legislator to estimate and provide for, since it involves an understanding of peoples with a 
quite different cultural and religious background. Yet, it is clear from the high number of 
convicted foreigners, relative to the size of Dubai’s population, indicates that harsh 
punishments may be required to maintain the credibility of the law among foreign residents. 
 
Again, the non-implementation of the death penalty as a divine ordinance punishment in the 
crime of adultery shows the significant influence exerted on the UAE legislator of Western 
and Arab-Western legislations which do not incriminate or condemn adultery. This is quite 
evident in the courts of the Emirate of Dubai and in other Emirates, which although they 
register thousands of adultery cases, have never imposed the death penalty on the offender. 
Further, the legislator provides under Article 356 that the crime of adultery by mutual 
                                                 
10 Albayan Newspaper, issue no. 10036, 10.12.2007, p.25 
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consent shall be liable to a sentence of imprisonment for not less than one year. This 
contradicts the provisions of Article 1 of the same code, which upholds the primacy of the 
sharia in cases of divine ordinance crime, and in matters of retaliation and blood money. 
This disparity and anomaly illustrate the problematic or confused approach of the UAE 
legislator in the context of the global trends calling for the death penalty to be abandoned or 
abolished. It seems to the writer that the action taken by the legislator to avoid the use of 
the death penalty as a discretionary punishment is entirely correct. But the same cannot be 
said of a divine ordinance punishment, since in this case the legislator is obliged by the 
tenets of Islamic religious law to be stricter. This is not intended to advance the view that 
the thousands of people who, according to statistics, commit the crime of adultery should 
be executed. Rather, the responsible authority should be strict at the time of registering this 
crime, and register it only according to the provisions of the sharia. Safeguards to protect 
the accused, we should remember, are extremely strong. Islamic law requires that for 
adultery to be proved four men shall witness the crime, or that the adulterer confess, or that 
the guilt is inferred from the pregnancy of an unmarried woman. Thus, the legislator does 
not need to include Article 356 since it contradicts Article 1 of the Penal Code. 
 
9.5 Implications of the delay or commutation of the death sentence in the UAE 
Once judicial rulings are finalised, and all the stages of the process complete, the sentence 
must be implemented. Yet it has been observed that in the UAE death sentences are not 
carried out immediately, whether ordered by the Court of Cassation in Dubai or Ras Al 
Khaimah, each maintaining its local judiciary, or by the Federal Supreme Court. Sentences 
rendered from Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah require the endorsement of the ruler, while 
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rulings issued by the Federal Supreme Court require the approval of the President. 
However, the endorsement of death sentences is in many cases delayed for a number of 
years without there being any clear legal justification for this.  
 
Although it is not for the writer to comment on the authority of the state to postpone 
implementation of the death penalty, it is clear that a long delay can harm the interests of 
the parties involved, especially those of the blood relatives in a case of homicide. Delay 
might be considered an encroachment on their right to retaliation against the murderer. For 
instance, a Pakistani man who was accused of a homicide waited for more than 26 years in 
prison for the relatives to give him pardon, although the relatives did not wish to comply 
with the request. After all those years, however, the relatives did finally accept the legal 
blood money and gave the accused pardon. Their explanation was that after the passage of 
so long a time, the execution of the murderer would not mean anything to them, and hence 
they decided in the end to waive their right to retaliation and accept the blood money11.  
 
It is surely reasonable to suppose that a delay in implementing the death penalty is positive 
and commendable since it gives the blood relatives an opportunity to think and consider 
forgiveness. Such an attitude is urged by the sharia. However, it ought not to be prolonged 
for many years since this can create psychological pressure and push the blood relatives of 
the victim to waive their right to retaliation out of fear or for the non-fulfilment by the 
authorities of their rights. In addition, delaying the implementation of the death sentence is, 
of course, further evidence of the international pressure calling for its abolition. Moreover, 
                                                 
11 Alkhaleej Newspaper, issue No. 9859, dated 17.5.2006, p.11 
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on many religious and national occasions, the President and the rulers of the Emirates of the 
UAE issue special pardon orders for numbers of convicted criminals. Sometimes, those 
sentenced to death as a discretionary punishment, benefit from such amnesties, especially in 
drug-trafficking cases12. Again, it is not intended here to comment on the authority of the 
Governors. However, pardoning those convicted of drug-related offences carries obvious 
dangers. It may be harmful to or impede the public deterrent effect, which is an explicit 
objective of all penal codes. Besides, these pardons are a further indication that the UAE 
legislator and judicial authorities are unwilling in practice to undertake a death sentence in 
order to avoid the negative effect of media campaigns. These may be carried out by 
international organisations calling for the abolition of the death sentence which, as we have 
seen, they consider uniquely harsh and inhumane. In the UAE, this was especially felt after 
the declaration by the UN General Assembly (19/12/2007), which passed a resolution 
calling for the freezing of the implementation of capital punishment in preparation for its 
total abolition13. Although this resolution was not binding on member states, its effect on 
some was profound. 
 
9.6 influences upon the methods of implementing the death penalty in the UAE 
The UAE Federal Criminal Procedures Code (1992) does not specify the method of 
implementing the death penalty. However, the most commonly used method to carry out an 
execution, which has no roots in the teachings of the sharia, is by firing squad. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia decided upon the use of the sword as the only permitted method, 
                                                 
12 26 people sentenced to death in Dubai in drug-trafficking cases gained pardon from the ruler in 2006  
13 This resolution, as related in chapter 8, was proposed by Italy, approved by 104 countries, opposed by 54, 
with 29 abstentions. 
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both because its own enquiries suggested that this is the fastest and least painful method 
and because its origins are to be found in the sharia. In other Westernized Arab countries, 
such as Egypt, hanging is the commonest way to carry out an execution. In the thirty or so 
states of the USA where the death penalty is in force, various methods are used; they 
include lethal injection, hanging, electrocution, by gas, and by firing squad. 
   
Again, the resolution of the UAE to use a firing squad indicates Western influence since 
this method has no support or precedent in the texts of Islamic law.14 Yet it was employed 
at a time when the death penalty existed in Europe, and when the emirates, now bound 
together as the UAE, were a British protectorate. The European Union has since abolished 
this penalty, but it was the preferred method of many countries ruled by European military 
governors to deal with their most serious offenders.  
 
The Prophet, may Peace be upon Him, urges use of the least painful way to carry out 
execution in crimes other than adultery. The method of punishment for the crime of 
adultery, however, is by stoning. 
 
Conclusion 
There is sufficient indication from all the points discussed that the UAE has been 
influenced by Western legislation and in particular by the Western trend to oppose 
implementation of the death penalty. There is a very obvious tendency in the UAE to 
                                                 
14 Lest this appear a solecism, it should be remembered that firing squads were commonly used in the ancient 
world, as in Roman decimation, before the invention of gunpowder. 
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restrict the use of this punishment to a very narrow range of capital crimes, such as a 
homicide requiring retaliation either by implementation of a death sentence or by pardon 
from the blood relatives. 
 
Western influence is apparent in the language of the Constitution itself, in which the sharia 
is stated to be ‘a main’ rather than ‘the sole’ source of legislation. This thinking is reflected 
in all the laws of the United Arab Emirates. Several years of delay before issuing the 
Federal Penal Code was one of the results of this Western influence, since some Emirates in 
the union wanted full exercise of the sharia while others wanted to move towards 
contemporary Western law. In the end, all crimes and punishments related to Islamic law 
provisions were put in one article without further elaboration or comment.  At the level of 
issuing judgments, it was observed in drug-trafficking crimes that judges pass sentences 
other than those mentioned in the Anti-Narcotics Code, despite the Code’s mandatory 
sentencing for drug-trafficking, that is to say its refusal to allow judges the right to exercise 
discretion according to circumstances. However, these judgements almost always, on 
appeal, order life imprisonment rather than the death penalty, for which statistics provided 
here offer strong evidence. Furthermore, even in cases where there is no commutation of 
sentence, implementation of the death penalty may be delayed for several years. In the case 
of the death penalty used as a discretionary punishment, rulers may and do exercise their 
authority to reduce the punishment, or even grant pardon. However, a long delay in 
carrying out execution as a retaliation punishment has been criticised since this can put the 
blood relatives under pressure to waive their right even against their will. The execution 
method used in the UAE, the firing squad, has no roots in the sharia. Although we cannot 
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say it is brutal or causes excessive pain and suffering to the condemned, it is without legal-
religious precedent. In the final chapter, an attempt is made to bring these many strands 
together and offer the reader the comments, concerns and recommendations thrown up in 
the course of this research.    
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Chapter Ten 
Closing remarks and recommendations 
 
Closing Remarks. 
This research has attempted to shed light on capital punishment, its nature, origins and 
methods, and its place within the penal system of Islamic law, the current statutes of the 
United Arab Emirates and in the wider world. There has been much to assimilate and draw 
into contrast or comparison. It is an assumed function of this work that conclusions are 
reached, not merely as to what has occurred and does occur in our state, but in the 
judgements that might be made and recommendations offered. It must begin, however, with 
a brief résumé of the findings. The point of departure was a discussion of the three 
categories of punishable offence laid down in the sharia.  
 
Within these categories, we have discussed four absolute offences, namely those of 
adultery, armed highway robbery, rebellion, and apostasy, which are divine ordinance 
crimes, that is to say crimes against God. It is written that these are capital offences for 
which no pardon can be granted, yet the laws of evidence relating to them are extremely 
onerous. Sharia asks the adulterer to repent his actions but not to confess, so that 
implementation of the death penalty may be avoided.1 Moreover, proof of his crime, 
requiring multiple witness, may in practice be impossible. Concerning armed highway 
robbery, the sharia demands that the criminal repents of his crime before the governor and 
                                                 
1 A precedent (previously referred to) taken from the life of the Prophet when he tried to turn aside the 
confession of an offender. 
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commits himself to reform; in this way, the sentence of death can be commuted. In relation 
to rebellion too we found a forbearance and a legal requirement for the parties to try to 
make up their dispute. Only killing that results from the act of lawlessness itself is 
prescribed. Concerning apostasy, the sharia demands that the individual enter into Islam in 
complete knowledge, conviction and seriousness. If having done so, he blasphemes and 
turns against his religion, he must repent. If he does this, the law allows him to escape the 
supreme penalty which is not, in any event, carried out precipitately, but only after the 
offender has had a long time to reflect on his conduct. In sum, the death penalty is difficult 
to apply in divine ordinance crimes and rarely enforced. 
 
The second area of discussion was homicide, an offence against the right of a human being 
to live. Sharia provides that relatives of the deceased (guardians) have the right to exercise 
a corresponding retaliation against the perpetrator. They may also accept compensation 
(legal blood money). The Islamic Sharia encourages them to waive the right to retaliation 
since mercy honours the giver, both in this life and the life hereafter. In consequence, 
capital punishment is seldom applied to homicide. It should be noted that Islamic law treats 
crimes of this nature in a way that is particular to the individuals concerned. It mediates. It 
does not condemn by formula. 
 
The attitude of the law to discretionary crimes, our third discussion, is entirely different. 
These are not crimes specified within the holy Qu’ran. Their seriousness, and consequently 
the punishment they attract, is for the legislator to determine. In crimes such as drug 
trafficking, the chief concern will be for the safety of society and use of the death penalty 
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can be made. In this too, we can see that the sharia is not formulaic but adaptive; it listens 
to the needs of its people. 
 
The thesis went on to outline the hybrid nature of the formation of the United Arab 
Emirates, its roots in tribal Arab society, and the compromises undergone in assimilating 
other influences on this Gulf region through migration of other nationalities. It showed how 
the federal code asserts both the laws of sharia and other adapted sources, some the laws of 
Western countries. The federal nature of the UAE is made further complex by the existence 
of three independent judiciaries, including those of Dubai, Ras Alkhaimah and, more 
recently, Abu Dhabi. 
 
The death penalty in UAE legislation received extensive exposition and scrutiny. Here 
some uncertainty or inconsistency of approach was detected. Harsh treatment, including the 
death penalty, meted out to drug traffickers, is controversial for the mandate imposed on 
judges. Not only does this deny discretion in cases where a range of sentencing might be 
indicated, but it fails properly to distinguish the trafficker from the casual consumer of 
drugs. There is also equivocation in relation to culpable homicide, with or without 
aggravated circumstances. At the heart of this is a confusion between direct application of 
sharia and the interpolation of Western legal practice. It is recalled that accommodation of 
quite different jurisprudence, running in parallel, is the legacy of a time when British 
administrators in the region operated two types of court. In view of the numbers of overseas 
workers in the UAE, the necessity for allowing coterminous systems is unchanged. 
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In the final section of purely domestic concern regarding the laws of the UAE, it was found 
that the safeguards protecting the accused in a capital charge are both fundamental in their 
traditional basis and elaborated in the workings of the modern court. Presumption of 
innocence and the right to representation favour the defendant. The judge has extensive 
powers of discretion, subject to strict laws of evidence. Admissibility of confession, expert 
opinion and documentation are likewise tempered. Controversy within the UAE on use of 
the death penalty is more likely to centre on how little it is implemented rather than on how 
much. Under its independent jurisdiction, the death penalty has been carried out eight times 
in Dubai, and in the rest of the UAE just six. These executions were for the discretionary 
crime of homicide, acts of an extreme nature with aggravated circumstances. By contrast, 
drug offences have been dealt with to date by deportation of the foreign nationals involved. 
 
Turning to the international context, a great deal was made of the historical and cultural 
contexts from which differences of outlook arose. The extent to which outside influence 
impinges on almost every aspect of UAE thinking became apparent in the account of 
domestic law. This suggested the importance of understanding the experience that has 
shaped Western jurisprudence. An attempt was made, therefore, to formulate how thinking 
on the death penalty has evolved, both in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries and in continental 
Europe. 
 
It was seen that the origins of contemporary opinion are not hard to find. The catastrophe of 
social breakdown in the larger European states, beginning with the empires of Russia, 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and spreading their totalitarian infection to Italy, Portugal, 
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Spain and elsewhere, began as a result of mass warfare in 1914 and culminated in the near-
total destruction of great swathes of the continent by 1945. This long struggle precipitated a 
revulsion at the blood-letting which states had practised, both against their enemies and on 
sections of their own people.2 A humanitarian response, beginning with the Hague 
conventions on the treatment of combatants, and followed by the 1929 Geneva Convention, 
grew into a widespread conviction that states should be restrained from committing such 
crimes as the deliberate starvation or industrialised slaughter of their ethnic and religious 
minorities. In this climate, the notion of state execution came to be alienated, even for the 
perpetrators of horrific personal violence.  
 
Western opinion not formed by direct experience of this mass destruction and lawlessness 
is more uncertain. In England, nearly a generation passed after the Second World War 
before a bill of abolition was accepted. This was, moreover, a tentative step knowing that 
popular opinion was not behind it.3 In the United States, at a still greater remove, the nation 
was and is divided. Its differences of viewpoint, often extreme, can be regionally located, 
mirroring the old fault lines between Northern and Southern feeling. But they are also 
intellectual, as between those who see capital punishment as ‘dysfunctional violence’ 
within society and those who regard it as an indispensable line of defence. A more 
measured justification for retention can be found in a judgement of the US Supreme Court: 
                                                 
2 It is commonly held that Soviet soldiers preferred captivity by the enemy to repatriation; after 1945, 
returnees were routinely regarded as traitors and consigned to Siberian labour camps. (cf. Radzinsky, E., 
Stalin, Hodder: London, 1996, pp. 489-490).  
3 The Act was subject to a free vote on the subject in each new parliament of the House of Commons. 
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that as a legitimate expression of popular feeling it should not be overturned.4 Some 
sophisticated proponents of the death penalty argue from a utilitarian standpoint.5 Many 
more regard deterrence as mere ‘commonsense’6 and offer the down-to-earth rejoinder that 
since we know crimes are often calculated against risk, it follows that lives will be saved by 
the existence of a death penalty.7 
 
Compelling argument was found to suggest that the cause of universal abolitionism rests on 
shaky foundations. The Human Rights lobbyists neither acknowledge the particular 
contingency from which their movement arose nor the shallowness of its response to 
serious crime.8 In particular, abolitionists seem a sleep to the fact that in states subject to 
habitual violence, where the rule of law may be suspended or scarcely observed, a 
constitutional abolition of the death penalty is a cover for illegality. It makes the practice of 
extra-judicial killing more comfortable for the law-denying state. To nations that uphold the 
law, their frustration is compounded by hearing themselves lectured to for retaining the 
                                                 
4 That states such as California had recently reinstated capital punishment for the worst crimes was, in the 
court’s opinion, an expression of popular will that could not be overridden by the abstract idea that the death 
penalty was ‘cruel and unusual punishment’. (in Gregg v Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976)) 
5 A utilitarian view of punishment is argued by the philosopher, John Rawls. While recognising the arbitrary 
potential of an over-systematic application, he finds, in comparison to the retributive justification of 
punishment, a more comprehensive, forward-looking legislator’s standpoint in utilitarian argument. (cf. 
Rawls, J., The Concepts of Rules in The Philosophical Review (1955),  pp. 3-13) 
6 “Unless intent on suicide, people do not jump from high mountain cliffs, however tempted to fly in the air; 
and they take precautions against falling ... Unlike natural dangers, legal threats are constructed deliberately 
by legislators to restrain actions which may impair the social order.” (cf. van den Haag, E. 1969 ‘On 
Deterrence and the Death Penalty’, reprinted in Baird, R. & Rosenbaum, S. (eds.) 1995 ‘Punishment and the 
Death Penalty’, New York: Prometheus, pp. 127-128)  
7 “If we impose the death penalty and thereby deter some future murderers, we spared the lives of some future 
victims ... In this case, the death penalty has led to a net gain, unless the life of a convicted murderer is valued 
more highly than that of the victim.” (ibid, pp. 133-134) 
8 A current case in point involves the mass murder of teenagers at a holiday camp in Norway (2011) where 
the perpetrator not only admitted but sought to justify his actions on political grounds. To the outrage of the 
population, it was reported that the court in Oslo might have to admit a plea of insanity, which would have 
meant the offender was put up for annual parole review to investigate his state of mind. However, in August 
2012, Preivik was ruled to be off sound mind, and sentenced as a common criminal. 
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death penalty, even by states that routinely execute their citizens by other means. Hypocrisy 
pays dividends in the international arena. 
 
It was also found that abolitionists ratchet their case in an unscrupulous manner. A pretence 
of even-handedness or understanding of ‘the other’ is undermined by mocking statements, 
and an offhand attitude towards statistics by which abolitionists present themselves as 
representative of the majority of the world’s population when the reverse is true.9 To find 
key aspects of international law annexed by interest groups within the UN risks general 
discredit.10 
 
This survey of international experience was left with two overriding, remaining questions. 
Firstly, is justice served when the court is prevented absolutely from sentencing an offender 
to punishment that corresponds to the nature of the crime he has committed? Secondly, if 
abolitionism can be said to have arisen from a particular set of historical contingencies, can 
it suffer reversals to its authority without popular support?11  
 
                                                 
9 The extent of this deception, as for example in the tables given by Hood, R. & Hoyle, C., 2008, op. cit., 
cannot be overstated.  Even if we ignore the Arab world, the people of China, the Indian sub-continent, the 
east and south-east Asian periphery, The United States of America and Nigeria amount to roughly four-
sevenths of the world’s population. 
10 The serious and contemporary nature of this issue is obvious at a time when national leaders are being 
deposed, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, with the active participation of the UN and the competence 
of national courts to undertake their trial is called into question. It might be asked, for example, whether the 
people of Serbia were content with the extradition of ex-President Milošević (elected 1997) for trial at The 
Hague, and did not resent the apparent ‘victor’s justice’ of this proceeding. 
11 Given that the historical contingencies are broadly the same, this question may also be asked of the future 
of the European Union and its panoply of optimistic, consolidating laws. 
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Although the evidence presented has carried us far from the situation faced by the UAE, it 
raises the principle of sovereignty. A nation has the right to decide its laws in the light of its 
own beliefs and experience. Yet one of the specific problems confronting the UAE, as well 
as many of its neighbours, is that it is more than being a single nation. We can say that the 
sharia, the bedrock of our religious law, belongs to the nation of Islam, but that there also 
exists a particular Arab nation, bound within a federation, that must answer to its own 
specificities. This is not, as it may sound to the Westerner, a point of division, but an 
endless work of reconciliation. The UAE can no more alienate one part of its composition 
than choose to walk with one leg rather than with two. 
 
Notwithstanding that the principle of capital punishment must be asserted, this study has 
found multiple evidence of moderation in the practice of the UAE judiciary. Executions are 
very few, and avoided whenever possible. This we have found is not in contradiction to the 
provisions of the sharia, but in pursuance of the mercy which is everywhere to be found in 
Islamic teaching. Conflict is to be avoided, harm or hurt lessened. Life is a gift the Muslim 
believer is taught to preserve. 
 
Recommendations. 
10.1 Article 1 of the Federal Penal Code. 
The UAE legislator decided in Article 1 of the Federal Penal Code to implement the 
provisions of the sharia with respect to Al-Hudud crimes, retaliation and legal blood 
money. However, the legislator did not specify or define clearly these crimes. This has 
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created much confusion and mystery, especially as the provisions of the articles which 
follow contradict the provisions of Article 1. 
 
The legislator has not implemented the provisions of sharia with respect to Al-Hudud 
crimes. It was made clear in this thesis that, according to the available statistics, a large 
number of adultery crimes and cases have been registered, yet capital punishment has not 
been used against the offenders. Reports confirm that stoning has never been carried out in 
the UAE. 
 
Therefore, my first recommendation is to delete Article 1 of the Federal Penal Code, since 
the inexplicit and attenuated nature of its reference to Islamic law is unhelpful, and the 
legislator is not compelled to refer to it by such an article. It is obvious that the legislator’s 
initial intention was to avoid implementation of all the provisions of sharia. Giving the 
impression that the sharia is merely one source of law among other sources is not 
consonant with the specific provisions of subsequent articles which are derived from 
Islamic religious law. 
 
It may be thought that the legislator, by not mentioning Al-Hudud crimes in Article 1, 
would avoid any criticism being raised. However, the opposite result has been achieved. 
Such criticism has increased as it is plainly recognised that other articles in the penal code 
contradict the first article, while at the same time signalling that the legislator does not 
intend to apply the provisions of the sharia. This became clear when the legislator decided 
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that imprisonment would be the punishment for adultery and life imprisonment for 
homicide. Thus, my conclusion is that the first article should be deleted altogether. 
 
10.2 Adultery offences. 
Since adultery cases are very frequently recorded, I recommend recording and treating such 
cases only within the provisions of sharia. These provisions require the adulterous person 
to confess his adultery several times in front of the justice council, in conformity with the 
Sunna of Prophet Mohammed. The authority or the judge must inform the perpetrator of the 
consequences of his confession, which tacitly invites him to refrain from confession or 
from recording a statement concerning an adultery case in the absence of four witnesses 
attending the act, which is usually impossible in practice. 
 
The practice of adultery or any vice is strongly discouraged. However, it is of no benefit to 
see the legislator in a situation in which he is open to criticism of inconsistency, for on the 
one hand, he asserts that he wishes to implement the provisions of Islamic law, while on the 
other, he registers hundreds of adultery cases without imposing the required penalty. 
 
10.3 Rape offences. 
My recommendation here concerns the punishment of the crime of rape in the UAE and the 
decision that it deserves capital punishment. There is, however, a danger of exaggerated 
response in this regard. If the mandatory penalty for rape is capital punishment, there is no 
incentive for the perpetrator not to kill his victim. If, on the other hand, rape is assigned a 
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less severe punishment, then the perpetrator will consider leaving his victim alive. Hence, 
the legislator’s mandatory sentence may unintentionally cause the death of the victim. 
 
I would recommend that the legislator amend the punishment for rape to make it variable. 
For example, the rape of an innocent virgin girl should not be equated with the rape of a 
prostitute, since there is an obvious disparity in the consequences and impacts of the two 
cases. 
 
10.4 Crimes against figureheads of the State. 
Moving to crimes against the figureheads and symbols of the state, the UAE legislator has 
surely been too severe in imposing capital punishment. This makes the crime more heinous 
than the crime of rebellion, since by the provisions of the sharia, the opportunity is given 
for rebels to repent and avoid their execution. Capital punishment is even imposed against 
anyone attempting, preparing or even thinking about committing this crime. Yet if the 
punishment is the death penalty for mere preparation, whether mental or material, what 
must it be in the event that the perpetrator actually succeeds in carrying out the act? If the 
punishment for the preparation or commencement of a crime is equal to that of its 
enactment, then the perpetrator will surely have a strong incentive to continue until the end 
since the consequences for him will be the same. Thus, I would recommend removing the 
death penalty as a punishment for all acts preceding enactment, in order to grant the 
perpetrator an opportunity to draw back and desist from perpetrating the crime.  
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The same logic, of course, applies to any preparation or attack upon the president. Hence, it 
is unnecessary to differentiate between the case of a president and that of some other 
figurehead. Emphasis should be placed on strategies to deter serious crime, and any legal 
distinction and variation of punishment which has the effect of lessening the risk of an 
attempt against the person of the ruler or other figurehead should be employed.  
 
10.5 Crimes against Individuals. 
The legislator has differentiated between a homicide accompanied by aggravated 
circumstances and a homicide not accompanied by aggravated circumstances. This is in 
accordance with punitive laws in some other Arab countries influenced by Western ways of 
thinking, and in particular the laws of Egypt.  
 
The specificity of aggravated circumstances may push the perpetrator to seek circumstances 
which avoid liability to the death penalty. Furthermore, specifying a mandatory sentence 
for homicide, whether or not it is accompanied by aggravated circumstances, should not 
allow the manipulation of the right of the guardians of the victim to waive or to claim 
punishment against the perpetrator.  
 
Hence, I recommend that the legislator should not allow this black and white distinction 
between crimes of homicide and leave this matter to the provisions of the sharia.   
 
Despite the multiplicity of cultures and peoples now living in the state, the Supreme 
Federal Court has emphasized that no differentiation between people of different origins 
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can be made with respect to the sentencing or implementation of a punishment. Although 
some jurists believe that there should be some distinction made, the argument against it is 
related to universal human rights and specifically to the right to life. Every human being 
has the right to be respected and forfeit of a person’s life should not be dealt with in the 
light of any form of discrimination, whether positive or negative. 
 
10.6 The Death Penalty and Deterrence. 
Regarding the polemics over the deterrent effect of capital punishment, I recommend a 
committee be formed in every member state, as well as a higher committee at the collective 
level, of the United Nations. These committees should comprise jurists, state prosecutors, 
directors of prisons, psychologists, sociologists and other relevant parties in order to 
undertake studies regarding the efficiency and deterrence value of the death penalty, 
bringing together countries that both do and do not practise capital punishment. These 
committees should consider a very wide scope of relevant factors, including the religious, 
moral, economic and environmental condition of individual societies, looking at each state 
in turn in order to achieve accurate and comprehensive results.  
 
10.7 The death penalty and human rights. 
Regarding the instatement or abolition of the death penalty in accordance with economic, 
political or security circumstances, I recommend that each state clarify its attitude towards 
this punishment taking into consideration human rights, namely the right to live. It should 
be borne in mind that in all relevant criteria there may be historical change, but that the 
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attempt to strive for universality with respect to human rights is a noble and honourable 
one.  
 
10.8 Mandatory death sentences. 
I believe that it is unfair and ineffective for the federal legislator of the UAE to impose the 
death penalty for crimes such as spying without granting the judge the prerogative to 
sentence an offender according to the circumstances of a crime. Here, I recommend the 
articles of the penal code be amended, specifying the death penalty as a possible sentence, 
but allowing a choice to be made between capital punishment and temporary or life 
imprisonment in accordance with the evaluations of the judge pursuant to the circumstances 
of each case. 
 
As to the capital sentence itself, after it becomes final but before its approval by His 
Highness, the President of the UAE, I recommend that it be submitted to a special 
committee. This should be formed under an order of the president of the state. The said 
committee would include experts in law including the sharia, and it would study and 
examine cases and decisions, before submitting a sentence for final approval by the 
president. This would serve as an additional guarantee for the person facing capital 
punishment. In the event that the committee finds error in the judgement, whether in the 
procedures or in excessive strictness, it would give its report to the president so that he may 
confirm or dispose of it in any manner he deems suitable.  
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Furthermore, I recommend that the same committee should be the mediator between the 
victim’s guardians and the killer in cases of homicide with respect to waiving the right to 
claim retaliation. Therefore, I recommend that the members of the committee should be 
senior members of the tribes and statesmen so that their mediation would be prominent and 
enjoy general credit, although in no circumstances should the victim’s guardians be 
pressured into waiving their rights.  
 
10.9. The method of implementation  
With respect to the method of implementing capital punishment, the means used in the 
UAE is a firing squad. This method is not prescribed by Islamic religious law, which 
simply requires the method to be the least painful for the criminal. However, the aforesaid 
method has not been proved to be the least painful for the criminal; indeed, in one case of 
capital punishment in Dubai, the criminal did not die immediately and had to be shot again 
to ensure his death. Some other methods used in the US cause severe pain for criminals, as 
clarified previously. Hence, I recommend the constitution of a committee comprising 
doctors and other experts to ascertain the least painful method of expediting capital 
punishment. 
 
10.10 Drug trafficking and the death penalty. 
With respect to drug-trafficking, the legislator has decreed the death penalty. However, the 
legislator was surely too strict in this regard. Again, he did not grant the option for the 
judge to choose between capital punishment and a punishment less severe, such as 
imprisonment. The circumstances of such cases, as we have noted, are widely variable. 
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Mandatory sentencing by the legislator does not grant the judge the chance to evaluate the 
circumstances of each case. 
 
In particular, the legislator has not defined the quantity of drugs involved for the crime to 
be considered drug-trafficking and deserving of capital punishment. Thus, he makes no 
distinction between the trafficking of one gram of heroin and the trafficking of thousands of 
grams. It is scarcely necessary to reiterate the point that the trafficking of huge quantities 
leads to the greater harm and even to the death of thousands of people. Those who trade in 
very small quantities, however, may simply be drug addicts who need treatment more than 
punishment.  
 
I recommend, therefore, that the legislator define the quantity of drug deserving of capital 
punishment. If the legislator believes that by specifying the quantity it will lead to habitual 
criminals dealing in smaller quantities, it should be pointed out that the criminal may 
succeed once in this strategy, but to keep on trafficking in smaller quantities, is very likely 
to bring him to the attention of the police. Furthermore, a dealer brought before the court 
for trafficking on a first offence should not be subject to the death penalty. 
 
10.11 Terrorism and the death penalty. 
With respect to the Anti-Terrorism Law (2004), the legislator appears to have done well in 
imposing capital punishment only if the crime results in the death of one or more persons. 
Nevertheless, he was surely incorrect in not mentioning the rights of the victim’s guardians 
to claim punishment or to waive the same. An ensuing death is presumed as the result of the 
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crime, which makes it equivalent to homicide, and thus should be subject to the same 
provisions as homicide.  
 
Hence, I recommend that the legislator highlight the rights of the victim’s guardians if the 
terrorist crimes result in the death of one or more people. In addition, I recommend that the 
legislator prescribe a discretionary punishment proportionate to the scale, results and 
damage caused by the crime. Each act of terrorism should be dealt with separately. The 
legislator should enjoy the prerogative to decide upon a suitable punishment.  
 
The legislator was surely too strict, under Article 9, in declaring the death penalty for 
crimes of damage to property employing air, sea and land transport in order to perpetrate an 
act of terrorism, or of taking hostages as an act of terrorism, or of obtaining some utility 
from the state or from other states in the use of explosives or unusual weapons in such 
crimes. The legislator was right, on the other hand, to be strict in prescribing capital 
punishment for those who use explosive materials or unusual weapons which lead to the 
deaths of people, where the criminal knows in advance the result of his act and crime.  
 
Furthermore, such crimes lead to the spreading of terror among people, affect the economy 
of the state and create instability. They are crimes usually aimed at the state or the 
government, but the results of their enactment affect innocent people. Besides, the use of 
explosive materials engenders huge material losses. This crime is similar to Al-Harabah 
crime stated in the sharia. However, I recommend that the death penalty should not be the 
only punishment before the court. A choice should be allowed between capital punishment 
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and a lesser punishment according to the results and effects of such acts. This takes into 
account that all the punishments listed in the anti-terrorism law are discretionary, since no 
clause in this law refers to implementation of the provisions of the sharia. 
The Anti-Terrorism Code of 2004 does not allow for appeal on conviction, but I find it both 
consistent and advisable that it should follow the same procedure as for other serious 
crimes. I recommend, therefore, that provision should be made for appeals.  
. 
10.12 The death penalty and revenge. 
Total abolition of the death penalty for crimes such as homicide in a Muslim society like 
the UAE would undoubtedly spread a culture of revenge, with the victim’s guardians 
implementing by themselves a retaliation against criminals or even their families. This 
principle of taking justice into one’s own hands is both inimical and threatening to a 
modern, civilised state. It is for society, via laws that are habituated, understood and 
respected, to contain and control this explosive issue.  
 
Islamic religious law provides that the victim’s guardians or blood relatives have a right to 
retaliation, choosing either to enforce or waive their right to appropriate punishment of the 
offender.  
 
There are many examples that I have witnessed during my service in the police force, one 
of which was the case of a person who killed his own friend intentionally. When the police 
took the offender to prison, the family of the victim pursued the police car, in defiance of 
their authority and power, in order to revenge themselves on the man by attempting to kill 
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him themselves. This incident took place before implementation of the first capital sentence 
in Dubai in 199612.  
 
 Although enactment of the death penalty is not common in the UAE, the governments and 
rulers do their best to satisfy the blood relatives, so they will not seek revenge by taking the 
law into their own hands. The tendency of the authorities is to keep the murderer in custody 
for several years, so that the blood relatives can think calmly and consider pardon as the 
sharia urges them to do. The rulers too have time to meditate on the case, and if all else 
fails will retaliation be implemented. As a result of this policy and this process, the people 
trust their government and do not set their minds to revenge. However, it is implicit in this 
relationship of law and society, that the death penalty will occasionally be applied. A 
particularly heinous crime, such as the rape and murder of a child, generates a righteous 
anger in the people, and here a collective demand for retaliation must be satisfied. The 
reader may consider, in contrast to this, whether society is rendered more healthy or 
believing in the justice of courts, when even the most very worst killers are merely confined 
to a comfortable prison cell, or a hospital bed. 
 
 
                                                 
12 A case was reported in France involving a child who had been kidnapped and killed. Although the criminal 
was arrested, the father of the child stated that he kept on hearing the voice of his son calling him, and that the 
son appointed him to punish the criminal. The father promised to seek justice by himself take revenge for his 
son’s death, however long it might take him. Another event happened in Germany, when a mother of a 
murdered girl entered the court hall where the case was being examined and shot the criminal. She said that 
she was carrying out justice. In both cases, the parents were entirely convinced that no punishment other than 
capital punishment would be fair or effective, and in neither country is the death penalty applied.(cf. Rabah, 
Ghassan., The death Penalty (Arabic), Alwajeez fi oqobat aledam, Mansharat Alhalabi, 2008, pp.243-244 
 
 349
10.13 Postscript: the United Arab Emirates and the abolition of the Death Penalty. 
The United Arab Emirates could find itself in the situation where the death penalty is de 
facto abolished yet not removed from the statute book. It could effectively be discontinued 
by adherence to divine ordinance punishments under sharia provisions, since these provide 
the offender with escapes. It could also be abolished in crimes of retaliation where rulers 
and decision-makers enforce mediation between the murderer and the victim’s family, 
ensuring that they waive their rights and give pardon. However, this would be in defiance 
of the sharia which prohibits that pressure should be applied to the blood relatives of a 
victim.  
 
The death penalty would be abandoned for all practical purposes if confined to only the 
most dangerous crimes resulting in mass consequences. Likewise, it would be a de facto 
abolition if the President and local rulers chose to exercise their authority to grant clemency 
in each case of capital sentencing that came before them. This, I believe, is the factual 
situation from which abolitionist may take heart. It is not, of course, the preferred option of 
this writer. Long research and contemplation of the subject have generated a thousand 
illustrations of the meanings and implications of capital punishment. 
 
The process is sometimes uncomfortable. An Arab and a believing Muslim, confident in the 
long-held principles of his people, has nevertheless to see himself through the lens of other 
and, in particular, Western eyes. The moral requirements of those who take up the cause of 
human rights are not easily challenged.  
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Nevertheless, our analysis has shown flaws in the arguments of those who strongly oppose 
the use of the death penalty. They have also exposed two persistent questions, which are: 
how far do they really convince themselves; and, how far are the societies, whose views 
they claim to represent, really persuaded of the wisdom of abolishing capital punishment? 
Against the tendencies of modern thought, a great weight of historical experience points to 
the sad necessity of removing from among us those who have outraged society beyond all 
reasonable limits. 
 
I hope that this research may give confidence, and be of use, to other researchers in the 
field. It is a subject in which people of every society feel deeply involved. Shifts of 
historical perspective are mysterious and unpredictable. We can only hope that by honest 
enquiry we arrive at conclusions which are true to our deepest convictions.  
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